Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

After surgery to remove an ovarian cyst in May 2019, April S. Clark suffered a bowel perforation and subsequent complications while under the care of several doctors. She ultimately died in June 2019. Her husband, Charles Clark, and her daughter, April D. Clark, brought wrongful death claims against Dr. Thomas Leigh, Dr. William Shirley, and OB/GYN Specialists, LLP, alleging negligent post-operative care. At trial in July 2024, the jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the full value of Clark’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses.Following the verdict, the defendants filed post-trial motions seeking to apply the statutory cap on noneconomic damages under OCGA § 51-13-1(b), which limits such awards in medical malpractice actions to $350,000. The State Court of Bibb County granted the motion to remit and amend the judgment, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 but leaving the pain and suffering and medical expenses awards unchanged. The court denied the motion for new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the constitutionality and application of the statutory damages cap. The Court reaffirmed its prior decision in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, holding that the Georgia Constitution’s right to trial by jury prohibits applying the cap to damages for pain and suffering and loss of consortium in medical malpractice actions. The Court further determined that, as a matter of statutory construction, OCGA § 51-13-1(b) cannot operate in cases where a verdict includes damages to which Nestlehutt applies, since the statute requires combining all noneconomic damages into a single capped amount. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s amended judgment and remanded for consideration of the defendants’ remaining claim regarding excessiveness of the wrongful death award. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

A woman who was diagnosed with placenta previa during her pregnancy developed placenta accreta spectrum (PAS) during a cesarean section at a hospital, which led to a massive hemorrhage and an emergent hysterectomy. After extensive surgery, she was moved to the ICU for monitoring. The ICU physician and a medical staffing agency were responsible for her care there. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children sued the ICU doctor and the staffing agency, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. The plaintiffs presented expert testimony regarding deviations from the standard of care by the ICU doctor.The Superior Court of Rockdale County presided over the trial. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only the ICU physician and the staffing agency. The jury found both defendants liable, awarding $10 million to the estate for pain and suffering and $32 million to the children for wrongful death. After trial, the defendants moved for a new trial and, alternatively, to amend the judgment to apply a statutory cap on noneconomic damages. The court denied both motions, concluding the cap had been waived and, in the alternative, that the statutory cap was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees under Georgia law after the defendants rejected a qualifying settlement offer.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appeal. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding portions of the defendants’ expert testimony, nor did it err in its jury instructions, as any alleged error was affirmatively waived by the defendants. The Court also held, consistent with its contemporaneous decision in Clark v. Leigh and Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases cannot constitutionally be applied to the jury’s verdict in this case. The award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs was affirmed. Judgment affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman died after complications from surgery to remove an ovarian cyst, during which her bowel was perforated. Following the procedure, she received post-operative care from several doctors, who were later sued by her husband and daughter. The plaintiffs, acting as statutory wrongful death plaintiff and administrator of the estate, brought claims for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Several defendants settled before trial, but Dr. Leigh, Dr. Shirley, and their practice went to trial. The jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the value of the decedent’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses.After the verdict, the defendants moved for a new trial and to reduce (“remit and amend”) the judgment based on a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases (OCGA § 51-13-1(b)). The State Court of Bibb County denied the new trial but granted the motion to remit, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 under the statutory cap, while leaving pain and suffering and medical expenses unchanged.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the defendants to invoke the damages cap for the first time in post-trial motions. The court reaffirmed Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, concluding that Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial prohibits applying OCGA § 51-13-1(b)’s cap to noneconomic damages for pain and suffering in medical malpractice actions. Statutory construction principles, in light of Nestlehutt, prevent the cap from being applied to a verdict that includes such damages. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s reduction of the wrongful death award and remanded for consideration of an unresolved excessiveness argument. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

A woman died in a hospital after giving birth by cesarean section, having suffered a rare and severe complication known as placenta accreta spectrum, which led to a massive hemorrhage. She underwent an emergency hysterectomy and was transferred to the intensive care unit for postoperative management. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children, brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against multiple medical providers and the hospital. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only one doctor and a medical staffing agency as defendants.In the Superior Court of Rockdale County, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony alleging breaches of the standard of care by the remaining defendants. The jury found both liable and awarded $42 million in total damages: $10 million for pain and suffering to the estate and $32 million for wrongful death to the children. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, denied the defendants’ post-trial motions for a new trial, and refused to apply Georgia’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, finding it unconstitutional and waived due to the defendants’ failure to raise it earlier. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, awarding over $11 million.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain defense expert testimony or in granting the challenged jury instruction, as the defendants had affirmatively waived any instructional error. The court affirmed that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages could not constitutionally be applied to the judgment. Finally, it upheld the award of attorney fees, finding that the plaintiffs’ settlement offer complied with statutory requirements and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman, acting as conservator for her mother, filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and ordinary negligence against a hospital and a nurse practitioner. The mother had suffered a stroke, became permanently disabled, and was transferred to the hospital for long-term care. During her stay, she developed a severe tongue injury that ultimately required amputation. The conservator was appointed nearly two years after the injury, and the lawsuit was filed more than two years after the alleged malpractice occurred. The plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the mother’s mental incompetence.The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions under Georgia law was not tolled for mental incompetence, based on the “nontolling” provision in OCGA § 9-3-73(b). The court relied on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s prior decision in Deen v. Stevens, which upheld the constitutionality of this provision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it was bound by Deen and rejecting the plaintiff’s equal protection challenge to the statute.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether Deen controlled the case and whether the statute’s treatment of mentally incompetent medical malpractice plaintiffs violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court held that Deen was controlling and that the statute’s classification was subject to rational basis review. The court found that the legislative decision not to toll the statute of limitations for mentally incompetent plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases was rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as ensuring affordable healthcare and preventing stale claims. The court also rejected new arguments regarding the expert affidavit requirement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "WILLIAMS v. REGENCY HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

