Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Defendants Dr. Gerald Hodge and Tombigbee Healthcare Authority d/b/a Bryan W. Whitfield Memorial Hospital separately petitioned for a writ of mandamus directing the Marengo Circuit Court to dismiss the claims asserted against them by Gertha and David Tucker. In 2012, Gertha sued Dr. Hodge, Tombigbee, and others, alleging claims under the Alabama Medical Liability Act. Gertha alleged that Dr. Hodge performed a hysterectomy on her in 2005; that Dr. Hodge negligently failed to account for and to remove a surgical hemostat clamp from her abdomen; she did not discover the presence of the clamp until 2011 when she first started experiencing pain; and that as the proximate result of the negligent failure to remove the clamp she was made to suffer pain, life- threatening medical problems, including severe infections, and mental anguish. "Although the situation with which [the Supreme Court was] presented here [did] not involve the statute-of-limitations defense in the context of fictitious-party practice and the relation-back doctrine, the defendants . . . [were] faced with the extraordinary circumstance of having to further litigate this matter after having demonstrated from the face of the plaintiff's complaint a clear legal right to have the action against them dismissed based on the four-year period of repose found in 6-5-482(a). Having concluded that an appeal pursuant to Rule 5 or an appeal from a final judgment following further litigation is not an adequate remedy in this case, [the Court] conclude[d], based on the particular circumstances of this case, that mandamus is necessary in order to avoid the injustice that would result from the unavailability of any other adequate remedy."View "Tucker, Jr. v. Tombigbee Healthcare Authority " on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, the issue presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the trial court properly gave an "error in judgment" jury instruction. The underlying case arose out of the death of a two-month-old child while under the care of his pediatricians. Appellees sued the pediatricians. Their experts testified that the doctors deviated from the standard of care by failing to refer the child for further testing. The trial judge held a charging conference and stated that all of the doctors' proposed points for charge would "either be read or covered." The judge, however, did not say which (if any) proposed changes would actually be read to the jury. Appellees did not object at the time. The judge then proceeded to discuss one of the doctors' proposed "error in judgment" charge. Counsel for Appellees objected that the instruction was inappropriate for this case. The judge ultimately included the "error in judgment" charge when instructing the jury. The jury later ruled in the doctors' favor. Appellees filed timely post-trial motions arguing, among other things, the trial court erred in giving the "error in judgment" charge. Approximately one month after Appellees filed their post-trial motions (and before the trial court ruled on those motions), the Superior Court filed its decision in "Pringle v. Rapaport," (980 A.2d 159 (Pa.Super. 2009)). In that case, the trial court had given a charge very similar to the one given here. Approximately one year later, the Superior Court decided Pringle, holding: "such an instruction should never be given because it 'wrongly suggests to the jury that a physician is not culpable for one type of negligence, namely the negligent exercise of his or her judgment.'" The trial court here denied Appellees' post-trial motions and entered judgment in the doctors' favor. The Supreme Court concluded the Superior Court applied Pringle correctly to the circumstances of this case. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Passarello v. Grumbine" on Justia Law

Chhibber, an internist, operated a walk‐in medical office on the south side of Chicago. For patients with insurance or Medicare coverage, Chhibber ordered an unusually high volume of diagnostic tests, including echocardiograms, electrocardiograms, pulmonary function tests, nerve conduction studies, carotid Doppler ultrasound scans and abdominal ultrasound scans. Chhibber owned the equipment and his staff performed the tests. He was charged with eight counts of making false statements relating to health care matters, 18 U.S.C. 1035, and eight counts of health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347. The government presented witnesses who had worked for Chhibber, patients who saw him, and undercover agents who presented themselves to the Clinic as persons needing medical services. Chhibber’s former employees testified that he often ordered tests before he even arrived at the office, based on phone calls with staff. Employees performed the tests themselves with little training, and the results were not reviewed by specialists; normally, the tests were not reviewed at all. Chhibber was convicted of four counts of making false statements and five counts of health care fraud. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to evidentiary rulings.View "United States v. Chhibber" on Justia Law

As a result of Defendants’ negligence, Margaret Mueller was mistakenly diagnosed with the incorrect type of cancer. Mueller and her domestic partner of twenty-one years, Charlotte Stacy, brought this medical malpractice action against Defendants, seeking damages for Mueller’s personal injuries and Stacey’s loss of consortium. The trial court granted Defendants’ motion to strike Stacey’s claims on the ground that Stacey and Mueller were not in a civil union or married before or during the dates of the negligent acts. The Appellate Court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs failed to state a legally sufficient claim for loss of consortium because they had not alleged that they would have married or entered into a civil union before the dates of Defendants’ negligent acts if they had not been barred from doing so under state law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the Appellate Court erred in affirming the trial court’s judgment on grounds distinct from those of the trial court instead of remanding the case to provide Stacey with an opportunity to amend her complaint; and (2) if, on remand, Stacey amends her complaint to allege that she and Mueller would have been married when the underlying tort occurred if they had not been barred from doing so under state law, the trial court must deny Defendants’ motion to strike Stacey’s loss of consortium claims. Remanded. View "Mueller v. Tepler " on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice wrongful death action against Cedars Healthcare Group, a facility at which Plaintiff’s father was a patient when he died, and other health care providers. Plaintiff sought records of adverse medical incidents from Cedars pursuant to Fla. Const. art. X, 25, which guarantees patients the right to “have access to any records made or received in the course of business by a health care facility or provider relating to any adverse medical incident.” The trial court overruled Cedars’ objection to the discovery request. Cedars subsequently petitioned the district court for a writ of certiorari. Citing to Fla. Stat. 381.028(7)(a), the district court granted the petition on the ground that the request to produce asked for “records of adverse medical incidents involving patients other than the plaintiff” but did not limit the production of those records to the same or substantially similar condition as the patient requesting access. Prior to the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court, in Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, declared section 381.028(7)(a) invalid. Accordingly, the Court quashed the decision of the district court in this case and remanded for reconsideration pursuant to Buster. View "Ampuero-Martinez v. Cedars Healthcare Group" on Justia Law

