Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In 2012, 41-year-old Karen Hubbard suffered a catastrophic stroke caused by a blood clot to her brain--a venous sinus thrombosis, a type of venous thromboembolism (VTE). She had been taking Beyaz, a birth control pill manufactured by Bayer. While she first received a prescription for Beyaz on December 27, 2011, Karen had been taking similar Bayer birth control products since 2001. The pills are associated with an increased risk of blood clots. The Beyaz warning label in place at the time of Karen’s Beyaz prescription warned of a risk of VTEs and summarized studies.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Bayer. Georgia’s learned intermediary doctrine controls this diversity jurisdiction case. That doctrine imposes on prescription drug manufacturers a duty to adequately warn physicians, rather than patients, of the risks their products pose. A plaintiff claiming a manufacturer’s warning was inadequate bears the burden of establishing that an improved warning would have caused her doctor not to prescribe her the drug in question. The Hubbards have not met this burden. The prescribing physician testified unambiguously that even with the benefit of the most up-to-date risk information about Beyaz, he considers his decision to prescribe Beyaz to Karen to be sound and appropriate. View "Hubbard v. Bayer Healthcare Pharmaceuticals Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to Defendant in this medical malpractice action, holding that the trial court properly granted summary judgment to Defendant.Plaintiff went to the hospital complaining of slurred speech and numbness in her left arm. Defendant contacted Plaintiff's primary care physician and erroneously communicated that Plaintiff had no neurological deficits. Plaintiffs symptoms continued until she was admitted. Plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Defendant's negligence diminished her likelihood of full recovery, thus proximately causing her injury. At issue was whether Plaintiff's "loss of chance" at a better outcome following her stroke was a separate type of injury for which Plaintiff could recover in a medical malpractice action. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions granting summary judgment for Defendant, holding that losing the chance for an increased opportunity for an improved outcome is not a cognizable and compensable claim in North Carolina. View "Parkes v. Hermann" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Defendant Dr. Richard Nadal Carrion on Plaintiff's claims for negligently failing to obtain Plaintiff's informed consent before performing an abdominoplasty surgery and negligently abandoning her thereafter, holding that Plaintiff's challenges failed.Plaintiff filed her complaint in the District of Puerto Rico following her abdominoplasty, alleging that Nadal failed to disclose and discuss the risks of the surgery and that Nadal conditioned a necessary corrective procedure on her signing a consent form that she considered unacceptable. The magistrate judge granted Nadal's motion for summary judgment on the ground that Plaintiff had failed to provide expert testimony to support her claims. The judge then denied Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Nadal and denying Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. View "Laureano-Quinones v. Nadal-Carrion" on Justia Law

In this case brought by a patient who sued her doctor for lack of informed consent, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court granting in part Plaintiff's motion to compel the production of medical records of Defendant's non-party patients, holding that the circuit court erred.Plaintiff underwent an anterior spinal surgery with Defendant, a general surgeon, to relieve lower back pain. After Defendant performed a vertical incision rather than Plaintiff's requested horizontal incision Plaintiff brought this action alleging that Defendant performed the vertical incision without Plaintiff's informed consent. At issue was Plaintiff's motion to compel certain non-party patients' medical records. The circuit court granted the motion to compel in part, limiting the scope of the discoverable records. The Supreme Court reversed the order, holding that the records Plaintiff requested were irrelevant and therefore not discoverable. View "Ferguson v. Thaemert" on Justia Law

Donald has glaucoma and keratoconus, a thinning of the cornea that causes distorted vision. To treat his keratoconus, Donald had left-eye corneal transplant surgery in 2011. A few years later, Donald was convicted of drug crimes. He began his prison sentence at Illinois River Correctional Facility in 2014. His eye problems started flaring up, causing redness and poor vision. He was subsequently seen by Illinois River’s optometrists and at Illinois Eye Center several times. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with a rupture of the globe, an irreversible loss of vision in his left eye. After surgery, pathological tests revealed that the infection that led to the ruptured globe was caused by bacteria that can act very quickly and cause perforation in as few as 72 hours. Donald filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The undisputed evidence shows that the defendants did not act with deliberate indifference toward an objectively serious medical condition and the district court appropriately exercised supplemental jurisdiction to dispose of the malpractice claim. View "Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court granting in part Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Defendants' appeal from the judgment of the trial court rendered following a jury verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on certain medical malpractice claims and denied Defendants' motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a late appeal, holding that the Appellate Court did not err.On appeal, Defendants argued that the Appellate Court erred in granting Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the portion of the appeal challenging the jury's verdict as untimely and abused its discretion in denying their motion to suspend the rules of practice to permit a later appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the Appellate Court correctly concluded that the appeal was untimely; and (2) the Appellate Court did not abuse its discretion or work injustice by determining that Defendants had failed to establish good cause for their failure to file a timely appeal. View "Georges v. OB-GYN Services, P.C." on Justia Law

