Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

After Paula Denison was declared dead at a hospital in Meridian, Mississippi, her family consented to organ donation. She was transferred to a transplant facility, where it was later discovered that she was actually alive. Denison was then returned to the original hospital, where her condition deteriorated and she was pronounced dead the following day. Denison’s estate, through her daughter Brooke Denison as administratrix, and Brooke individually, brought separate lawsuits against the Mississippi Organ Recovery Agency, Dr. Shirley Schlessinger, and Dr. Dustin Shea Allen, among others, alleging claims such as negligence and infliction of emotional distress.In the Lauderdale County Circuit Court, the defendants moved to dismiss both complaints. In the estate’s case, the court granted dismissal based on the immunity provisions of the Revised Mississippi Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, finding the defendants acted in good faith and in reliance on the family’s authorization. In Brooke’s individual case, the court granted dismissal because her complaint did not allege that she was present or witnessed any negligent acts, thus failing to establish bystander liability. Brooke and the estate appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of Mississippi consolidated the appeals. The Court held that the trial court erred by considering material outside the pleadings in the estate’s case without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and thus reversed and remanded that case for further proceedings. However, the Court found that Brooke’s individual allegations failed to meet the requirements for bystander liability under Mississippi law and affirmed the dismissal of her claims. The Court expressly declined to decide whether immunity under the Anatomical Gift Act applied, noting the need for further factual development. View "Denison v. Mississippi Organ Recovery Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman with a complex medical history, including autoimmune hepatitis and cirrhosis, was admitted to a regional medical center with symptoms of weakness, nausea, and vomiting. After consultation and diagnostic imaging suggested gallstones and cholecystitis, a general surgeon evaluated her and determined she was not a surgical candidate due to end-stage liver disease. She was treated non-surgically, showed some improvement, and was discharged. Two days later, she was admitted to another hospital with sepsis and subsequently died from cardiopulmonary arrest due to urosepsis.Her daughter, on behalf of her wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed a medical malpractice suit against, among others, the general surgeon. The plaintiff sought to introduce a board-certified interventional radiologist as her medical expert, whose testimony suggested that the surgeon failed to meet the standard of care by not pursuing further diagnostic testing or recommending non-surgical interventions. The Washington County Circuit Court struck this expert’s testimony, holding that the radiologist was not qualified to testify about the standard of care for a general surgeon, and granted summary judgment for the surgeon.The Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding the expert. Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702 in excluding the expert’s testimony, as the expert did not demonstrate sufficient familiarity with the field of general surgery or with the relevant procedures. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated, and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, thereby upholding the exclusion of the expert testimony and the grant of summary judgment. View "Lee v. Doolittle" on Justia Law

The plaintiff brought a suit under Puerto Rico law after her mother died while residing in an assisted living facility. The plaintiff alleged that the facility's staff, including a licensed practical nurse, incorrectly informed treating physicians that her mother was a Jehovah's Witness. As a result, necessary blood transfusions were not administered, and the mother died from heart failure. The facility’s insurer had denied coverage for the incident under its general liability policy, claiming that the alleged wrongful acts were excluded as “professional services.”The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico first granted partial summary judgment for the insurer, finding that certain actions—such as failing to call 911—were excluded as “professional services,” but allowed the case to proceed on claims related to record-keeping and miscommunication, concluding those were not “professional services” under existing precedent. After the case was reassigned, the new district judge reaffirmed that ruling, and a damages trial resulted in a verdict against the facility. Subsequent to a decision by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in Rivera-Matos v. Commonwealth, which clarified the scope of “professional services” exclusions, the district judge permitted the insurer to relitigate the coverage issue, ultimately finding that the exclusion did apply to the acts in question and entering judgment for the insurer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the plaintiff had forfeited her argument that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s decision should not be applied retroactively, as she had not raised it below. The court further found no plain error in the application of the new precedent. The judgment of the district court in favor of the insurer was affirmed. View "Garcia-Navarro v. Universal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute granting immunity to health care providers from civil liability for certain acts or omissions occurring between March 12, 2020, and July 11, 2020. Savannah Wren, whose pregnancy was considered high risk, experienced the stillbirth of her child after multiple visits to Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital. She alleged negligent care and subsequently filed suit for medical malpractice, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the hospital and associated medical professionals.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the immunity provided by WIS. STAT. § 895.4801. Wren challenged the statute’s constitutionality on several grounds, including vagueness, overbreadth, and violations of her rights to redress, jury trial, due process, and equal protection. The circuit court struck her supplemental equal protection claim and ultimately dismissed her complaint with prejudice, finding the statute constitutional.Upon appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. It held that § 895.4801 was facially unconstitutional because it deprived litigants of their right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed only whether § 895.4801 facially violates the state constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that because the legislature has the authority to abrogate or suspend common law causes of action under Article XIV, Section 13, and because the statute eliminated Wren’s causes of action during the specified period, her right to a jury trial did not attach. The court concluded that § 895.4801 does not implicate the constitutional jury trial right, reversed the court of appeals’ decision, and remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved issues. View "Wren v. Columbia St. Mary's Hospital Milwaukee, Inc." on Justia Law

