Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Gene Cleveland Battieste, a veteran, underwent surgery at a Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi in 2006. Although he had consented to surgery on certain cervical vertebrae, an additional procedure was performed on his C2 vertebra without his knowledge or consent. Following the surgery, Mr. Battieste experienced post-operative complications, including infection and increased pain. He applied for VA disability benefits in 2008, which were ultimately approved in 2020. The 2020 decision by the VA Board of Veterans’ Appeals was the first time Mr. Battieste or his family learned of the unauthorized surgery and the VA’s failure to provide proper informed consent or adequate post-operative care. Mr. Battieste died in 2022.In November 2022, the administrator of Mr. Battieste’s estate filed an administrative claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), which the VA denied. In May 2024, a lawsuit for medical negligence was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. The district court dismissed the case, finding that Mississippi’s medical malpractice statute barred any action brought more than seven years after the alleged negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court determined that Mississippi Code Annotated § 15-1-36(2)’s seven-year period is a statute of repose, not merely a statute of limitations. The court found that Mississippi’s intermediate appellate courts consistently interpret the seven-year provision as an absolute bar to claims, and the statute’s structure and language support this reading. Because the suit was filed more than seven years after the surgery, the court held the claim was time-barred and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "Battieste v. United States" on Justia Law

A woman underwent knee replacement surgery at a hospital and soon developed respiratory distress. Shortly after the operation, she allegedly suffered a femur fracture in a fall while hospitalized, which her doctor failed to detect on an X-ray. The following day, she fell again, reportedly because a nurse fell on her while assisting her, resulting in a more severe fracture. This severe injury caused fat emboli to enter her bloodstream and led to a pulmonary embolism. She was transferred to another hospital, where her deteriorating condition was documented. She died nearly two weeks later. Her estate filed a wrongful-death lawsuit alleging that the defendants’ negligence in failing to diagnose and prevent the fracture ultimately caused her death.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the lawsuit as untimely under Iowa Code § 614.1(9)(a), which imposes a two-year statute of limitations on medical malpractice actions. The district court determined that the estate knew or should have known of the injury and its cause by February 5, 2021, the date the decedent was transferred and her injury was documented. Because the estate filed its petition on February 17, 2023, more than two years later, the court found the claims time-barred.Reviewing the case, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that, under Iowa law, wrongful-death claims based on medical malpractice are derivative of the decedent’s personal injury claims. When the injury and its negligent cause are known during the decedent’s lifetime, the limitations period begins at that time, not the date of death. Because the estate had knowledge of the injury and its cause by February 5, 2021, the wrongful-death action was untimely and barred by the statute of limitations. View "Cataldo v. RCHP-Ottumwa, LLC" on Justia Law

Michael Hickson, who had become severely disabled following cardiac arrest and anoxic brain injury in 2017, was hospitalized multiple times for recurring infections but recovered from several serious episodes. In June 2020, while hospitalized for pneumonia, sepsis, and suspected COVID-19, his doctors at St. David’s Healthcare assessed him as having a 70% chance of survival. Despite this, he was placed on hospice care and a do-not-resuscitate order was issued, with medical staff indicating that his inability to walk or talk equated to a poor quality of life. Life-sustaining treatment, including food and fluids, was withdrawn, even as his condition temporarily improved. Michael’s family, led by his wife Melissa Hickson, sought answers and attempted to visit him, but were repeatedly denied access and information. Michael ultimately passed away, and subsequent public statements by the hospital disclosed protected health information and cast aspersions on Melissa’s fitness as a guardian.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas dismissed or granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all claims, including disability discrimination under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and § 1557 of the ACA, § 1983 claims, state-law medical negligence, informed consent, wrongful death, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiffs objected to the recommendations for dismissal of the disability discrimination and § 1983 claims; the district court overruled these objections and dismissed those claims with prejudice. The remaining state-law claims were later resolved on summary judgment.Upon de novo review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that disability discrimination claims based on alleged denial of medical treatment solely due to disability are cognizable and may proceed. The court also vacated and remanded the dismissals of the informed consent and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, but affirmed dismissal of the § 1983 claims and other state-law claims. View "Hickson v. St. David's Healthcare Partnership" on Justia Law

