Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The case involves the estate of Penny Ann Simmons, who passed away on July 19, 2018. Dianna Lynn Davenport was appointed as the personal representative of Simmons' estate by the Spencer District Court on September 11, 2018, with the order entered by the Spencer County Clerk on September 21, 2018. Davenport filed a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against Kindred Hospitals on September 20, 2019. Kindred argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the one-year statute of limitations, which they claimed began when the judge signed the appointment order.The Jefferson Circuit Court granted Kindred's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the lawsuit was indeed filed outside the statute of limitations. The court found that the statute of limitations began when the judge signed the order of appointment, as per KRS 395.105. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, referencing its own precedent in Batts v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, but invited the Supreme Court of Kentucky to review the issue.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that probate proceedings, including the appointment of a personal representative, are special statutory proceedings. Therefore, the procedural requirements of KRS 395.105, which state that the appointment is effective upon the judge's signing, prevail over the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure. The court also clarified that the one-year limitation period for filing claims, as set forth in KRS 413.180(1), begins at the time of the appointment, which is when the judge signs the order. Thus, Davenport's lawsuit was filed outside the permissible time frame, and the summary judgment in favor of Kindred was affirmed. View "DAVENPORT KINDRED HOSPITALS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP" on Justia Law

In 2020, several residents at a skilled nursing facility died from coronavirus infections. Family members of the deceased sued the facility and its alleged alter egos, asserting claims including elder abuse, negligence, and wrongful death. The defendants moved to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by family members rather than the decedents. The trial court denied the motion, finding no evidence that the family members had authority to sign on behalf of the decedents, and that the agreements did not bind the family members in their individual capacities. For one agreement where a family member had power of attorney, the court exercised its discretion to deny arbitration to avoid conflicting results.The Shasta County Superior Court denied the motion to compel arbitration. It found that the defendants did not provide evidence that the family members had authority to sign the arbitration agreements on behalf of the decedents. Additionally, the court ruled that the agreements did not bind the family members in their individual capacities. For the agreement involving a power of attorney, the court denied arbitration to prevent conflicting rulings between court and arbitration proceedings.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that the defendants failed to establish that the family members were authorized agents of the decedents. The court also found that the family members did not sign the agreements in their individual capacities, and thus were not bound by them. Furthermore, the court upheld the trial court's discretion to deny arbitration for the claim involving a power of attorney to avoid conflicting rulings. The order denying the motion to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Hearden v. Windsor Redding Care Center" on Justia Law

In Iowa, a ten-year-old boy was treated at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) for a dislodged feeding tube and died the next day. The boy's mother filed administrative tort claims on behalf of the child's estate prior to being appointed as the estate's administrator. The child's parents also individually claimed loss of consortium. The claims were dismissed by the district court, which ruled that the mother lacked authority to file a claim on behalf of the estate prior to her official appointment, and that the parents had not properly filed individual administrative tort claims.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the district court was correct to dismiss the parents' individual claims as no individual administrative tort claims were filed. However, the court determined the district court had erred in dismissing the estate's claims, arguing that the mother's administrative tort claims were valid despite her not being appointed as the estate's administrator at the time of filing. The court explained that a representative may act to protect an estate's interests before being officially appointed and can ratify pre-appointment acts, granting them the same effect as acts that would occur after appointment. The court also confirmed that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit the plaintiffs' new evidence. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Ohio dealt with a case involving the plaintiff, who was acting both individually and as the executor of an estate, and the defendants, which included a medical center and various medical professionals. However, the opinion provides very little information about the specific facts of the case or the legal issues at stake. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, relying on the authority of a prior case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. The case was then remanded back to the Court of Appeals to consider arguments that it had previously declined to address. The specific nature of these arguments, and the reasons for the Court of Appeals' initial refusal to consider them, are not provided in the opinion. As such, the precise holding of the Supreme Court of Ohio in this case cannot be determined from the available information. View "Davis v. Mercy St. Vincent Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals. The case involved a dispute between Ewing, in her capacity as executor of an estate and personal representative of the deceased's next of kin and beneficiaries, and UC Health along with other defendants. The court did not provide detailed facts or legal conclusions in its decision. Instead, it simply stated that it was reversing the judgment of the lower court based on the authority of a separate case, Everhart v. Coshocton Cty. Mem. Hosp. Since the court does not elaborate on the details of the case nor the reasons for its decision, the exact holding in this case isn't clear from the opinion provided. View "Ewing v. UC Health" on Justia Law

