Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

by
A woman in her mid-30s suffered a severe stroke that left her paralyzed and unable to speak, requiring months of inpatient care at a rehabilitation hospital operated by a corporate defendant. While at the facility, she was assigned daily intimate care, including by a male certified nursing assistant. She later alleged that this male attendant sexually assaulted her multiple times during her stay. After her discharge, she sued the hospital, its corporate parent, and the attendant, asserting claims for assault, battery, negligence, and abuse of a dependent adult.The case went to a jury trial in Marin County Superior Court. The jury found in favor of the attendant on all claims, concluding he had not assaulted, abused, or been negligent towards the plaintiff. However, the jury found the hospital and its parent negligent, and determined their negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. The jury awarded her $1,000,000 in noneconomic damages. The hospital and its parent then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing there was no causal link established between their negligence and the plaintiff’s harm. The trial court agreed, granting the motion and entering judgment for the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the hospital’s failure to offer the plaintiff, or her representative, the option of receiving intimate care from a female caregiver (as required by the Patient’s Bill of Rights) was a substantial factor in causing her emotional distress. The court found this basis for liability was independent of the alleged sexual assault and did not require expert testimony on causation. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed the trial court to reinstate the judgment in accordance with the jury’s special verdict. View "Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care" on Justia Law

by
Mitchell Glenn Revette sought medical care from Dr. Andrew Mallette at The Surgical Clinic Associates, P.A. for abdominal pain and underwent surgery for diverticulitis in June 2021. He later returned for a follow-up surgery in January 2022, after which he died due to complications related to respiratory depression. His wife, Nitkia Revette, brought a wrongful death and medical negligence lawsuit on behalf of his estate, alleging that negligent anesthesia and pain management led to his death.The defendants, Dr. Mallette and the Clinic, moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement included in an intake packet mailed to Mitchell. The agreement was signed "Mitchell Revette," but during a hearing in the Hinds County Circuit Court, Nitkia testified that she signed her husband’s name without his knowledge or presence, and she stated she had no authority to sign for him. The Clinic’s staff testified that patients were required to sign such agreements personally. The circuit court found that Mitchell did not sign the arbitration agreement and that Nitkia lacked authority to bind him, thus ruling the agreement unenforceable and denying the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s findings, applying a deferential standard to factual determinations and de novo review to the denial of arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Nitkia lacked both actual and apparent authority to sign for Mitchell and that there was no basis for binding the estate via direct-benefits estoppel. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Mallette v. Revette" on Justia Law

by
James Secrist, after recovering from COVID-19, began experiencing significant neurological symptoms, including leg weakness and inability to urinate. He was evaluated by various healthcare professionals at Rush Medical Foundation and Cardiovascular Institute of the South between March and June 2021. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with transverse myelitis attributed to COVID-19. James and his wife Dawn filed a medical malpractice suit against the involved healthcare providers, alleging negligence in failing to recognize and urgently address his worsening neurological condition.The case was brought in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. The defendants moved to dismiss, asserting immunity under Mississippi Code Section 11-71-7, which provides legal immunity to healthcare professionals and facilities for acts or omissions related to healthcare services performed during the COVID-19 state of emergency. The circuit court found that the alleged negligent acts occurred during the COVID-19 state of emergency, that James’s condition was caused by COVID-19, and that the defendants’ actions were covered by the statutory immunity. The court therefore dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the statutory language and the facts alleged in the complaint de novo. The Supreme Court determined that Section 11-71-7 immunity applied because James’s injuries resulted from treatment for a condition caused by COVID-19 during the COVID-19 state of emergency. The court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the statute should be construed more narrowly to exclude these facts, and also found extrajurisdictional cases cited by plaintiffs to be distinguishable. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the Lauderdale County Circuit Court’s dismissal, holding that the defendants are immune from liability under Section 11-71-7. View "Secrist v. Rush Medical Foundation" on Justia Law

