Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The parents of Kenia Lopez-Rosario, an adult with several physical and cognitive disabilities, petitioned the circuit court appoint them as Lopez-Rosario’s co-guardians. The circuit court granted guardianship to the parents. Subsequently, Lopez-Rosario had surgery to remove her gallbladder, and the surgeon, Dr. Christine Habib, allegedly made an error that injured Lopez-Rosario. Lopez-Rosario filed a negligence suit against Dr. Habib and her employer. Defendants filed a plea in bar/motion to dismiss, arguing that Lopez-Rosario could not file suit in her own name because her parents had been appointed as her guardians. The circuit court granted the plea in bar/motion to dismiss, concluding that Lopez-Rosario did not have standing to sue in her own name. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to Va. Code 64.2-2025, Lopez-Rosario’s parents had the authority and obligation to prosecute lawsuits on Lopez-Rosario’s behalf, and therefore, Lopez-Rosario lacked standing to file suit in her own name. View "Lopez-Rosario v. Habib" on Justia Law

In November 2009, Plaintiff underwent a knee-replacement surgery at Sanford USD Medical Center. The day after the surgery, when he was still hospitalized, Plaintiff fell while walking with assistance from a patient-care technician. After being discharged, Plaintiff underwent inpatient rehabilitation and outpatient physical therapy. In September 2012, Plaintiff sought additional physical therapy for the alleged effects of the injury resulting from his fall. When Sanford declined to pay for additional treatment, Plaintiff commenced this action. Sanford moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s action was time-barred under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-14.1 as a medical malpractice claim. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he commenced his action within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to general-negligence actions and that the circuit court erred in determining his action was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s action against Sanford was one for error or mistake, and therefore, section 15-2-14.1’s two-year period of repose applies; and (2) principles of estoppel and tolling are inapplicable to a period of repose, and the continuous-treatment rule did not toll section 15-2-14.1’s period of repose under the facts of this case. View "Pitt-Hart v. Sanford USD Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Regina Corr sued Dr. Charles Robinson for medical malpractice. The jury awarded Corr $55,634.78 for past medical expenses and $420,000 for pain and suffering. Robinson filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for remittitur, which the trial court denied. On appeal, Dr. Robinson argues that the trial court erred in excluding his proffered testimony, in admitting testimony from Regina’s expert that was outside her expert’s designation, and in denying his request for a remittitur. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Robinson v. Corr" on Justia Law

After Enrique Ojeda-Morales (Ojeda) died, his widow and his sister (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a negligence action against two doctors, including Dr. Jorge Rodriguez-Wilson (Dr. Rodriguez), and related medical facilities. The medical facilities and one medical doctor (collectively, the settling parties) entered into settlement agreements with Plaintiffs. The district court dismissed the settling parties from the case, leaving Dr. Rodriguez as the sole defendant. After a trial, the jury concluded that Dr. Rodriguez’s negligent care was the proximate cause of Ojeda’s death and awarded Plaintiffs $475,000. The district court issued a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Dr. Rodriguez sought to alter the judgment, arguing that the jury’s damages award should be offset against the $700,000 that Plaintiffs received from the settling parties. The district court agreed and vacated the jury award. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling, holding (1) the district court improperly vacated the jury award, as the district court misapplied Puerto Rico law when it implemented a dollar-for-dollar offset, and furthermore, Dr. Rodriguez waived any argument that he was entitled to offset; and (2) Dr. Rodriguez engaged in obstinate conduct trial trial, and therefore, the district court erred in refusing to grant Plaintiffs attorneys’ fees. View "Gomez v. Rodriguez-Wilson" on Justia Law

