Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Janice and Timothy McGill appealed a circuit court judgment against them in their medical-malpractice lawsuit against Victor Szymela, M.D. The McGills alleged that Dr. Szymela failed to properly perform Janice's temporomandibular-joint total-replacement ("TJR") surgery. Janice sought treatment to relieve her temporomandibular-joint ("TMJ") disorder. Janice had been experiencing clicking and locking of her jaw and excruciating jaw and ear pain. Janice alleged that she experienced distinct, worse pain immediately after the surgery and that the new pain did not resolve with time. She continued to experience popping in her jaw. She alleged that her overbite was exacerbated by the surgery. She also alleged that she could not open her mouth as wide as previously and that she lost sensation in her lips, which diminished her ability to speak clearly. Janice sought treatment from Dr. Michael Koslin, who referred Janice to a pain-management specialist. Ultimately, Janice's providers determined that her pain was unresponsive to conservative treatment. In 2017, Dr. Koslin surgically removed the prosthesis. Several weeks later, Dr. Koslin implanted custom joints. Janice alleged Dr. Koslin's treatment relieved her pain. In March 2016, Janice sued Dr. Szymela, alleging that he breached the standard of care for an oral and maxillofacial surgeon by failing to properly assess the source of Janie's pain or install the prosthesis correctly. The McGills identified Dr. Louis G. Mercuri as one of their expert witnesses regarding oral and maxillofacial surgery. On Dr. Szymela's motion, the trial court ruled that Dr. Mercuri did not qualify as a "similarly situated health care provider" under § 6-5-548(c)(4), Ala. Code 1975, because he had not practiced in Dr. Szymela's specialty within the year preceding Dr. Szymela's alleged breach. Thus, the court excluded Dr. Mercuri as a witness. At the close of all evidence, on Dr. Szymela's motion, the trial court entered a partial judgment as a matter of law ("JML") in favor of Dr. Szymela. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court did not exceed its discretion by excluding the testimony of Dr. Mercuri on the basis that he was not statutorily qualified as an expert. And because the McGills did not present or point to substantial evidence of the standard of care for Dr. Szymela's performance of Janice's TJR surgery, the trial court properly entered a JML on the claims relating to the surgery. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "McGill v. Szymela" on Justia Law

Martin Crowson was an inmate at the Washington County Purgatory Correctional Facility (the “Jail”) when he began suffering from symptoms of toxic metabolic encephalopathy. Nurse Michael Johnson and Dr. Judd LaRowe, two of the medical staff members responsible for Crowson’s care, wrongly concluded Crowson was experiencing drug or alcohol withdrawal. On the seventh day of medical observation, Crowson’s condition deteriorated and he was transported to the hospital, where he was accurately diagnosed. After Crowson recovered, he sued Johnson, LaRowe, and Washington County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied motions for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity by Johnson and LaRowe, concluding a reasonable jury could find both were deliberately indifferent to Crowson’s serious medical needs, and that it was clearly established their conduct amounted to a constitutional violation. The district court also denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding a reasonable jury could find the treatment failures were an obvious consequence of the County’s reliance on LaRowe’s infrequent visits to the Jail and the County’s lack of written protocols for monitoring, diagnosing, and treating inmates. Johnson, LaRowe, and the County filed consolidated interlocutory appeals, raising threshold questions of jurisdiction. Johnson and LaRowe challenged the denial of qualified immunity, while the County contended the Tenth Circuit should exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of its summary judgment motion. The Tenth Circuit exercised limited jurisdiction over Johnson’s and LaRowe’s appeals pursuant to the exception to 28 U.S.C. 1291, carved out for purely legal issues of qualified immunity through the collateral order doctrine. The Court held Johnson’s conduct did not violate Crowson’s rights and, assuming without deciding LaRowe’s conduct did, the Court concluded LaRowe’s conduct did not violate any clearly established rights. The Court's holding was "inextricably intertwined with the County’s liability on a failure-to-train theory," so the Court exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction to the extent Crowson’s claims against the County rested on that theory. However, under Tenth Circuit binding precedent, the Court's holdings on the individual defendants’ appeals were not inextricably intertwined with Crowson’s claims against the County to the extent he advanced a systemic failure theory. The district court's denial of summary judgment to Johnson, LaRowe, and the County on the failure-to-train theory was reversed, and the remainder of the County’s appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Crowson v. Washington County State, Utah" on Justia Law

In this medical negligence lawsuit, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals denying Defendants' application for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent the trial court from enforcing a protective order that forbade them from certain ex parte communications, holding that the trial court abused its discretion.Plaintiff brought this action against the University of Kentucky Medical Center and thirteen healthcare professionals allegedly employed by the Medical Center. Here, Defendants sought to prevent the trial court from enforcing a protective order forbidding them from ex parte communication with Plaintiff's unnamed treating physicians or other healthcare providers employed by the Medical Center. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of appeals with direction to issue a writ consistent with this decision, holding that the trial court abused its discretion because the basis of the order was purportedly the personal conviction of the trial court that departed from precedent without appropriate justification. View "Beck v. Honorable Ernesto Scorsone" on Justia Law

