Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In this challenge to the legislatively-enacted cap of $750,000 on noneconomic damages for victims of medical malpractice set forth in Wis. Stat. 893.55, the Supreme Court held that section 893.55 is facially constitutional and constitutional as applied to Plaintiffs.Plaintiffs were awarded noneconomic damages of $16,500,000 in a medical malpractice action. The defendant moved to reduce the jury’s noneconomic damage award to $750,000, as required by the cap. Plaintiffs moved for entry of judgment on the verdict as well as for declaratory judgment that Wis. Stat. 655.017 and 893.55(4) are unconstitutional facially and as applied to Plaintiffs. Relying on Ferdon ex rel. Petrucelli v. Wisconsin Patients Compensation Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440 (Wis. 2005), the circuit court held that the cap was unconstitutional as applied to Plaintiffs on equal protection and due process grounds. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages was unconstitutional on its face because it violated the principles articulated in Ferdon. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the $750,00 cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice judgments and settlements is constitutional both facially and as applied to Plaintiffs; and (2) Ferdon is overruled because it erroneously invaded the province of the legislature and applied an erroneous standard of review. View "Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Compensation Fund" on Justia Law

Dr. Paulus, a cardiologist at Ashland, Kentucky’s KDMC, was first in the nation in billing Medicare for angiograms. His annual salary was around $2.5 million, under KDMC’s per-procedure compensation package. In 2008, HHS received an anonymous complaint that Paulus was defrauding Medicare and Medicaid by performing medically unnecessary procedures, 42 U.S.C. 1320c-5(a)(1), 1395y(a)(1), placing stents into arteries that were not blocked, with the encouragement of KDMC. An anti-fraud contractor selected 19 angiograms for an audit and concluded that in seven cases, the blockage was insufficient to warrant a stent. Medicare denied reimbursement for those procedures and continued investigating. A private insurer did its own review and concluded that at least half the stents ordered by Paulus were not medically necessary. The Kentucky Board of Medical Licensure subpoenaed records and concluded that Paulus had diagnosed patients with severe stenosis where none was apparent from the angiograms. Paulus had retired; he voluntarily surrendered his medical license. A jury convicted Paulus on 10 false-statement counts and on the healthcare fraud count. It acquitted him on five false-statement counts. The court set aside the guilty verdicts and granted Paulus a new trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The degree of stenosis is a fact capable of proof. A doctor who deliberately inflates the blockage he sees on an angiogram has told a lie; if he does so to bill a more expensive procedure, then he has also committed fraud. View "United States v. Paulus" on Justia Law

Jose Reyes died after a course of treatment for tuberculosis. Judith Reyes alleged that her husband did not have tuberculosis and that the treatment prescribed to him for that disease caused him fatal liver damage due to an undiagnosed, underlying, liver disease. Judith alleged that the Yakima Health District and Christopher Spitters, M.D., were negligent in treating Jose. A year after filing suit, her expert witness submitted an affidavit alleging as much. But because allegations of misdiagnosis without deviation from the proper standard of care was not the basis for liability, the Washington Supreme Court held that the expert witness' affidavit was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material face, and affirmed the Court of Appeals. "In so holding, we do not require talismanic words, but the words... the want of the right word makes lightning from lightening bugs." View "Reyes v. Yakima Health Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on her constitutional challenges to Maine’s Wrongful Birth Statute.After she gave birth to a healthy child, Plaintiff brought this lawsuit against Merck & Co., Inc., claiming that a contraceptive implant manufactured by Merck and/or its applicator were defective. Plaintiff also sued the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging that a doctor at a federally-funded community health center unsuccessfully implanted the Merck product. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in reliance on Maine’s Wrongful Birth Statute. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s case, rejecting her constitutional challenges to the Wrongful Birth Statute. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s challenges to the constitutionality of the Wrongful Birth Statute under the Maine and United States Constitutions failed. View "Doherty v. Merck & Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the judgment of the district court removing Plaintiffs’ informed consent claims from this case and entering judgment for Defendants on Plaintiffs’ specific negligence claim.Plaintiffs, a patient and his family, brought this lawsuit against Defendants, a physician and the physician’s employer. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the informed consent claim based on the physician’s failure to disclose his lack of training and experience in performing the procedure and, during trial, refused to allow the informed consent claim based on the physician’s failure to disclose the risk of the surgery considering the patient’s bad heart. The jury then returned a verdict for Defendants on the specific negligence claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment on the specific negligence claim but remanded the case to allow Plaintiffs to proceed on their two informed consent claims, holding that the district court erred in removing the two informed consent claims from the case. View "Andersen v. Khanna" on Justia Law

In this medical-malpractice case stemming from the death of Shannon McCoy, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals, holding that judgment was properly entered in favor of Plaintiff as to Dr. Debra Gunn’s negligence in this case and that Obstetrical and Gynecological Associates, P.A. (OGA) was vicariously liable for Dr. Gunn’s negligence.The Court further held (1) there was legally sufficient evidence of causation; (2) the trial court erred in excluding deposition testimony of Defendants’ expert witness regarding future medical expenses, but the error was harmless; (3) the medical billing affidavits providing proof of past medical expenses were proper; (4) the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on unavoidable accident; (5) OGA’s indemnity claim against Dr. Gunn was properly asserted post-verdict; and (6) Shannon’s death on the eve of the court of appeals’ decision did not create a windfall for Plaintiff. View "Gunn v. McCoy" on Justia Law

