Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In 2010, Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit against Appellants, several healthcare practitioners. Before trial, Appellants filed third-party complaints against Gary Slaton for contribution and an allocation of fault pursuant to, inter alia, the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. The jury apportioned one hundred percent of fault to Slaton and found that Plaintiff obtained zero damages. The circuit court later vacated its previous judgment and granted a new trial based on recent decisions by the Supreme Court, concluding that the third-party complaints were not properly before the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Act 1116 of 2013 could not be applied retroactively to this case because it created a new, substantive right of allocation of fault that Appellants sought to invoke in this case; and (2) any error in instructing the jury was not harmless. View "English v. Robbins" on Justia Law

Hours after receiving an angiogram from defendant-petitioner Dr. James Chapman, Dr. Lynn Harner died. Dr. Harner's wife, plaintiff-respondent Carolyn Harner subsequently sued petitioner for medical malpractice. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in accordance with Colorado case law, or whether it shifted only the burden of production in accordance with more recently adopted Colorado Rule of Evidence (CRE) 301. The Court of Appeals followed case law and disregarded CRE 301 n the absence of any clear statements by the Supreme Court overruling its precedent. After considering the various conflicting authorities on the subject, the Supreme Court concluded that CRE 301 represented the better approach to burden-shifting under res ipsa loquitur. Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration of respondent's remaining arguments. View "Chapman v. Harner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action alleging negligence on the part of employees or agents of Defendants, Connecticut Childbirth & Women’s Center and Women’s Health Associates, P.C., during the delivery of her child and at postpartum office visits. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a(c) on the ground that the physician opinion letter submitted by Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requirements of section 52-190a(1) because the letter was not authored by a similar health care provider, as defined in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-184c(c). Specifically, because Plaintiff brought this action principally on the basis of vicarious liability for the alleged negligence of certain certified midwives, Defendants argued that Plaintiff was required to submit an opinion letter authored by a certified nurse-midwife or registered nurse. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiff provided an opinion letter of a physician who is board certified in obstetrics, which is the same specialty practiced by the nurse-midwives, Plaintiff fulfilled the requirements of section 52-184c(c) and 52-190a. Remanded. View "Wilkins v. Conn. Childbirth & Women's Ctr." on Justia Law

Christian Westby, James Westby, and Kristina Westby appealed the district court’s denial of their motion to reconsider the court’s protective order granted to Mercy Medical Center and Dr. Gregory Schaefer. This case arose from the Westbys’ claim that Dr. Schaefer’s and Mercy Medical’s negligence resulted in lifelong brain damage to Christian Westby. Near the end of discovery, the district court granted Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s protective order motion to prohibit the Westbys from deposing Mercy Medical and Dr. Schaefer’s expert witnesses. The district court later denied the Westbys’ motion to reconsider that protective order. The Westbys argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the district court abused its discretion by not requiring any showing of good cause or unreasonable delay and basing its decision on a mistaken belief that the Westbys were dilatory. The Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred, vacated the order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Westby, et al v. Schaefer, M.D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice action in New York against Laser Spine Institute (LSI) and various LSI professionals after undergoing unsuccessful back surgeries at an LSI facility in Tampa, Florida. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Supreme Court granted the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over LSI and its doctors because they were not transacting business in New York within the meaning of N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1) and there was no personal jurisdiction under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(3) because Plaintiff’s injury did not occur in New York. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that New York lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendants. View "Paterno v. Laser Spine Inst." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Bard, manufacturer and seller of polypropylene mesh kits, for personal injuries, and plaintiff's husband sought damages for loss of consortium. A jury found Bard was negligent and awarded $5.5 million in damages. The jury also found that plaintiff's surgeon, a nonparty, was 40 percent at fault and the trial court reduced the award accordingly. The court concluded that the jury was properly instructed on the theory of negligent design, negligent training, and negligent misrepresentation; substantial evidence supported the negligence verdict; and Bard was not denied a fair trial. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that it was necessary to instruct the jury on medical professional negligence to support the apportionment and, because the jury was not so instructed, the trial court erred in reducing the damages. Plaintiffs acquiesced in the giving of incomplete jury instructions on the surgeon's fault when it was in their best interest for the jury to be properly instructed on that issue. Consequently, plaintiffs are estopped from asserting this instructional error on appeal. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Scott v. C.R. Bard, Inc." on Justia Law

Twelve-year-old J.K. underwent an appendectomy performed by Appellee, but complications arose requiring additional surgery and medical treatment. Appellants, on behalf of J.K., filed a medical malpractice claim against Appellee. Appellee moved to dismiss, alleging that the claim was barred by the two-year statute of limitations contained in Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-3-107(a)(ii). The district court granted the motion. Appellants appealed, arguing that the statute, as applied to minors, violates the Wyoming Constitution. The Supreme Court agreed and therefore reversed, holding that section 1-3-107(a)(ii) violates the open courts provision of Wyoming’s Constitution by restricting a minor’s access to the courts. Remanded. View "Kordus v. Montes" on Justia Law

After Susan Special died following the delivery of her son, Frank Special, Susan’s husband and the personal representative of his wife’s estate, filed a negligence lawsuit against Dr. Ivo Baux, Baux’s related corporations, and West Boca Medical Center, Inc. for negligence. After a jury trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the defendants. The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that alleged errors on the part of the trial court “did not contribute to the verdict” and were therefore harmless. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the test for harmless error requires the beneficiary of the error to prove that there is no reasonable possibility that the error complained of contributed to the verdict; and (2) there was a reasonable possibility in this case that the errors by the trial court contributed to the verdict. View "Special v. W. Boca Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Appellant, as the special administrator of the Estate of Robert Nash, filed a wrongful-death suit against Dr. Victor Williams alleging that Dr. Williams placed a nasogastric tube against Nash’s express wishes and that he placed it improperly, thereby causing Nash to aspirate and suffer hypoxic brain injury. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Williams. On appeal, Appellant argued, among other things, that the circuit court abused its discretion in giving the jury erroneous and confusing instructions in a case premised on lack of consent. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in instructing the jury regarding the issue of informed consent. View "Millsap v. Williams" on Justia Law

Joanne Anderson sued Jackson Hospital and Clinic, Inc., Dr. Stephen K. Kwan, and Dr. Kwan's practice group, Capital Cardio-Thoracic, P.C. asserting medical-malpractice claims against them. The trial court granted a motion to substitute bankruptcy trustee Daniel Hamm for Anderson as the real party in interest because Anderson had filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy after her medical malpractice claim had accrued. The Jackson Hospital defendants subsequently petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, arguing that Hamm's attempt to be substituted as the real party in interest was untimely. Anderson filed a separate Rule 5 petition for permission to appeal challenging the trial court's decision to remove her as the plaintiff in this case. The Supreme Court granted both petitions; however, treated the parties' petitions for permissive appeals as petitions for writs of mandamus, found that neither were entitle to mandamus relief, and denied the petitions. View "Anderson v. Jackson Hospital & Clinic" on Justia Law