Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

While being held in Saginaw County Jail on a misdemeanor charge relating to failure to pay court fines, Rouster succumbed to sepsis and died as a result of a perforated duodenal ulcer. Before his death, he had complained of stomach pain, engaged in bizarre behaviors indicative of mental-health problems, and displayed signs of agitation. His estate, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the medical staff members who interacted with Rouster during the final 36 hours of his life, alleging that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Experts agreed that prompt medical attention could have saved his life and that Rouster received substandard care. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that it could not conclude that the medical staff became aware of Rouster’s serious medical need and deliberately refused to provide appropriate treatment.View "Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty." on Justia Law

This case arose from Quizzie Manning's 2008 visit to the King's Daughters Medical Center's emergency room. Manning alleged she sustained injuries as a result of the Center's negligence during that visit. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the circuit court abused its discretion by dismissing Manning's case with prejudice. Upon review of the facts of this case and the circuit court record, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Manning's case. Therefore, the Court affirmed the circuit court's decision. View "Manning v. King's Daughters Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's Rule 59(a)(6) motion was denied when the jury found that defendant Dr. John Lundeby did not breach the standard of care owed to his patient, Rick Blizzard. The district court found that although the jury's verdict was against the clear weight of the evidence, the ultimate outcome would not have been different if a new trial was granted. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial. A such, the district court's decision was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Blizzard v. Lundeby, M.D." on Justia Law

Dustin Watkins suffered an in utero stroke approximately two days before he was born (in 1990), allegedly arising out of the medical malpractice of the treating obstetrician, Dr. Richard Barry, which resulted in a brain injury. This medical malpractice action followed, and a November 2003 trial resulted in multiple damage awards. At issue in this case was the extent to which the Louisiana Patient's Compensation Fund (PCF) continued to be obligated to make advance payments for custodial/attendant care for a medical malpractice victim, after receiving information indicating that such care may no longer be needed, and whether the PCF had the right to unilaterally terminate such payments, without prior court approval, when a judgment was previously rendered ordering it to make said payments. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when the PCF denies a claim for payment of a future medical or related expense and the district court thereafter exercises its continuing jurisdiction and issues a ruling as to that matter, the PCF is obligated to comply with the district court's ruling, order, or judgment unless it modified or set aside by the court. View "Watkins v. Lake Charles Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued Dr. Murphy and his employer, ECHO, alleging that Murphy was negligent in treating Anderson, who suffered a severe and permanent brain injury following emergency room treatment. ECHO billed Anderson for services physicians provided him during a previous emergency room visit, but did not bill for Murphy’s services during the Code Blue that resulted in his injury. The hospital billed Anderson for supplies used during the Code Blue. The circuit court concluded that Murphy was immune from liability under the Good Samaritan Act, 745 ILCS 49/25. The appellate court reversed, holding that the Act was meant to apply to volunteers, not to those who treat patients within the scope of their employment and are compensated for doing so. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. The Act provides “Any person licensed under the Medical Practice Act of 1987 or any person licensed to practice the treatment of human ailments in any other state or territory of the United States who, in good faith, provides emergency care without fee to a person, shall not, as a result of his or her acts or omissions, except willful or wanton misconduct on the part of the person, in providing the care, be liable for civil damages.” Murphy was fully compensated for his time that day. He responded to the emergency not because he was volunteering to help but because it was his job to do so. The agreement that ECHO had with the hospital and the agreement that ECHO had with Murphy require that ECHO physicians to comply with hospital policies, and the hospital’s written policy was that emergency room physicians were to respond to Code Blues. The legislature never intended that Good Samaritan immunity would be available in this situation.View "Home Star Bank & Fin. Servs. v. Emergency Care & Health Org., Ltd." on Justia Law

Appellant Marvin Morgan appealed the dismissal of his wrongful death action, as well as an order imposing sanctions against him and his former attorney. Morgan asserted that he was entitled to special and general damages as a result of the wrongful death of his wife, Ella Morgan. In January of 2004, Mrs. Morgan underwent testing at the Idaho Heart Institute in Idaho Falls. After reviewing Mrs. Morgan’s test results, Dr. John Chambers recommended that she return for an angiogram. The Morgans expected that Dr. Chambers would perform the angiogram. Mr. Morgan drove Mrs. Morgan to the Idaho Heart Institute for her scheduled angiogram. Morgan asserts that it was not Dr. Chambers who performed the angiogram, but Dr. Michael Demos, a doctor who neither of the Morgans had ever met. Morgan alleged that Dr. Demos negligently performed the angiogram, "causing a dissection and damage to Mrs. Morgan’s heart and right coronary artery, creating a medical emergency which then necessitated a high-risk medical procedure in an attempt to repair the damage." Mrs. Morgan passed away on February 24, 2004, purportedly because of complications resulting from the angiogram performed by Dr. Demos. The case sat "dormant for a remarkable twenty one months." Due to the inactivity, Mr. Morgan's son filed notice of substitution of counsel, then attempted to reopen the case. Morgan's motion to reopen was ultimately denied, and the case dismissed with prejudice. The Supreme Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion for dismissing the case without prejudice, but vacated the sanction against Morgan's former counsel. View "Morgan v. Demos" on Justia Law