A patient was admitted to a hospital after suffering chest pains and remained hospitalized for three months until his death. During his stay, he developed a severe Stage 4 sacral ulcer. The patient’s widow, acting individually and as personal representative of his estate, filed suit against the hospital and associated medical providers for negligence and medical malpractice, alleging that failures in wound care, skin monitoring, and repositioning caused the ulcer and contributed to his suffering and death. She also asserted a claim for lack of informed consent regarding risks of long-term hospitalization.The case was first reviewed by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. During proceedings, the plaintiff shifted her theory to res ipsa loquitur, arguing that negligence could be inferred solely from the development of a Stage 4 ulcer during hospitalization. The Superior Court rejected application of res ipsa loquitur, expressing skepticism about the informed consent claim, and granted summary judgment for the defendants. The court also excluded the plaintiff’s expert testimony but gave little explanation for its reasoning.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals conducted de novo review and affirmed the Superior Court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to establish a triable res ipsa loquitur case because her experts did not sufficiently address the patient’s multiple comorbidities, which were shown by defense evidence to have contributed to the unavoidable development and worsening of the ulcer. The court also held that the lack of informed consent claim failed due to the absence of expert testimony establishing that long-term hospitalization posed distinct risks compared to alternative care, or that the patient had a meaningful choice. Thus, summary judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Pearson v. Medstar Washington Hospital Center" on Justia Law

After the death of Sandra Robinson from a fentanyl overdose, her adult children brought suit against Muhammad Alghannam, M.D., and others, alleging professional negligence, lack of informed consent, wrongful death, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and elder abuse. Sandra had an implanted fentanyl infusion pump managed by Alghannam and underwent surgery at Rideout Health. Post-surgery, she continued to receive fentanyl through the pump and self-administer doses, with clinical staff observing changes in her mental status. Plaintiffs claimed Alghannam treated Sandra without proper hospital staff privileges, failed to turn off the pain pump as requested, and did not obtain valid consent.The Superior Court of Yuba County sustained Alghannam’s demurrer to the fifth amended complaint without leave to amend, finding the medical negligence claims time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5 and the elder abuse allegations insufficient. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the medical negligence statute of limitations did not apply, that tolling should occur due to intentional concealment, and that the claims related back to the original complaint under section 474.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. It held that section 340.5 applied because Alghannam’s alleged actions fit within the statutory definition of professional negligence. The plaintiffs failed to plead facts supporting intentional concealment or timely substitution under section 474. The court also determined the elder abuse claim was insufficient, as there was no well-pleaded allegation of a caretaking relationship or physical abuse with the requisite culpability. The court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding plaintiffs did not meet their burden to show a reasonable possibility of amendment. View "Nichols v. Alghannam" on Justia Law

Susan Cox, a resident of Albion, Washington, died from an overdose of medications prescribed by her primary care physician, Dr. Patricia Marciano. Dr. Marciano, along with Gritman Medical Center, both based in Idaho near the Washington border, had treated Susan for several years. Although Susan lived in Washington, her medical treatment occurred in Idaho. At Susan’s request, her prescriptions were regularly transmitted to pharmacies in Washington. Susan’s husband, Mark Cox, and her estate brought a wrongful death and survivor action in the Eastern District of Washington, alleging that Susan’s death resulted from negligent over-prescription of pharmaceuticals.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery regarding general personal jurisdiction over Gritman and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court found that Washington’s long-arm statute did not confer jurisdiction and that exercising specific jurisdiction would violate due process, as the defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the Washington forum. The district court did not reach the question of venue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court of appeals held that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defendants was proper under Washington’s long-arm statute and consistent with the Due Process Clause because the defendants maintained ongoing, deliberate relationships with Washington residents and regularly sent prescriptions to Washington pharmacies in compliance with state law. The court also held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington since a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred there. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with dismissal affirmed only for one defendant whom the plaintiffs conceded was properly dismissed. View "COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER" on Justia Law

A woman died after a rapid health decline while receiving emergency and critical care at a West Des Moines hospital. Her husband, who was appointed as the administrator of her estate, filed a wrongful-death medical malpractice lawsuit against various medical providers. He brought the suit both on behalf of the estate and in his individual capacity, alleging multiple claims including negligence and seeking damages for emotional and financial loss. The husband, a nonlawyer, filed the petition without legal counsel and argued that, as the sole beneficiary, he should be allowed to proceed pro se or, alternatively, be given time to retain an attorney if one was required.The Iowa District Court for Polk County dismissed the lawsuit, ruling that the petition was a legal nullity because a nonlawyer cannot represent an estate or other parties in court, and denied the husband’s request for more time to secure counsel. The court also denied his motion to amend the petition. On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, agreeing that the wrongful-death action could not proceed without a lawyer and finding that the request for additional time had not been properly preserved for appeal. Two appellate judges dissented, concluding the husband was entitled to a warning and additional time to obtain counsel.The Supreme Court of Iowa granted further review. The court held that a nonlawyer cannot represent an estate or other persons in a wrongful-death action in district court. However, it found that the district court abused its discretion by not granting the husband reasonable time to retain counsel before dismissing the case. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ decision, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case with instructions to allow at least thirty days for the husband to secure trial counsel. View "Estate of Tornell v. Trinity Health Corporation" on Justia Law

