Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In this case, Tiffany Bingham challenged the constitutionality of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act’s four-year statute of repose after her medical malpractice claim against Dr. George C. Gourley and Dr. McKay L. Platt was dismissed. Bingham underwent surgeries in 2010, experienced complications, and discovered in 2017 that the surgeries had caused damage, leading to the removal of her kidney. She filed her lawsuit in 2020, more than four years after the alleged malpractice, prompting the dismissal of her claim under the statute of repose.The Fourth District Court in Provo dismissed Bingham’s complaint, concluding that the statute of repose was constitutional. The court found that the statute did not violate the Open Courts Clause, the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision, or the Equal Protection Clause. The court reasoned that the statute was a non-arbitrary means of addressing the social and economic issues related to rising medical malpractice insurance costs and was reasonably necessary to achieve the legislative goal of stabilizing insurance premiums.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court held that Bingham failed to demonstrate that the statute of repose violated the Open Courts Clause, as the legislature’s findings of a health care crisis were fairly debatable and the statute was a reasonable means to address that crisis. The court also found that the statute did not violate the Uniform Operation of Laws Provision, as it was reasonably necessary to achieve the legislative goals and actually and substantially furthered those goals. Finally, the court concluded that the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as it was rationally related to a legitimate public purpose and did not impair a fundamental right. View "Bingham v. Gourley" on Justia Law

Ninety-four former patients of Dr. David Broadbent, an obstetrician and gynecologist, sued him, alleging that he sexually assaulted them under the guise of providing medical treatment. The claims against Broadbent included sexual battery, sexual assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs described various incidents where Broadbent allegedly performed inappropriate and non-medical acts during their medical appointments, causing them significant emotional and psychological harm.The defendants, including Broadbent and the healthcare facilities where he worked, moved to dismiss the case in the Fourth District Court in Provo, arguing that the plaintiffs' claims were essentially medical malpractice claims. They contended that the plaintiffs had failed to comply with the prelitigation requirements of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. The district court agreed with the defendants, concluding that the plaintiffs' injuries arose from health care provided by Broadbent and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.The plaintiffs appealed to the Utah Supreme Court, arguing that their claims were not subject to the Malpractice Act because their injuries did not arise from health care but from sexual assaults that had no medical purpose. The Utah Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that the Malpractice Act did not apply to their claims. The court reasoned that the alleged acts of sexual assault were not within the scope of legitimate medical treatment and had no medical purpose, even though they occurred during medical appointments. Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims were not based on health care rendered by Broadbent, and the Malpractice Act's prelitigation requirements did not apply. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Does v. Broadbent" on Justia Law

In the medical malpractice case concerning the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from Lillian Birt, her daughter Jenafer Meeks sued the treating doctors, Wei Peng and Christina G. Richards, both individually and on behalf of Ms. Birt's heirs and estate. The children of Ms. Birt had decided to discontinue her life support based on the misinformation they received from the doctors about her condition. The doctors inaccurately portrayed her condition as terminal, leading the children to believe that the treatment was only prolonging her life unnaturally. However, Ms. Birt's condition was not terminal, and there was a high probability of her recovery if the treatment had continued.In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, the doctors appealed on two issues. Firstly, they argued that the trial court's jury instruction 23 was incorrect as it did not explicitly state that Ms. Meeks had the burden to prove the standard of care. Secondly, they contended that the lower court erred in denying their motion for judgment as a matter of law on the survival claim due to lack of evidence that Ms. Birt experienced pain and suffering in the hours between the doctors' negligence and her death.The Supreme Court held that the trial court correctly instructed the jury that Ms. Meeks had the burden to prove the standard of care, as the instruction implicitly required the jury to determine the standard of care as part of proving a breach of it. However, the Supreme Court agreed with the doctors that Ms. Meeks failed to provide evidence of Ms. Birt's experience of pain, suffering, or inconvenience during the period between the doctors' negligence and her death. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the lower court. View "Peng v. Meeks" on Justia Law

