Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued Defendant, a medical doctor, claiming that Defendant failed to obtain her informed consent before operating on her. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant, and the trial court entered judgment accordingly. The court of appeals affirmed. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that the judgment should be set aside because the trial court’s instructions to the jury misstated the law regarding informed consent. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the instruction given in this case was in error because it failed to incorporate the law applicable to a medical provider’s duty to obtain informed consent; and (2) Plaintiff was prejudiced by the erroneous instruction. View "Sargent v. Shaffer" on Justia Law

Siouxland, a group practice of obstetrician-gynecologists, terminated Hagen, its President and an equity owner, invoking the for-cause termination provision in Hagen’s 1993, Employment Agreement, after an incident during which Hagen yelled at Dr. Eastman (another Siouxland doctor) and hospital staff, accusing them of neglecting a patient, resulting in a stillbirth. Hagen also reported the incident to hospital administration and told the Siouxland partners that he was considering reporting to the Iowa state medical board. Hagen advised the patient to sue for malpractice. Hagen filed suit, alleging wrongful retaliatory discharge in violation of Iowa public policy. The other doctors testified about Hagen’s history of workplace conflicts and outbursts and about concern that his suspension by the hospital would hurt the reputation of the practice. A jury awarded Hagen $1,051,814 in compensatory damages. The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that Hagen failed to prove he was an at-will employee who may assert a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The exclusive remedy of a medical professional practicing under Hagen’s Employment Agreement would be a breach of contract claim, which would permit inquiry into the professional conduct the district court found separately protected by the tort of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Hagen v. Siouxland Obstetrics & Gynecology, PC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from five separate but essentially identical wrongful death claims brought by Plaintiffs against Hospital. The petitions alleged that a former employee of the hospital intentionally administered a lethal dose of medication that resulted in the decedents’ deaths and that the Hospital acted affirmatively to conceal the suspicious nature of the deaths. The trial courts entered judgment on the pleadings in favor of Hospital, concluding that Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred by the three-year limitation in Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.100. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that their claims were not barred by the statute of limitation because Hospital intentionally and fraudulently concealed the tortious nature of the decedents’ deaths. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, despite the harsh result, Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the three-year statute of limitation had passed when the lawsuits were filed and because section 537.100 does not provide an exception for fraudulent concealment. View "Boland v. Saint Luke's Health Sys., Inc." on Justia Law

Volkman, a University of Chicago M.D. and Ph.D. (pharmacology), board-certified in emergency medicine, was in financial distress after lawsuits. Hired by Tri-State, a cash-only clinic, he was paid $5,000 to $5,500 per week. Soon, pharmacies refused to fill his prescriptions, citing improper dosing. Volkman opened a dispensary in the clinic. The Ohio Board of Pharmacy issued a license, although a Glock was found in the drug safe. Follow-up inspections disclosed poorly maintained logs; that no licensed physician or pharmacist oversaw the actual dispensing process; and lax security of the drug safe. Patients returned unmarked and intermixed medication. The dispensary did a heavy business in oxycodone. A federal investigation revealed a chaotic, unclean environment. Tri-State fired Volkman, who opened his own shop; 12 patients died. Volkman and Tri-State’s owners were charged with conspiring to unlawfully distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); maintaining a drug-involved premises, 21 U.S.C. 856(a)(1); unlawful distribution of a controlled substance leading to death, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 24(c). The owners accepted plea agreements and testified against Volkman, The Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction on most counts, and a sentence of four consecutive life terms. On remand from the Supreme Court, in light of Burrage v. United States (2014), the Sixth Circuit again found the evidence of but-for causation sufficient. View "United States v. Volkman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States in a federal district court alleging that medical staff at the VA medical center in Salt Lake City negligently caused his son’s death. The district court certified two questions to the Utah Supreme Court asking whether the noneconomic damages cap in section 78B-3-410 of the Malpractice Act permissible as applied to wrongful death cases under Utah Const. art. XVI, 5, which prohibits damage caps in wrongful death cases. The Supreme Court held that the damages cap in section 78B-3-410 is unconstitutional as applied to cases of wrongful death under article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2003, Kristy Orlowski, who was twenty-two years old and thirty-six weeks pregnant, was found unresponsive in her home by a family member. Less than twenty-four hours earlier, Orlowski had been seen by her prenatal care physician, Dr. Norman Taylor, to whom she complained of headaches, dizziness, nausea, and swelling of her hands and feet, all of which were symptoms of pre-eclampsia. Despite Orlowski's reported symptoms, Dr. Taylor failed to diagnose Orlowski's pre-eclampsia and sent her home from her doctor's visit without any special instructions or warnings. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in which the court of appeals affirmed as modified the dismissal of this action, which was the second medical malpractice case filed by a conservator on behalf of Orlowski. The first medical malpractice action was filed in August 2006 against a different physician. When the trial of that action resulted in a defense verdict, Petitioner Gladys Sims filed this action on Orlowski's behalf seeking the same damages against different defendants, Respondents, Dr. Edward Creagh and Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center ("Piedmont"). Respondents moved for summary judgment, asserting Petitioner's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner contended her suit was timely filed because the three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations in section 15-3-545 of the South Carolina Code was subject to the tolling provision for insanity in section 15-3-40. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the court of appeals properly construed section 15-3-545 in rejecting Petitioner's reliance on section 15-3-40 in arguing for an eight-year statute of limitations, and accordingly, affirmed. View "Sims v. Amisub of SC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs brought this medical malpractice action against Defendant, a medical doctor, for the wrongful death of their deceased father. A jury found that Defendant breached the standard of care and that this breach was the proximate cause of the death of Plaintiffs’ father. The jury awarded Plaintiff more than $3 million in general damages and $300,000 in punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new jury trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Defendant’s prior felony conviction under rules 608 and 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, and the admission of Defendant’s conviction was not harmless error. View "Robinson v. Taylor" on Justia Law