by
Four women incarcerated at the Huron Valley Correctional Facility in Michigan suffered from persistent, painful rashes between 2016 and 2019. Despite repeated complaints, medical staff—contracted through Corizon Health—failed to diagnose scabies, instead providing ineffective treatments and attributing the condition to environmental factors like improper laundering. It was only after an outside dermatologist intervened that scabies was correctly identified, prompting prison-wide treatment efforts. However, these efforts were delayed and, in some cases, inadequate, resulting in prolonged suffering for the affected inmates.After their experiences, the four women filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan against multiple defendants, including high-level Michigan Department of Corrections officials and Wayne State University medical officers, alleging Eighth Amendment violations and state-law negligence. The district court found that the women’s complaint plausibly alleged “clearly established” Eighth Amendment violations by all defendants and denied the officials’ request for qualified immunity. The court also rejected a claim of state-law immunity, finding that the officials could be the proximate cause of the inmates’ injuries under Michigan law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denials. The Sixth Circuit held that existing precedent did not “clearly establish” that the non-treating prison officials’ reliance on contracted medical providers was so unreasonable as to violate the Eighth Amendment. Thus, it reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the federal damages claims. However, the appellate court affirmed the denial of state-law immunity, finding the plaintiffs adequately pleaded proximate cause under Michigan law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Machelle Pearson v. MDOC" on Justia Law

by
Several women incarcerated at a Michigan prison developed painful, persistent rashes between 2016 and 2019. Their complaints were largely ignored by prison staff, and medical providers initially misdiagnosed the condition, ruling out scabies, a highly contagious skin infestation. The prison’s contracted health care provider, Corizon Health, and its infectious disease coordinator were tasked with managing infectious diseases but failed to control the outbreak. Only after an outside dermatologist diagnosed scabies did prison officials begin widespread treatment and quarantine measures, though these efforts were not immediately effective. Four inmates who suffered from these conditions filed suit, seeking damages and injunctive relief against both the medical providers and high-level prison officials who had not directly treated them.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied motions for judgment on the pleadings by the Michigan Department of Corrections and Wayne State Officials. The district court held that the inmates had plausibly alleged that all defendants, including non-treating prison officials, committed clearly established Eighth Amendment violations and were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that the gross negligence claims could proceed under Michigan law, as the complaint adequately alleged that the officials proximately caused the harms.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit determined that, under existing precedent, non-treating prison officials’ reliance on contracted medical providers did not clearly constitute an Eighth Amendment violation. The court reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the inmates’ federal damages claims against these officials, finding no clearly established law requiring them to override medical judgments. However, the court affirmed the denial of state-law immunity, concluding that proximate cause under Michigan law could not be resolved at the pleading stage. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "BLC Lexington SNF, LLC v. Townsend" on Justia Law

by
Jenna Sondag underwent hip surgery performed by Dr. John Hoffman at Orthopaedic Specialists, P.C. in February 2017. She filed a medical malpractice action in January 2019, agreeing to designate expert witnesses by a deadline set under Iowa Code section 668.11. Sondag missed this deadline due to a combination of her attorneys’ involvement in a lengthy trial, a medical emergency affecting one attorney, and a calendaring error by their docketing software. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the missed deadline, while Sondag sought an extension to name her expert witnesses.The Iowa District Court for Scott County held a hearing on both motions, and in 2019, found good cause for Sondag’s delay due to the circumstances described. The court denied summary judgment and extended the expert designation deadline. The defendants did not seek interlocutory appeal at that time. Nearly four years later, days before trial, the district court revisited its prior order after the defendants filed a motion in limine to decertify Sondag’s expert. The court reversed its earlier finding, excluded the expert, and dismissed the case for failure to timely designate an expert witness.Sondag appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, siding with the district court’s 2023 decision. The Supreme Court of Iowa granted further review. The Supreme Court held that while a district court may correct an erroneous ruling before final judgment, its 2019 order extending the deadline was not an abuse of discretion, but its 2023 order excluding the expert and dismissing the case was an abuse of discretion. The court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for trial. View "Sondag v. Orthopaedic Speciatists, P.C." on Justia Law

by
The appellant arrived at the emergency room of a medical center with severe lower back pain, right flank pain, and numbness and weakness in her left leg. Initial evaluations suggested symptoms consistent with sciatica, but further testing revealed profound anemia and a herniated disk, which did not warrant surgery. Imaging also showed a nonoccluding thrombus in her aorta. She was discharged after several days, with recommendations for follow-up. About two weeks later, she returned to the hospital with ischemic symptoms in her left leg, which led to an above-the-knee amputation due to advanced ischemia.The matter was initially heard in the Houston Circuit Court, where the appellant sued the medical center and a physician for negligence, alleging that improper evaluation and failure to initiate anticoagulant therapy resulted in limb loss. The physician was dismissed as a defendant, leaving the case against the medical center. After discovery, the medical center moved for summary judgment, arguing the appellant lacked substantial evidence of causation. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that causation could not be established.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the standard that summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court found that the appellant failed to present expert testimony establishing a proximate causal connection between the alleged breach and her injury. The medical expert's causation testimony was deemed speculative, as it relied on hypothetical actions by a vascular surgeon outside the expert’s specialty. The medical center’s expert, a vascular surgeon, testified that no different treatment would have been provided. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Armour v. Southeast Alabama Medical Center" on Justia Law

