Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In 2011, after about two weeks of reporting symptoms and being treated for constipation and gas, Allard, a prisoner at the Clarinda Correctional Facility of the Iowa Department of Corrections , suffered a bowel obstruction and perforation. Allard had emergency surgery where a colostomy bag was installed and his bowel was repaired. Allard filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment to the prison staff. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim that material questions of fact existed regarding the appropriateness of the care Allard received. Although Allard demonstrated that CCF medical staff failed to properly diagnose his bowel obstruction, and demonstrated that failure to treat the bowel obstruction led to a bowel perforation, Allard failed to put forward evidence to support a finding of deliberate indifference. View "Allard v. Baldwin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against Defendants, medical providers, alleging, inter alia, claims of medical malpractice and negligence. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice (1) did not overlook genuine disputes as to material facts that would preclude summary judgment; (2) did not err in finding that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not properly be applied to the facts of this case; and (3) did not err in granting summary judgment in light of what Defendant alleged was the “egregious conduct” of his former attorney. View "Laplante v. Rhode Island Hospital" on Justia Law

David Garver and Katheryn Garver filed a medical malpractice action against several medical providers. The claims brought by David were referred to arbitration. The Garvers filed an appeal after the arbitration panel issued its decision but before the district court issued a judgment conforming to the arbitration award. The district court subsequently dismissed the Garvers’ claims. The Garvers filed a motion pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) arguing that the district court had been divested of jurisdiction by their premature notice of appeal, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the judgment. The district court agreed and purported to reissue the judgment. The Garvers then filed another notice of appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the district court had jurisdiction to issue its original judgment and erred in assuming it was divested of jurisdiction by the Garvers’ premature notice of appeal; and (2) because the Garvers failed to timely appeal the original judgment, the Court lacked jurisdiction to address any challenge to the merits. View "Garver v. Rosenberg" on Justia Law

Billy Jo Ries gave birth to a daughter who, due to the loss of approximately one-third of her blood during delivery, suffered multiple organ failure and brain damage. The Rieses filed suit against the hospital, the physician who delivered their daughter, and the neonatologist who treated their daughter after her birth, alleging medical negligence. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the defendants. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence testimony from an expert that was not scientifically reliable under the Daubert standard. The physician appealed, arguing that the court of appeals impermissibly substituted its findings for the trial court’s findings regarding the reliability of the expert testimony and erroneously determined that the error required reversal. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court did not err in admitting the expert testimony, and if there was error, it was harmless. View "Oliphant v. Ries" on Justia Law

Patricia Powell filed this medical malpractice action against Dr. Todd Tallman, alleging that Dr. Tallman was medically negligent in causing the death of her spouse. During discovery, Powell moved to exclude from trial the opinions that were set out in a supplemental expert witness disclosure submitted by Dr. Tallman, alleging that the disclosure was made to Powell’s counsel a significant time after the deadline for making such disclosures. The trial court granted the motion. Dr. Tallman then invoked the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court’s order. The Supreme Court granted the writ, holding that the circuit court committed error as a matter of law in precluding Dr. Tallman’s experts from presenting their additional opinions at trial. View "State ex re. Tallman v. Hon. Susan B. Tucker" on Justia Law

AEG hired Dr. Murray as entertainer Michael Jackson’s personal physician for a concert tour. Michael died of acute propofol intoxication while under Murray’s care. Katherine Jackson, on behalf of herself and as guardian of Michael’s children, Michael Jr., Paris-Michael and Prince Michael, filed suit for negligence hiring, retention, and supervision. The jury found that Murray was not unfit or incompetent to perform the work for which he was hired. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in summarily adjudicating negligence because AEG did not owe Michael a duty to refrain from exerting pressure over Murray; AEG did not undertake to provide protective services to Michael; and AEG owed Michael no duty arising out of the contract with Murray. The court also did not err in summarily adjudicating respondeat superior because the undisputed facts establish that Murray was an independent contractor as a matter of law; AEG is not liable under the peculiar risk doctrine as an independent contractor; and Murray was not an agent of AEG. The trial court did not err in instructing the jurors with a modified jury instruction along with the special verdict form; the special verdict was legally sufficient. View "Jackson v. AEG Live, LLC" on Justia Law

