Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Relatives of Saldana, who died from COVID-19 at Glenhaven nursing home, sued Glenhaven in California state court, alleging state-law causes of action. Glenhaven removed the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a remand to state court,The district court lacked jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, because Glenhaven did not act under a federal officer or agency’s directions when it complied with mandatory directives from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Department of Health and Human Services.The claims were not completely preempted by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, which provides immunity from suit when the HHS Secretary determines that a threat to health constitutes a public health emergency, but provides an exception for an exclusive federal cause of action for willful misconduct. A March 2020 declaration under the Act provided "liability immunity for activities related to medical countermeasures against COVID-19.” The Act does not displace non-willful misconduct claims related to the public health emergency, nor did it provide substitute causes of action. The federal scheme was not so comprehensive that it entirely supplanted state law claims.The district court did not have jurisdiction under the embedded federal question doctrine, which applies if a federal issue is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. View "Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC" on Justia Law

In 2015, Talignani, a U.S. military veteran, consulted a VA neurosurgeon, who recommended that he undergo neck surgery. Because the VA could not perform a timely surgery, the surgeon suggested Talignani obtain evaluation and treatment at Saint Louis University Hospital. Talignani agreed and expressed a preference for the Hospital because he had previously undergone surgery there. A nurse obtained the VA’s approval to secure treatment for Talignani at a non-VA provider. The VA agreed to pay for “evaluation and treatment rendered pursuant to the non-VA provider’s plan of care.” The VA then sent a request for outpatient services to the Hospital. The Hospital agreed to treat Talignani and asked the VA to conduct several pre-operative tests. In January 2016, Dr. Mercier performed neck surgery on Talignani using the Hospital’s facility and staff. Talignani died shortly after being released.Talignani’s estate alleged he was prescribed excessive pain medication prior to his discharge, which proximately caused his death. An administrative complaint with the VA was denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The Act waives sovereign immunity for certain torts committed by “employee[s] of the Government.” The estate’s claim does not involve a government employee. View "Talignani v. United States" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action arising from a circumcision, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court precluding Plaintiff from presenting evidence as to either using incorrect scissors or incorrect use of scissors during the subject surgical procedure, holding that the court did not err.Plaintiff, for the benefit of her son, brought this action against Defendant, alleging that Defendant was negligent in performing her son's circumcision. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's evidentiary rulings and the subsequent defense verdict, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding portions of Plaintiff's expert's testimony not disclosed in accordance with Mont. R. Civ. P. 26 and the scheduling order. View "Higgins v. Augustine" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court concluding that the accidental failure of suit statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-592, did not save the otherwise time-barred action of Plaintiff, executrix of the estate of Theresa Riccio, holding that there was no error.The trial court concluded that Plaintiff's wrongful death action was time barred because her first medical malpractice action was dismissed due to her attorney's gross negligence for failing to file with the complaint legally sufficient medical opinion letters, as required by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a(a) and two appellate court decisions interpreting section 52-190a(a). The appellate court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the action was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in determining that the omission of the experts' qualifications was egregious conduct rather than a matter of form or mistake. View "Riccio v. Bristol Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Defendants in this action alleging that Boston Scientific Corporation's sale of its Obtryx Transobturator Mid-Urethral Sling System (Obtryx) violated the Connecticut Product Liability Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-572m et seq., holding that there was no error.The named plaintiff alleged that the Obtryx, a transvaginal mesh sling implanted in women to treat stress urinary incontinence, injured her in various ways after it was implanted in her. Plaintiffs brought claims against Boston Scientific and the named plaintiff's gynecologist and medical practice, alleging violations of the Act, negligence sounding in informed consent, and misrepresentation. The trial court granted the medical defendants' motion for summary judgment. The case proceeded to trial against Boston Scientific, and the jury returned a verdict in its favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in granting summary judgment for the medical defendants on the informed consent and misrepresentation claims; and (2) properly declined to instruct the jury on the reasonable alternative design prong of the risk-utility test. View "Fajardo v. Boston Scientific Corp." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of defendant, a neurosurgeon, in a medical malpractice action against defendant and others, alleging claims related to plaintiff's treatment in the emergency room. Plaintiff and his wife alleged that emergency surgery should have taken place sooner than six hours after his arrival at the emergency room because time was of the essence in removing a blood clot. After the surgery, plaintiff ended up partially quadriplegic.The court concluded that the trial court did not err in declining to instruct the jury with CACI 509 (Abandonment of Patient) as the instruction was not supported by substantial evidence. The court also concluded that CACI 411 (Reliance on the Good Conduct of Others) did not prejudice plaintiffs. Furthermore, the trial court's refusal to give CACI 430 (Causation: Substantial Factor) and CACI 431 (Causation: Multiple Causes) and its decision to give Defense Special Instruction No. 2 are moot in light of the jury's finding of no negligence. Finally, plaintiff's challenge to CACI 506 (Alternative Methods of Care) is waived, and the trial court did not err in refusing to give BAJI 6.15, which defined "emergency." View "Zannini v. Liker" on Justia Law

