Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

This case centered on a claim for reimbursement made by California's State Department of Health Care Services for funds expended on behalf of an injured party by the state's Medi-Cal program. The injured party, Ashlynn Aguilera, filed a special motion to determine the Department's lien under Welfare & Institutions Code section 14124.76. When Ashlynn was two months old she suffered injuries as a result of the negligence of a physician. She underwent a hemispherectomy (removal of half of the cerebral portion of her brain). Ashlynn suffered from global developmental delay, mental retardation and behavioral disorders. Ashlynn filed an action for medical malpractice and her parents settled the action for $950,000. The settlement was near the defendant's liability policy limits. The trial court approved the settlement, along with the request of Ashlynn's counsel for attorney fees and costs totaling $253,006. Ashlynn's parents received $85,000 of the settlement as a resolution of their prospective wrongful death action against the defendant. The balance of the settlement was placed in a special needs trust. The Department asserted a lien on Ashlynn's recovery, based on the $211,191 that it spent on her behalf. Ashlynn supported her special motion with declarations from her counsel and two physicians, presenting evidence regarding: her life expectancy; the care she will need throughout her life; the cost of future care; lost earning capacity; and the value of her pain and suffering. Among other things, Ashlynn presented evidence that she needs 16 hours per day of licensed vocational nurse (LVN) attendant care until she reaches the age of 21, and 24 hours per day LVN attendant care for the rest of her life. Upon review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly employed the methodology used in "Arkansas Dept. of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn,"(547 U.S. 268 (2006)) but erred when it refused to reduce the Department's lien to account for the attorney fees and expenses Ashlynn incurred. The matter was remanded to the trial court to set aside the order and conduct further proceedings: (1) regarding whether the cost of Ashlynn's future at-home attendant care and medical care should be included in its Ahlborn calculation; and (2) apply section 14124.72 (d) to determine the Department's share of Ashlynn's attorney fees and costs. View "Aguilera v. Loma Linda Univ. Med. Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a civil action against a physician and his employer alleging that Defendants negligently failed to protect the confidentiality of his HIV test results and seeking to recover both compensatory and exemplary damages. The superior court granted Defendant's motion to strike Plaintiff’s claims for exemplary damages and severed Plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages without holding an evidentiary hearing pursuant to Palmisano v. Toth. The Supreme Court quashed the order of the superior court, holding that the hearing justice erred failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing in accordance with the Court’s holding in Palmisano on Plaintiff’s claim for exemplary damages. Remanded. View "Sherman v. Ejnes" on Justia Law

Ronald Hines was a Texas-licensed veterinarian who practiced since the mid-1960s. He worked mainly in traditional veterinary practices until he retired in 2002. After his retirement, he founded a website and began to post articles about pet health and care. These general writings soon turned to more targeted guidance and, as he acknowledged in his complaint, he began “to provide veterinary advice to specific pet owners about their pets.” This advice was given via email and telephone calls, and Hines “never physically examine[d] the animals that are the subject of his advice,” though he did review veterinary records provided by the animal owners. Texas required veterinarians to conduct a physical examination of an animal or its premises before they can practice veterinary medicine with respect to that animal. In 2012, the Texas Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners informed Hines that by providing veterinary advice without a physical examination, he had violated Texas law. Hines eventually agreed to: abide by the relevant state laws, including the physical examination requirement, one year of probation; a stayed suspension of his license; a $500 fine; and to retake the jurisprudence portion of the veterinary licensing exam. Hines thereafter filed suit in federal court, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. He argued that the physical examination requirement violates his First Amendment right to free speech as well as his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Board moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The district court granted the Board’s motion in part and denied it in part. With respect to the equal protection claim, the court concluded that because the law did not discriminate on the basis of any suspect classification, the count was evaluated pursuant to rational basis review, and held that the physical examination requirement passed that deferential standard. The court dismissed Hines’s substantive due process claim for similar reasons. The district court denied the motion to dismiss the First Amendment claims. It recognized that states have broad power to regulate professionals, but determined that because the physical examination requirement “regulate[s] professional speech itself,” it is subject to the First Amendment. Relying on federal Supreme Court precedent, the district court held that Hines had stated a plausible claim that the Board had infringed his First Amendment rights. The Board moved to certify for interlocutory review the district court’s order. The issue this case presented for the Fifth Circuit's review thus centered on whether Hines' First or Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. The Court concluded it offends neither, reversing the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s First Amendment counts and affirming the district court’s granting of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment counts. View "Hines v. Alldredge" on Justia Law

