Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A woman died after complications from surgery to remove an ovarian cyst, during which her bowel was perforated. Following the procedure, she received post-operative care from several doctors, who were later sued by her husband and daughter. The plaintiffs, acting as statutory wrongful death plaintiff and administrator of the estate, brought claims for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Several defendants settled before trial, but Dr. Leigh, Dr. Shirley, and their practice went to trial. The jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the value of the decedent’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses.After the verdict, the defendants moved for a new trial and to reduce (“remit and amend”) the judgment based on a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases (OCGA § 51-13-1(b)). The State Court of Bibb County denied the new trial but granted the motion to remit, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 under the statutory cap, while leaving pain and suffering and medical expenses unchanged.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the defendants to invoke the damages cap for the first time in post-trial motions. The court reaffirmed Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, concluding that Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial prohibits applying OCGA § 51-13-1(b)’s cap to noneconomic damages for pain and suffering in medical malpractice actions. Statutory construction principles, in light of Nestlehutt, prevent the cap from being applied to a verdict that includes such damages. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s reduction of the wrongful death award and remanded for consideration of an unresolved excessiveness argument. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

A woman died in a hospital after giving birth by cesarean section, having suffered a rare and severe complication known as placenta accreta spectrum, which led to a massive hemorrhage. She underwent an emergency hysterectomy and was transferred to the intensive care unit for postoperative management. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children, brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against multiple medical providers and the hospital. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only one doctor and a medical staffing agency as defendants.In the Superior Court of Rockdale County, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony alleging breaches of the standard of care by the remaining defendants. The jury found both liable and awarded $42 million in total damages: $10 million for pain and suffering to the estate and $32 million for wrongful death to the children. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, denied the defendants’ post-trial motions for a new trial, and refused to apply Georgia’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, finding it unconstitutional and waived due to the defendants’ failure to raise it earlier. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, awarding over $11 million.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain defense expert testimony or in granting the challenged jury instruction, as the defendants had affirmatively waived any instructional error. The court affirmed that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages could not constitutionally be applied to the judgment. Finally, it upheld the award of attorney fees, finding that the plaintiffs’ settlement offer complied with statutory requirements and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

After Charlene Jorgensen underwent two breast reduction surgeries by Dr. Adam Smith, she and her husband filed suit in May 2020, alleging the second surgery in 2018 was negligently performed and left Charlene disfigured. Their claims included medical negligence and lack of informed consent against Dr. Smith, medical negligence and respondeat superior against Smith’s professional corporation, and negligent retention and respondeat superior against Tri-State Specialists, LLP. The plaintiffs timely served a certificate of merit affidavit from Dr. Mark Jewell, which addressed Dr. Smith’s surgical care, but did not specifically address negligent retention by Tri-State.The Iowa District Court for Woodbury County denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, which challenged the negligent retention claim based on Iowa Code section 147.140 and section 668.11, arguing the certificate of merit affidavit was insufficient. The defendants sought interlocutory review. In a prior appeal (Jorgensen I), the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding that section 147.140 did not apply to the negligent retention claim and distinguishing Struck v. Mercy Health Services-Iowa Corp. The Court also found section 668.11 did not bar the negligent retention claim since Tri-State was not a licensed professional under the statute.Following remand, the defendants filed two further summary judgment motions challenging the sufficiency and applicability of the certificate of merit affidavit. The district court again denied these motions, and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of Iowa, applying the law-of-the-case doctrine, concluded that issues or matters necessarily decided in the prior appeal could not be re-examined. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the summary judgment motions and remanded the case for trial, holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred reconsideration of the certificate of merit issues and applicability of section 147.140 to the negligent retention claim. View "Jorgensen v. Smith" on Justia Law

A patient died after undergoing surgery at a hospital in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The personal representative of the patient’s estate brought suit against the hospital, asserting both direct negligence claims and vicarious liability claims based on the actions of the hospital’s employed registered nurses. The hospital was a qualified health care provider (QHP) under the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), but its employed registered nurses were not, and could not be, QHPs under the version of the MMA in effect at the time.In the District Court, the plaintiff sought summary judgment, arguing that because registered nurses could not be QHPs, the MMA’s protections, including its damages cap, did not apply to vicarious liability claims based on their conduct. The District Court agreed, holding that the hospital was not entitled to the benefits and protections of the MMA for claims arising from the conduct of its nurse employees. After the District Court granted interlocutory appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied review. The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico then granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico held that the plain language of the MMA applies to vicarious liability claims against QHPs, even when those claims are based on the actions of non-QHP employees such as registered nurses. The court concluded that the definition of “malpractice claim” under the MMA is broad and does not require that the agent whose conduct gives rise to vicarious liability be a QHP. Thus, the hospital, as a QHP, is entitled to the MMA’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims based on its nurses’ conduct. The Supreme Court reversed the District Court’s ruling. View "Ferlic v. Lovelace Health Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

