Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Respondent Vasilios Haralampopoulos visited the emergency room with severe abdominal pain. After a CT scan revealed a large cystic mass in his liver, Petitioner Dr. Mauricio Waintrub examined Respondent, gave a differential diagnosis identifying four possible causes for his condition, and approved a fine-needle biopsy to determine the nature of the cyst. Petitioner Dr. Jason Kelly performed the procedure, during which Respondent suffered respiratory and cardiac arrest. Normal resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful, and it took over 30 minutes to revive Respondent's heart. Lack of oxygen to his brain left Respondent in a vegetative state. Ten days later, Respondent's family and friends met with doctors to determine why Respondent went into arrest and had such a poor reaction to resuscitation efforts. After the meeting, Respondent's then-roommate and ex-girlfriend Gulsans Akyol Hurd approached Dr. Kelly and asked him whether Respondent's prior cocaine use could have contributed to his injuries. Dr. Kelly responded that cocaine could have contributed to Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, but he was not a cardiologist so he did not know. Respondent brought a medical malpractice suit against seven individuals, including Petitioners Dr. Kelly and Dr. Waintrub. Respondent filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly as inadmissible hearsay not covered by any hearsay exception. The trial court denied the motion in limine, finding that Hurd's statements were made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment under Rule 803(4), and that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Colorado Rule of Evidence 403. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Respondent's cocaine use. The court held that Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly were not admissible under Rule 803(4) because the statements were made after Respondent was in a vegetative state and treatment was no longer possible, they were not made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in limiting the scope of Rule 803(4) to statements made for the purpose of prospective treatment. The Rule's plain language applies to "diagnosis or treatment," and while the term "treatment" has a prospective focus, the term "diagnosis" does not. "Here, Hurd's statements were made for the purpose of discovering the cause of Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, and were thus admissible under Rule 803(4)." The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Haralampopoulos" on Justia Law

Appellee Ursula MacDowell was referred by another dentist to both Dr. Steven Gallant, a general practitioner with a specialty in prosthetics, and Mollie Ann Winston, D.D.S., an oral surgeon, for them jointly to provide professional services necessary for a full mouth prosthodontic reconstruction. The dentists maintained separate practices and engage in different professional specialties, sometimes worked together as a team to perform reconstructive dental services for appellee. Based upon a treatment plan devised by Dr. Gallant, Dr. Winston was to extract certain teeth and place implants into MacDowell's jaw which Dr. Gallant would utilize in the installation of dental prostheses. Shortly after the first of several implant procedures, in August of 2006, Dr. Gallant determined that the implants had been improperly placed in such a manner as to make the installation of prostheses difficult. In fact, he consulted with another dentist, Dr. Hal Arnold, who confirmed Dr. Gallant's opinion. Dr. Gallant admitted he did not inform MacDowell of his opinion or discuss the options for treatment with her. Instead, he exercised his own judgment that it would be best to work around the difficulties created by the implants and go forward with installing the prostheses, so as not to put the patient through the process of removing and replacing the implants, because she had been through "enough." When appellee sued for malpractice, Dr. Gallant moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment to Dr. Gallant and the professional corporation through which he practiced. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal of that reversal was whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the statutory period [of limitation] was tolled even after the plaintiff consulted with a second dentist. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the outcome. View "Gallant v. MacDowell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a healthcare liability suit against several healthcare providers (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint based on Plaintiff's noncompliance with Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), which requires that a plaintiff's pre-suit notice to a healthcare provider include a HIPAA complaint medical authorization in order to permit the healthcare provider to obtain complete medical records from all other providers that are being sent a notice. The trial court denied Defendants' motion, concluding that Plaintiff's noncompliance with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E) was excused by extraordinary cause. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiff was required to substantially comply with section 29-26-121(a)(2)(E), and Plaintiff's failure to comply was not excused by extraordinary cause.View "Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a medical facility, for medical malpractice after a surgery on Plaintiff that was aborted. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant, finding that Plaintiff did not suffer damages legally caused by Defendant's negligence. Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, asserting, among other things, that the jury clearly erred in awarding no damages for the incisions that were made in the course of the aborted surgery. The circuit court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because there was competent evidence supporting the jury's verdict in favor of Defendant on the issue of damages relating to Plaintiff's subsequent cardiac problems, the circuit court abused its discretion in granting a new trial on the question of causation and damages relating to Plaintiff's need for a pacemaker and her subsequent medical problems; and (2) the circuit court erred in granting a new trial on Plaintiff's claim for incisional pain because Plaintiff's claim for damages for incisional pain was barred by the statute of limitations. View "Lewis v. Sanford Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was treated by a surgeon at Central Maine Medical Center (CMMC) for abdominal pain. The doctor informed Plaintiff that he may be suffering from either hepatic or pancreatic cancer, which has a very low survival rate. Several weeks later, test results revealed that Plaintiff actually suffered from B-cell non-Hodgkins lymphoma, which has a five-year survival rate of up to ninety percent. Plaintiff complained, and CMMC’s president sent a letter to Plaintiff that CMMC claimed was “an expression of sympathy or benevolence” and an “offer to compromise.” Plaintiff subsequently filed a medical malpractice action against CMMC. CMMC moved to exclude from evidence the letter from CMMC’s president to Plaintiff, but the trial court admitted into evidence a redacted version of the letter. The jury returned a $200,000 verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) did not err by admitting the portion of the letter that contained an admission of fault, as statements of fault are admissible under the Apology Statute; and (2) properly concluded that the statements contained in the letter were not made as part of a settlement negotiation or mediation. View "Strout v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Thelma Johnson took her 15-year-old son Shaquille to the emergency department at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital; a week earlier, Shaquille had undergone arthroscopic knee surgery. Shaquille complained of chest pain; was first seen by a nurse; and then examined by Dr. Price Omondi. The doctor noted that Shaquille had undergone surgery a week earlier; he inquired about Shaquille's medical history and family history and conducted a physical examination. Dr. Omondi ruled out multiple ailments, specifically, pulmonary embolism as causes of Shaquille's pain. Dr. Omondi diagnosed Shaquille with pleurisy and discharged him from the hospital with a prescription for an anti-inflammatory pain reliever, and instructions to return to the emergency department if his symptoms continued. Two weeks later, Shaquille returned to the emergency department, and died of a bilateral pulmonary embolism. Thelma Johnson and her husband sued Dr. Omondi and Southwest Emergency Physicians, P.C., for medical malpractice. Dr. Omondi moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in to determine whether the appellate court properly applied the standards for a medical malpractice claim in a hospital emergency department as found in OCGA 51-1-29.5 (c). Finding that the plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Omondi" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's daughter was born with permanent nerve damage in her right shoulder and arm, plaintiff filed suit against the physician who performed the delivery of plaintiff's daughter. The court concluded that the proper standard for review of the district court's order granting the motion in limine is abuse of discretion, not plain error; the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of plaintiff's experts because the experts' opinions did not fit the specific facts of this case; the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of informed consent where the record did not support the contention that the physician's expert testified the risk factors present in this case required a physician to warn a patient about the possibility of a permanent injury; and the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the district court should have granted her a new trial based on allegedly prejudicial and inflammatory comments made by defense counsel during closing arguments. View "Lawrey v. Kearney Clinic, P.C., et al." on Justia Law