After a malpractice action was filed against a physician licensed by the Commissioner of Public Health (Department), the Department and the physician entered into a consent order, designated as a public document, indicating that the physician had agreed to a reprimand on his license and a civil penalty. A newspaper (Newspaper) subsequently made a request to the Department under the Freedom of Information Act (Act) for the records reviewed by a consultant in connection the Department’s investigation into the case, including an exhibit (exhibit A). After the Department failed to produce exhibit A, the Newspaper filed a complaint with the Freedom of Information Commission (Commission). The Department argued before the Commission that exhibit A contained Practitioner Data Bank and Healthcare Data Bank records and that federal law provided a basis to withhold those records. The Commission concluded (1) federal regulations barred disclosure of records received from the Healthcare Data Bank, but (2) regulations did not bar disclosure of records received from the Practitioner Data Bank. The superior court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that none of the records were not subject to public disclosure under the Act. View "Comm’r of Pub. Health v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Michelle McCall received prenatal medical care at a United States Air Force clinic as an Air Force dependent. McCall died after delivering her son as a result of severe blood loss. Petitioners filed an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The federal district court found the United States liable under the FTCA. The court concluded that Petitioners’ economic damages amounted to $980,462 and Petitioners’ noneconomic damages totaled $2 million. However, the district court limited Petitioners’ recovery of wrongful death noneconomic damages to $1 million after applying Fla. Stat. 766.118, Florida’s statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages based on medical malpractice claims. The district court subsequently denied Petitioners’ motion challenging the constitutionality of the wrongful death statutory cap. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the application of the statutory cap on noneconomic damages and held that the statute was not unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of Florida law and answered by holding the statutory cap on wrongful death noneconomic damages provided in Fla. Stat. 766.118 violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida Constitution. View "Estate of McCall v. United States" on Justia Law

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity from tort suits, 28 U. S. C. 1346(b)(1), except for certain intentional torts, including battery; it originally afforded tort victims a remedy against the government, but did not preclude suit against the alleged tort-feasor. Agency-specific statutes postdating the FTCA immunized certain federal employees from personal liability for torts committed in the course of official duties. The Gonzalez Act makes the FTCA remedy against the U.S. preclusive of suit against armed forces medical personnel, 10 U. S. C. 1089(a), and provides that, “[f]or purposes of this section,” the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply to any cause of action arising out of a negligent or wrongful act or omission in the performance of medical ... functions.” Congress subsequently enacted the Federal Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act, which makes the FTCA remedy against the government exclusive for torts committed by federal employees acting within the scope of their employment, 28 U. S. C. 2679(b)(1); federal employees are shielded without regard to agency or line of work. Levin, injured as a result of surgery performed at a U. S. Naval Hospital, sued the government and the surgeon, asserting battery, based on his alleged withdrawal of consent shortly before the surgery. Finding that the surgeon had acted within the scope of his employment, the district court released him and dismissed the battery claim. Affirming, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Gonzalez Act served only to buttress the personal immunity granted military medical personnel and did not negate the FTCA intentional tort exception. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Gonzalez Act section 1089(e) abrogates the FTCA intentional tort exception, allowing Levin’s suit against the U.S. alleging medical battery by a Navy doctor acting within the scope of employment. The operative clause states, “in no uncertain terms,” that the FTCA intentional tort exception “shall not apply,” and confines the abrogation to medical personnel employed by listed agencies. View "Levin v. United States" on Justia Law

The Medicaid statute’s anti-lien provision, 42 U. S. C. 1396p(a)(1), pre-empts state efforts to take any portion of a tort judgment or settlement not “designated as payments for medical care.” A North Carolina statute requires that up to one-third of damages recovered by a beneficiary for a tortious injury be paid to the state to reimburse it for payments made for medical treatment on account of the injury. E. M. A. suffered serious birth injuries that require her to receive 12 to 18 hours of skilled nursing care per day and that will prevent her from working or living independently. North Carolina’s Medicaid program pays part of the cost of her ongoing care. E. M. A. and her parents filed a medical malpractice suit against the physician who delivered her and the hospital where she was born and settled for $2.8 million, due to insurance policy limits. The settlement did not allocate money among medical and nonmedical claims. The state court placed one-third of the recovery into escrow pending a judicial determination of the amount owed by E. M. A. to the state. While that litigation was pending, the North Carolina Supreme Court held in another case that the irrebuttable statutory one-third presumption was a reasonable method for determining the amount due the state for medical expenses. The federal district court, in E.M.A.’s case, agreed. The Fourth Circuit vacated. The Supreme Court affirmed. The federal anti-lien provision pre-empts North Carolina’s irrebuttable statutory presumption that one-third of a tort recovery is attributable to medical expenses. North Carolina’s irrebuttable, one-size-fits-all statutory presumption is incompatible with the Medicaid Act’s clear mandate View "Wos v. E. M. A." on Justia Law