Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Bradly Brothers received medical treatment at Kimball County Hospital after suffering injuries in a single-vehicle accident. After a chiropractor subsequently discovered multiple fractures in Brothers’ finger, Brothers filed a tort claim pursuant to the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act and later filed a complaint against Kimball County, the Hospital, and a Physician. The district court dismissed the County and entered summary judgment for the Hospital and the Physician. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a county hospital is a separate legal entity from the county, and because the County in this case could have no liability under the facts alleged, any error by the district court in failing to allow Brothers to present evidence on the County’s motion to dismiss was harmless; and (2) the Hospital and Physician were properly dismissed due to Brothers’ failure to meet the Act’s filing requirements. View "Brothers v. Kimball County Hosp." on Justia Law

In 2010, Blevins had knee surgery at a surgical facility. The knee later became infected by bacteria, subsequently found on a sponge manufactured by Ruhof that had been used to clean surgical equipment before the surgery. The bacteria had apparently "survived the sterilization process." The surgical center paid Blevins $4,118.23 for medical expenses he incurred in treating the infection. Blevins did not sign an agreement releasing the center from liability; he was not represented by counsel and the center did not give him written notice of the statute of limitations for a medical malpractice action. More than 15 months after receiving the payment, Blevins filed suit. Ruhof settled for $100,000. The trial court, relying on Insurance Code section 11583, ruled that the one-year limitations period was tolled by the payment of medical expenses. The trial court reduced a jury’s award of damages against the surgical facility to $285,114. The court of appeal affirmed. Section 11583, which provides that the applicable statute of limitations is tolled when advance or partial payment is made to an injured and unrepresented person without notifying him of the applicable limitations period, applies to the one-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions. View "Coastal Surgical Inst. v. Blevins" on Justia Law

Tallahatchie General Hospital moved to dismiss a medical malpractice claim filed against it because the plaintiffs failed to provide it with proper presuit notice before the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the filing of the complaint tolled the statute of limitations, despite the plaintiffs’ failure to provide proper presuit notice. Finding no reversible error to the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Tallahatchie General Hospital v. Howe" on Justia Law

The day after seeking treatment at Ashland Health Center, a municipal hospital, Ann Krier died. Four days after the executor of Krier’s estate (Plaintiff) submitted a notice of claim to Ashland, asserting claims against the hospital for the alleged negligence of its employees, Plaintiff filed a wrongful death action and a survivor action against one of Ashland’s employees (Defendant). The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff failed to comply with the notice requirements in Kan. Stat. Ann. 12-105b by not waiting to file the lawsuits until the statutorily required time of 120 days had elapsed after submitting the written notice to the hospital. A divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that failure to comply with section 12-105b(d) does not deprive a district court of jurisdiction over a lawsuit against a municipal employee because the jurisdictional bar in the statute unambiguously applies only to lawsuits against municipalities. View "Whaley v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, including Cumberland County Health System, Inc. (CCHS), seeking damages based upon negligence after an accidental fire during a surgery caused first and second degree burns to Plaintiff. Plaintiff filed motions to compel discovery of certain documents in the possession of CCHS. Defendants claimed the documents were shielded from discovery by N.C. Gen. Stat. 131E-95, which protects the “proceedings of a medical review committee, the records and materials it produces and the materials it considers.” The trial court disagreed with Defendants and granted the motions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that section 131E-95 did not apply because Defendants had not shown that the withheld documents were part of a medical review committee’s proceedings, were produced by a medical review committee, or were considered by a medical review committee as required by the statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that CCHS failed to demonstrate the existence of a medical review committee within the meaning of the statute, and therefore, the documents were not shielded from discovery on this basis. View "Hammond v. Saini" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, who performed laser surgery on Plaintiff’s eye. Before trial, Defendant filed a motion seeking a waiver of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-115(b)’s contiguous state requirement, which would allow an ophthalmologist from Florida to testify as an expert witness. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Defendant had not established that appropriate witnesses would otherwise be unavailable. The court of appeals granted Defendant a Tenn. R. App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal and concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to waive the contiguous state requirement. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the court of appeals, holding that the court of appeals improvidently granted Defendant’s application for extraordinary appeal. View "Gilbert v. Wessels" on Justia Law

