Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In a medical malpractice lawsuit, Kimberly Taylor claimed that Dr. Keith Brill breached the accepted standard of medical care by causing damage during her surgery. The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the lower court had made several errors during the trial. Firstly, the lower court should not have allowed any evidence or argument regarding Taylor's informed consent or assumption of risk, as Taylor's consent was uncontested and such information was irrelevant to determining whether Dr. Brill had conformed to the accepted standard of care. Secondly, the lower court should not have prohibited Taylor from presenting non-expert evidence to show that the costs of her medical damages were reasonable. The Supreme Court also found that the lower court should not have allowed evidence of insurance write-downs, as these did not create any payable benefit to Taylor. Finally, the lower court was wrong to limit the scope of Taylor's closing argument. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a new trial. View "Taylor v. Brill" on Justia Law

In January 2018, Dorothy Warren passed away after Dr. Nirandr Inthachak allegedly misinterpreted her CT scan. Angela Wilson, Warren’s daughter, filed a lawsuit against Dr. Inthachak. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Inthachak on two grounds. First, Wilson failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence required under OCGA § 51-1-29.5 for healthcare liability claims arising from emergency medical care. Second, Wilson couldn’t prove that the outcome would have been different if Dr. Inthachak had correctly interpreted the CT scan.Wilson appealed, and all 14 judges of the Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was improper. However, they were evenly divided on why summary judgment was incorrect under OCGA § 51-1-29.5. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the equal division, invoking the Court's equal-division jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Court of Appeals was not equally divided on the disposition of the judgment that was appealed. The Court of Appeals had unanimously agreed that the grant of summary judgment could not stand, and their disagreement was only regarding the reasons for why one of the two grounds was faulty. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that such a disagreement did not invoke its equal-division jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court returned the case to the Court of Appeals. View "WILSON v. INTHACHAK" on Justia Law

A minor, Freedom Morris, sought emergency treatment for appendicitis at Vidant Medical Center and was operated on by Dr. David Rodeberg. Despite complaining of severe pain after the surgery, Morris was discharged. He returned to the hospital a day later with a fever and sharp abdominal pain. A second surgery performed by a different doctor revealed that not all of the appendix had been removed during the first operation. This had caused a ruptured appendix and infection in Morris' body. Morris underwent a third surgery to drain a pelvic abscess.More than five years after the first surgery, Morris filed a lawsuit against Dr. Rodeberg and Vidant Medical Center alleging medical malpractice and medical negligence. The defendants responded with motions to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the lawsuit was filed outside the statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims of persons who are over ten years old but under eighteen years old when their claims accrue. The trial court denied the defendants' motions, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the three-year statute of limitations barred Morris' medical malpractice claims. The Court reasoned that while the North Carolina General Assembly has recognized that individuals under certain disabilities, including being a minor, are unable to appreciate the nature of potential legal claims and take appropriate action, subsection 1-17(c) of the North Carolina General Statutes eliminates the tolling of the medical malpractice claims of minors, except in certain situations. None of those exceptions applied to Morris' case, so his claim was subject to the standard three-year statute of limitations and was therefore time-barred. The Court did not address Morris' argument that the application of the three-year statute of limitations violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because it did not have jurisdiction to review that issue. View "Morris v. Rodeberg" on Justia Law

An incarcerated individual developed a mass under his armpit and was referred to a surgeon who had a contract with the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). The surgeon performed a biopsy, which was then sent to the pathology department at the Cortland Regional Medical Center (CRMC) for examination. Dr. Jun Wang, the Medical Director of CRMC's pathology department and a member of Cortland Pathology, examined the specimen and determined that the mass was benign. A year later, the patient was diagnosed with Hodgkin's lymphoma.The patient initiated a medical malpractice lawsuit against CRMC and others, alleging that they misdiagnosed his condition and failed to promptly diagnose or refer him for treatment. Dr. Wang sought defense and indemnification from the State, claiming that he was entitled to coverage under Public Officers Law § 17 and Correction Law § 24-a because his actions arose from treating an incarcerated individual at the request of DOCCS. The Attorney General rejected Dr. Wang's request, stating that he treated the patient through his employment arrangement with CRMC, not directly at the request of the State, and thus the State had no obligation to provide defense or indemnification.The New York Court of Appeals held that the State is not obligated to indemnify or defend Dr. Wang in a medical malpractice lawsuit. The court ruled that under the Correction Law § 24-a, the State's obligation to defend and indemnify only applies when there has been an explicit request by DOCCS for the services of a specific provider—an arrangement or understanding made in advance between DOCCS and the healthcare professional. In this case, no such express request or direct agreement existed between DOCCS and Dr. Wang, therefore, the State had no obligation to defend or indemnify him. The court also stated that the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. Hence, the court affirmed the order of the Appellate Division. View "In re Wang v James" on Justia Law