A woman underwent cervical spine surgery and subsequently developed neurological symptoms, including balance problems, dizziness, and sensory changes. Her surgeon referred her to a neurologist at a specialty clinic, where she was evaluated by a physician who ordered a brain MRI. The MRI report noted findings that could not exclude multiple sclerosis (MS), but the neurologist did not inform the patient of these results, believing there were no dangerous findings that required immediate notification. The patient was not scheduled for further follow-up and continued to experience worsening symptoms over the next 19 months. Eventually, her primary doctor referred her to another neurologist, who diagnosed her with MS and began treatment, after which her condition stabilized.The patient and her husband filed a medical malpractice suit in Madison Circuit Court, alleging that the neurologist and the clinic negligently failed to inform her of her abnormal MRI results and failed to provide appropriate follow-up, leading to a significant delay in her MS diagnosis and treatment. During discovery, the plaintiffs’ expert testified that the delay worsened her symptoms, but when questioned, he stated he could not say with certainty that an earlier diagnosis would have changed her outcome. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding insufficient evidence of causation, and later struck the expert’s postjudgment affidavit as untimely.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the circuit court’s decision to strike the late-filed affidavit but reversed the summary judgment. The Supreme Court concluded that, when viewing the expert’s testimony as a whole and in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to decide whether the neurologist’s failure to inform and follow up probably worsened the patient’s condition. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Keister v. Neurology Consultants of Huntsville, P.C." on Justia Law

Alexander Rudnicki suffered permanent brain damage at birth due to Dr. Peter Bianco’s negligent use of a vacuum extractor, resulting in lifelong medical needs and disabilities. Nine years after the injury, Rudnicki’s parents filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Bianco on his behalf. Their individual claims were dismissed as time-barred, but the claim for Alexander proceeded. A jury found Bianco liable and awarded $4 million in damages. The trial court found good cause to exceed Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act ("HCAA") $1 million damages cap, citing the unfairness of limiting recovery given Rudnicki’s extensive care requirements. The court reduced the award by $391,000, excluding pre-majority medical expenses based on then-existing precedent. On appeal, this reduction was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court, which reinstated the $391,000 in damages.After remand, the trial court reinstated the previously excluded damages and awarded prejudgment interest, including $319,120 in prefiling interest, resulting in a total judgment of about $1,357,000. The court maintained its finding of good cause and awarded the full amount, holding that the statutory cap did not limit the inclusion of prejudgment interest. Bianco appealed, arguing that prefiling interest could only be awarded up to $1 million, even if the good cause exception applied. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, interpreting the HCAA to treat prefiling interest as part of economic damages, subject to the cap and the good cause exception.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the statutory language and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that prefiling interest accruing on economic damages is part of the economic damages award and thus falls within the good cause exception to the HCAA’s $1 million cap. The Court clarified that prefiling interest is not a separate category of damages and overruled conflicting precedent. View "Bianco v. Rudnicki" on Justia Law

Chance and Erin Gresser sued Banner Health on behalf of their minor daughter, C.G., alleging medical malpractice during labor, delivery, and postpartum care that resulted in severe, permanent injuries to C.G., including neurological damage and cerebral palsy. The jury found Banner Health negligent and awarded the Gressers over $27 million in economic damages, including past and future medical expenses and lost wages. Given Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act (HCAA) generally imposes a $1 million cap on such damages, the Gressers moved to exceed the cap based on good cause and unfairness, while Banner Health sought to reduce the award to the statutory limit.The Weld County District Court determined that imposing the statutory cap would be unfair under the circumstances and found good cause to exceed it. The court concluded its role was limited to a binary choice: either impose the cap or allow the full jury award, subject only to challenges for insufficient evidence or excessive damages. After finding the evidence supported the jury’s award and that the amount was not manifestly excessive or based on improper motives, the court entered judgment for the full amount, nearly $40 million with interest. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, though it reasoned the trial court retained some discretion in determining damages after finding good cause to exceed the cap.On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that, once a trial court finds good cause and unfairness under section 13-64-302(1)(b) of the HCAA to exceed the damages cap, the amount of damages is governed by common law. The jury retains authority to determine the amount of damages, subject only to remittitur and sufficiency-of-evidence review by the court. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the full judgment awarded to the Gressers. View "Health v. Gresser" on Justia Law