Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Appellant Angelia Anderson brought a medical malpractice action in the U.S. District Court against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA contains a two-year statute of limitations regarding the timeliness of bringing claims against the government. However, if there is substantive law in the state where the claim arose governing the timeliness of a similar claim, the state provision controls over the FTCA's statute of limitations. A state statute of repose is considered substantive law and prevails over the procedural FTCA statute of limitations. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jursidiction. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Maryland Supreme Court. At issue was whether Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-109(a)(1), which provides that the time period allowed for bringing a medical malpractice action is five years from the time the injury was committed, was a statute of limitation or a statute of repose. The Court held that the plain language of section 5-109(a)(1), confirmed by its legislative history, demonstrates that the statute is a statute of limitations, rather than repose. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Infant was born with severe brain damage. Respondent, Infant's mother, on behalf of Infant, applied for and received Medicaid benefits from the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR). Respondent later filed a medical malpractice lawsuit on behalf of Infant. Subsequently, Respondent petitioned the circuit court for approval of the settlement, requesting that Medicaid not be reimbursed. DHHR intervened. The court granted the motion of Respondent for allocation of the $3,600,000 settlement, holding that, pursuant to Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, a proportional reduction of DHHR's recovery was required based on the ratio of the settlement to the "full value" of the case among the various damages categories. Using this allocation method, the court reduced DHHR's statutory reimbursement from the requested amount of $289,075 to $79,040 and directed that the net settlement proceeds be placed in a special needs trust for the benefit of Infant. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) a $500,000 cap on noneconomic damages was applicable in this case; and (2) under the formula applied in Ahlborn, the DHHR was entitled to approximately $98,080, less its pro rata share of attorney's fees and costs. Remanded. View "In re E.B." on Justia Law

After a jury returned a verdict for Dr. Mary Johnson on her legal malpractice claim against Steven K. Leibel, Leibel filed a motion for JNOV and a motion for a new trial. The trial court denied the motion for JNOV but granted the motion for new trial. Both parties appealed and the court of appeals reversed the grant of Leibel's motion for new trial but affirmed the denial of the motion for the JNOV. The court held that, contrary to the court of appeals' reasoning, the second jury in the malpractice case was not deciding what the first jury would have done in the underlying case had the attorney not been negligent, but only what a reasonable jury would have done had the underlying case been tried without the attorney negligence alleged by plaintiff. Because the jury in the malpractice case was not being asked to decide what a prior jury would have done, it was merely being asked to do exactly what any jury in a discrimination lawsuit would do, which was, evaluate the evidence in the case and decide the case on the merits. This was a task that was solely for the jury, and that was not properly the subject of expert testimony. Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in concluding that the expert testimony at issue was admissible in this case. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Leibel, et al. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant, a young child with severe cerebral palsy, was excluded from most of the liability phase of the trial of her and her parents' lawsuit alleging that her condition was caused by appellees' medical malpractice. At issue was whether a party could be denied a right to be present in court during the trial of their case and excluded from the courtroom because her physical and mental condition could evoke undue sympathy from the jury and thereby improperly prejudice the other party. The court concluded that a party could not be excluded from her own trial simply because her physical and mental condition could evoke sympathy, even under these circumstances. Instead, trial courts could and should address the risk of undue sympathy by using jury instructions and other common and time-tested means of ensuring that both parties received a fair trial, without infringing on the parties' right to be present. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Kesterson, et al. v. Jarrett, et al." on Justia Law

