Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Supreme Court of Texas
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Renaissance Medical Foundation (the Practice) is a nonprofit health organization certified by the Texas Medical Board. The Practice employed Dr. Michael Burke, a neurosurgeon, to provide medical services to its patients. Rebecca Lugo brought her daughter to Doctors Hospital at Renaissance for brain surgery performed by Dr. Burke. The surgery resulted in permanent neurological damage to Lugo’s daughter. Dr. Burke later expressed that a retractor used during the procedure migrated into the child’s brainstem, causing the injury. Lugo filed a lawsuit alleging negligence by Dr. Burke and sought to hold the Practice vicariously liable for his actions.The trial court denied the Practice’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for Dr. Burke’s negligence because it did not control the manner in which he provided medical care and that Dr. Burke was an independent contractor. The court concluded that Dr. Burke’s employment agreement granted the Practice sufficient control over him to trigger vicarious liability. The court authorized a permissive interlocutory appeal of the ruling.The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Dr. Burke was an employee of the Practice under traditional common-law factors and was acting within the scope of his employment when the alleged negligence occurred. The Practice then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a nonprofit health organization may not be held vicariously liable if exercising its right of control regarding the alleged negligence would interfere with its employee physician’s exercise of independent medical judgment. The court concluded that the Practice did not conclusively demonstrate such interference and affirmed the denial of the Practice’s motion for summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "RENAISSANCE MEDICAL FOUNDATION v. LUGO" on Justia Law

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Ireille Williams-Bush, a 35-year-old woman, was taken to Medical City Arlington Hospital with symptoms indicative of a pulmonary embolism. However, she was diagnosed with a non-ST-elevated myocardial infarction and admitted under that diagnosis. The consulting cardiologist did not screen her for a pulmonary embolism. She was discharged in stable condition but died three days later from clotting in her heart and lungs. Her husband, Jared Bush, sued the hospital and associated physicians for negligence, focusing on the hospital's failure to have adequate protocols to ensure proper diagnosis and treatment.The trial court initially found the expert report by Dr. Cam Patterson, which supported Bush's claims, to be adequate. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas reversed this decision, deeming the report conclusory regarding causation and dismissing the claims against the hospital with prejudice. The appellate court held that the expert's opinions did not sufficiently explain how the hospital's policies could have influenced the medical decisions made by the physicians.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate. The court concluded that Dr. Patterson's report provided a fair summary of the standard of care, the hospital's breach, and the causal relationship between the breach and Williams-Bush's death. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "BUSH v. COLUMBIA MEDICAL CENTER OF ARLINGTON SUBSIDIARY, L.P." on Justia Law

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An employee, Sharon Dunn, was injured while working as an emergency-department nurse for East Texas Medical Center Athens (ETMC Athens), a nonsubscriber to the Texas workers’ compensation program. Dunn alleged that an emergency medical technician (EMT), who was not employed by ETMC Athens, negligently pushed a stretcher into her, causing a serious back injury. Dunn initially sued the EMT and his employer, but those claims were dismissed due to her failure to timely serve an expert report as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act. Dunn then amended her pleadings to assert negligence claims against ETMC Athens.The trial court granted ETMC Athens's motion to designate the EMT and his employer as responsible third parties under the Texas proportionate-responsibility statute. However, eleven months later, Dunn moved to strike the designations, arguing that her suit was an action to collect workers’ compensation benefits, to which the proportionate-responsibility statute does not apply. The trial court granted Dunn’s motion, and the court of appeals denied ETMC Athens’s petition for mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by striking the designations. The court held that the proportionate-responsibility statute applies because Dunn’s negligence claim against ETMC Athens is not an action to collect workers’ compensation benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also held that the Act does not prohibit nonsubscribing employers from designating responsible third parties and that there was sufficient evidence of the third parties’ responsibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted ETMC Athens’s petition for mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to vacate its order striking the designations. View "IN RE EAST TEXAS MEDICAL CENTER ATHENS" on Justia Law

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Kristen Walker gave birth to her son Henry at Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital under the care of Dr. Rhodesia Castillo. Henry required resuscitation after birth due to asphyxiation during labor and allegedly suffered a stroke. The Walkers sued the hospital and Dr. Castillo for negligence, claiming their actions caused Henry’s permanent neurologic injury. They provided expert reports from an obstetrician, a neonatologist, and a nurse to support their claims. The defendants challenged the qualifications of the experts and the sufficiency of the reports, arguing they did not adequately explain the standards of care, breaches, and causation.The trial court overruled the defendants’ objections and denied their motion to dismiss, finding the reports provided a fair summary of the experts’ opinions as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas reversed this decision, holding that the reports contained conclusory and incomplete language that did not sufficiently explain the cause of Henry’s brain injury.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the expert reports sufficiently explained causation and that the trial court correctly rejected the defendants’ other challenges. The court found that the reports from Drs. Tappan and Null together explained how breaches of the standard of care by Dr. Castillo and the nurses caused Henry’s injury. The court also determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the defendants’ objections to the experts’ qualifications. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony's Hospital" on Justia Law