In the case presented, plaintiff Bette Bennett alleged that she suffered a traumatic brain injury due to medical negligence by the defendant, the United States. However, the cause of her injury was not diagnosed until after the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under Washington law had expired, making it impossible for her to timely commence her lawsuit. The United States moved to dismiss her complaint as time-barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington was asked to decide whether the statute of repose violates certain provisions of the Washington Constitution. The court held that while the legislature has broad authority to set time limits for commencing an action, the eight-year statute of repose for medical malpractice actions under RCW 4.16.350(3) violates the privileges and immunities clause of article I, section 12 of the Washington Constitution. The court reasoned that the statute implicates the fundamental right of state citizenship by limiting the pursuit of common law claims against certain defendants, but it does not satisfy the "reasonable ground" test under the state constitution. Therefore, the court concluded that the statute of repose is unconstitutional under independent state law. The court declined to reach the second certified question regarding whether the statute of repose unconstitutionally restricts a plaintiff's right to access the courts in violation of the Washington Constitution. View "Bennett v. United States" on Justia Law

In Alabama, an attorney was representing three individuals, Charles, John, and Linda Evans, in relation to a car accident. Following the accident, Charles was taken to Shelby Baptist Medical Center and discharged. He subsequently collapsed at home and died. The attorney filed a complaint asserting medical malpractice, negligence, wantonness, and recklessness on behalf of John as next friend of Charles. Eventually, an insurance company provided a settlement check and a general release relating to Charles. However, this check was signed by John and not Charles' personal representative, Bowers, who had been appointed after Charles' death. The trial court ruled that the settlement was binding on Bowers, and all claims against the defendants were dismissed.Bowers appealed, and the Supreme Court of Alabama partially reversed the trial court's decision. It ruled that the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of the malpractice defendants without a motion from them and without holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the attorney had express or apparent authority to settle the wrongful-death claim against Short. The court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Short with respect to John's and Linda's individual claims. The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Bowers v. BBH SBMC, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of Corizon Healthcare Inc. in this medical malpractice action, holding that the requirements of Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-2604 do not apply to claims against medical institutions not based on vicarious liability.David Windhurst, an inmate, was provided with health care through the Arizona Department of Corrections' contractor Corizon Healthcare Inc. David later died due the infections complications of diabetes mellitus. Plaintiff, David's widow, filed a wrongful death action against Corizon and other defendants, alleging, inter alia, institutional negligence by Corizon and vicarious liability based on the negligence of its medical personnel. The trial court granted summary judgment for Corizon on the medical negligence claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when it is unclear which provider breached the standard of care, an expert on institutional standards of care may address an alleged breach by establishing that a class of providers failed to exercise appropriate care; (2) the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment for Corizon; and (3) a registered nurse may testify regarding gate cause of death in a medical malpractice case. View "Windhurst v. Ariz. Dep't of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the decision of the court of claims seeking to recover a portion of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation (BWC)'s subrogated award in this case, holding that the BWC's attempted expansion of subrogation was unlawful.The BWC allowed Lamar Thomas's workers' compensation claim for some conditions he received in an industrial accident caused by a third party but disallowed an additional claim for other conditions linked to the workplace accident based on a second opinion rendered during a medical review. When Thomas settled his personal injury case against a third-party tortfeasor, the BWC recouped through subrogation the cost of the medical review it had used to deny Thomas's additional claim. Thomas brought suit against the BWC. The court of claims denied the complaint via judgment on the pleadings. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the medical review the BWC obtained was not an expense recoverable in subrogation. View "Thomas v. Logue" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court that two expert reports provided to support Plaintiff's claims for negligence provided the information required by the Texas Medical Liability Act, Tex. Civ. Proc. & Rem. Code 74.351(a), (l), (r)(6), holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff, the guardian of a care facility resident, sued Defendant, the facility, alleging negligence. The trial court concluded that the two expert reports provided by Plaintiff to support the claims provided a fair summary of the experts' opinion regarding the standard of care, breach, and the cause of injury, as required by the Act. The court of appeals reversed on the ground that the reports lacked sufficient detail regarding the appropriate standard of care and breach. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the proffered reports provided a fair summary of the experts' opinions as to the appropriate standard of care and breach of that standard. View "Uriegas v. Kenmar Residential HCS Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the State's motion to dismiss the second count of the complaint filed by Celine Escobar-Santana (Celine) and her son Emmett Escobar-Santana (Emmett), holding that the phrase "medical malpractice claims" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-160(f) was broad enough to encompass Celine's claim for emotional distress damages under the circumstances of this case.Celine brought this action alleging that she suffered emotional distress damages from physical injuries to Emmett that were proximately caused by the negligence of health care professionals (collectively, Defendants) during the birthing process. The State moved to dismiss count two of the complaint on the ground that the count did not fall within the statutory waiver of the State's sovereign immunity in section 4-160(f) because the count stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress or bystander liability rather than medical malpractice. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Celine's allegation that she suffered a traumatic delivery followed by severe psychological distress was inextricably connected to her allegations of medical malpractice and therefore qualified as a medical malpractice claim for purposes of section 4-160(f). View "Escobar-Santana v. State" on Justia Law