Virginia Jacobson died from complications after choking on a piece of meat. Jacobson was under the care of Dr. Sherry Shresta and Dr. Gaston Cornu-Labat before she died. Virginia’s husband and the special administrator of Virginia’s estate (collectively, the Jacobsons) filed a wrongful death action against the doctors (Defendants). Defendants filed a motion to bifurcate on the issue of whether Defendants were employees of the hospital, a political subdivision. If Defendants were hospital employees, the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA) barred the Jacobsons’ action. Before hearing the bifurcated employment issue, the trial court rejected the Jacobsons’ claim that they were entitled to a jury trial on the employment issue. The district court then dismissed the complaint, finding that Defendants were employees. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that the Jacobsons had waived their right to a jury trial because they failed to make a timely objection to the bench trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Jacobsons, by their silence, could not have waived their right to a jury trial; but (2) the Jacobsons did not have a right to have a jury decide whether Defendants were political subdivision employees. View "Jacobson v. Shresta" on Justia Law

After Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121 and -122, which implemented pre-suit notice and certificate of good faith requirements. Plaintiff subsequently dismissed her original action and filed two successive actions. The second action did not comply with sections 29-26-121 and -122, but the third action complied with the statutes. Plaintiff filed a motion to consolidate her second and third actions. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiff’s second action should be dismissed for failure to comply with the notice and certificate of good faith requirements and that her third action should be dismissed based on the doctrine of prior suit pending. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court granted Defendant’s application for extraordinary appeal. During the pendency of the appeal, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her second action. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that Plaintiff’s third complaint was timely filed because Plaintiff properly provided pre-suit notice of her claim prior to filing her third action and was entitled to a 120-day extension in which to refile her complaint. Remanded.View "Cannon ex rel. Good v. Reddy" on Justia Law

Johanna Hicks died from an accidental overdose of her medications. Hicks’ estate filed suit against the doctor who treated Hicks for severe chronic pain for negligently causing Hicks’ death and filed suit against the doctor’s employer, claiming it should be held vicariously liable for the doctor’s negligence. A jury found that the doctor was not negligent in his treatment of Johanna and returned a defense verdict. On appeal, the estate argued that the district court erred by permitting the doctor and his codefendant to introduce the testimony of two expert witnesses on the doctor’s adherence to the appropriate standard of care for practitioners of pain medicine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the estate failed to preserve for appellate review the issue regarding the admissibility of the testimony of the two standard of care experts.View "Hicks v. Zondag" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, Vicki Wilkinson appealed the circuit court's dismissal of her civil action with prejudice based on the motions filed by respondents East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc., Carolina Aesthetic Plastic Surgery Institute, P.A., and Dr. Thomas Hahm. Wilkinson argued on appeal that the court erred in finding: (1) the statute of limitations was not tolled because she failed to file an expert witness affidavit contemporaneously with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code; and (2) she failed to file her Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations given she did not contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with the Complaint or within forty-five days thereafter in accordance with section 15-36-100(C). This appeal implicated the Court of Appeals' decision in "Ranucci v. Crain," (723 S.E.2d 242 (Ct. App. 2012)) ("Ranucci I"). The Supreme Court reversed Ranucci I, holding that section 15-79-125(A) incorporatesdsection 15-36-100 in its entirety. Therefore, Wilkinson could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit with her NOI and tolled the applicable statute of limitations. However, because the analysis in Ranucci II was limited to the dismissal of the pre-litigation NOI, it was not dispositive since this case involved the next procedural step in medical malpractice litigation. Accordingly, the circuit court's order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilkinson v. East Cooper Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Shannon Ranucci appealed the circuit court's order dismissing her medical malpractice case for failing to contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code. Ranucci argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in finding the affidavit of her medical expert was not timely filed because section 15-79-125 incorporated section 15-36-100, which included a "safe harbor" provision that extends the time for filing the affidavit. The Court of Appeals, holding the pre-litigation filing requirement for a medical malpractice case found in section 15-79-125 incorporated only the parts of section 15-36-100 that related to the preparation and content of an expert's affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Court held that section 15-79-125(A) incorporated section 15-36-100 in its entirety. Thus, Ranucci could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit and tolled the applicable statute of limitations. View "Ranucci v. Crain" on Justia Law