Dr. Ann M. Mottershaw and The Radiology Group, LLC, appealed a trial court's order granting a motion for a new trial filed by plaintiff Shannon Ledbetter, as administrator of the estate of Venoria Womack. These appeals primarily concerned whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in ordering a new trial based on the jury's exposure to certain evidence that the trial court had excluded by an order granting a motion in limine. After careful consideration of defendants' arguments and the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Mottershaw v. Ledbetter" on Justia Law

Bobbie Troup, in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of Easter Dawkins, filed suit alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against Petitioners. During the trial proceedings, Troup filed a petition requesting that Petitioners be required to pay for the cost of five expert witnesses who had appeared to testify on her behalf on the scheduled trial date but did not testify because the circuit court had granted a motion for continuance made by Petitioners. The circuit court entered an order directing Petitioner to pay Troup for expert-witness costs associated with the continuance of the trial. Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of certiorari, against the circuit court, contending that the court exceeded its authority and abused its discretion in ordering them pay the expert-witness costs of Troup. The Supreme Court denied the petitions, as Petitioners had an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal.View "Moore v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

In 2005, Dr. Eugene Libby, an orthopedic surgeon, performed surgery on Megan Hamilton’s left knee. In an effort to combat a serious infection that had developed in the knee, Dr. Libby performed another surgery on Hamilton’s knee in 2006. The infection persisted. In 2010, Hamilton brought a claim for injury against Dr. Libby. Dr. Libby filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Hamilton’s claims were barred by the three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion. Dr. Libby subsequently filed a petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.097(2)’s three-year limitation period begins to run when there is an appreciable manifestation of the plaintiff’s injury, regardless of whether the plaintiff was aware of the injury’s cause; and (2) because Hamilton suffered appreciable harm to her knee more than three years before she filed her complaint, the district court was required to grant summary judgment in Dr. Libby’s favor. View "Libby v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Cout" on Justia Law