On December 24, 2009, inmate Conley’s hand was examined by a prison nurse, who described Conley’s symptoms to Dr. Birch over the phone; throbbing pain, severe swelling, discoloration, and loss of function throughout the entire hand. The nurse concluded in his treatment notes that Conley suffered from a “possible/probable fracture.” Dr. Birch ordered a regimen of ibuprofen and ice but did not order an x-ray until almost five days later. The x-ray revealed that Conley’s hand was fractured, and years later, he continues to suffer from chronic pain and limited mobility. In 2011, Conley brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in the days following his injury. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Birch, stating that a reasonable jury could find that, based on the information conveyed to her in her December 24 telephone conversation, Dr. Birch strongly suspected that Conley’s hand was fractured. Dr. Birch’s uncontroverted testimony was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that, by declining to order an x-ray of Conley’s hand at such a crucial point in the healing process, she exacerbated his lasting injuries. View "Conley v. Birch" on Justia Law

In 2009, Plaintiff Barry White went to Memorial Hospital at Gulfport's emergency room complaining of slurred speech and left-sided numbness. White told the nurses there he thought he was having a stroke. He was diagnosed with hypertension, given medicine and sent home. He returned the next day, and after testing, White was diagnosed with having had a completed stroke. White underwent a battery of outpatient occupational therapy, speech therapy and physical therapy. White then brought a medical negligence lawsuit against Memorial Hospital regarding the alleged misdiagnosis and won at trial. On appeal, the hospital challenged White's expert witnesses' testimony, claiming they failed to provide medical literature to support their opinions. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the experts were not required to provide medical literature to support their opinions, and affirmed. View "Memorial Hospital at Gulfport v. White" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Petties was climbing stairs when he felt a “pop” and extreme pain in his left ankle. At the prison infirmary, the examining physician prescribed Vicodin and crutches and a week of “meals lay-in.” The medical director, Dr. Carter, noted in the file that Petties had suffered an “Achilles tendon rupture” and modified the instructions, directing that Petties be scheduled for an MRI and examination by an orthopedist as an “urgent” matter. Prison lockdowns resulted in cancelation of three appointments. Eight weeks passed before he received an orthopedic boot. Petties claimed that more than a year later, he still experienced “serious pain, soreness, and stiffness” in his ankle. Petties argued that Carter was deliberately indifferent by failing to immobilize his ankle with a boot or cast immediately and that a physician he saw later was deliberately indifference in not ordering physical therapy despite a recommendation. The court granted the doctors summary judgment, reasoning that waiting before immobilizing Petties’s ankle could not have constituted deliberate indifference because several physicians held different opinions and that a jury could not reasonably find that rejection of the recommendation for physical therapy constituted deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A jury could not reasonably find that the treatment of Petties’s ankle rose to the level of a constitutional violation. View "Petties v. Carter" on Justia Law