After Peggy Branham was involved in an accident, she was transported to the University of Kentucky Medical Center, where she was examined and treated by several physicians (Physicians). Two and one half hours after arriving in the emergency room, Branham was discharged. Branham died thirty-six hours later due to a ruptured aorta related to blunt force trauma to her chest. One year later, Branham’s estate (Estate) brought suit against the Physicians, the Medical Center, and University Hospital of the Albert B. Chandler Medical Center, Inc. (the Hospital Corporation). The trial court dismissed the claims against the Medical Center and the Hospital Corporation on grounds of sovereign immunity, and the jury found in favor of the Physicians. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in excluding evidence of one physician’s licensure problems and another physician’s failure to pass his medical board examination; (2) did not abuse its discretion in permitting the Physicians to call multiple expert witnesses; (3) properly instructed the jury regarding the standard of care; and (4) correctly concluded that the Hospital Corporation and the Medical Center had immunity. View "Branham v. Rock" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants for medical malpractice and medical battery. Before trial, Plaintiff settled with two defendants, and the case went to trial against the third defendant, Dr. Franklin Moser. The jury found that Moser’s negligence caused Plaintiff’s injury and awarded $331,250 for past noneconomic damages and $993,750 for future noneconomic damages. The trial court reduced the award of noneconomic damages to $250,000, conforming with the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) cap. Moser appealed, contending that he was entitled to offsets of the amount of the pretrial settlement attributable to noneconomic losses. The court of appeal held that offsets were required by the MICRA cap even though Moser failed to establish the comparative fault of the settling defendants. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeal insofar as it reduced the award of noneconomic damages below $250,000, holding that the court erred in allowing Moser a setoff against damages for which he alone was responsible. View "Rashidi v. Moser" on Justia Law

In October 2010, Clara Dees filed a medical malpractice suit against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees and against River Region Medical Center and its employees. River Region was owned by Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC. Dees also filed, with her complaint, a certificate of consultation. Dees filed an amended complaint in January 2011, also accompanied by a certificate. No summonses were issued until after February 16, 2011, the same date Dees moved the court for an enlargement of time (which was granted). Dees issued a number of summonses from February 22 to March 3, 2011. In May, an agreed order staying the proceedings and compelling binding arbitration was entered concerning defendants Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Vicksburg Healthcare moved to set aside the order allowing additional time to serve process. Vicksburg Healthcare also moved to dismiss and, alternatively, moved for summary judgment, while also asserting its affirmative defenses and answering the amended complaint. In February 2012, Heritage House Nursing Home filed its motion to confirm the arbitrator’s ruling. Dees failed to submit a response, and failed to request additional time in which to respond, and did not request a continuance of the scheduled hearing. The circuit court confirmed the decision of the arbitrator, dismissing with prejudice all claims against Heritage House Nursing Home and its employees. Subsequently, a notice of service of discovery requests was filed by Vicksburg Healthcare in September of 2012. In December, Vicksburg Healthcare filed a motion to compel discovery and for sanctions, and shortly thereafter filed a new a motion for summary judgment on the basis that Dees had failed to designate any expert witness and had failed to provide expert-witness testimony to establish a prima facie case in support of her claim. Dees then responded, requesting that the motion for summary judgment be denied, and designating her expert. No affidavit signed by the expert was attached. The motion for summary judgment was heard by the circuit court in January 2013, and was denied based on Dees’s designation. The circuit court granted Dees an additional sixty days in which to provide a sworn affidavit of the expert’s testimony. The circuit court provided that Vicksburg Healthcare could renew its motion for summary judgment once the expert opinion had been submitted. Vicksburg Healthcare petitioned the Supreme Court for interlocutory appeal, arguing (1) that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment; and (2) that the trial court erred in granting Dees additional time to submit her expert's affidavit establishing her claim. The Supreme Court concluded the record was clear that the trial court erred in not granting Vicksburg Healthcare’s motion for summary judgment. The trial court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Vicksburg Healthcare, LLC v. Dees" on Justia Law

The plaintiff-patient presented expert testimony in this medical malpractice case establishing that following the patient's heart surgery, the surgeons in charge of the patient's postoperative recovery failed to meet their standard of care, which required appropriately monitoring the patient for "compartment syndrome," a known possible complication following such surgery, and also failed to direct members of the hospital's care team treating the patient during his recovery to so monitor. The jury found for plaintiff but the trial court overturned the verdict, reasoning that plaintiff failed to prove that the standard of care had been breached by any one individual member of the hospital's team. The Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court, reasoning that because plaintiff failed to prove negligence by a particular individual, "[he] failed to prove the standard of care for the relevant 'health care provider."' The primary issue in this medical malpractice case is whether the trial court properly granted the defendant hospital's postverdict motion for judgment as a matter of law. Considering the inferences and the evidence presented in plaintiff's favor, the Supreme Court concluded plaintiff met his burden under chapter 7.70 RCW to show that identified health care providers employed by the hospital failed to meet the applicable standard of care in monitoring his postoperation recovery for compartment syndrome, resulting in the untimely diagnosis of that syndrome and proximately causing injury to plaintiff by failure to timely treat that complication. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to reinstate the jury verdict in favor of plaintiff. View "Grove v. Peacehealth St. Joseph Hosp." on Justia Law