James Williams suffered a severe brain injury from complications following cervical spine surgery. A lawsuit was brought against the hospital and the surgeon for medical malpractice, which included a claim for wrongful death after Williams died. Dr. Orhan Ilercil was ultimately found to be 15 percent responsible for Williams’s injuries and death, which amounted to a judgment against him for $205,800. Dr. Ilercil appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court erred by refusing to give an intervening/superseding-cause instruction. To this, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed, reversed judgment and remanded for a new trial. View "Ilercil v. Williams" on Justia Law

After Dameron underwent a robotic-assisted hysterectomy at Mercy Hospital, she brought a medical malpractice action. During discovery, Dameron disclosed Dr. Preston as a controlled expert witness under Ill. Sup. Ct. Rule 213(f)(3). Dameron stated that Preston would testify concerning "the comparison electromyogram and/or nerve conduction studies he will be performing" and would also testify that he reviewed the results of Dameron’s November 2013 EMG and NCV tests performed at Mercy. In June 2017, Preston performed the EMG study and prepared a report. In July 2017, Dameron e-mailed the defendants, stating that she was withdrawing Preston as a Rule 213(f)(3) controlled expert witness and considering him to be a Rule 201(b)(3) non-testifying expert consultant and that she would not produce any documents from Preston’s review of the case or his examination. Dameron moved to change Preston’s designation and sought to preclude discovery of facts and opinions known by Preston absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, stating that Preston was not one of her treating physicians.The appellate court reversed the denial of Dameron’s motion. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Defendants are not entitled to Preston’s report and EMG study on the basis that Preston served as Dameron’s treating physician; Preston was consulted for the purpose of providing testimony. A party is permitted to redesignate an expert from a Rule 213(f) controlled expert witness to a Rule 201(b)(3) consultant in a reasonable amount of time before trial, where a report has not yet been disclosed. Rule 201(b)(3) protects both conceptual data and factual information. Defendants did not show exceptional circumstances. View "Dameron v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court finding that Plaintiff's complaint against Defendant, a surgeon, alleging that he negligently treated Plaintiff's spinal condition, was barred by the statute of limitations, holding that the district court correctly found that Plaintiff's complaint was untimely filed.In her complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Defendant did not meet the applicable standard of care in his performances of surgeries on her and in her after care. Defendant moved for summary judgment, asserting that the complaint was barred by the applicable statute of limitations, Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-3-107. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the statute of limitations expired four days before Plaintiff's complaint was filed. View "Candelaria v. Karandikar" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in five appeals consolidated appeals for review to address two discrete issues – one related to pleading vicarious liability, and the other related to vicarious liability and apportionment. In August 2009, Keith Trabue’s wife, Shannon, suffered a catastrophic brain injury resulting from pulmonary edema leading to full cardiac arrest within days of giving birth to the couple’s daughter at Northside Hospital in Atlanta. At the hospital, Shannon was treated by physician-employees of Atlanta Women’s Specialists, LLC (AWS), including Dr. Stanley Angus and Dr. Rebecca Simonsen. Trabue and the bank serving as his wife’s conservator (Plaintiffs) later filed a medical malpractice action naming as defendants only Dr. Angus and AWS, although the complaint contained allegations regarding Dr. Simonsen’s conduct and alleged that AWS was vicariously responsible for the acts and omissions of both Dr. Angus and Dr. Simonsen. The complaint did not allege any independent acts of negligence on the part of AWS. At a two-week trial in 2017, after the close of the evidence, Dr. Angus and AWS, asked the court to require the jury to assess the percentages of fault of Dr. Angus and Dr. Simonsen and to apportion the damages between Dr. Angus and AWS under OCGA 51-12-33 (b). The Supreme Court asked the parties to brief two questions: (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently pled a claim for vicarious liability against AWS based on the conduct of Dr. Simonsen?; and (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that, to obtain apportionment of damages with regard to the negligence of Dr. Simonsen, the defendants were required to comply with OCGA 51-12-33 (d) by filing a pretrial notice of nonparty fault? The Supreme Court answered both questions in the negative and affirmed the Court of Appeals’ judgment. View "Atlanta Women's Specialists, LLC et al. v. Trabue et al." on Justia Law