A woman experiencing severe back pain visited the emergency department at a hospital in Pocatello, Idaho, where she was treated by a physician assistant under the supervision of an emergency medicine physician. She received pain medications, including a transdermal fentanyl patch. After being discharged and returning to the hospital the next day, she was again treated and had another fentanyl patch administered. Subsequently, her orthopedic surgeon prescribed additional fentanyl patches to manage her pain. Her husband applied two more patches at home as instructed. The woman died several days later, with her death certificate listing respiratory depression and acute fentanyl intoxication as causes.The woman’s family filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in Idaho’s Sixth Judicial District Court against the hospital, the emergency department providers, the orthopedic surgeon, and others, alleging negligent treatment and failure to obtain informed consent. The defendants requested disclosure of the identities of any non-testifying local experts consulted by the plaintiffs’ out-of-state expert witnesses regarding the local standard of care. The plaintiffs refused, citing concerns for the consultants’ professional standing, and sought a protective order, which was denied. The district court struck the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses for failing to timely disclose the local consultants, and then granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding the plaintiffs could not prove breach of the standard of care or causation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to strike the expert witnesses for discovery violations, holding that Idaho law requires disclosure of non-testifying local standard-of-care experts, regardless of the degree of reliance by testifying experts. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on causation, holding that plaintiffs need only show the general risk of harm was foreseeable, not the specific mechanism of injury. The case was remanded for further proceedings against the hospital on the remaining negligence claim. The Court also awarded partial attorney fees to certain defendants for defending an aspect of the appeal deemed frivolous. View "Hartman v. Pocatello Hospital" on Justia Law

Brooke Morton was admitted to the hospital at 37 weeks gestation for labor induction due to cystic fibrosis-induced diabetes. After complications, her baby, Brody Morton, was delivered by emergency cesarean section, resuscitated, transferred to the NICU, and passed away five hours later. Mrs. Morton suffered severe postpartum complications. Mr. Morton consented to an autopsy, allegedly under the impression it would be performed by the state medical examiner, but later learned it was conducted by the hospital, with internal organs not preserved, preventing further autopsy.The Mortons sent two pre-suit notices and screening certificates of merit to the hospital, one for medical negligence related to labor and delivery, and another for emotional distress and related claims concerning the autopsy and handling of organs. The hospital responded by requesting more definite statements and identifying perceived deficiencies, following procedures established in Hinchman v. Gillette. The Mortons replied with additional certificates. The complaint included claims against both the hospital and the West Virginia University Board of Governors (WVUBOG). After mediation, the Mortons settled medical negligence claims with WVUBOG, but not with the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing that the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) applied and the certificates were deficient, depriving the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed some claims but denied dismissal of emotional distress claims, finding MPLA did not apply.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the hospital’s petition for a writ of prohibition. The Court held that while total failure to provide pre-suit notice under the MPLA is jurisdictional, alleged deficiencies in a screening certificate of merit do not deprive a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The writ of prohibition was denied, and the circuit court’s order stands. View "State ex rel. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Simms" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought treatment at a hospital for abdominal pain in January 2018. Multiple medical professionals reviewed his CT scan, which showed a suspected mass on his kidney, but none documented or communicated this abnormal finding to him or to other medical staff. He was discharged without being informed of the mass. Over the next several years, other doctors also failed to alert him to the mass despite reviewing his earlier scans. In July 2021, a new MRI revealed a kidney mass, later confirmed to be cancer, resulting in the removal of his right kidney. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit in September 2023.In district court in Linn County, the plaintiff filed certificates of merit to support his claim. After the Iowa Supreme Court decided Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa Corp., which clarified the requirements for such certificates, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the certificates were defective. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice and filed a new but identical lawsuit within six months, citing Iowa’s savings statute, Iowa Code § 614.10. The district court dismissed the second suit, holding that the savings statute did not apply because the failure of the first suit was not compelled and was due to the plaintiff’s own negligence in prosecuting the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and held that the savings statute did apply. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to provide compliant certificates of merit was not due to negligence, as the legal requirements were unsettled prior to Miller. Additionally, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to resist summary judgment with futile arguments. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trask v. Ahmed" on Justia Law