by
Susan Cox, a resident of Albion, Washington, died from an alleged overdose of medications prescribed by her primary care physician, Dr. Patricia Marciano. Susan’s husband, Mark Cox, and her estate initiated a wrongful-death and survivor action against Dr. Marciano and Gritman Medical Center after Susan’s death. The Coxes had lived in Washington, while Dr. Marciano and Gritman are based in Idaho, with all medical treatment having taken place in Idaho. However, at Susan’s request, her prescriptions were regularly transmitted by Dr. Marciano and Gritman to pharmacies in Washington, and Gritman engaged in marketing and accepted patients from the Washington area.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over the Idaho-based defendants, holding that Washington’s long-arm statute did not reach them and the exercise of jurisdiction would violate due process. The district court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery relating to general personal jurisdiction over Gritman, and did not address the issue of venue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over Dr. Marciano and Gritman Medical Center was proper under both Washington’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. The court found that the defendants had sufficient minimum contacts with Washington, as they cultivated relationships with Washington residents and regularly transmitted prescriptions to Washington pharmacies in compliance with Washington law. The court also held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington because a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred there. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings and affirmed the dismissal only as to one defendant who was conceded to be properly dismissed. View "COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER" on Justia Law

by
A woman with a long history of lupus, a chronic autoimmune disease, was under the care of a rheumatologist who managed her symptoms with medications over several years. In early 2018, the patient experienced severe joint pain and other symptoms, and her physician adjusted treatments accordingly. In February, she visited a walk-in clinic with fever and chills; tests were negative for infection, but a chest X-ray showed a possible abnormality. As a precaution, antibiotics were prescribed, and her symptoms improved. In March, she again presented with a fever and minor symptoms. The rheumatologist ordered new tests and increased her medication but did not urgently refer her to an infectious disease specialist or order new chest imaging. Over the following weeks, her symptoms worsened, leading to hospitalization, emergency surgery, and ultimately her death from intestinal tuberculosis.Her spouse, representing her estate, filed a medical malpractice suit against the treating physician and clinic, alleging a failure to meet the standard of care by not acting more urgently on March 1 and 2. Both sides presented expert testimony about the standard of care. The plaintiff objected to a jury instruction allowing the jury to consider whether the physician’s exercise of judgment in choosing among alternative treatments was reasonable, arguing it was unwarranted and prejudicial. The Snohomish County Superior Court gave the instruction, and the jury found for the defense.The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that evidence supported the instruction because the physician made choices among treatments and exercised clinical judgment. The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether the record contained sufficient evidence to justify the "exercise of judgment" instruction. The court held that such an instruction is proper when the record contains evidence that the physician’s decision-making process and treatment choices complied with the applicable standard of care. The court affirmed, concluding the trial court acted within its discretion. View "Beard v. Everett Clinic, PLLC" on Justia Law

by
A woman with a Medtronic infusion pump for fentanyl died from an overdose while hospitalized for a hernia repair. Her doctors included her pain management physician, who managed her pump, and a surgeon at a hospital. After surgery, she continued receiving fentanyl from the pump and self-administered additional doses. Hospital staff noticed changes in her mental status, but the actuator allowing self-administration was not removed. The family alleged that the managing pain doctor treated her at the hospital without proper staff privileges and failed to turn off the pump when asked.Her children filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Yuba County, initially against other medical providers, and later amended their complaints several times to add the pain management physician as a defendant, more than four years after their mother’s death. They asserted claims for professional negligence, lack of informed consent, wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse.The Superior Court of Yuba County sustained the pain management physician’s demurrer to the fifth amended complaint without leave to amend. It found that the medical negligence claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the complaint did not sufficiently allege elder abuse. Judgment was entered for the physician, and the plaintiffs appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the judgment. The court held that the statute of limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 applied to the negligence-based claims because the alleged acts constituted “professional negligence” and did not fall within exclusions for acts outside the scope of hospital-imposed restrictions. The court also found no factual basis for tolling the statute for intentional concealment and concluded that the claims did not relate back to the original complaint against fictitiously named defendants. Finally, the court agreed that the elder abuse allegations were deficient and found no abuse of discretion in denying further leave to amend. View "Nichols v. Alghannam" on Justia Law