Dr. Solman performed arthroscopic surgery on Grussing’s knee in June 2014. At her July 9 appointment, Grussing reported swelling in her knee to a physician's assistant, who recommended physical therapy. Dr. Solman did not examine Grussing. Grussing returned to Dr. Solman’s office on July 18, again reporting pain and swelling. Dr. Solman aspirated Grussing’s knee, observed that the synovial fluid looked normal, and did not test the fluid for infection. Grussing continued to experience pain and swelling. In October, a different physician aspirated Grussing’s knee and sent the fluid for analysis. The knee was chronically infected. Grussing underwent a total knee replacement. The primary issue in Grussing’s malpractice suit was whether Dr. Solman breached the standard of care when he decided not to test the synovial fluid aspirated during her July 18, appointment. Grussing opened her case with Dr. Solman’s deposition testimony; he acknowledged that fluid that does not appear cloudy can test positive for bacterial infection. The defense’s expert, Dr. Matava testified that there was no way to confirm that Grussing’s knee was infected on July 18. The Eighth Circuit affirmed a defense verdict, rejecting arguments that the district court erroneously limited Grussing’s cross-examination of Matava during an attempt to elicit testimony that fluid that is not cloudy can test positive for bacterial infection and that it failed to correct defense counsel’s misstatement of law during closing argument. The correct burden of proof was properly emphasized throughout trial. View "Grussing v. Orthopedic and Sports Medicine, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners Dr. Troy Pierce and the Bone & Joint Center petitioned for a supervisory writ following the district court's denial of their motion to dismiss. In 2015, Robert Carvell was injured in a vehicle accident. Carvell arrived at the Emergency Department at St. Alexius Medical Center in Bismarck, where the staff took note of Carvell's injuries. Carvell claimed Petitioners were negligent in failing to treat his fractured and dislocated right middle or third finger. The North Dakota Supreme Court cautiously exercises its supervisory jurisdiction to prevent injustice in extraordinary cases where there is no adequate alternative remedy. Under N.D.C.C. 28-01-46, an occurrence is not obvious if it takes place during a technical surgical procedure and is beyond the understanding of a layperson. The Court was "left with a definite and firm conviction" the district court clearly erred in concluding the obvious occurrence exception contained within N.D.C.C. 28-01-46 applied. Dr. Pierce's interrogatory answer and the report following the May 2015 surgery clearly established the alleged professional negligence occurred during a technical surgical procedure outside the plain knowledge of a layperson. Because the obvious occurrence exception applied only to cases that are plainly within the knowledge of a layperson, the district court erred in its factual determination that the exception applied. In the absence of an obvious occurrence, the district court erred as a matter of law in denying the Petitioners' motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted Petitioners' request for a supervisory writ and directed the district court to enter a judgment dismissing Carvell's complaint against Petitioners. View "Pierce v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Dalton’s doctor implanted Teva’s Intrauterine Device (IUD) in her uterus for long-term birth control. Dalton became dissatisfied with the IUD and asked her doctor to remove it. The doctor did so by grasping its strings with a forceps and pulling the IUD down. A piece broke off either before or during the removal and lodged in her uterus. Dalton’s doctor advised that removing the remaining portion of the IUD would require a hysterectomy. Dalton sued Teva, asserting “strict liability,” “strict products liability failure to warn,” and “manufacturer’s defect.” Dalton failed to timely disclose any expert witness and serve the expert witness report required by FRCP 26(a)(2). The district court granted Teva summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Claims under the Indiana Products Liability Act, which governs all consumer actions against a manufacturer for physical harm caused by a product, require proof that the injury was proximately caused by whatever defect or breach of duty underlies the claim. The Act requires expert testimony when an issue “is not within the understanding of a lay person.” Dalton did not establish how a lay juror faced with a broken IUD could identify the cause of the break—maybe the IUD was damaged after coming into the possession of the physician, maybe human error resulted in damage during implantation or removal. This case is far removed from situations in which a causation issue is so obvious that a plaintiff may forgo expert testimony. View "Dalton v. Teva North America" on Justia Law

In consolidated petitions, defendant Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("MIMC") sought a writ of mandamus to direct the Mobile Circuit Court to vacate portions of its May 5, 2017, discovery orders. More specifically, in case no. 1160731, MIMC sought mandamus review of the portion of the trial court's order compelling MIMC to produce certain documents previously submitted to the trial court for in camera review on the ground that the documents are protected from discovery under section 6-5-551 and/or section 22-21-8, Ala. Code 1975. In case no. 1160815, MIMC sought mandamus review of another May 5, 2017, order denying MIMC's motions seeking reconsideration of, or in the alternative, a protective order regarding the trial court's November 10, 2016 order compelling MIMC's response to various discover requests. The underlying case centered on a negligence action brought by the administrator of the estate of Rhonda Lynn Snow who sought surgery at an MIMC facility in 2013. At around 5:50 a.m. on December 11, 2013, a nurse allegedly administered a dose of Dilaudid to Rhonda; thereafter, at 6:40 a.m. Rhonda was found "non-responsive" in her room and the staff at the medical center were unable to resuscitate her. Rhonda remained on life support until her death on January 3, 2014. The Alabama Supreme Court determined MIMC demonstrated the trial court exceeded its discretion in requiring MIMC to respond to the discovery requests at issue, and accordingly, issued writs in both cases. View "Ex parte Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center." on Justia Law