Reed claims that during a 2012 stay at the hospital, its staff ignored her requests, treated her poorly, refused to consult with her regarding her care, and physically injured her when she was forcibly discharged. An amended complaint alleged an unelaborated claim of “retaliation,” a violation of the ADA, and state-law claims. The judge dismissed, without prejudice, after considering whether any of her claims asserted a violation of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794 or the retaliation provision of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. 12203. Reed filed a second case, asserting that she suffers from tardive dyskinesia plus post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and acute anxiety; she uses a computer to communicate. The complaint alleged specific instances of mistreatment and various constitutional violations 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed, finding that her claims were precluded by the dismissal of her earlier suit and that neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act could offer her any remedy. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that the complaint stated viable claims. View "Reed v. Columbia St. Mary's Hosp." on Justia Law

The decedent in this case died from an acute intra-abdominal bleed from a hematoma with adjacent tissue damage. The day before his death, the decedent visited an emergency department, where CT scans of the decedent’s abdomen, pelvis, and chest were performed and sent to Defendant, a radiologist. The decedent’s widow (Plaintiff) sued the radiologist, alleging that the radiologist negligently evaluated the CT scans. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that Plaintiff failed to establish that Defendant’s negligence caused the decedent’s death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court correctly granted judgment for Defendant because Plaintiff failed to establish causation, an essential element of Plaintiff’s medical malpractice claim, by failing to establish that the decedent would not have died but for Defendant’s alleged breach of the standard of care. View "Drouhard-Nordhus v. Rosenquist" on Justia Law

Appellee Maria Brady had a lengthy history of foot problems. By 2007, both of her feet were in pain due to toe deformities. Appellee’s podiatrist, William Urbas, D.P.M., successfully treated toes on her left foot with surgery; he then turned his attention to her right foot. One of Appellee’s primary complaints on her right foot pertained to a hammer-toe condition of her second toe: this deformity caused the middle of Appellee’s second toe to rise above the plane of the foot, which in turn caused rubbing and pain when Appellee wore shoes. Dr. Urbas performed a total of four operations between March 2008 and January 2010. Before each surgery, he explained the risks and complications that could occur, and Appellee signed a consent form acknowledging her awareness of these possible outcomes. The first operation did not finally alleviate Appellee’s condition, and Dr. Urbas eventually performed three more surgeries, each involving, among other things, the removal of additional bone material with the expectation that the foot would, over time, generate soft tissue to fill the gap and provide flexibility. Nevertheless, Appellee’s pain persisted and, in the end, her toe was less stable and significantly shorter than it had been initially. In August 2010, Appellee consulted a different podiatrist, Dr. Harold Schoenhaus, who performed a bone-graft operation which returned the toe to approximately ninety percent of its original length. This procedure also had the effect of restoring some of the toe’s stability and substantially reducing the pain. Appellee testified that she was pleased with the outcome of Dr. Schoenhaus’ surgery and that she returned to all levels of activity. In December 2010, Appellee filed a complaint against Dr. Urbas, alleging that he negligently treated her toe in the three follow-up surgeries performed after March 2008. In this appeal by allowance involving alleged medical negligence, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether a doctor may introduce evidence that the patient was informed of and acknowledged various risks of surgery, although the complaint does not assert a cause of action based on a lack of informed consent. After unsuccessfully moving for a new trial on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting the consent evidence, Appellee appealed. The Superior Court vacated and remanded for a new trial. In concluding that the trial court had abused its discretion, the Superior Court court adopted the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Virginia regarding the relevancy of consent evidence in a medical malpractice case: assent to treatment does not amount to consent to negligence, regardless of the enumerated risks and complications of which the patient was made aware. In a trial on a malpractice complaint that only asserts negligence, and not lack of informed consent, evidence that a patient agreed to go forward with the operation in spite of the risks of which she was informed is irrelevant and should be excluded. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that evidence that a patient affirmatively consented to treatment after being informed of the risks of that treatment is generally irrelevant to a cause of action sounding in medical negligence. View "Brady v. Urbas" on Justia Law

In 2008 Knox, the mother of Keys and the sister of Smith underwent surgery on her thyroid. When Knox was transferred from a post-anesthesia care unit to a medical-surgical unit, a nurse noticed Knox’s breathing was “noisy,” and called the hospital’s rapid assessment team to evaluate her. During the medical team’s efforts Knox was without a pulse for a number of minutes and as a result of her blocked airway, she suffered a permanent brain injury. She died after life support was withdrawn. A jury awarded Keys and Smith damages on their claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that plaintiffs meaningfully comprehended the medical negligence that led to the death of their family member at the time the negligence was occurring. View "Keys v. Alta Bates Summit Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