The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc. d/b/a Trace Regional Hospital, and Marcia Morgan, a registered nurse. Aggrieved, Ruth Crosthwait appealed to the Supreme Court, which in turn assigned this case to the Court of Appeals. In a four-four plurality opinion (two judges not participating), the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The case arose from a slip and fall incident at the hospital: Crosthwait was admitted to Trace Regional Hospital for treatment of fluctuating blood sugar stemming from diabetes. Crosthwait was eighty-two years old, lived alone, and generally could walk without assistance. While she was hospitalized, Crosthwait's attending physician instructed her to ring a bell to have a nurse assist her when she rose from her hospital bed. In 2008, Crosthwait was preparing to leave the hospital, and she decided to take a shower. Crosthwait called for Marcia Morgan to assist her with undressing. Crosthwait walked into the bathroom unassisted. Morgan offered Crosthwait a shower stool, which she accepted. Morgan then left and returned with a chair, which she placed in the shower. While Crosthwait showered, Morgan told Crosthwait she would have to leave to attend another patient. When Morgan returned, she turned off the shower and Crosthwait exited the shower. It was undisputed that the fall caused Crosthwait significant injury, including a broken hip and a loss of mobility and independence. Crosthwait filed suit against the hospital and Morgan. The hospital and Morgan filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that Crosthwait's action was for medical malpractice, and summary judgment was proper because, among other things, Crosthwait needed expert testimony to establish the duty of care owed to her by the hospital and to show whether that duty had been breached. Crosthwait responded that the claim was for ordinary negligence, for which expert testimony was not required. The circuit court granted the hospital’s motion, and Crosthwait appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. View "Crosthwait v. Southern Health Corporation of Houston, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants, Donald and Tamara Troyer, filed a medical-malpractice complaint against Appellee, Leonard Janis. In response, Appellee filed a motion for summary judgment in which he alleged that the claims asserted against him in the complaint had already been filed and dismissed in a previous action and were now barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In support of his motion, Janis attached a copy of the complaint in the prior case, the trial court's decision granting his motion to dismiss for failure to file an affidavit of merit, and the court's judgment of entry. The trial court granted summary judgment for Janis, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a dismissal of a complaint for failure to attach the affidavit of merit is an adjudication otherwise than on the merits and is a dismissal without prejudice by operation of law. Remanded. View "Troyer v. Janis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Candice Johnson suffered a lost pregnancy at 20 weeks’ gestation, and on behalf of herself and the deceased fetus, Baby Johnson, sued Defendant-Appellant Rajan Pastoriza, M.D. and his professional corporation alleging negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment; the circuit court refused to grant the motion, but ordered Plaintiff to appoint a personal representative for the estate of the baby and to amend the complaint to bring the negligence claim that had been brought on behalf of the baby through Michigan's wrongful-death statute. Defendant appealed. The appellate court held that the wrongful-death statute as amended in 2005, applied retroactively to Plaintiff's claim for wrongful death. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the 2005 amendment to the wrongful-death statute did not apply to claims arising before the effective date of the amendment. Further, because Defendant would be subjected to liability that did not exist at the time the cause of action arose, the amendment was not remedial, and therefore could not be deemed retroactive. The case was remanded to the circuit court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Denfendant on the wrongful-death claim. View "Johnson v. Pastoriza" on Justia Law

On December 14, 2006, Robert Winn's daughter, Sedona, suffered an extensive brain injury during a heart surgery. On February 3, 2009, Winn filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital, doctors, and perfusionists who were involved in the surgery. The district court dismissed the action as untimely, concluding that more than one year had elapsed between the time when Winn discovered Sedona's injury and the time when he filed suit. At issue on appeal was Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.097(2), which provides that medical malpractice actions must be filed within three years of the injury date and within one year of the injury's discovery, and section 41A.097(3), which tolls both deadlines when the health care provider has concealed information upon which the action is based. The Supreme Court vacated in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the district court, holding (1) questions of fact remained as to whether subsection 2's one-year discovery period was tolled for concealment against the hospital; and (2) subsection 3's tolling-for-concealment provision did not apply against the doctors and perfusionists. View "Winn v. Sunrise Hosp. & Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

David Zinni was injured when his car was struck by a taxicab driven by Appellant Sun Cab's employee. Zinni filed a personal-injury action against Sun Cab. During discovery, Sun Cab learned that Respondent Dr. Gary LaTourette may have negligently treated Zinni after the accident. Sun Cab subsequently filed a third-party complaint against LaTourette, asserting claims for equitable indemnity and contribution based on LaTourette's alleged medical malpractice. The district court dismissed Sun Cab's complaint as untimely. The Supreme Court affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) because there was no preexisting relationship between the parties in this case, and because the claims against the third-party plaintiffs were based on their active negligence, the equitable indemnity claim was properly dismissed; (2) a party need not pay toward a judgment before bringing a claim for contribution, and as such, the third-party contribution claim was not properly dismissed on that ground; and (3) when a claim for contribution is contingent upon a successful showing of medical malpractice, a claimant must satisfy the expert affidavit requirement of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071, and therefore, the third-party plaintiffs' failure to attach an expert affidavit warranted dismissal of their complaint, but such dismissal should have been without prejudice. View "Pack v. LaTourette" on Justia Law

This interlocutory appeal challenged the dismissal of plaintiffs' Deborah and Harold Knapp's medical malpractice claim related to a slip and fall in a hospital bathroom. The Knapps sued the hospital after a 2006 incident that had her admitted. She slipped and fell on a wet bathroom floor, allegedly from a leaky toilet. She was transferred to the Behavioral Health Unit, and while there, was attacked by another patient. Based on these two events, the Knapps listed "negligence," "breach of warranty" and "gross negligence, punitive damages, etc." as grounds for their complaint. Finding that the claim at issue did not involve professional negligence, and that the trial court properly recognized the parties' discovery obligations, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Knapp v. St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law