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A mother sued her doctor and his medical practice for allegedly failing to perform a sterilization procedure she paid for and then failing to tell her that the procedure was not performed. She claims the doctor’s actions caused an unplanned pregnancy and the birth of her healthy fourth child. The mother sought to recover damages for medical expenses, physical pain and suffering, mental anguish, and the costs to maintain, support, and educate her daughter.The trial court granted summary judgment for the doctor as to all claims, and the mother timely appealed. A divided court of appeals reversed in part and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The majority affirmed the grant of summary judgment as to most of the mother’s claims, reasoning that they were impermissibly recast health care liability claims. But the majority reversed the grant of summary judgment as to the medical-negligence claim, holding that the mother had produced some evidence of duty, breach, and damages.The Supreme Court of Texas held that when a mother alleges that medical negligence proximately caused an unplanned pregnancy, that claim is not foreclosed merely because the ultimate result is the birth of a healthy child. But the recoverable damages are limited. The mother may recover the cost of the sterilization procedure and economic damages designed to compensate for injuries proximately caused by the negligence, such as medical expenses incurred during the pregnancy, delivery, and postnatal period, if proven. But Texas law does not permit recovery of the expenses of raising the healthy child, or any noneconomic damages, because the birth and life of a healthy child do not constitute an injury under Texas law. The court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment in part and reinstated the trial court’s judgment. View "Noe v. Velasco" on Justia Law

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Dorothy Hampton was released from the Medical Center of Southeast Texas after an abdominal hernia surgery. Later that night, she fell at home, becoming confused and disoriented, and was readmitted to the hospital. She filed a health care liability claim against Dr. Leonard Thome, alleging that she was released prematurely from the hospital which led to her fall and subsequent mental and physical injuries. Hampton's lawyer sent a pre-suit notice to Dr. Thome along with a medical authorization form as required under Texas law before filing a suit. The form listed only two providers and omitted future health care providers.Hampton filed her suit outside the usual two-year statute of limitations but within the 75-day tolling period provided by the law. Dr. Thome argued that the lawsuit was filed outside the limitations period as the medical authorization form served by Hampton was deficient, and hence the 75-day tolling period was not applicable. The trial court rejected this argument, but the court of appeals reversed the decision.The Supreme Court of Texas held that an imperfect medical authorization form is still a medical authorization form, which is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations for 75 days. The court emphasized that the limitations period should be established with clarity at the outset. Any defects or omissions in the medical authorization form that came to light during the litigation could have been adequately addressed by the statutory remedy of abatement, additional discovery, or even sanctions. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "HAMPTON v. THOME" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court of Texas considered a medical negligence case where a 13-year-old girl, Raynee Dunnick, was bitten by a rattlesnake and was treated by Dr. Kristy Marsillo at a local hospital. The hospital had a specific guideline for snakebite treatment, which was followed by Dr. Marsillo. This guideline recommends administering antivenom, a treatment for snakebite, only when certain clinical parameters are met. According to the guideline, the risk of side effects from the antivenom should also be considered.Raynee and her parents sued Dr. Marsillo, claiming that her adherence to the guidelines and her decision not to immediately administer the antivenom upon Raynee's arrival at the hospital was negligent and resulted in Raynee's pain, suffering, impairment, and disfigurement. The trial court granted Dr. Marsillo's motion for summary judgment on the grounds of no-evidence of breach of duty and causation. The court of appeals reversed this decision, but Dr. Marsillo appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.In its decision, the Supreme Court of Texas held that under section 74.153(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, a heightened standard of proof is required for a patient's negligence claim against a physician for injuries arising out of the provision of emergency medical care. The claimant must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the physician acted with willful and wanton negligence, which is at least equivalent to gross negligence.The court found that the evidence presented by Raynee did not meet this standard. Specifically, the court found that the expert affidavit provided by Raynee was conclusory and did not adequately explain why the guidelines should have been disregarded or why doing so would have posed an extreme degree of risk to Raynee. Therefore, the court reversed the court of appeals’ judgment and reinstated the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Dr. Marsillo. View "MARSILLO v. DUNNICK" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court that two expert reports provided to support Plaintiff's claims for negligence provided the information required by the Texas Medical Liability Act, Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 74.351(a), (l), (r)(6), holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff, the guardian of a care facility resident, sued Defendant, the facility, alleging negligence. The trial court concluded that the two expert reports provided by Plaintiff to support the claims provided a fair summary of the experts' opinion regarding the standard of care, breach, and the cause of injury, as required by the Act. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the reports lacked sufficient detail regarding the appropriate standard of care and breach. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proffered reports provided a fair summary of the experts' opinions as to the appropriate standard of care and breach of that standard. View "Uriegas v. Kenmar Residential HCS Services, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court conditionally granted Defendants' petition for mandamus relief from the trial court's order striking their counteraffidavit served under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 18.001, holding that the trial court's order was an abuse of discretion for which Defendants lacked an adequate remedy by appeal.Plaintiff sued Defendants for negligence. At issue was the counteraffidavit and testimony of Dr. Benny Sanchez, who was retained by Defendants as an expert witness. Plaintiff moved to strike Dr. Sanchez's counteraffidavit and testimony, arguing that the counteraffidavit improperly challenged the cause of Plaintiff's injuries, not the necessity of his treatment. The trial court granted the motion. Thereafter, the trial court issued its opinion in Allstate. Defendants later brought this petition seeking a writ of mandamus and citing In re Allstate Indemnity Insurance Co., 622 S.W.3d 870 (Tex. 2021), in support of their argument that the trial court abused its discretion. The Supreme Court agreed and conditionally granted the writ, holding that the trial court clearly abused its discretion by striking Dr. Sanchez's counteraffidavit and testimony, and Defendants lacked an adequate remedy to address this error by way of appeal. View "In re Chefs' Product of Houston, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court affirming a verdict for the family of a teenager who committed suicide after seeking treatment for depression from her pediatric healthcare providers, holding that the testimony did not establish the necessary but-for causation required by precedent.The expert testimony at trial established negligence on the part of the teen's medical providers but did not establish that, but for the negligence, the teen would not have committed suicide. Plaintiffs sued their daughter's providers for negligence and gross negligence. The jury found that certain providers were liable, and the trial court awarded $1.285 million to Plaintiffs. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was no evidence that the providers' care proximately caused the teen's suicide. View "Pediatrics Cool Care v. Thompson" on Justia Law