Helen McNeal, who had been appointed administratrix of Delores Mason’s estate, brought a wrongful death claim against a physician, Dr. Eniola Otuseso. Upon learning that McNeal did not satisfy the qualifications to serve as an administratrix, Otuseso moved to intervene in the estate matter and to strike the letters of administration. The chancellor denied her motion. But the chancellor, upon learning that McNeal was not related to the decedent and that she was a convicted felon, removed McNeal as administratrix and appointed the decedent’s two siblings, who were Delores Mason’s heirs at law, as coadministrators of the estate. Otuseso appealed the chancellor’s decision to deny her motion to intervene and the decision to replace McNeal, with the decedent’s actual heirs at law. Otuseso argued she had a right to intervene in the estate matter and that the chancellor was without authority to substitute the decedent’s heirs as the new administrators. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor’s decision to substitute and appoint the decedent’s siblings and heirs as the coadministrators of Mason’s estate. Because Otuseso sought to intervene in the estate matter to challenge McNeal’s qualifications as admininstratrix, the Supreme Court found that the question of intervention was moot as it no longer was at issue, due to the chancellor’s rightful removal of the unqualified administratrix and his appointment of successor coadministrators. View "Otuseso v. Estate of Delores Mason, et al." on Justia Law

The estate of Ed Young, deceased, by and through its personal representative, Fannie Pollard, appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of H.C. Partnership d/b/a Hill Crest Behavioral Health Services ("Hill Crest") in a wrongful-death action alleging medical malpractice. On May 7, 2017, the estate of Ed Young sued Hill Crest alleging that Hill Crest caused Young's death on May 9, 2015, by improperly administering the antipsychotic drugs Haldol and Thorazine to Young as a chemical restraint without taking a proper medical history and evaluating him. The style of the complaint indicated that it was filed by the "Estate of Ed Young and Fannie M. Pollard as personal representative of the Estate of Ed Young." On May 8, 2017, the probate court appointed Fannie M. Pollard as administrator of Young's estate. On May 9, 2017, the two-year limitations period under Alabama's wrongful-death act expired. On June 15, 2017, the estate filed an amended complaint, adding additional claims against Hill Crest. The amended complaint listed as plaintiffs the estate and Pollard as the personal representative of the estate. The parties then engaged in discovery. In 2019, Hill Crest moved for summary judgment, arguing that Pollard was not the personal representative of the estate when the complaint was filed, and therefore she lacked capacity to bring suit. Furthermore, Hill Crest argued the complaint was a nullity and there was no properly filed underlying action to which Pollard's subsequent appointment as personal representative could relate. The Alabama Supreme Court found Hill Crest's argument regarding the relation-back doctrine as unavailing: "the relation-back doctrine 'simply recognizes and clarifies what has already occurred' in that application of the doctrine does not extend the limitations period but merely allows substitution of a party in a suit otherwise timely filed." Summary judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Pollard v. H.C. Partnership d/b/a Hill Crest Behavioral Health Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two of the decedent’s children, brought wrongful death and survival actions under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act against a nursing home, alleging that injuries the decedent received when the nursing home’s employee dropped her while transferring her from a bath chair to her bed caused her to suffer injuries that ultimately resulted in her death. The decedent’s granddaughter, rather than plaintiffs, initially filed a request for a medical review panel ostensibly as the representative either of the decedent or her estate. The lower courts found that the granddaughter was a “claimant” within the meaning of the Medical Malpractice Act, namely La. R.S. 40:1231.1(A)(4) and (A)(16), and that her timely request had therefore suspended prescription with regard to the medical malpractice claims of the plaintiffs, even though they had not been named as claimants in the original request for a medical review panel. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court found the lower courts erred in concluding the granddaughter was a proper “claimant” under the language of the Act on the basis that she was a succession representative for the decedent’s estate. Because the initial request for the medical review panel was not made by a proper “claimant,” prescription was not tolled. Accordingly, because defendant’s exception of prescription should have been granted, the trial court’s ruling denying the exception of prescription was reversed. View "Guffey v. Lexington House, LLC" on Justia Law