A man suffered a serious injury to his right index finger in a bandsaw accident and was treated by a plastic surgeon who recommended amputation. The patient refused amputation, and the doctor attempted to salvage the finger through surgery and follow-up care. Another surgeon later treated the patient and ultimately performed a “ray amputation,” removing the entire finger and a portion of the hand. The patient sued the original doctor, alleging that negligent treatment led to an infection and necessitated the more extensive amputation. Medical experts for both sides testified that the initial injury left a very low chance of saving the finger.The case was tried to a jury in a Texas district court, which rendered an 11–1 defense verdict, finding neither the doctor nor the patient proximately caused the injury. The charge included a “loss of chance” instruction, requiring the jury to find the finger had more than a 50% chance of survival with proper care. The patient objected to this instruction before and after the verdict, arguing it was not appropriate under Texas law. After trial, the patient moved for a new trial, attaching a letter from the dissenting juror describing deliberations and alleged confusion about the charge. The district court granted a new trial, later amending its order to provide seven reasons, mainly contesting the “loss of chance” instruction. The doctor sought mandamus relief from the Texas Court of Appeals, which denied relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and conditionally granted mandamus relief. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on legally incorrect grounds, including its misunderstanding of the “loss of chance” doctrine, which is recognized under Texas law in both death and injury cases. The Court directed the district court to vacate its new trial order and render judgment on the jury’s verdict. View "IN RE LAPUERTA" on Justia Law

A patient underwent surgery on September 4, 2020, and died twelve days later. Her estate and children brought a medical malpractice suit against the surgeon and hospital, alleging negligence. The defendants sought dismissal, arguing the plaintiffs had not satisfied Iowa’s certificate of merit requirements under Iowa Code section 147.140(1), which mandates a supporting expert affidavit early in medical malpractice litigation. The district court denied the motion to dismiss.The defendants then sought interlocutory review from the Iowa Supreme Court. The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial, finding the plaintiffs had not complied with the statutory affidavit requirement, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case with prejudice. Following the remand, the plaintiffs attempted to file dismissals without prejudice before and after the district court’s order of dismissal with prejudice. Despite these filings, the district court entered a dismissal with prejudice as directed by the Iowa Supreme Court. The plaintiffs then filed a new lawsuit asserting the same claims against the same defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss this second action, citing claim preclusion (res judicata) and the statute of limitations. The Iowa District Court for Clinton County dismissed the second action.On appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. The court held that its prior mandate required dismissal with prejudice, and any attempt by the plaintiffs to dismiss without prejudice was contrary to that mandate and thus ineffective. The court found that the elements of claim preclusion were satisfied: the parties and claims were identical to the prior action, and there was a final judgment on the merits. Accordingly, the second lawsuit was barred. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal on claim preclusion grounds. View "Shontz v. Mercy Medical Center-Clinton, Inc." on Justia Law

A Pennsylvania state prisoner with a history of opioid addiction participated in a prison Medication Assisted Treatment program, receiving Suboxone to help control his cravings. After prison officials twice accused him of possessing contraband and diverting his medication to other prisoners, he was removed from the treatment program. Instead of abruptly ending his medication, a prison doctor tapered his doses over a week to reduce withdrawal symptoms. The prisoner later suffered withdrawal effects and mental health challenges but was not reinstated in the program despite his requests. He claimed the diversion finding was unfair but did not allege personal animus or pretext by the officials involved.He filed a pro se lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania against various prison officials and a doctor, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment (cruel and unusual punishment), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and a state-law negligence claim. The District Court dismissed all claims, finding the federal claims inadequately pleaded and the state-law claim procedurally improper for lack of a certificate of merit under Pennsylvania law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim, holding that the complaint failed to allege deliberate indifference to medical needs as required by precedent; the officials’ actions were judged to be good-faith medical decisions, not constitutionally blameworthy conduct. The court also affirmed dismissal of the ADA claim, finding no plausible allegation that the prisoner was excluded from treatment “by reason of” his disability, but rather for diversion of medication. However, the court vacated the dismissal of the state-law negligence claim, as recent Supreme Court precedent abrogated the procedural requirement relied upon by the District Court, and remanded for further proceedings on that claim. View "DiFraia v. Ransom" on Justia Law