Kirk Lloyd sought to be admitted at United Hospital to stop his pattern of self-harm. United informed Lloyd and his mother, Melinda Binkley, that Lloyd would not be admitted to United’s inpatient mental-health program and released Lloyd. The next night, Lloyd committed suicide. Binkley, acting as trustee, filed a medical-malpractice action against Allina Health System and its staff (collectively, Respondents) alleging that Respondents’ negligent failure to properly examine, evaluate, and provide services to Lloyd caused his death. Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that they were entitled to immunity for their good-faith actions under the Minnesota Commitment and Treatment Act. The district court denied summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondents’ good-faith decision to deny Lloyd admission to the inpatient mental health unit is entitled to immunity; but (2) it is not clear that Respondents are entitled to summary judgment on all of Binkley’s claims. Remanded. View "Binkley v. Allina Health System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendants for medical malpractice. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for insufficient process and and insufficient service of process. The district court (1) denied the motions to dismiss for insufficient process, concluding that, although the summons and complaint were defective due to the lack of a Minnesota attorney’s signature, the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure granted the court discretion to allow the summons and complaint to be cured by amendment; and (2) denied the motions to dismiss for insufficient service of process as to some defendants, finding those defendants to have been validly served, but granted the motions with respect to the remaining defendants. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the summons and complaint bearing only the signature of an attorney not licensed to practice in Minnesota were defective, but the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing them to be amended; and (2) Plaintiffs in this case produced sufficient evidence of effective service, and Defendants did not satisfy their burden to prove that service was not effective, and therefore, the district court erred in granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss for insufficient service. View "DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Pratikshya Gurung (“the Estate”) was born with brain damage and quadriplegia. The Estate filed in the circuit court a medical negligence action against Norton Hospital. During the course of discovery, the Estate requested production from Norton of various hospital documents relating to patient safety. Norton argued that the documents were not discoverable. The trial court compelled the production of the disputed documents and denied Norton’s privileged claim. Norton filed a petition in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition and a request for an order staying execution of the trial court’s discovery order. The Estate, in turn, received an emergency hearing with the trial court. Before the hearing on Norton’s emergency motion in the court of appeals and after the Estate’s emergency hearing with the trial court, the trial court handed the copies of the disputed documents directly to counsel for the Estate. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed Norton’s writ petition as moot. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, holding that the court of appeals abused its discretion because its decision was not based on sound legal principles. Remanded for consideration of Norton’s asserted privilege. View "Norton Hospitals, Inc. v. Hon. Barry Willett" on Justia Law

Decedent was a resident of Courtyard Gardens Health and Rehabilitation, LLC for nearly one year when she transferred to another nursing home. Decedent subsequently executed a purported durable power of attorney in favor of Appellant. Thereafter, Appellant, as power of attorney for Decedent, filed suit against Courtyard Gardens alleging negligence, medical malpractice, and violations of the Arkansas Long-Term Care Residents’ Rights Act. After Decedent died, the circuit court entered an order substituting as the nominal plaintiff Appellant, as special administrator of Decedent’s estate and on behalf of the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Decedent (“the Estate”). Courtyard Gardens moved for summary judgment, asserting that the complaint and amended complaint filed by Appellant under the power of attorney given to him by Decedent were nullities because the power of attorney was invalid and that the circuit court should dismiss the action because the statute of limitations on the Estate’s claims had expired. The circuit court granted Courtyard Gardens’ motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that the power of attorney was invalid and in granting summary judgment based on the conclusion that the complaints were nullities. View "Quarles v. Courtyard Gardens Health & Rehab., LLC" on Justia Law

This case arose from post-operative injuries plaintiff Richard Dupuy sustained based on a hospital’s alleged failure to properly maintain and service equipment utilized in the sterilization of surgical instruments. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiffs’ claims that the hospital failed to properly maintain and service equipment utilized in the sterilization of surgical instruments fell within the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“MMA”). The Supreme Court concluded the claims did fall within the MMA and reversed the ruling of the district court which held to the contrary. View "Dupuy v. NMC Operating Company, LLC d/b/a Spine Hospital of Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2675(a), after surgery at a VA medical center rendered him quadriplegic. The district court found the VA liable for plaintiff's injuries and awarded him $4,468,859.91 in damages. Both parties appealed. The court vacated the district court's decision insofar as it offset the award for future medical care and supplies, holding that federal law does not require that a veteran injured as a result of the VA’s malpractice be forced to continue under VA care or lack of financial resources and be subject to a concomitant offset, and New York state law does not warrant such an offset. The court also held that the district court failed to provide adequate analysis to support both its denial of plaintiff’s motion to increase the ad damnum and its decision to set the award for past and future pain and suffering at $2 million, and the court remanded with directions that the district court consider anew plaintiff’s motion to increase the ad damnum, taking into account the testimony of plaintiff's treating physician, and determine damages without an offset for future receipt of medical care and supplies from the VA, consistent with this opinion. Finally, the court affirmed the district court’s decision not to further offset the award for future home health services on the ground that the provision of such services going forward is not reasonably certain. View "Malmberg v. United States" on Justia Law