Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

E.Y., a child, was diagnosed with diplegic cerebral palsy. His mother alleges that E.Y.’s illness resulted from medical malpractice by the federally-funded Friend Family Health Center, where she received her prenatal care, and the private University of Chicago Hospital, where she gave birth. Federal law makes a suit against the Center a suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) that had to be filed within the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations, 28 U.S.C. 2401(b). The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding that the suit was filed about two weeks too late. The mother argued that although she was aware she might have a claim against the University Hospital more than two years before filing this suit, she remained unaware that the Friend Center might be involved until she received a partial set of medical records on December 14, 2006, making her suit timely. The Seventh Circuit reversed. A reasonable trier of fact could find that Ms. Wallace the mother was unaware and had no reason to be aware of the Friend Center’s potential involvement in her son’s injuries until less than two years before she filed suit. View "E. Y., v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against the Campbell County Memorial Hospital under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (Act), alleging that Amanda Phillips, a certified nurse anesthetist for Northern Plains Anesthesia Associates, which provided anesthesia services for the hospital, acted as an employee or agent of the hospital, making the hospital vicariously liable for Phillips’ alleged negligence. The hospital filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that a government hospital could not be vicariously liable for acts of non-employees or independent contractors under the doctrine of ostensible agency. The district court denied the motion based on Sharsmith v. Hill. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its interpretation of Sharsmith and that Sharsmith did not create an implied waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. View "Campbell County Memorial Hosp. v. Pfeifle" on Justia Law

Walter Saunders and his wife, Ruby Saunders, sued Dr. Willis Dickens, a neurologist, filed a failure to diagnose action against Dickens after Saunders developed quadriplegia from his condition. Saunders died during the pendency of the appeal. The jury returned a general verdict in favor of Dickens. The Fourth District affirmed, holding that counsel for Dickens did not improperly shift the burden of proof when he asserted that Saunders had not established causation in light of a subsequent treating physician’s testimony that he would not have changed the course of treatment even if Dickens had not acted negligently. The Supreme Court quashed the decision below, holding that testimony that a subsequent treating physician would not have treated the patient differently had the defendant physician acted within the applicable standard of care is inadmissible and will not insulate a defendant physician from liability for his own negligence. View "Saunders v. Dickens" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as personal representative for Connie Scribner, filed a wrongful death complaint against Defendants, Dr. Sean Beyer and Emergency Medical Physicians, P.C., alleging that Defendants’ care of Scribner fell below the standard of care. The first trial ended in a mistrial, and a second trial was held. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed and Defendants cross-appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial or in admitting the testimony of Dr. Beyer and Defendants’ emergency medicine expert concerning certain medical tests and a pneumonia severity index. View "Miller v. Beyer" on Justia Law

In 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into law a statute that prohibits a doctor, under threat of heavy penalties, from performing an abortion unless he has admitting privileges at a hospital no more than 30 miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed. Wis. Stat. 253.095(2). Planned Parenthood and others challenged the law under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court noted that the seven doctors affected by the law had applied for, but after five months, had not been granted, admitting privileges; that all Wisconsin abortion clinics already have transfer agreements with local hospitals to facilitate transfer of clinic patients to the hospital emergency room. A hospital emergency room is obliged to admit and to treat a patient requiring emergency care even if the patient is uninsured, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(b)(1). Had enforcement of the law, with its one-weekend deadline for compliance, not been stayed, two of the state’s four abortion clinics would have had to shut down and a third clinic would have lost the services of half its doctors. View "Planned Parenthood of WI v. Van Hollen" on Justia Law

Before he committed suicide in September 2012, twenty-two-year old Christopher Landry had been under the care of appellant, psychiatrist Crit Cooksey. In August 2012, Dr. Cooksey prescribed both Seroquel and Cymbalta for Christopher, two drugs that contained "black box warnings" warning of an increased risk of suicidal thinking and behavior in young adults and recommended that medical professionals prescribing the drugs monitor patients for worsening or emergent suicidal thoughts and behavior. Following Christopher's death, his parents, appellees Lisa and Michael Landry, began investigating a potential medical malpractice, wrongful death, and survival action against Dr. Cooksey and made multiple requests for copies of Christopher's psychiatric records. Dr. Cooksey on each occasion refused to produce the records, claiming they were protected from disclosure by Georgia's psychiatrist-patient privilege. Appellees filed a complaint seeking a permanent injunction directing Dr. Cooksey to turn over all of Christopher's psychiatric records. The trial court, without reviewing Dr. Cooksey's files, concluded that equity supported appellees' position and issued an injunction directing Dr. Cooksey to produce to appellees "all records pertaining to the medical treatment and history of Christopher Landry." Dr. Cooksey appealed the trial court's order and filed a motion for an emergency stay which was granted. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred to the extent it exercised its equitable powers to order the production of information protected from disclosure by Georgia law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the trial court in part and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooksey v. Landry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Leslie Milliun's conservator, filed a negligence suit against Defendant hospital, alleging that, while in Defendant's care, Leslie suffered severe respiratory dysfunction which resulted in Leslie's severe brain injury. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Defendant because Plaintiff failed to offer the requisite expert testimony to create an issue of material fact regarding Defendant's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of Leslie's injuries. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in (1) refusing to admit certain medical records of Leslie's treating physicians as expert opinion on causation, and (2) concluding that its order granting Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of a commission so Leslie's out-of-state treating physicians could be deposed should be withdrawn because the physicians could not be compelled to offer expert opinion on causation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to admit certain statements contained within the medical records to establish a causal connection between Leslie's injuries and the alleged negligence.View "Milliun v. New Milford Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dr. Florian Cortese after Plaintiff’s small intestine was perforated during a procedure performed by Cortese. The trial court denied Cortese’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and also denied Cortese’s motions for summary judgment and to preclude Plaintiff from presenting unpleaded claims at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that it had jurisdiction to consider arguments Plaintiff had not specifically presented to the Montana Medical Legal Panel; and (2) the Court should not suspend the Rules of Appellate Procedure to consider the district court’s denial of Cortes’s remaining motions. View "Pickett v. Cortese" on Justia Law

Bay Area Physicians for Women ("BAPW") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate an order entered by that court on November 8, 2012, which reinstated a medical-malpractice case filed against BAPW and transferred the case to the Mobile Circuit Court. The Supreme Court concluded BAPW did not include a statement of circumstances constituting good cause for the Supreme Court to consider vacating the November 8, 2012 order, notwithstanding that it was filed more than seven months after the Baldwin Circuit Court entered it. Accordingly, insofar as BAPW's petition for a writ of mandamus sought vacatur of the Baldwin Circuit Court's order, the Court dismissed the petition as untimely. View "White v. Bay Area Physicians for Women" on Justia Law

Plaintiff attempted to file a medical malpractice action against Defendant by mailing the summons and petition via unrestricted certified mail to Defendant's business address. Defendant received the petition and filed an answer asserting several affirmative defenses. After participating in the discovery process, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Plaintiff had failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements for service of process, and Defendant's actual notice of the lawsuit did not confer personal jurisdiction on the district court. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff's service of process in this case was invalid; but (2) the district court erred in dismissing the case without permitting Plaintiff the additional time set forth in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-203(b) in which to obtain valid service of process.View "Fisher v. DeCarvalho" on Justia Law