Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The case involves Somsak Limprasert, a patient diagnosed with COVID-19 and acute hypoxic respiratory failure, who was transferred to PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas, LLC, for rehabilitation and treatment. While at PAM, Limprasert, who was bedridden and unable to stand without support, was assisted by PAM's workers to rise from his bed. However, they unexpectedly let go of him while he was in a standing position, causing him to fall and suffer injuries. Limprasert filed a complaint against PAM, asserting claims for negligence and abuse of the vulnerable, and alternatively, under Nevada’s medical malpractice statutes. However, he failed to attach a supporting declaration from a medical expert to his complaint.The district court found that Limprasert’s claims were of professional negligence, requiring a supporting declaration from a medical expert. As Limprasert filed his complaint without the supporting declaration and the erratum was not filed at the same time as the complaint, the district court granted PAM’s motion to dismiss. Limprasert appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the decision, finding that the district court erred by dismissing Limprasert’s complaint. PAM petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for judicial review.The Supreme Court of Nevada determined that Limprasert’s claims were of professional negligence, requiring an affidavit under Nevada law. However, the court concluded that Limprasert’s expert declaration complied with the law, and the district court therefore erred by dismissing his complaint for noncompliance. The court reversed the dismissal of Limprasert’s professional negligence claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice claim filed by Saeed Gohari, acting as the guardian ad litem for Nammi Gohari, a minor. Nammi was born prematurely in 2012 and developed irreversible brain damage, which the family attributed to professional negligence by the medical staff at facilities operated by Dignity Health. The malpractice claims were filed against Dignity Health and several individuals who provided medical care to Nammi's mother, Afsaneh Amin-Akbari, over a decade after Nammi's birth, on November 30, 2022.The case was initially brought before the Eighth Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Dignity Health moved to dismiss the complaint as untimely under NRS 41A.097, which sets a limitation period for filing medical malpractice claims. However, Gohari argued that the complaint was still timely under NRS 41A.097(5) due to a pair of emergency directives issued by Governor Steve Sisolak during the COVID-19 pandemic, which tolled the limitations period. The district court agreed with Gohari, concluding that the directives tolled the limitations period for 122 days, making Gohari's complaint timely.The case was then brought before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada. Dignity Health filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, asking the court to vacate the district court order and direct the district court to dismiss the case because Gohari's complaint was untimely under NRS 41A.097(5) and its timeliness was not preserved by the directives. However, the Supreme Court denied the petition, concluding that the district court correctly applied the directives and that the law does not require dismissal of Gohari's complaint as untimely. The court found no support for Dignity Health's argument in the directives’ plain language and held that the directives tolled Gohari's limitations period for 122 days. View "Dignity Health v. District Court" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Kimberly D. Taylor, sued Dr. Keith Brill and Women’s Health Associates of Southern Nevada-Martin PLLC for professional negligence. Taylor alleged that Dr. Brill breached the standard of care by perforating her uterus and bowel during a surgical procedure and failed to inform her of these complications. The jury ruled in favor of Dr. Brill and denied all of Taylor’s claims.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that in a professional negligence action, evidence of informed consent and assumption of the risk are irrelevant and inadmissible when the plaintiff does not challenge consent. The court stated that even if a plaintiff gave informed consent, it would not vitiate the medical provider’s duty to provide treatment according to the ordinary standard of care. Furthermore, evidence of a procedure’s risks must still fall within Nevada's professional negligence statute, and a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether the evidence should be excluded due to its potential to confuse the jury.The court also held that expert or physician testimony is not required to demonstrate the reasonableness of the billing amount of special damages. The court found that the district court had abused its discretion by prohibiting non-expert evidence demonstrating the reasonableness of the charges for medical treatment received by Taylor.Finally, the court ruled that evidence of insurance write-downs is not admissible under NRS 42.021(1), as it only contemplates evidence of actual benefits paid to the plaintiff by collateral sources.Based on these errors, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada ruled on a motion for disqualification of a supreme court justice in a medical malpractice action appeal. The appellant argued that Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct 2.11(A)(6)(d) required disqualification of Justice Douglas Herndon, who had been assigned the case when he was a district judge, but had not heard or decided any matters in the case before it was reassigned. The appellant argued that the rule required disqualification whenever a judge previously presided over a matter, regardless of the level of involvement.Justice Herndon and the respondents countered that he had seen no documents and performed no work on the case at the district court level, and therefore his impartiality could not be questioned. They argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct does not require disqualification in such circumstances, and that a judge has a general duty to hear and decide cases where disqualification is not required.After considering the language and context of the Code of Judicial Conduct, along with similar cases from other jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that to "preside" over a matter within the meaning of the disqualification rule, a judge must have exercised some control or authority over the matter in the lower court. Given that Justice Herndon had simply been administratively assigned the case and took no action during his assignment, he did not "preside" over the case in a way that mandated disqualification. The court therefore denied the motion for disqualification. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