Albright was severely injured in a car accident and used opioids to manage her chronic pain. She became addicted to opioids. Seeking treatment for her addiction, Albright turned to Dr. Christensen to administer a one-week in-patient detoxification program. Christensen started Albright with a patient-controlled analgesia pump to supply her with hydromorphone, a pain reliever; he also gave Albright phenobarbital, which depresses the central nervous system. Christensen terminated these treatments after Albright became “anxious and tearful” while the two discussed the treatment. Changing tack, Christensen twice administered Suboxone—an opioid-replacement medication—to Albright. On both occasions, Albright immediately developed muscle spasms, pain, contortions, restlessness, and feelings of temporary paralysis. She refused further treatment and was discharged. Albright still suffers shaking, muscle spasms, and emotional distress.The Sixth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Albright’s suit against Christensen. The suit sounds in medical malpractice rather than negligence. Michigan’s affidavit-of-merit and pre-suit-notice rules for medical-malpractice actions conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and do not apply in diversity cases in federal court. Federal Rule 3 requires only the filing of a complaint to commence an action—nothing more. The district court mistakenly invoked Erie and applied the pre-suit-notice rule in Albright’s case. View "Albright v. Christensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court entered after the jury returned a no-negligence verdict in favor of a surgeon in this medical malpractice case, holding that the district court erred in ruling on permissible expert opinions, and the error was not harmless.A patient who suffered a disabling stroke after undergoing surgery to relieve stenosis brought a medical malpractice suit against the surgeon. At trial, the patient was allowed to introduce evidence that a neurologist and neuroradiologist, from whom he sought a second opinion following surgery, had read his CT angiogram as showing a lesser degree of stenosis. Other evidence, however, was excluded. The Supreme Court reversed the no-negligence judgment in favor of the surgeon, holding (1) the district court misapplied the pretrial disclosure requirements of Iowa Code 668.11 and Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.500(2); and (2) the error was harmful. View "McGrew v. Otoadese" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals and the trial court concluding that the Health Care Liability Act, Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-101 to -122, did not apply to Plaintiffs' medical battery and intentional misrepresentation claims, holding that Plaintiffs' claims fell within the definition of a "healthcare liability action" under the Act.Plaintiffs sued a doctor and his medical practice alleging medical battery and intentional misrepresentation. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Plaintiffs did not comply with the Act's pre-suit notice and filing requirements. The trial court agreed, ruling that Defendants' misrepresentations were made before they rendered any health care services and therefore did not relate to the provision of health care services. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Act applied to Plaintiffs' claims. View "Cooper v. Mandy" on Justia Law

Following a back surgery, Daniel Shope continued to experience lower back pain. Shope was referred to Dr. Michael Winkelmann at NewSouth Neurospine for an evaluation. Dr. Winkelmann recommended a course of opioid medication to enable Shope to participate in physical therapy and to return to work. In January 2013, Shope signed a NewSouth Neurospine Pain Management Policy, which specifically provided that Dr. Winkelmann could stop prescribing any or all medications if Shope used any illegal substances. In May 2014, Dr. Winkelmann informed Shope that he had been noncompliant with the policy and ceased his patient-physician relationship with Shope. Shope filed a complaint against Dr. Winkelmann in November 2018 in county court. The county court granted summary judgment to Dr. Winkelmann and NewSouth, finding that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Two days later, Shope appealed and designated the record. That same day, Dr. Winkelmann filed a Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 59 motion to alter or amend the judgment, which requested that the trial court consider relief under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and the Litigation Accountability Act. Shope received a cost estimate from the court clerk for $4,825.20 for the designation of the entire record. Shope revised his request for only Plaintiff's pleadings. The revised estimate was $2,593.20, which Shope paid. The trial court then ruled on Dr. Winkelmann's motion; Dr. Winkelmann and NewSouth then designated the record. Based on those designations, the clerk amended the estimate of the cost of preparing the record to $4,297.50; minus Shope's prepayment, the balance was $2,052. By October 4, 2020, thirty days after the trial court had ruled on Dr. Winkelmann’s posttrial motion, Shope had not paid the balance. Shope argued that under the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure, he was only obligated to pay for the portions of the record that he designated. On October 16, 2020, Dr. Winkelmann filed a motion to dismiss Shope’s appeal due to lack of appellate jurisdiction. On October 23, 2020, Shope paid the balance of the cost bond in the amount of $2,052, plus an additional $500. That same day, he filed a certificate of compliance. On November 3, 2020, the circuit court issued an order dismissing the appeal. Shope appealed to the Mississippi Supreme Court November 4, 2020. The Supreme Court found that becanse Shope failed to pay the cost bond within the time frame provided by statute, his appeal was not perfected, and the circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Therefore, Dr. Winkelmann’s motion to dismiss the appeal was appropriately granted. View "Shope v. Winkelmann, et al." on Justia Law