Saltz, a plastic surgeon, was sued by a former patient for releasing her photographs to a news outlet. Saltz submitted his legal defense to his malpractice insurance provider, UMIA, which initially defended Saltz but sought a declaratory judgment, claiming that Saltz lacked insurance coverage for the former patient’s claims. The district court found that Saltz was not covered under the plain language of the policy and dismissed his claim for waiver and his request for punitive damages but denied UMIA’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and allowed Saltz’s promissory estoppel and breach of the duty of good faith claims. Over UMIA’s objections, the court also allowed evidence from a settlement negotiation to be presented to the jury, which found in favor of Saltz on both claims.The Utah Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings on Saltz’s requests for punitive damages and for attorney fees incurred on appeal. The district court properly allowed Saltz’s claims for promissory estoppel and breach of the duty of good faith to go to the jury; the court was correct to deny UMIA’s motion for a new trial on the claim for breach of the duty of good faith. The court upheld the admission of evidence from the settlement talks. The district court erred in dismissing Saltz’s claims for waiver and for punitive damages. View "UMIA Insurance, Inc. v. Saltz" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court against Plaintiff on his medical malpractice claims against LDS Hospital, holding that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury.While undergoing abdominal surgery Plaintiff suffered a cardiac arrest, and his heart did not beat for more than fifteen minutes. Plaintiff suffered brain damage as a result. At trial, LDS Hospital moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the action was time barred. After a bifurcated trial, the jury found that Plaintiff discovered or should have discovered his legal injury more than two years before he commenced the action, and therefore, the action was barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial court incorrectly instructed the jury on "discovery of legal injury." The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that, when viewed as a whole, the trial court's instructions to the jury correctly stated the law relevant to discovery of a legal injury. View "Jensen v. IHC Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the judgment of the district court excluding Plaintiffs' proximate cause expert's testimony, holding that the district court did not err.Plaintiffs brought suit against the University of Utah Hospital alleging that the Hospital's treatment of their daughter's baclofen withdrawal caused the daughter's permanent injuries. The Hospital filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Plaintiffs' causation expert, arguing that the testimony should be barred under Utah R. Evid. 702 because the expert's opinion was not based upon sufficient facts or data. The district court agreed and excluded the testimony. At issue on appeal was whether the threshold showing that the principles or methods underlying in the expert's testimony were based upon sufficient facts or data where the method - logical deduction - was based upon broad and attenuated facts. The Supreme Court held that the showing was not present in this case, and therefore, the district court properly excluded the expert testimony on proximate cause. View "Taylor v. University of Utah" on Justia Law

In these three medical malpractice actions the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's denial of Defendants' motions to dismiss and remanded to uphold Plaintiffs' opportunity to develop and present evidence in support of the "fraudulent concealment" exception to the two-year limitations period, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment to avoid dismissal and that the sufficiency of the evidence was a matter for summary judgment or trial.In each case, Defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and that the time bar was not tolled by either the foreign object or fraudulent concealment exceptions set forth in the statute in part because Plaintiffs did not allege fraudulent concealment with the particularity required by Utah R. Civ. P. 2(c). The motions to dismiss were denied in large part. The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions denying the motions to dismiss on time-bar grounds and reversed the decision dismissing the negligent credentialing claim, holding (1) Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment to avoid dismissal; (2) the foreign object exception did not apply in this case; and (3) the Act did not retroactively bar Plaintiffs' negligent credentialing claims. View "Bright v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

In three consolidated cases, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the district judges denying in large part Defendants' motions to dismiss these medical malpractice lawsuits on time-bar grounds and reversed the judgment of one of the three judges granting the motion to dismiss as to a negligent credentialing claim, holding that Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged fraudulent concealment to avoid dismissal.Plaintiffs, three former patients of Dr. Sherman Sorensen, sued Sorensen, his business entity, and either St. Mark's Hospital or IHC Health Services, Inc., alleging that Sorensen performed unnecessary heart surgery on them. Defendants moved to dismiss each case on the ground that Plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act. Defendants also contended that the time bar was not tolled by the statute's "fraudulent concealment" or "foreign object" exceptions. The three district judges denied the motions to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding(1) the statutory tolling provisions in Utah Code 78B-3-404(2) apply to both the two-year limitations period and the four-year repose period in section 78B-3-404(1); and (2) responses to affirmative defenses are not subject to the pleading requirements of rules 8 and 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. View "Bright v. Sorensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants, a hospital and a midwife, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce expert evidence that created a genuine dispute of material fact as to the causation element of her medical malpractice claim.Thirteen years after her baby sustained brain damage during delivery, Plaintiff, as parent and natural guardian of her minor child, sued Defendants, alleging that the hospital's labor-and-delivery nurses and the midwife inadequately monitored Plaintiff's labor, which resulted in the child's hypoxic brain injury. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Defendants dismissing Plaintiff's claims for premajority medical expenses and then later dismissed Plaintiff's remaining negligence claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly found that Plaintiff failed to provide evidence that would establish the necessary causal link between the alleged breaches in standard of care and the supposed injury to the child. View "Ruiz v. Killebrew" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court ruling against Appellant in this declaratory judgment action and holding that the Office of Recovery Services (ORS) was entitled to recover from the portion of Appellant's settlement award representing all medical expenses, both past and future, holding that ORS may recover from only that portion of an award representing past medical expenses.Appellant brought malpractice and negligence claims against a hospital, alleging that the hospital's failure to diagnose his stroke caused severe injuries. At the time of his injuries, Appellant received Medicaid through the State, and Medicaid paid for Appellant's treatment. At issue here was what portion of Appellant's settlement award the ORS was permitted to collect. The district court held that ORS was entitled to recover from the portion of Appellant's settlement award representing all medical expenses, both past and future. The Supreme Court disagreed and remanded the case, holding that ORS may place a lien on and recover from only that portion of Appellant's settlement representing past medical expenses. View "Latham v. Office of Recovery Services" on Justia Law