Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Appellant Harrill & Sutter filed a complaint in the circuit court alleging a violation of Arkansas's Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Appellant had previously filed a medical-malpractice action against three physicians, who were employed by the University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences (UAMS). Mariam Hopkins was hired to represent the physicians. Appellant subsequently filed a FOIA request asserting that because Hopkins represented public employees, Hopkins's file was a public record. Hopkins refused to allow Appellant to inspect the file, and Appellant filed the present case. The circuit court found (1) Hopkins, her firm, and the physicians were not the custodians for the FOIA request to UAMS or to the University of Arkansas Board of Trustees; (2) Appellees did not have administrative control of the public records of those entities; (3) the records sought by Appellant were not public records under FOIA and, therefore, were not subject to a FOIA request; and (4) the litigation files and documents sought by the FOIA request were subject to attorney-client privilege and were work-product. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that FOIA did not apply. View "Harrill & Sutter, PLLC v. Farrar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff David Eads underwent surgery performed by a Defendant Dr. Timothy Borman, a physician whose office was in a building that Defendant Salem Hospital, a limited liability company (LLC), leased to medical providers. The surgeon performed the surgery negligently, causing Plaintiff permanent and disabling injuries. Plaintiff brought this malpractice action against the LLC landlord, as well as the surgeon and others involved in his medical treatment. Plaintiff pursued the action against the LLC on a theory of apparent agency. Specifically, Plaintiff's theory was that, through the signage on the building and other representations, the LLC created the appearance that the building housed a group medical entity of which Plaintiff's surgeon was an agent. The trial court granted summary judgment for the LLC, concluding that the evidence was legally insufficient to hold the LLC vicariously liable for the surgeon's negligence on an apparent agency theory. The Court of Appeals agreed, and affirmed. The Supreme Court granted Plaintiff's petition for review to resolve when a nonnegligent person or entity may be held vicariously liable on an apparent agency theory for physical injuries negligently inflicted by a medical professional. The Court concluded that, for such liability to arise, the injured party must have dealt with the negligent medical professional based on a reasonable belief, traceable to the putative principal's conduct or representations, that the medical professional was the principal's employee or was otherwise subject to the principal's right of control in providing the medical services that caused the injured party's injury. View "Eads v. Borman" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-Appellees Guy and Midge Ledbetter sued Defendant-Appellant Derek Howard and his employer Radiology Services of Ardmore, Inc. for malpractice. Plaintiffs alleged that the doctor misread an x-ray which caused delayed treatment of his rapidly deteriorating left foot. A jury found in favor of Defendant. Plaintiffs moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The trial court denied the judgment but granted a new trial when evidence of juror misconduct surfaced. Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. The foreperson assured the trial court in voir dire that she would not allow her expertise and experience to override the evidence presented at trial. Nevertheless, she not only did so on a personal level, but went further by communicating her alleged professional knowledge and experiences to her fellow jurors with the apparent intent to sway their votes in favor of Defendants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the juror's affidavit was admissible under the "extraneous prejudicial information" exception to 12 O.S. 2011 sec. 2606(B); and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a new trial for juror misconduct during deliberations. View "Ledbetter v. Howard" on Justia Law

Thomas and Barbara Jandre filed an action against, inter alia, a physician and her insurer, asserting (1) the physician negligently diagnosed Thomas with Bell's palsy, and (2) the physician breached her duty to inform a patient by failing to inform Thomas of a diagnostic test that was available to rule out the possibility of a stroke. The circuit court found that the physician's diagnosis of Bell's palsy was not negligent but that the physician was negligent with respect to her duty to inform the patient. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision after applying the reasonable patient standard, holding that under circumstances of the present case involving a non-negligent diagnosis of Bell's palsy, the circuit court could not determine, as a matter of law, that the physician had no duty to inform Thomas of the possibility that the cause of his symptoms might be a blocked artery and of the availability of alternative, non-invasive means of ruling out or confirming the source of his symptoms. View "Jandre v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued a surgeon, alleging negligent performance of a pancreaticoduodenectomy, and a hospital, contending it negligently granted credentials to the surgeon. The district court entered judgment in favor of Defendants after concluding that the tort of negligent credentialing was a viable claim in Iowa. Plaintiffs appealed, contending the district court applied the wrong standard of care in adjudicating Plaintiffs' claim of negligent credentialing against the hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court applied the standard of care advocated by Plaintiffs; and (2) substantial evidence supported the district court's conclusion that the hospital did not breach the standard of care. View "Hall v. Jennie Edmundson Memorial Hosp." on Justia Law