After Plaintiff underwent cervical disk replacement surgery at Rhode Island Hospital she suffered a stroke caused by a vertebral artery dissection. Dr. Gita Pensa at Newport Hospital treated Plaintiff when she first complained of pain due to the stroke, but Plaintiff was later discharged from the hospital. Plaintiff filed this medical malpractice action against Newport Hospital, Dr. Pensa, and NewPort Emergency Physicians, Inc. (collectively, Defendants), alleging negligence and lack of informed consent. After a three-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants, finding that Plaintiff had failed to prove that Dr. Pensa had breached the standard of care. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial justice’s erroneous admission into evidence of three documents during the voir dire of Plaintiff’s standard-of-care expert, combined with the questionable wording of one question on the jury verdict form, was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new trial. View "O’Connor v. Newport Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Phyllis Paetsch was referred to Spokane Dermatology Clinic for Botox injections to smooth facial wrinkles. Paetsch had never heard of the clinic, had never been there before, and was not aware of the staff or medical reputation of the clinic. She made an appointment for treatment and was told that her appointment would be with Dan Rhoads. Spokane Dermatology Clinic is a professional services company owned solely by Dr. William Werschler. The clinic also employed another doctor as a dermatologist and three certified physician's assistants (PA-Cs), one of which was Dan Rhoads. Paetsch completed some medical history and patient profile forms, signed them, then was escorted to her appointment room. She was told "the doctor" would be in soon. Shortly thereafter, a man in scrubs entered and introduced himself as "Dan." Rhoads injected Paetsch with both Botox and Restylane. He injected Restylane into Paetsch's forehead, not knowing that the federal Food and Drug Administration did not approve the use of Restylane in the forehead as it increased the risk of necrosis. While initially pleased with the results, Paetsch later developed a headache, the symptoms of which worsened. Rhoads misdiagnosed her condition as an infection and prescribed antibiotics and anti-inflammatories to control it. These treatments were ineffective, and Paetsch's condition continued to deteriorate. Paetsch sought treatment from her primary care provider. The clinic properly diagnosed the condition as necrosis caused by the use of Restylane in the forehead; the Restylane had expanded throughout the forehead, cutting off the only flow of blood to the skin. This diagnosis was too late to treat the condition, and the provider could only scrape the dead tissue from Paetsch's face. The necrosis resulted in deep, permanent scarring to Paetsch's forehead. Paetsch filed suit against Spokane Dermatology Clinic and against Dr. Werschler personally for the failure to obtain her informed consent to treatment and for medical malpractice by Dr. Werschler and Dan Rhoads. At trial, Paetsch presented evidence that Dr. Werschler presented himself as her doctor through the use of consent forms, that he owed her a duty of care, and that he breached that duty. Paetsch also presented evidence that as a PA-C, Rhoads was an agent of the physician and that Dr. Werschler's failure to adequately supervise Rhoads breached the standard of care. After the close of evidence, the trial court granted Dr. Werschler's motion for judgment as a matter of law, dismissing Dr. Werschler from personal liability on the ground that no jury could find that he breached a duty to Paetsch under the evidence. Following this motion, Spokane Dermatology Clinic was the only remaining named defendant. Despite dismissing Dr. Werschler personally, the court instructed the jury that the clinic could be held liable for Dr. Werschler's medical negligence, as he was an employee of Spokane Dermatology Clinic. The jury was never told that Dr. Werschler was dismissed as a defendant, and the majority of the jury instructions remained unchanged. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the jury instructions allowed Paetsch to argue her theory of the case and the jury found that the defendant was not negligent. View "Paetsch v. Spokane Dermatology Clinic, PS" on Justia Law

This is a consolidated case of two medical malpractice suits. In each case, the trial judge gave the jury instruction on a physician's exercise of judgment, similar to 6 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Civil105.08 (6th ed. 2012) (WPI) was given. Both juries found in favor of the defendants and both plaintiffs appealed. After review of both cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's use of the exercise of judgment jury instruction. Furthermore, the Court held that evidence of consciously ruling out other diagnoses is not required; a defendant need only produce sufficient evidence of use of clinical judgment in diagnosis or treatment to satisfy a trial judge that the instruction is appropriate. "We reaffirm that this instruction is supported in Washington law and has not been shown to be incorrect or harmful." View "Fergen v. Sestero" on Justia Law