Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, West Virginia Mutual Insurance Company, Inc. (WVMIC), was a professional medical liability insurer that insured physicians, medical practices and others in West Virginia. The medical malpractice claims underlying the current dispute were asserted by Respondents against their surgeon’s former employer, United Health Professional, Inc. (UHP), a medical corporation insured under a medical malpractice policy issued by WVMIC for the year 2010. Under the terms of a global settlement agreement, WVMIC tendered $3 million to Respondents under an extended reporting endorsement insuring the surgeon. The settlement further provided that Respondents and WVMIC would abide by a judicial determination as to whether additional insurance limits were available for Respondents’ vicarious liability claims against UHP. The circuit court concluded that there was an additional $6 million in policy limits available for Respondents’ claims against UHP. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that UHP has a total of $3 million in separate policy limits under the 2010 policy for Respondents’ claims asserted against it, which amount was in addition to the $3 million that WVMIC previously tendered under the global settlement agreement for the claims asserted against the surgeon. Remanded. View "W. Va. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adkins" on Justia Law

Susan and Rodney Drown filed a medical malpractice action against Associated Women’s Health Specialists, P.C. (Health Specialists) asserting vicarious liability claims arising from the acts or omissions of its physicians. During the relevant period, Health Specialists was insured through a professional liability policy issued by Medical Inter-Insurance Exchange (Exchange). Health Specialists settled for the full amount of the policy and assigned to the Drowns its rights to recover against Exchange. Health Specialists was subsequently declared insolvent, and the Connecticut Insurance Guaranty Association (Association) assumed liability for the Exchange’s obligations. The Association then commenced this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that it had no obligations for the Drowns’ claims. Defendants, the Drowns and Health Specialists, counterclaimed. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Exchange’s preinsolvency breach of its duty to defend Health Specialists did not estop the Association from challenging its liability under the policy; and (2) the policy unambiguously did not cover Health Specialists for its vicarious liability in this case. View "Conn. Ins. Guar. Ass’n v. Drown" on Justia Law

Respondent-plaintiff Scott Simpson sought to obtain meeting minutes from two Cedar Springs Hospital quality management committees in his medical malpractice case. Cedar Springs refused to produce these documents, arguing they were protected by the quality management privilege in 25-3-109, C.R.S. (2014). Simpson argued at trial that Cedar Springs failed to show that the quality management program was "approved by" the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDHPE), and because Cedar Springs failed to adhere to the requirements of the CDHPE with regard to the program, the meeting minutes should have been produced. The trial court agreed with Simpson that simple licensure was insufficient to demonstrate that facilities "complied with what they are required to comply with" and no "authoritative" documentation was provided confirming the quality management plan was properly implemented. The Supreme Court reversed: "because a quality management program is required in order to be licensed by CDHPE, and because Cedar Springs was licensed by CDHPE during all relevant periods, its quality management program was necessarily "approved." Therefore the documents Simpson sought from Cedar Springs were privileged, and the trial court erred in ordering them produced. View "Simpson v. Cedar Springs Hosp., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against Defendant, and the claims brought by one of the plaintiffs were referred to arbitration. After an arbitration panel issued its decision but prior to the district court confirming that ruling and disposing of the remaining claims, Plaintiffs appealed. After the district court’s subsequent ruling, the Supreme Court dismissed as premature Plaintiffs’ appeal. More than sixty days after entry of the judgment, Plaintiffs filed a Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion seeking to reissue the judgment based on the presumption that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter its previous judgment because it had been divested of jurisdiction by Plaintiffs’ premature notice of appeal. The district court agreed and reissued the judgment, purporting to “amend” the judgment, without substantively altering the original decision. Plaintiffs then filed another notice of appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to issue the original judgment, and because Plaintiffs failed to timely appeal that judgment, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to address any challenge to the merits. View "Garver v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