In this health care liability case, Plaintiffs, before filing their health care liability complaint, gave Defendants written notice pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121(a)(1). Plaintiffs subsequently voluntarily dismissed their case. The next year, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint, raising the same claims against the same defendants. Plaintiffs did not give Defendants pre-suit notice before filing the second action. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice for Plaintiffs’ failure to comply with the notice requirement of section 29-26-121(a)(1). The Court of Appeals reversed, determining that, since the complaints were essentially identical, the statute required only that Defendants be notified once. The Supreme Court reversed and dismissed the action without prejudice, holding (1) section 29-26-121(a)(1) requires that plaintiffs notify prospective defendants of a forthcoming health care liability lawsuit before the filing of each complaint, and the sanction for failure to comply with the statute is dismissal without prejudice; and (2) Plaintiffs in this case failed to provide the required pre-suit notice. View "Foster v. Chiles" on Justia Law

This case arose from the death of Seth Cromer at the pediatric intensive-care unit of Children’s Hospital Medical Center. Seth’s mother and father, individually and as administrator, brought this medical-negligence action against the hospital, alleging that Seth’s death was caused by the negligence of multiple hospital employees. The trial court entered judgment in favor of the hospital. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by including an instruction on foreseeability when it instructed the jury on the hospital’s standard of care. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) foreseeability of harm is generally relevant to the determination of the scope of a physician’s duty in a medical-malpractice action, and therefore, giving a foreseeability instruction in such an action is not manifestly incorrect; (2) where the parties in this case did not dispute that the physician understood that the chosen course of treatment carried some risk of harm, the instruction regarding foreseeability was not necessary; and (3) the unneeded jury instruction on foreseeability did not prejudice Plaintiffs’ substantial rights, and therefore, reversal was not justified. View "Cromer v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr. of Akron" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually, and on behalf of her children, sued two physicians for medical malpractice. During the ensuing trial, one of the jurors fainted while she was sitting in her chair in the jury box. One of the defendant physicians immediately rose to assist the juror, after which the juror recovered and was excused. Plaintiffs moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. The jury subsequently returned verdicts for the physicians. The court of appeals reversed and ordered a new trial as to both physicians. The physician who did not help the ailing juror sought further review. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals as to the appellant, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed the jury verdict to stand as to the physician who had not rendered medical assistance because nothing in that physician’s behavior during the incident could have “engendered any particular good will in her favor.” Remanded. View "Jack v. Booth" on Justia Law

In 1997, Dr. Michael Hayes and Dr. Michael Taillon were working as emergency room physicians at Providence Hospital, presumably as independent contractors. Arthur Sharpe came to the Providence Hospital emergency room complaining of chest pain. Dr. Hayes and Dr. Taillon evaluated Sharpe and diagnosed him as suffering from reflux. Sharpe was discharged. Sharpe had actually suffered a heart attack, which was determined a few days later when he sought further medical care elsewhere. Because of the misdiagnosis, in 1999, Sharpe and his wife filed a medical malpractice and loss of consortium action against Providence Hospital and Dr. Hayes. The Sharpes did not name Dr. Taillon as a defendant. Providence Hospital settled with the Sharpes in 2004. In 2007, Providence Hospital filed this equitable indemnification action against Dr. Taillon and his medical malpractice insurer, The South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association (collectively Respondents). Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground that the medical malpractice statute of repose barred Providence Hospital's claim and the circuit court granted the motion on that basis. Providence Hospital appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the medical malpractice statute of repose applied to Providence Hospital's indemnity claim. The Court concluded that Providence Hospital's indemnity action was indeed barred by the statute of repose, and as such affirmed the trial court. View "Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare System v. So. Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association" on Justia Law