Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

An elderly man with significant medical needs was admitted to a skilled nursing facility, where a physician provided in-facility care. The physician was responsible for evaluating the patient, making treatment orders, and recording medical information. The complaint alleged that the physician performed only cursory examinations, failed to follow up on necessary tests, did not adequately address serious medical issues, and maintained illegible records. The patient’s condition deteriorated, leading to hospitalization and eventual death.The patient’s brother, acting as successor in interest and on behalf of the heirs, filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the facility, its operators, and the physician. The complaint included claims for elder neglect and financial abuse under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, as well as negligence and wrongful death. After settling with all defendants except the physician, the plaintiff proceeded against him alone. The physician demurred to the elder abuse claims, arguing that he did not have the requisite caretaking or custodial relationship with the patient and that the financial abuse claim was not viable. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the allegations amounted only to professional negligence, which is excluded from the Act’s heightened remedies.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that a physician’s negligent provision of medical services to an elder in a skilled nursing facility, without more, does not constitute “neglect” under the Act because the physician lacks the necessary robust caretaking or custodial relationship. The court also held that a financial abuse claim based solely on alleged professional negligence is not actionable under the Act. The judgment in favor of the physician was affirmed. View "Frankland v. Etehad" on Justia Law

A woman, acting individually and as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice lawsuit against a hospital and an emergency room physician. She alleged that the physician negligently failed to diagnose and treat her husband’s condition after he presented to the emergency room with head and neck pain following a blow to the head. The physician diagnosed abrasions and a closed head injury, but did not order cardiac tests. The patient was discharged and died that night from an apparent heart attack.The case was filed in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska. Over several years, the parties engaged in discovery, and the court issued multiple progression orders setting deadlines for, among other things, the disclosure of expert witnesses. The plaintiff did not disclose a medical expert by the required deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not prove her malpractice claim. Shortly before the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiff disclosed a new medical expert. The district court excluded the expert’s affidavit, both as a discovery sanction and under its inherent authority to enforce its progression orders, and granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the case with prejudice.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert’s affidavit as a discovery sanction and remanded for further proceedings. On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the late-disclosed expert under its inherent authority to enforce progression orders. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with directions to affirm the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Ricker v. Nebraska Methodist Health System" on Justia Law

A woman brought suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after her child suffered severe and permanent nerve damage during childbirth at a Texas hospital. She alleged that the resident physician who delivered her baby used excessive force in responding to a complication known as shoulder dystocia, and that the attending physician failed to properly supervise. The plaintiff sought compensatory damages for medical care and related expenses.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s recommendation, determined that shoulder dystocia is always an obstetrical emergency under Texas law. It concluded that, in such emergencies, Texas law requires proof of “willful and wanton negligence” (a heightened standard akin to gross negligence). The court further reasoned that because the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for punitive damages, and because damages for willful and wanton negligence are punitive, it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in two respects: first, by presuming as a matter of law that the physician provided emergency medical care in every instance of shoulder dystocia, rather than treating it as a factual question; and second, by conflating the heightened standard of liability (willful and wanton negligence) with the nature of damages recoverable. The Fifth Circuit clarified that compensatory damages for gross negligence are available under Texas law and are not barred by the FTCA, which only precludes punitive damages. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Robledo v. USA" on Justia Law