Allen Turner died from surgical complications, leading his daughter, Norkesia Turner, to sue Drs. William Thompson and Heather Nolan, and their employer, the Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc. (MCCG), for medical malpractice and wrongful death. The jury awarded Turner approximately $7.2 million in noneconomic damages for wrongful death. MCCG moved to reduce this award to the statutory cap of $350,000 under OCGA § 51-13-1 (b) and (c), but the trial court denied the motion, citing the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, which found such caps unconstitutional.MCCG appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the Nestlehutt decision foreclosed MCCG's argument. The Court of Appeals held that the $7.2 million award did not need to be reduced to the statutory cap. MCCG then petitioned the Supreme Court of Georgia for a writ of certiorari, which was granted to address whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the precedent regarding the constitutional right to trial by jury.The Supreme Court of Georgia did not decide whether the application of OCGA § 51-13-1’s caps to the $7.2 million award would violate Turner’s constitutional right to a jury trial. Instead, it found that the lower courts had not applied the correct analytical framework from Nestlehutt to the wrongful death claim. The Supreme Court clarified that the holding in Nestlehutt was specific to medical malpractice claims and did not control the issue in this case. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "THE MEDICAL CENTER OF CENTRAL GEORGIA, INC. v. TURNER" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jacqueline Statham suffered injuries during a hysterectomy performed by Dr. David S. Quang, assisted by Dr. Tan-Loc Nguyen and a medical student. The medical student, under the supervision of the defendant physicians, improperly inserted a sponge stick into Statham's rectum instead of her vagina, leading to a rectovaginal fistula. Statham sued the physicians and their medical practice, alleging professional negligence, negligent supervision, and vicarious liability for the medical student's actions.The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, ruling they could not be held vicariously liable for the medical student's negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with the lead opinion concluding that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not impose vicarious liability on the physicians and that the evidence did not support vicarious liability under general agency principles or the borrowed servant doctrine.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not provide a basis for vicarious liability. The court also agreed that the borrowed servant doctrine did not apply as an independent basis for imposing vicarious liability. However, the court disagreed with the conclusion that the defendant physicians could not be held vicariously liable under general agency principles. The court held that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a physician can be vicariously liable for a medical student's negligence if the student was acting as the physician's servant in furtherance of the physician's goals and within the scope of the physician's business.The Supreme Court found that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendant physicians were vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Therefore, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of vicarious liability. View "STATHAM v. QUANG" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice and hospital negligence claim filed by Jami Lynn Golden against Floyd Healthcare Management, Inc. Golden visited Floyd Emergency Care Center in July 2016, complaining of abdominal pain, fever, chills, and nausea. Despite a computer-generated sepsis alert, Golden was discharged with instructions to follow up in two to three days. Her condition worsened, and she was later admitted to Redmond Regional Medical Center Intensive Care Unit in septic shock. As a result, Golden suffered necrosis that required the amputation of parts of her fingers and toes.Floyd Healthcare Management moved to dismiss Golden's claim, arguing that the five-year medical malpractice statute of repose had expired. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the repose statute was tolled by the "Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency" issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, holding that the repose statute was not tolled by the emergency order.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. It held that the emergency order did indeed toll the repose statute, and that there was no impediment in the federal or Georgia Constitutions for the statute of repose to be tolled. The court concluded that Golden's claims were not time-barred, and that the application of the emergency order to toll the repose statute did not violate Floyd Healthcare Management's due process rights. View "GOLDEN v. FLOYD HEALTHCARE MANAGEMENT, INC." on Justia Law

In January 2018, Dorothy Warren passed away after Dr. Nirandr Inthachak allegedly misinterpreted her CT scan. Angela Wilson, Warren’s daughter, filed a lawsuit against Dr. Inthachak. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Inthachak on two grounds. First, Wilson failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence required under OCGA § 51-1-29.5 for healthcare liability claims arising from emergency medical care. Second, Wilson couldn’t prove that the outcome would have been different if Dr. Inthachak had correctly interpreted the CT scan.Wilson appealed, and all 14 judges of the Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was improper. However, they were evenly divided on why summary judgment was incorrect under OCGA § 51-1-29.5. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the equal division, invoking the Court's equal-division jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Court of Appeals was not equally divided on the disposition of the judgment that was appealed. The Court of Appeals had unanimously agreed that the grant of summary judgment could not stand, and their disagreement was only regarding the reasons for why one of the two grounds was faulty. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that such a disagreement did not invoke its equal-division jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court returned the case to the Court of Appeals. View "WILSON v. INTHACHAK" on Justia Law

Diane Dickens Hamon filed a medical malpractice action against William Connell, M.D., and South Georgia Emergency Medicine Associates, P.C. (collectively “Appellees”), for the wrongful death of her father, James Dickens, Jr. Appellees moved for judgment on the pleadings asserting that, because Dickens had a surviving spouse, Hamon did not have the right to bring the claim. The trial court denied the motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Hamon’s petition for certiorari to consider the issue of whether the trial court erred in determining that Hamon had the right, under equitable principles, to pursue a claim under the Wrongful Death Act, OCGA § 51-4-1 et seq. (the “Act”), when Dickens’s widow allegedly refused to do so. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings, the appellate court was reversed. View "Hamon v. Connell, et al." on Justia Law