After Jerome Walsh died, Elizabeth Walsh and the couple's four children filed a wrongful death action against Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered (ACS) and its employees (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had caused Jerome's death by failing to diagnose and treat an infection. The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded $1 million to Elizabeth but no damages to the children. The children moved for a new trial, arguing insufficient damages and that the verdict was not justified by the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiffs had waived the issue. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether wrongful death claimants whose trial testimony on damages is uncontroverted, but who receive a jury verdict awarding zero damages, are entitled to a new trial on damages as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a jury may award no compensation in these circumstances if it deems that award to be fair and just; and (2) although a new trial is not automatically required, the trial court may grant one pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(a) if it determines the award is insufficient or not justified by the evidence. Remanded. View "Walsh v. Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered" on Justia Law

Henry Gibson was a resident of Arnold Avenue Nursing Home (AA) in Greenville from 2001 until 2002. After being hospitalized in December 2002, Gibson was moved to another nursing home and died on January 26, 2003. Gibson's estate filed a wrongful-death action in 2004 seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The plaintiffs averred that Magnolia Healthcare, Inc., the owner of AA, and Foundation Health Services, Inc. were negligent in causing various injuries, some of which contributed to Gibson's death. The jury awarded $1.5 million in compensatory damages, which the trial court reduced to $500,000 for noneconomic damages and $75,000 for permanent disfigurement. The trial court refused to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. Plaintiffs appealed asserting: (1) whether the trial court erred in refusing to allow the jury to consider punitive damages; and (2) whether the statutory cap for noneconomic damages was constitutional. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the trial court's refusing to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. The Court found that Plaintiffs failed to raise the constitutionality of the statutory cap before the trial court; thus that issue was procedurally barred. View "Estate of Henry Gibson v. Magnolia Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Real parties in interest Laura and Edward Rehfeldt filed a complaint for medical malpractice against Defendants, a hospital and health care practitioners. Accompanying the Rehfeldts' complaint was an opinion letter from a medical expert supporting their claim and a notary acknowledgment form attached to the letter. Neither the opinion letter nor the acknowledgment contained a declaration that the statements contained in the opinion letter were made under penalty of perjury, and the opinion letter did not contain a jurat. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Rehfeldts failed to comply with the affidavit requirement of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. Defendants then filed the instant petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court granted a writ of mandamus for the purpose of instructing the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing for the limited purpose of determining whether the Rehfeldts could sufficiently prove that the medical expert appeared before the notary public and swore under oath that the statements contained in his opinion letter were true and correct in accordance with section 41A.071's affidavit requirement. View "MountainView Hosp. v. Nev. Dist. Court " on Justia Law

Ron Teter was diagnosed with a tumor in his right kidney. Urologist Dr. Andrew Deck, assisted by Dr. David Lauter, performed surgery to remove Teter’s kidney. Immediately after surgery, Teter developed a condition in which increased pressure in one compartment of the body that compromised the tissues in that compartment. Even after a procedure to relieve the pressure, Teter continued to suffer from pain in his left leg that interfered with his ability to stand for long periods of time and with his ability to engage in his usual activities. Teter and his wife (the Teters) sued Drs. Deck and Lauter for negligence. The Teters eventually settled with Dr. Lauter and stipulated to his dismissal as a defendant. The parties encountered difficulties in preparing for trial for their case against Dr. Deck. Neither the Teters nor Dr. Deck complied completely with discovery deadlines and the trial court granted motions to compel by both sides. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who made a record of his strict requirements of conducting the trial in his court. Defense counsel was routinely cautioned about her conduct during trial, and the judge noted his displeasure with both parties' "disregard for protocol and rules of evidence." The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court involved the court's exclusion of a key medical witness as sanction for the parties' conduct during trial. The Court concluded the pretrial motions judge excluded the expert without making the required findings that the violation was willful and prejudicial and could be imposed only after explicitly considering less severe sanctions. When the trial judge was reassigned to this case, he granted a new trial on the ground that the exclusion was a prejudicial error of law, and he was "well within his discretion in granting the new trial." The Supreme Court found that the facts of this case "amply" supported the ruling. View "Teter v. Deck" on Justia Law

Ronald Sanders recovered judgments against Dr. Iftekhar Ahmed and Iftekhar Ahmed, P.A. (collectively, Defendants) for the wrongful death of his wife. After the jury returned a verdict awarding $9.2 million in non-economic damages, the trial court entered a judgment providing just over $1 million in non-economic damages in accordance with a statutory cap on non-economic damages. On appeal, Sanders challenged the constitutionality of the damages award cap, and Defendants appealed the judgment, the denial of reduction pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.060, and the denial of periodic payments. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in all respects except as to reduction under section 537.060, which permits a defendant's liability to be reduced by the amounts of settlements with joint tortfeasors. The Court reversed the judgment in respect to that section, as a discovery denial prejudiced Defendants' ability to plead and prove the affirmative defense of reduction, and insofar as the settlements included economic damages, the statutory cap would not obviate statutory reduction. Remanded. View "Sanders v. Ahmed" on Justia Law