Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Johanna Hicks died from an accidental overdose of her medications. Hicks’ estate filed suit against the doctor who treated Hicks for severe chronic pain for negligently causing Hicks’ death and filed suit against the doctor’s employer, claiming it should be held vicariously liable for the doctor’s negligence. A jury found that the doctor was not negligent in his treatment of Johanna and returned a defense verdict. On appeal, the estate argued that the district court erred by permitting the doctor and his codefendant to introduce the testimony of two expert witnesses on the doctor’s adherence to the appropriate standard of care for practitioners of pain medicine. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the estate failed to preserve for appellate review the issue regarding the admissibility of the testimony of the two standard of care experts.View "Hicks v. Zondag" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Doctor and Doctor’s employer (Employer), alleging that Doctor touched her inappropriately and made sexually charged comments during her office visits. Plaintiff settled with Doctor, and the case proceeded against Employer. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claims against Employer were barred by Kan. Stat. Ann. 40-3403(h), which past decisions of the Supreme Court interpreted to cover a covered health care provider’s vicarious liability and any other responsibility, including independent or direct liability, for claims caused by the professional services of another health care provider. The court of appeals affirmed. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the lower courts erred in relying on the cases interpreting the statute because the cases were wrongly decided, were distinguishable, or had been effectively overruled. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 40-3403(h) barred Employer’s liability, and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.View "Cady v. Schroll" on Justia Law

Dr. Ann M. Mottershaw and The Radiology Group, LLC, appealed the trial court's order granting a motion for a new trial filed by plaintiff Shannon Ledbetter, as administrator of the estate of Venoria Womack. These appeals primarily concerned whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in ordering a new trial based on the jury's exposure to certain evidence that the trial court had excluded by an order granting a motion in limine. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not exceed its discretion, and affirmed its decision. View "Mottershaw v. Ledbetter" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jaryd Schroeder sought treatment from the respondents, Dr. Steven Weighall and Columbia Basin Imaging. Schroeder was nine years old at the time and suffered from headaches, nausea, dizziness, weakness in his legs, and double vision. He underwent an MRI (magnetic resonance imaging), which Weighall reviewed and found to be normal. Schroeder's symptoms persisted. On either November 9 or 19, 2009, when he was 17, Schroeder underwent another MRI. This time the radiologist who reviewed the image found an Arnold Chiari Type I Malformation. On January 13, 2011, the day before his 19th birthday, Schroeder filed a medical malpractice action against Weighall, Columbia Basin Imaging, PC, and a third party subsequently dismissed by stipulation. Weighall asserted that the action was barred by the statute of limitations codified at RCW 4.16.350 and subject to the minority tolling exemption codified at RCW 4.16.190(2). Schroeder and his mother discovered Weighall's alleged omission November 2009 when Schroeder was still a minor. If not for RCW 4.16.190(2), the one-year statute of limitations applicable to his claim would have tolled until his 18th birthday. The ultimate issue before the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of RCW 4. 16. 190(2). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that RCW 4.16.190(2) violated article I, section 12 of the Washington State Constitution, and therefore reversed the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing Schroeder's medical malpractice action. View "Schroeder v. Weighall" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice case, the defendant alleged the plaintiff’s discovery response concerning his expert was insufficient. The trial judge ordered the plaintiff to produce the expert for a deposition but, due to illness, the expert was unable to attend the scheduled deposition. Without addressing whether the plaintiff was at fault for failure to comply with the court’s order to produce the expert for deposition, the trial court ordered that the expert would not be allowed to testify. The Mississippi Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a hearing on that issue. View "Boyd v. Nunez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was being treated at a private medical facility, a nurse employed by the clinic committed an unauthorized disclosure of Plaintiff’s confidential health information. Plaintiff filed this action in federal court against Defendants, various affiliated entities that allegedly owned or otherwise controlled the clinic. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss all eight of Plaintiff’s claims. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of all but one of Plaintiff’s causes of action, reserving decision on Plaintiff’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty. In a separate opinion, the Second Circuit found the nurse’s actions were not foreseeable to Defendants nor taken within the scope of her employment. The court, however, certified a question to the New York Court of Appeals regarding Defendants’ liability where respondeat superior liability is absent. The Court of Appeals answered that, under New York law, the common law right of action for breach of the fiduciary duty of confidentiality for the unauthorized disclosure of medical information may not run directly against medical corporations when the employee responsible for the breach acts outside the scope of her employment. View "Doe v. Guthrie Clinic, Ltd." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice action against the Campbell County Memorial Hospital under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (Act), alleging that Amanda Phillips, a certified nurse anesthetist for Northern Plains Anesthesia Associates, which provided anesthesia services for the hospital, acted as an employee or agent of the hospital, making the hospital vicariously liable for Phillips’ alleged negligence. The hospital filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that a government hospital could not be vicariously liable for acts of non-employees or independent contractors under the doctrine of ostensible agency. The district court denied the motion based on Sharsmith v. Hill. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its interpretation of Sharsmith and that Sharsmith did not create an implied waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. View "Campbell County Memorial Hosp. v. Pfeifle" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Leslie Milliun's conservator, filed a negligence suit against Defendant hospital, alleging that, while in Defendant's care, Leslie suffered severe respiratory dysfunction which resulted in Leslie's severe brain injury. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Defendant because Plaintiff failed to offer the requisite expert testimony to create an issue of material fact regarding Defendant's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of Leslie's injuries. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in (1) refusing to admit certain medical records of Leslie's treating physicians as expert opinion on causation, and (2) concluding that its order granting Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of a commission so Leslie's out-of-state treating physicians could be deposed should be withdrawn because the physicians could not be compelled to offer expert opinion on causation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to admit certain statements contained within the medical records to establish a causal connection between Leslie's injuries and the alleged negligence.View "Milliun v. New Milford Hosp." on Justia Law

Appellants filed complaints alleging claims for malpractice and wrongful death against Appellees Dr. Jeffrey Kirchner, Arkansas Health Group, Baptist Health, and Baptist MedCare, Inc. for medical injury and the wrongful death of Alfred Spires. The circuit court dismissed Appellants' complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) granting judgment in favor of Appellees before the completion of discovery; (2) dismissing the complaint against Kirchner for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and (3) dismissing the complaint against Arkansas Health, Baptist Health, and Baptist MedCare on the ground that Appellants' claims were barred by the statute of limitations.View "Worden v. Kirchner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, a physician. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his original action. Plaintiff subsequently filed his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff's second action was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff responded that (1) his pre-suit notice commenced his new action prior to the expiration of the one-year saving statute; and (2) alternatively, section 29-26-121 extended the saving statute by 120 days. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's action was commenced by the filing of his second health care liability complaint rather than by providing pre-suit notice; and (2) a plaintiff who files his initial action prior to the effective date of section 29-26-121 dismisses his original action, properly provides pre-suit notice, and refiles his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121 is entitled to the 120-day extension.View "Rajvongs v. Wright" on Justia Law