Robert E. Anderson, M.D. and Selma Doctors Clinic, PC, d/b/a Selma Doctors Clinic ("SDC") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Circuit Court to vacate its order granting plaintiff Barbara Craig's Rule 60(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, and to reinstate the final judgment entered in favor of Dr. Anderson and SDC. This matter stemmed from a medical-malpractice/wrongful-death action filed by Barbara G. Craig as the administrator of the estate of her husband William Craig. Dr. Anderson performed hernia surgery on Mr. Craig at Vaughan Regional Medical Center ("VRMC"), following which, he died. Mrs. Craig sued Dr. Anderson, SDC, and VRMC alleging that the defendants were negligent in their care and treatment of Mr. Craig and that their conduct proximately caused his death. The trial court found that Mrs. Craig failed to qualify her expert on the applicable standard of care, and accordingly, was unable to establish that Dr. Anderson violated the applicable standard of care. Mrs. Craig filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to vacate the judgment or for a new trial. In the motion, Mrs. Craig contended that the trial court erred in excluding the expert's testimony. The trial court denied this motion, but granted her Rule 60(b)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which she argued that Dr. Anderson had committed perjury and had perpetrated a fraud upon the trial court by testifying that he had performed an ulcer surgery when, in fact, he had not done so. Upon review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting Mrs. Craig's Rule 60(b)(3) motion. The Court therefore granted Dr. Anderson's request and issued the writ. View "Craig v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Dr. Melvin Levine worked as a pediatric physician at Children’s Hospital Medical Center from 1966 to 1985. After leaving Children’s Hospital, Levine resumed practicing medicine as an employee of the University of North Carolina School of Medicine (UNC) in North Carolina. In 2011, eleven former patients of Levine at UNC (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought this negligence action against Children’s Hospital, alleging that Children’s Hospital knew or should have known Levine was conducting inappropriate genital examinations of minors during his employment at Children’s Hospital yet failed to report Levine’s conduct. Due to this alleged negligence, Plaintiffs asserted that Levine was able to continue his abuse of patients, including Plaintiffs, during his employment at UNC. The superior court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Children’s Hospital did not owe a legally cognizable duty of reasonable care to Plaintiffs requiring it to take affirmative action to protect them from Levine. View "Roe No. 1 v. Children's Hosp. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Santana-Concepcion underwent exploratory brain surgery around a “symptomatic arachnoid cyst” during which a neurosurgeon placed a shunt to relieve pressure created by the cyst. Santana-Concepcion, along with her husband and four children, later filed suit against the neurosurgeon and the hospital at which the surgery was performed, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, holding (1) the claims of Santana-Concepcion and her adult children were time-barred; (2) the medical malpractice claim of Santana-Concepcion’s minor children was foreclosed by the “error of judgment” defense; and (3) the informed consent claim of the minor children failed on the element of causation. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on (1) the medical malpractice claims of Santana-Concepcion and her adult children and the informed consent claims of the adult children, as they were not filed within the limitations period; (2) the minor plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims, as they were unable to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to the application of the “error of judgment” defense; and (3) the informed consent claims of the minor plaintiffs for lack of causation. View "Santana-Concepcion v. Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2002, plaintiff William Vaughan went to the emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital complaining of symptoms that included abdominal pain. In this medical negligence case, Vaughan alleged that, as the result of a communication failure between a surgeon and a contract radiologist, St. Vincent failed to tell Vaughan about a cancer diagnosis. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent because Vaughan did not specifically plead vicarious liability relating to the radiologist, St. Vincent's apparent agent, and failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact through expert testimony. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Vaughan's complaint adequately notified St. Vincent that one or more of its employees or agents was negligent and that genuine issues of material fact required resolution at a trial on the merits. View "Vaughan v. St. Vincent Hospital" on Justia Law

The mother of sixteen-month-old Max Zohar (collectively, the Zohars), filed a medical malpractice complaint against multiple defendants, including a physician, a nurse, and several EmCare entities (collectively, Respondents), asserting claims of medical malpractice, professional negligence and vicarious liability after Max’s finger was amputated. The Zohars attached an expert affidavit specifying the allegedly negligent activities of several individuals, but the affidavit did not identify Respondents by name. The district court granted Respondents’ motions to dismiss, concluding that the expert affidavit was deficient because it did not specifically name Respondents as negligent parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court should read a medical malpractice complaint and affidavit of merit together when determining whether the affidavit meets the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071; and (2) in this case, the expert affidavit, while it failed to specifically name allegedly negligent defendants, adequately supported the allegations of medical malpractice against Respondents and provided adequate notice to Respondents of the claims against them, and therefore the district court erred in finding that the expert affidavit was inadequate to support the Zohars’ allegations of medical malpractice against Respondents. View "Zohar v. Zbiegien" on Justia Law

Luvetta Goff died as a result of complications from elective surgery performed by Appellants at the University of Kentucky Hospital (UK Hospital). Goff’s estate filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice action against Appellants. During discovery, the estate requested an “incident” or “event” report generated by a UK Hospital nurse concerning the surgery through the UK Healthcare Safety Evaluation System. Appellant sought a protective order concerning the report, arguing that it fell within the federal privilege created by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. The court of appeals granted Appellants the writ. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals regarding the scope of the privilege under the Act, holding (1) the court of appeals was misguided in its ultimate limitations on the scope of the privilege; and (2) information normally contained in an incident report is not privileged under the Act and may be discovered, following an in camera review, and its information compelled. Remanded. View "Tibbs v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law