A jury entered a verdict against defendant HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Gadsden, LLC in a medical malpractice case brought by plaintiff Regina Honts, as personal representative of the estate of Doris Green. HealthSouth Gadsden then filed a postjudgment motion seeking a judgment as a matter of law ("a JML"), a new trial, or a remittitur of the damages award. After an evidentiary hearing as to the request for a remittitur, the trial court denied the postjudgment motion. HealthSouth Gadsden appealed; Honts cross-appealed, challenging rulings on discovery issues. As to HealthSouth Gadsden's appeal, case no. 1160045, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial. As to Honts' cross-appeal, case no. 1160068, the Court affirmed. Honts' complaint pinpointed the start of Green's decline at a time during her residency at HealthSouth Gadsen, a nurse administered medication to Green that Green later had an adverse reaction to. Honts sought discovery of the nurse's personnel file; the trial court determined Honts failed to show what would have been in the personnel file that could establish a breach of the standard of care by HealthSouth Gasden with respect to Green. The Supreme Court determined the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the hospital standard of care, reversed the jury verdict as to that issue, and remanded for a new trial. View "HealthSouth Rehabilitation Hospital of Gadsden, LLC v. Honts" on Justia Law

Alexander Clark brought a medical malpractice lawsuit against the estate of his late pain management specialist, Dr. Daniel Brookoff. Clark claimed Dr. Brookoff negligently prescribed a prolonged course of drugs to alleviate Clark’s chronic pain and that Dr. Brookoff did not adequately inform his patient (then a minor) of the risks associated with the drug. Clark claimed that his consumption of the drug caused neurological and urological damage. Prior to trial, Clark indicated that he intended to present testimony about conversations he and his mother had with Dr. Brookoff prior to and during treatment. The Estate responded by filing a motion to exclude such evidence in accordance with Colorado’s Dead Man’s Statute. The trial court agreed that the anticipated testimony was inadmissible. Unable to introduce that testimony, Clark abandoned his informed consent claim, and the case proceeded to trial on his negligence claim. After judgment was entered in favor of the Estate, Clark appealed the order prohibiting him or his mother from testifying about their conversations with Dr. Brookoff. The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision to bar this testimony and remanded the case for a new trial on Clark’s informed consent claim. In so doing, the appellate division relied on case law predating the 2002 and 2013 amendments to the Dead Man’s Statute to conclude that, despite its current language, the statute was not applicable “in any civil action” but only when the outcome of a proceeding will increase or diminish an estate. Because Dr. Brookoff had an insurance policy, the court of appeals reasoned that any liability would be covered by insurance and thus would not diminish his estate. The court therefore declined to apply the Dead Man’s Statute. Following denial of its petition for rehearing, the Estate petitioned for certiorari. The Colorado Supreme Court held the Dead Man’s Statute was applicable “in all civil actions.” Because the statute applied irrespective of the potential impact of a judgment on an estate, the Court also held the existence of insurance coverage was not a factor militating for or against the applicability of the Dead Man’s Statute. View "Estate of Daniel Brookoff, M.D., v. Clark" on Justia Law