Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

After Defendant performed surgery on Plaintiff’s back, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging medical negligence and negligent failure to obtain informed consent. Defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim of negligent failure to obtain informed consent because Plaintiff did not have medical expert testimony as to the “materiality” of the risk to support his claim. The circuit court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to both of Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment as to the claim of negligent failure to obtain informed consent, holding (1) the common law materiality factors do not apply to a claim of negligent failure to obtain informed consent, and the circuit court erred in relying upon them instead of on Haw. Rev. Stat. 671-3(b); (2) consequently, Defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on lack of expert testimony as to the common law materiality factors; and (3) the circuit court erred in concluding that Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim of negligent failure to obtain informed consent. View "Garcia v. Robinson" on Justia Law

In 2001, BioEnterics obtained FDA approval for the Lap-Band, “designed to induce weight loss in severely obese patients by limiting food consumption" by creation of a small gastric pouch. The FDA indicated that the Lap-Band’s labeling must “specify the requirements that apply to the training of practitioners who may use the device” and required annual progress reports on a postapproval study. BioEnterics's brochure states that surgeons planning laparoscopic placement must have specific experience, participate in a training program authorized by BioEnterics, be observed by “qualified personnel” during their first placements, have the equipment and experience necessary to complete the procedure via laparotomy if required, and report on their personal experiences using the device. In 2003, plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure to implant a Lap-Band, which eventually eroded into her stomach and her liver; Lap-Band tubing became entangled with her small intestine. During surgery to remove the Lap-Band she suffered a massive hemorrhaging from her liver, causing her to experience profound hypotension and systemic shock, resulting in brain damage. More than nine years later, plaintiff filed suit. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal of her claim that the company failed to adequately train physicians in the use of the Lap-Band, as preempted by federal law. View "Glennen v. Allergan, Inc." on Justia Law

Eighty-three-year-old Geraldine Siner was admitted to Kindred Hospital in 2007 for treatment of aspiration pneumonia. Geraldine’s children, John Siner and Kathy Siner, later arranged for a transfer to Methodist Hospital. Upon her arrival, Geraldine required immediate treatment for a collapsed lung and was suffering from wounds on her cheeks, infection, and septic shock. Geraldine died twenty days later. The Siners filed a medical malpractice complaint against Kindred Hospital and Dr. Mohammed Majid, alleging that Defendants failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care, proximately resulting in injuries and damages requiring compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed after noting that Defendants’ own designated evidence revealed conflicting medical opinions on the element of causation, holding (1) conflicting evidence on a material issue precludes a prima facie case for summary judgment; and (2) Defendants did not affirmatively negate the Siners’ claims as required to merit summary judgment. View "Siner v. Kindred Hosp. Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Appellants Lucia Navo, Serena Navo, and Nicole Navo appealed the dismissal on summary judgment of a case arising out of the death of Ellery Navo during a surgery at Bingham Memorial Hospital (“BMH”). At trial, Appellants argued that BMH was liable both for its own negligence and for the negligent actions of certified nurse anesthetist Ryan Sayre (“Sayre”), an independent contractor who administered anesthesia services at BMH. Appellants supported their claim that BMH itself had been negligent with expert testimony from Dr. Samuel Steinberg. The district court held, inter alia, that: (1) Dr. Steinberg’s testimony was inadmissible because Appellants had failed to provide evidence that he was familiar with the relevant local standard of care; (2) Appellants had failed to provide any evidence that BMH employees had acted negligently; (3) Appellants had failed to plead that Sayre was an agent of BMH under a theory of apparent authority; (4) even if Appellants had properly pleaded a theory of apparent authority, they failed to provide evidence sufficient to create an issue of material fact; and (5) BMH was not entitled to discretionary costs, including attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in holding that Appellants were barred from arguing "apparent authority in response the BMH's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court erred in finding no genuine issue of material facts existed as to whether Sayre was BMH's agent under "apparent authority." The Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment and the award of costs and fees and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Navo v. Bingham Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

