Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A patient received treatment for diabetes at VA facilities from 2016 to 2022. In early 2020, he reported worsening symptoms and expressed dissatisfaction with his medical care, believing negligence contributed to his condition. Two years later, he filed a complaint with the Office of the Inspector General, alleging improper diagnosis and treatment at VA facilities. He also submitted a Standard Form-95 (SF-95) to the Office of the General Counsel, naming himself as claimant and his wife as a witness and property owner. The agency denied his claim, and he was informed of his right to sue. The couple then filed a pro se lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligent medical care caused kidney disease. Subsequently, the wife filed her own SF-95, asserting power of attorney, but the agency denied this claim as duplicative and because the couple had already sought judicial remedy.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the wife’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, dismissed both plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred, and denied leave to amend as futile. The plaintiffs objected, but the district court adopted the recommendations and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court erred in finding the wife failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her property damage claim, because the administrative filing gave sufficient notice for that claim. However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the alternative ground that all claims were barred by the FTCA’s statute of limitations, as the plaintiffs’ injuries and property damages were or should have been known more than two years before the administrative claims were filed. The denial of leave to amend was also affirmed. View "Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas Department of Veteran Affairs" on Justia Law

Mark Stanford, an incapacitated resident of a Mississippi nursing facility, suffered severe burns after starting a fire in his room. The Mississippi State Department of Health determined that the nursing center failed to adequately supervise Stanford and maintain a safe environment, citing the facility for violating federal regulations regarding the safety and supervision of residents. Stanford, through his conservator, brought a lawsuit alleging negligence and medical malpractice against the nursing facility and related entities.Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement signed in 2017 by Stanford’s brother, Russell Phillips, who acted as Stanford’s health surrogate during his admission. Stanford opposed arbitration, arguing that the agreement was invalid because Phillips lacked authority under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act to bind Stanford, since Stanford’s adult son—a higher-priority family member under the statute—was reasonably available and willing to serve as surrogate. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held that Phillips was not a proper surrogate under the statute and denied the motion to compel arbitration.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to both the denial of arbitration and interpretation of state law. The Fifth Circuit determined that the key issue was whether, under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, a health care provider must ensure that no higher-priority family member is “reasonably available” before accepting decisions from a lower-priority family member acting as surrogate. Noting the statutory ambiguity and lack of controlling Mississippi precedents, the Fifth Circuit did not resolve the merits but instead certified this question of state law to the Mississippi Supreme Court for authoritative interpretation. View "Stanford v. Brandon Nursing" on Justia Law

A woman brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after her child suffered severe and permanent nerve damage during childbirth at a Texas hospital. She alleged that the resident physician who delivered her baby used excessive force in responding to a complication known as shoulder dystocia, and that the attending physician failed to properly supervise. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages for medical care and related expenses.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, determined that shoulder dystocia is always an obstetrical emergency under Texas law. It concluded that, in such emergencies, Texas law requires proof of “willful and wanton negligence” (a heightened standard akin to gross negligence). The court further reasoned that because the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for punitive damages, and because damages for willful and wanton negligence are punitive, it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in two respects: first, by presuming as a matter of law that the physician provided emergency medical care in every instance of shoulder dystocia, rather than treating it as a factual question; and second, by conflating the heightened standard of liability (willful and wanton negligence) with the nature of damages recoverable. The Fifth Circuit clarified that compensatory damages for gross negligence are available under Texas law and are not barred by the FTCA, which only precludes punitive damages. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Robledo v. USA" on Justia Law

William Carter, a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, was arrested for unauthorized use of 911 and spent eight days in the Shreveport City Jail. During his incarceration, Carter, who had pre-existing bedsores, did not receive adequate medical care for his wounds, which allegedly led to their infection and his subsequent hospitalization. Carter's mother, suing on his behalf, filed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Louisiana state negligence law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana excluded the expert testimony of Dr. Joel Nitzkin before trial. After a jury trial, the court granted the defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ADA/RA claim, concluding that the claim was about medical treatment rather than an actionable disability claim. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants on the § 1983 and state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the ADA/RA claim amounted to a complaint about medical negligence, which is not actionable under the ADA. The court found that the failure to change Carter's bandages was a medical treatment issue, not a failure to accommodate under the ADA. Additionally, the court held that Carter's placement in a segregated cell for his safety did not constitute intentional discrimination under the ADA. The court also did not address the exclusion of Dr. Nitzkin's testimony, as it was only relevant to the ADA claims, which failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Carter v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law