A mother consented to have an ear, nose, and throat (ENT) specialist perform surgery on her two-year-old son, but was not informed that a fourth-year medical resident would assist with or perform the procedure. After surgery, the child suffered internal bleeding, was hospitalized twice, and ultimately died from a hemorrhage related to the site of the surgery. The mother, both individually and as administrator for her son’s estate, sued the ENT doctor and his employer for medical negligence in postoperative care and for failure to secure informed consent regarding the resident’s participation.The Iowa District Court for Johnson County dismissed the action with prejudice. The court determined that the certificate of merit (COM) submitted by the plaintiffs did not comply with Iowa Code section 147.140 because it was not signed under oath or penalty of perjury, following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives–Iowa, Corp. The district court concluded that a COM was required for all claims, including the informed-consent claim, and rejected arguments that the defendants had waited too long to challenge the COM or that subsequent affidavits could cure the original defect.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that a COM is not required for a claim alleging lack of informed consent, reversing the district court’s dismissal of that claim. The court reasoned that Iowa’s "patient rule" for informed consent focuses on the information a reasonable patient would want, and expert testimony is not required to establish a prima facie case for lack of informed consent regarding who performs the surgery. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the medical negligence claims due to noncompliance with the COM requirements and rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional and procedural arguments. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the informed-consent claim only. View "Lofgren v. Simpson" on Justia Law

While detained at the McLean County Detention Center, Dirk Alan Christianson developed a severe leg infection that ultimately resulted in the amputation of his leg above the knee. During his incarceration, Christianson sought medical attention several times and was treated both within and outside the jail, including being evaluated by a jail nurse and a family nurse practitioner. After displaying symptoms such as fever and pain, Christianson was transported to an outside clinic where he was evaluated, tested, and given instructions for follow-up. His condition deteriorated over the next several days, leading to hospitalization, a diagnosis of necrotizing fasciitis, and amputation.Christianson brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota against McLean County, jail officials, medical staff, and the outside clinic, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, Monell municipal liability, and state law medical malpractice. The district court dismissed the Monell and medical malpractice claims, granted summary judgment to all defendants on the deliberate indifference claims, and denied Christianson’s motion to amend his complaint to identify and add John Doe defendants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that Christianson failed to allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability under Monell, as the complaint did not set forth a specific policy or widespread custom causing constitutional harm. The court also determined that the evidence did not support claims of deliberate indifference by the sheriff, jail nurse, or family nurse practitioner, finding no facts showing that these individuals knew of and disregarded a serious medical need. Additionally, the court ruled that Christianson’s motion to amend was untimely and properly denied, and that dismissal of the John Doe defendants was appropriate. Finally, the court affirmed dismissal of the state law medical malpractice claim, concluding that the required expert affidavit was not timely served. View "Christianson v. McLean County" on Justia Law

A patient suffered an injury during knee surgery in March 2022 and, together with his wife, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the operating surgeon and the orthopedic clinic in January 2023. Iowa law requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to serve a certificate of merit affidavit within sixty days after the defendant’s answer to the lawsuit. The plaintiffs served a certificate of merit within the deadline. However, the document was not sworn before an authorized officer and did not include the phrase “penalty of perjury” as required by Iowa statutes. Over a year later, the plaintiffs served an amended certificate that met the affidavit requirements, but it was well past the statutory deadline.After the defendants answered and discovery proceeded for more than a year, the defendants moved to dismiss in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, arguing that the timely certificate did not comply with statutory requirements. The district court found that the initial certificate was neither a true affidavit nor a permissible substitute under the relevant statutes. The court also concluded that the late-filed, proper affidavit could not cure the statutory violation because it was not filed within the required sixty days and there was no extension by agreement or motion. The district court dismissed the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that substantial compliance with the certificate of merit affidavit requirement means providing either a true affidavit executed before an authorized person or a statement under penalty of perjury within sixty days. The plaintiffs failed to do either within the deadline, and their later submission could not cure the defect. The court also rejected arguments that the defendants had waived the affidavit requirement or that the statutory scheme violated the Iowa Constitution. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Rarick v. Smidt" on Justia Law