Burke McCarthy died in October 2018 after receiving medical treatment from Dr. Wesley Hiser at Wyoming Medical Center. Dianna Ellis, McCarthy’s daughter and wrongful death representative, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against Dr. Hiser and the hospital in February 2021, within the two-year statute of limitations. However, Dr. Hiser was never served with the original complaint. Nearly two years later, Ellis voluntarily dismissed her suit against Dr. Hiser. In December 2023, she refiled her complaint, relying on Wyoming’s savings statute to argue she had an additional year to commence a new action. Dr. Hiser was served for the first time in February 2024, more than five years after McCarthy’s death.The District Court of Natrona County granted Dr. Hiser’s motion to dismiss the refiled complaint. The court found that it had never obtained jurisdiction over Dr. Hiser in the original action because he was not served, and therefore the savings statute could not apply to extend the time for refiling. Ellis appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Wyoming’s savings statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-118, does not apply to actions that are voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff. The court overruled its prior decision in Hugus v. Reeder, 2022 WY 13, which had held that a voluntary dismissal qualified as a “failure otherwise than upon the merits” under the savings statute. The court reasoned that a voluntary dismissal is not a “failure” within the meaning of the statute, as it is a matter of choice rather than an unsuccessful attempt to proceed. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Wyoming affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Ellis’s refiled complaint. View "Ellis v. Hiser" on Justia Law

On January 20, 2018, Francisco Gutierrez was driving his truck on a California highway when an ambulance driven by Uriel Tostado, an EMT employed by ProTransport-1, LLC, rear-ended his vehicle. At the time, Tostado was transporting a patient between medical centers. Gutierrez filed a lawsuit on January 7, 2020, claiming the collision caused him neck and back injuries. He framed his complaint as a general negligence action. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claim was time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA)’s one-year statute of limitations for medical professional negligence. Gutierrez opposed, asserting his claim was timely under the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence.The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that MICRA’s statute of limitations applied because Tostado was rendering professional medical services at the time of the accident. Gutierrez appealed, and the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision, reasoning that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and held that MICRA’s statute of limitations does not apply to Gutierrez’s claim. The court concluded that the applicable statute of limitations depends on the nature of the right being sued upon. Since Gutierrez’s claim was based on a breach of a duty owed to the public generally, rather than a professional obligation owed to a patient, the two-year statute of limitations for general negligence claims applied. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeal and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law

Everett Robinson was transferred to Canton Harbor Healthcare Center, a skilled nursing facility, for follow-up care after a stroke. During his stay, he developed pressure ulcers, which allegedly worsened after his transfer to other facilities, leading to his death. Felicia Robinson, his widow, and his surviving children filed a complaint against Canton Harbor, alleging negligence in allowing the pressure ulcers to develop and worsen, causing his wrongful death. They submitted a certificate of a qualified expert, signed by registered nurse Anjanette Jones-Singh, attesting that Canton Harbor breached the standard of care, causing the pressure ulcers.The Circuit Court for Baltimore City dismissed the complaint, ruling that as a registered nurse, Jones-Singh was not qualified to attest to the proximate cause of Robinson's pressure ulcers. The Robinsons appealed, and the Appellate Court of Maryland vacated the dismissal, holding that a registered nurse is not disqualified per se from attesting that a breach of nursing standards proximately caused pressure ulcers. The case was remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Maryland affirmed the Appellate Court's judgment. The court held that a registered nurse may attest in a certificate that a breach of nursing care standards at a skilled nursing facility proximately caused a pressure ulcer, provided the nurse relies on a pre-existing diagnosis and does not make a medical diagnosis. The court also held that a registered nurse meets the peer-to-peer requirement to attest to breaches of nursing care standards but not to the standards applicable to physicians. The case was allowed to proceed based on the certificate provided by Nurse Jones-Singh. View "Canton Harbor Healthcare v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Carol Cutting filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A., based on treatment she received in 2013. Cutting alleged that a doctor at Down East treated her shoulder improperly and failed to obtain informed consent, particularly regarding how her Tourette’s syndrome might affect the surgery. She also claimed the doctor falsified her medical records. A prelitigation screening panel found unanimously against Cutting, determining that the doctor’s conduct did not deviate from the standard of care.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) admitted the panel’s finding into evidence at trial. The jury found that Down East was not negligent. Cutting challenged the admission of the panel’s finding, arguing it was biased and violated her due process rights. She also contested the court’s judgment as a matter of law on her claim for punitive damages, arguing that the court erred in its decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the panel’s finding. The court noted that the panel’s offer to decide the case based on written records, if both parties agreed, did not demonstrate bias, especially since the offer was declined and a full hearing was held. The court also found that the trial court provided the jury with the necessary instructions to contextualize the panel’s finding, preserving Cutting’s right to a jury trial.Regarding punitive damages, the court held that any error in granting Down East’s motion for judgment as a matter of law was harmless. Since the jury found no negligence, they could not award any damages, including punitive damages. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A. View "Cutting v. Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A." on Justia Law