In this case heard after the Kentucky Medical Review Panel Act (MRPA), Ky. Rev. Stat. 216C.005 et seq., was declared to be unconstitutional, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court finding the complaint to be untimely and dismissing this case, holding that the complaint was timely as to the individual defendants.Plaintiffs filed a complaint against advanced Practice Registered Nurse Wynetta Fletcher, Dr. Amjad Bkhari, Dr. James Detherage under the MRPA. After the claims made their way through the medical review panel process, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the same defendants and the entities that allegedly employed them. After Plaintiffs filed their complaint, the Supreme Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Claycomb, 566 S.W.3d 202 (Ky. 2018), wherein the Court declared the MRPA unconstitutional, was finalized. Thereafter, Defendants filed motions to dismiss, alleging that the claims were untimely and that Plaintiffs could not rely on the tolling provision of the MRPA to extend the deadline. The circuit court dismissed the suit as untimely. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Ky. Rev. Stat. 413.270 applied to Plaintiffs' claims; and (2) Plaintiffs' claims were timely filed under section 413.270 but saved only those claims that were filed with the medical review panel. View "Smith v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants in this insurance dispute, holding that the Legislature has clearly and unequivocally excluded captive insurers from the requirements of the Kentucky Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (USCPA), Ky. Rev. Stat. 304.12-230.Plaintiff brought this action against various healthcare defendants. The medical negligence claims were eventually settled. Thereafter, the circuit court denied Plaintiff's motion for declaratory relief as to his bad faith insurance claim against First Initiatives Insurance, Ltd., a foreign captive insurance entity that provides self-insurance for Catholic Health Initiatives, Inc. The court granted summary judgment for Catholic Health and First Initiatives. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that First Initiatives, as a captive insurer, is not subject to the USCPA. View "Merritt v. Catholic Health Initiatives, Inc." on Justia Law

Rockne Lee Hollingsworth brought a medical malpractice claim against a local hospital and doctor in Gem County, Idaho district court. The district court found Hollingsworth lacked due diligence in failing to determine the hospital was a political subdivision, subject to the notice requirements of the Idaho Tort Claims Act (“ITCA”), and granted summary judgment for Respondents. Hollingsworth appealed, arguing the corporate filings made by the county-owned hospital created the false impression the hospital was a private corporation. Respondents contended the hospital and corporate entity, both owned by Gem County, were both subject to the ITCA because they were actually one and the same. To this, the Idaho Supreme Court concurred and reversed the district court's ruling. View "Hollingsworth v. Thompson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a plaintiff may not take advantage of Ohio's saving statute to refile a medical claim after the applicable one-year statute of limitations has expired if the four-year statute of repose for medical claims has also expired.Plaintiffs filed a medical malpractice complaint against Defendants in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiffs previously filed their claims against Defendants in prior actions that were dismissed without prejudice before refiling their claims in Hamilton County. Defendants moved for judgment on the pleadings in both refiled cases, arguing that Ohio's medical statute of repose, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.113(C) barred the refiled claims. The trial court agreed and granted Defendants' motions. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiffs timely refiled their claims pursuant to the saving statute and that the statute of repose did not bar the refiled claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiffs commenced their actions in Hamilton County more than four years after the alleged conduct that formed the basis of their claims, the statute of repose barred Plaintiffs' refiled actions. View "Wilson v. Durrani" on Justia Law

In 2012, 41-year-old Karen Hubbard suffered a catastrophic stroke caused by a blood clot to her brain--a venous sinus thrombosis, a type of venous thromboembolism (VTE). She had been taking Beyaz, a birth control pill manufactured by Bayer. While she first received a prescription for Beyaz on December 27, 2011, Karen had been taking similar Bayer birth control products since 2001. The pills are associated with an increased risk of blood clots. The Beyaz warning label in place at the time of Karen’s Beyaz prescription warned of a risk of VTEs and summarized studies.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Bayer. Georgia’s learned intermediary doctrine controls this diversity jurisdiction case. That doctrine imposes on prescription drug manufacturers a duty to adequately warn physicians, rather than patients, of the risks their products pose. A plaintiff claiming a manufacturer’s warning was inadequate bears the burden of establishing that an improved warning would have caused her doctor not to prescribe her the drug in question. The Hubbards have not met this burden. The prescribing physician testified unambiguously that even with the benefit of the most up-to-date risk information about Beyaz, he considers his decision to prescribe Beyaz to Karen to be sound and appropriate. View "Hubbard v. Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendant in this medical malpractice action, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Defendant.Plaintiff went to the hospital complaining of slurred speech and numbness in her left arm. Defendant contacted Plaintiff's primary care physician and erroneously communicated that Plaintiff had no neurological deficits. Plaintiffs symptoms continued until she was admitted. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Defendant's negligence diminished her likelihood of full recovery, thus proximately causing her injury. At issue was whether Plaintiff's "loss of chance" at a better outcome following her stroke was a separate type of injury for which Plaintiff could recover in a medical malpractice action. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions granting summary judgment for Defendant, holding that losing the chance for an increased opportunity for an improved outcome is not a cognizable and compensable claim in North Carolina. View "Parkes v. Hermann" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Dr. Richard Nadal Carrion on Plaintiff's claims for negligently failing to obtain Plaintiff's informed consent before performing an abdominoplasty surgery and negligently abandoning her thereafter, holding that Plaintiff's challenges failed.Plaintiff filed her complaint in the District of Puerto Rico following her abdominoplasty, alleging that Nadal failed to disclose and discuss the risks of the surgery and that Nadal conditioned a necessary corrective procedure on her signing a consent form that she considered unacceptable. The magistrate judge granted Nadal's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to provide expert testimony to support her claims. The judge then denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Nadal and denying Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. View "Laureano-Quinones v. Nadal-Carrion" on Justia Law