A mother of four regularly sought care at a federally funded health center in Rhode Island from 2006 onward. Over a period of several years, she repeatedly reported persistent, weeks-long headaches with changing characteristics to her primary-care providers, also disclosing experiences of domestic abuse. Despite these reports, she was diagnosed with migraines and prescribed medication, but was never referred to a neurologist or for neuroimaging. In 2019, her symptoms worsened, and she lost consciousness, leading to hospitalization and the discovery of a slow-growing brain tumor, which had caused a buildup of cerebral fluid. Surgery to remove the tumor resulted in cerebellar strokes and permanent neurological damage, severely limiting her mobility and ability to care for her family.After the Department of Health and Human Services denied her administrative claim, she and her family filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island. The district court found negligence by the primary-care providers, awarded her damages for medical expenses, pain and suffering, and homemaker loss, and awarded her children damages for loss of consortium. The government appealed, arguing that the children’s consortium claims were not properly presented administratively, that the homemaker damages were excessive, and that the findings on standard of care, causation, and medical expenses were erroneous.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the children’s loss-of-consortium claims were barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and reversed those damages. The court vacated the homemaker damages award as excessive and unsupported by the evidence, remanding for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court’s findings on negligence and causation and upheld the pain and suffering awards, but reduced the medical expense award by the cost of an unrelated spinal MRI. The judgment was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, modified in part, and remanded. View "Urizar-Mota v. US" on Justia Law

A woman in her mid-30s suffered a severe stroke that left her paralyzed and unable to speak, requiring months of inpatient care at a rehabilitation hospital operated by a corporate defendant. While at the facility, she was assigned daily intimate care, including by a male certified nursing assistant. She later alleged that this male attendant sexually assaulted her multiple times during her stay. After her discharge, she sued the hospital, its corporate parent, and the attendant, asserting claims for assault, battery, negligence, and abuse of a dependent adult.The case went to a jury trial in Marin County Superior Court. The jury found in favor of the attendant on all claims, concluding he had not assaulted, abused, or been negligent towards the plaintiff. However, the jury found the hospital and its parent negligent, and determined their negligence was a substantial factor in causing harm to the plaintiff. The jury awarded her $1,000,000 in noneconomic damages. The hospital and its parent then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing there was no causal link established between their negligence and the plaintiff’s harm. The trial court agreed, granting the motion and entering judgment for the defendants.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that the hospital’s failure to offer the plaintiff, or her representative, the option of receiving intimate care from a female caregiver (as required by the Patient’s Bill of Rights) was a substantial factor in causing her emotional distress. The court found this basis for liability was independent of the alleged sexual assault and did not require expert testimony on causation. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and directed the trial court to reinstate the judgment in accordance with the jury’s special verdict. View "Sobalvarro v. Vibra Health Care" on Justia Law

Mitchell Glenn Revette sought medical care from Dr. Andrew Mallette at The Surgical Clinic Associates, P.A. for abdominal pain and underwent surgery for diverticulitis in June 2021. He later returned for a follow-up surgery in January 2022, after which he died due to complications related to respiratory depression. His wife, Nitkia Revette, brought a wrongful death and medical negligence lawsuit on behalf of his estate, alleging that negligent anesthesia and pain management led to his death.The defendants, Dr. Mallette and the Clinic, moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement included in an intake packet mailed to Mitchell. The agreement was signed "Mitchell Revette," but during a hearing in the Hinds County Circuit Court, Nitkia testified that she signed her husband’s name without his knowledge or presence, and she stated she had no authority to sign for him. The Clinic’s staff testified that patients were required to sign such agreements personally. The circuit court found that Mitchell did not sign the arbitration agreement and that Nitkia lacked authority to bind him, thus ruling the agreement unenforceable and denying the motion to compel arbitration.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s findings, applying a deferential standard to factual determinations and de novo review to the denial of arbitration. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision, holding that substantial evidence supported the findings that Nitkia lacked both actual and apparent authority to sign for Mitchell and that there was no basis for binding the estate via direct-benefits estoppel. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Mallette v. Revette" on Justia Law