William Carter, a paraplegic confined to a wheelchair, was arrested for unauthorized use of 911 and spent eight days in the Shreveport City Jail. During his incarceration, Carter, who had pre-existing bedsores, did not receive adequate medical care for his wounds, which allegedly led to their infection and his subsequent hospitalization. Carter's mother, suing on his behalf, filed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act (RA), 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Louisiana state negligence law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana excluded the expert testimony of Dr. Joel Nitzkin before trial. After a jury trial, the court granted the defendants' Rule 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law on the ADA/RA claim, concluding that the claim was about medical treatment rather than an actionable disability claim. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants on the § 1983 and state-law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, holding that the ADA/RA claim amounted to a complaint about medical negligence, which is not actionable under the ADA. The court found that the failure to change Carter's bandages was a medical treatment issue, not a failure to accommodate under the ADA. Additionally, the court held that Carter's placement in a segregated cell for his safety did not constitute intentional discrimination under the ADA. The court also did not address the exclusion of Dr. Nitzkin's testimony, as it was only relevant to the ADA claims, which failed as a matter of law. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Carter v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

Jessica Paulsen experienced severe bleeding after giving birth on December 13, 2021, at Avera McKennan Hospital. Dr. Amber Saloum performed a hysterectomy and another surgery on December 14, 2021, to stop the bleeding. Paulsen later claimed she did not consent to the hysterectomy and filed a lawsuit against Avera McKennan, Dr. Saloum, and unnamed parties on December 15, 2023. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Paulsen's claims were barred by the two-year repose period under SDCL 15-2-14.1.The Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Minnehaha County, South Dakota, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that Paulsen's lawsuit was filed outside the two-year repose period. Paulsen appealed the decision, arguing that the repose period should be calculated as 730 days and that she should have been allowed additional discovery to potentially establish a continuing tort.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case de novo. The court held that a "year" is defined as a "calendar year" under SDCL 2-14-2(36), meaning the repose period ends at the exact moment the start date reoccurs on the calendar. Therefore, the two-year repose period began on December 15, 2021, and ended on December 14, 2023. Since Paulsen filed her lawsuit on December 15, 2023, it was one day too late.The court also found that Paulsen's request for additional discovery was speculative and did not demonstrate how further discovery would reveal facts essential to opposing the summary judgment. Consequently, the court affirmed the circuit court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Paulsen v. Mckennan" on Justia Law

A Wisconsin prisoner, Armin Wand III, developed appendicitis in February 2018. He was seen by Nurse Beckey Kramer on February 13, 2018, but she did not diagnose appendicitis at that time. The next day, February 14, she recognized the symptoms and sent him to the hospital for emergency surgery. Wand sued Kramer and other officials, claiming inadequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment and state law negligence for not recognizing his need for emergency care on February 13.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin denied summary judgment for Kramer and another defendant, allowing the case to proceed to trial. The court recruited an experienced lawyer for Wand, but only for settlement purposes. After settlement efforts failed, the lawyer withdrew, and Wand's subsequent motion for recruitment of another lawyer was denied. The court noted Wand's legal blindness and severe stutter but believed he could represent himself with the court's assistance.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Wand's trial testimony contradicted his earlier claims, stating he did not report lower right quadrant pain to Kramer on February 13, which was crucial for diagnosing appendicitis. The court concluded that Wand's case was substantively weak and that he had not shown prejudice from the lack of recruited counsel. The court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Kramer, holding that Wand did not demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the presence of counsel would have changed the trial's outcome. View "Wand v. Kramer" on Justia Law