This case revolves around a lawsuit filed by Tiffiny Grace, legal guardian of E.G., against Sunrise Hospital and Nurse Cord Olsen for professional negligence. E.G. was born prematurely at Sunrise Hospital and suffered permanent developmental damage following a cardiac arrest in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit. The hospital's Patient Safety Committee investigated the incident, which Grace sought to examine during discovery. However, Sunrise Hospital objected, asserting that the information was privileged under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA) and Nevada law. The district court compelled the testimony, ruling that Sunrise Hospital had waived any privilege by allowing testimony on certain privileged topics.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, however, disagreed with the lower court's interpretation. It ruled that the PSQIA provides an absolute privilege for patient safety work products that is not subject to waiver. The court explained that this privilege aims to encourage healthcare providers to identify and learn from errors without fear of legal repercussions. The court concluded that the district court erred by interpreting the PSQIA to allow for waiver of privilege and by failing to determine whether the testimony sought constituted identifiable or non-identifiable patient safety work product. Therefore, the court granted a writ of prohibition, vacated the district court's order, and directed the lower court to reconsider Grace's motion to compel in light of its interpretation of the PSQIA. View "Sunrise Hospital v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

This case arose from a wrongful death and professional negligence action brought by Linda F. Smith, the mother of Kamario Mantrell Smith, an inmate who died after unsuccessful heart surgery and subsequent complications. The defendants were Christopher L. Igtiben, M.D., Dignity Health, and related entities. Smith filed her complaint on November 22, 2022, alleging that the defendants' failure to recognize her son's sickle cell anemia before ordering a CT scan with contrast ultimately led to his death. Dr. Igtiben filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the applicable statute of limitations under NRS 41A.097(2) had expired. The district court denied the dismissal motion.The Court of Appeals of Nevada found that Smith had been placed on inquiry notice of potential professional negligence and wrongful death claims when she received her son's medical records in January 2020. Accordingly, NRS 41A.097(2) required her to file any professional negligence or wrongful death action within one year from that date. Because Smith did not file her complaint until November 2022, the statute of limitations had expired, and the district court should have dismissed the complaint as untimely. As a result, the court granted the writ of mandamus and directed the clerk to issue a writ instructing the district court to dismiss the complaint. View "Igtiben v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice lawsuit, Kimberly Taylor claimed that Dr. Keith Brill breached the accepted standard of medical care by causing damage during her surgery. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the lower court had made several errors during the trial. Firstly, the lower court should not have allowed any evidence or argument regarding Taylor's informed consent or assumption of risk, as Taylor's consent was uncontested and such information was irrelevant to determining whether Dr. Brill had conformed to the accepted standard of care. Secondly, the lower court should not have prohibited Taylor from presenting non-expert evidence to show that the costs of her medical damages were reasonable. The Supreme Court also found that the lower court should not have allowed evidence of insurance write-downs, as these did not create any payable benefit to Taylor. Finally, the lower court was wrong to limit the scope of Taylor's closing argument. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner Jane Nelson's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying her motion to disqualify McBride Hall from representing real parties in interest Dr. Muhammad Said Sabir and Pioneer Health Care, LLC (collectively, Sabir) in her medical malpractice action, holding that Nelson failed to establish that she was entitled to the writ.Nelson's attorney, Adam Breeden, owned a solo practice and employed Kristy Johnson as his paralegal. While Johnson was employed at Breeden's practice Breeden represented Plaintiffs in two cases for which McBride Hall acted as defense counsel. Nelson moved to disqualify McBride Hall from representing Sabir due to Johnson's purported knowledge of Breeden's legal conclusions on Nelson's case. The district court denied the motion to disqualify. Nelson then sought a writ of mandamus instructing the district court to vacate its ruling. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that automatic disqualification was not necessary. View "Nelson v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying Appellant's request for a declaration that Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.021 precluded Respondent from recovering its workers' compensation payments from Appellant's medical malpractice settlement proceeds, holding that the statute applies only to situations in which a medical malpractice defendant introduces evidence of a plaintiff's collateral source benefits.Appellant brought this action against Respondent asserting claims for declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that Nev. Rev. Stat. 42.021(2) prohibited Respondent from asserting a lien against her settlement proceeds and seeking an injunction requiring Respondent to continue paying her workers' compensation benefits. The district court denied Appellant's motion for partial summary judgment and granted Respondent's Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(5) motion, concluding that section 42.021's plain language applied only to actions where third-party payments were introduced into evidence and did not apply to cases that settled before trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the plain language of sections 42.021(1) and (2) prohibits a payer of collateral source benefits from seeking reimbursement from a medical malpractice plaintiff only when the medical malpractice defendant introduces evidence of those payments. View "Harper v. Copperpoint Mutual Insurance Holding Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing this action for professional negligence, holding that Plaintiff's failure to include an affidavit from a medical expert in her complaint rendered her medical malpractice claim void ab initio.At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.100(1)(a), which allows an exemption from the requirement that an action for professional negligence be filed with an affidavit from a medical expert, when "[a] foreign substance other than medication or a prosthetic device was unintentionally left within the body of a patient following surgery." The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff's medical malpractice claim was not exempt from the affidavit requirement and that Plaintiff's premises liability claim sounded in medical malpractice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 41A.100(1)(a) is unambiguous and does not include bacteria in the definition of foreign substance; and (2) Plaintiff's premises liability claim sounded in medical malpractice. View "Montanez v. Sparks Family Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law