Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Decedent died from colorectal cancer that spread to her spine. Decedent had sought treatment for several years from Defendant, who failed to diagnose the cancer. Plaintiffs, Decedent's surviving husband and children, filed wrongful death claims against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims were precluded because Decedent had not brought a timely personal injury lawsuit against Defendant, nor could she have at the time of her death as it would have been barred by the statute of limitations applicable to medical negligence claims. The circuit court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a wrongful death beneficiary's right to file a lawsuit is not contingent upon the decedent's ability to bring a timely negligence claim on the date of her death; and (2) Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-109 does not apply directly to a wrongful death action arising out of alleged medical malpractice, and thus it does not bar Appellants' wrongful death action. View "Mummert v. Alizadeh" on Justia Law

Tammie Boyles, as mother and next friend of Colton Elijah Powell Boyles ("Eli"), filed a lawsuit on behalf of her son for injuries he allegedly sustained from an arterial stick while he was hospitalized at University of Alabama at Birmingham Hospital. Eli's treating physician ordered a blood culture, which was taken by registered nurse Denise Dougherty from Eli's right arm. Later that day, Eli's mother, who is also a nurse, noticed that Eli's fingertips on his right hand were blue or "dusky." Dougherty applied a warm compress to Eli's right hand. The discoloration in Eli's fingertips moved upward from his right hand toward his shoulder. Later Eli was transferred to Children's Hospital of Alabama for treatment of a bowel perforation. While at Children's Hospital, the fingertips of Eli's right hand auto-amputated or fell off. Boyles then filed suit against the nurse. Dougherty filed an answer denying that she was guilty of negligence and denying that there was a causal relationship between her and the injury alleged in the complaint. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Dougherty. The trial court concluded that a summary judgment in favor of Dougherty was proper because "[Boyles] lacked an expert capable of testifying as to causation [and] there has been no evidence presented to the [trial court] that [Eli]'s injuries were probably a result of a breach of the standard of care by Dougherty." Boyles appealed. Upon careful review, the Supreme Court concluded that the evidence in this case was sufficient to warrant the child's injuries occurred as alleged. Therefore, the Court reversed the summary judgment entered in favor of Dougherty, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Boyles v. Dougherty" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action to recover for injuries that their son sustained during delivery. The issues before the Supreme Court in this case centered on whether ORCP 59 H limits an appellate court's ability to review objections to a trial court's instructional rulings and whether a statutory cap on noneconomic damages constitutionally can be applied to actions brought by children injured during birth. The Court of Appeals held that, because defendant had not excepted to the trial court's rulings as ORCP 59 H requires, it could not seek appellate review of those rulings. On appeal and again on review, the parties debated whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury and whether applying a statutory cap to the jury's damages award would violate the Oregon Constitution. The jury returned a general verdict finding that defendant was "negligent in one or more ways alleged by plaintiffs" and, awarded plaintiffs economic damages and noneconomic damages. On appeal, defendant argued that both rulings were incorrect because the informed consent statute had no application to a vaginal delivery. The Supreme Court concluded that because an action for medical malpractice was one for which "the right to jury trial was customary in 1857," Article I, section 17, prohibited the legislature from limiting the jury's determination of noneconomic damages. Having reached that conclusion, the Court did not address plaintiffs' other arguments on constitutional grounds.View "Klutschkowski v. PeaceHealth" on Justia Law

Felicia Rogers Thomas and Thomas Johnson, Jr. appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of William Pace, M.D. in a medical-malpractice suit they filed against the doctor. The Johnsons' claim stemmed from a surgical procedure Dr. Pace had performed on Felicia Johnson. Dr. Pace filed his Answer and Defenses, denying any negligence. On the same day, Dr. Pace served his first set of interrogatories and requests for production of documents to the Johnsons. One interrogatory requested that the Johnsons identify any medical experts they intended to call as witnesses at trial, along with the proposed opinions of those experts. In their response, the Johnsons stated that they had not yet identified an expert to be called as a witness at trial. Dr. Pace then served his first requests for admission and second requests for production of documents to the Johnsons. In response, the Johnsons admitted that they did not have a report from a qualified medical expert stating that Dr. Pace had breached the standard of care applicable to him in any way in his care and treatment of Felicia. Dr. Pace then filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the Johnsons had failed to produce any expert testimony to support their claim. The Johnsons moved to quash Dr. Pace's motion, arguing it was premature, because no scheduling order had been entered in the case and no deadline for designating an expert witness had been established. The Johnsons did not respond to the substantive allegations of Dr. Pace's motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered its order granting Dr. Pace's motion for summary judgment. Finding no error in the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed.View "Johnson, Jr. v. Pace" on Justia Law