This was a medical malpractice case premised in part on the doctrine of informed consent. Appellant Teresa Allen swallowed a small nail. She went to Duncan Regional Hospital's emergency room. Appellee John Harrison, D.O., emergency room physician (Physician), examined Allen. An X-ray confirmed the presence of a foreign body in Allen's stomach, just below the diaphragm. Based on Physician's assessment and clinical judgment, Physician discharged Allen prescribing: (1) "a high-fiber diet to let the nail pass;" (2) return to the hospital if she had any problems; and (3) follow up with her family doctor in three days. A few days later following severe vomiting, Allen went to the emergency room at Southwestern Hospital in Lawton. That same day, the hospital performed emergency surgery to remove the ingested nail from Allen's intestines. At that time, Allen was treated for a perforated and infected bowel. In addition, Allen endured two additional surgeries to treat the complications that arose from the initial surgery. Allen sued Duncan Regional Hospital and Physician for the defendants' alleged medical negligence and failure to obtain Allen's informed consent. Specifically, Allen contended that Physician failed to disclose the potential risk in letting the nail pass through her digestive system as well as the alternatives to his recommended course of treatment. Had Physician effectively discharged his duty to disclose, Allen would have "chosen the option of no treatment or a different course of treatment." The issue presented on certiorari review was whether the doctrine of informed consent required a physician to obtain the patient's consent before implementing a nonsurgical or noninvasive course of treatment. "Inherent in the question presented, is whether a physician-in addition to discussing with the patient treatment alternatives that the physician recommends-should discuss medically reasonable alternatives that the physician does not recommend." After review of the trial court record, the Oklahoma Supreme Court answered both of those questions in the affirmative. View "Allen v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Joseph Mickels died from an incurable, terminal brain tumor. Mickels’ family (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought a wrongful death action against Defendant, a physician, for negligently failing to diagnose the tumor. Plaintiffs presented evidence that even though Mickels certainly would have died of his brain tumor with or without Defendant’s alleged negligence, he would not have died as early as he did had the brain tumor been properly diagnosed. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs could not establish that Defendant’s negligence caused Mickels’ death so as to be actionable under Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.080.1. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that Plaintiffs cannot sue for wrongful death under section 537.080.1, but the allegations in the petition do state a cause of action for negligence that would have been actionable under Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.020 if brought by Mickels’ personal representative. Remanded. View "Mickels v. Danrad" on Justia Law

Shannon Dodson died as a result of a dissection of her left main coronary artery during a cardiac catheterization. Dodson’s family (Plaintiffs) brought a wrongful death action against the physician who treated Dodson and his employer (collectively, Defendants). The jury returned a verdict in the amount of almost $2 million for economic damages and $9 million for noneconomic damages. The trial court reduced the noneconomic damages to $350,000 pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.210(1). Both parties appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the section 538.210 noneconomic damages cap does not violate the separation of powers principle, equal protection, or the right to trial by jury in wrongful death cases; (2) the trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict on the issue of aggravating circumstances damages at the close of Defendants’ evidence; and (3) there was no error in Defendants’ other issues on appeal. View "Dodson v. Ferrara" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, the parents of a newborn baby, alleged that on June 12, 2012, their son died as a result of the medical malpractice of the Hospital defendants and the Baker defendants (Richard Baker, M.D. and Mary Beerworth, M.D.). It was undisputed that this filing was within the period established by the applicable statute of limitations. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the denial of motions to dismiss filed by the Hospital defendants and the Baker defendants. Both sets’ motions were predicated on plaintiffs’ failure to timely serve process. On appeal, the Baker defendants argued that the trial court’s grant of an enlargement of time to serve process expired prior to plaintiffs’ serving of the summons and complaint, while the Hospital defendants contended that although they signed a waiver of service, plaintiffs failed to file that waiver with the court before the expiration of the service period. Both sets of defendants also appealed the trial court’s conclusion that even if plaintiffs’ service was found to be untimely, it retained the authority to retroactively grant a motion for enlargement of time and extend the period for service after the running of the statute of limitations on the basis of excusable neglect. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clark v. Baker" on Justia Law

The parents of Kenia Lopez-Rosario, an adult with several physical and cognitive disabilities, petitioned the circuit court appoint them as Lopez-Rosario’s co-guardians. The circuit court granted guardianship to the parents. Subsequently, Lopez-Rosario had surgery to remove her gallbladder, and the surgeon, Dr. Christine Habib, allegedly made an error that injured Lopez-Rosario. Lopez-Rosario filed a negligence suit against Dr. Habib and her employer. Defendants filed a plea in bar/motion to dismiss, arguing that Lopez-Rosario could not file suit in her own name because her parents had been appointed as her guardians. The circuit court granted the plea in bar/motion to dismiss, concluding that Lopez-Rosario did not have standing to sue in her own name. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, pursuant to Va. Code 64.2-2025, Lopez-Rosario’s parents had the authority and obligation to prosecute lawsuits on Lopez-Rosario’s behalf, and therefore, Lopez-Rosario lacked standing to file suit in her own name. View "Lopez-Rosario v. Habib" on Justia Law

In November 2009, Plaintiff underwent a knee-replacement surgery at Sanford USD Medical Center. The day after the surgery, when he was still hospitalized, Plaintiff fell while walking with assistance from a patient-care technician. After being discharged, Plaintiff underwent inpatient rehabilitation and outpatient physical therapy. In September 2012, Plaintiff sought additional physical therapy for the alleged effects of the injury resulting from his fall. When Sanford declined to pay for additional treatment, Plaintiff commenced this action. Sanford moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s action was time-barred under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-14.1 as a medical malpractice claim. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he commenced his action within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to general-negligence actions and that the circuit court erred in determining his action was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s action against Sanford was one for error or mistake, and therefore, section 15-2-14.1’s two-year period of repose applies; and (2) principles of estoppel and tolling are inapplicable to a period of repose, and the continuous-treatment rule did not toll section 15-2-14.1’s period of repose under the facts of this case. View "Pitt-Hart v. Sanford USD Med. Ctr." on Justia Law