Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Medical Malpractice
Flores v. Liu
After a surgeon competently performed a gastric re-sleeving surgery on plaintiff, she filed suit against him for negligence in recommending gastric re-sleeve surgery as a viable course of treatment and in not obtaining her informed consent to the surgery.The Court of Appeal held that a physician may be liable for negligently recommending a course of treatment if (1) that course stems from a misdiagnosis of the patient's underlying medical condition, or (2) all reasonable physicians in the relevant medical community would agree that the probable risks of that treatment outweigh its probable benefits. The court also held that a patient's informed consent to a negligently recommended course of treatment does not negate the physician's liability for his negligence in recommending it. In this case, although the trial court erred by instructing the jury that plaintiff's informed consent negated any liability for the surgeon's recommendation, the court concluded that this error did not prejudice her case because her negligent recommendation theory should never have gone to the jury in the first place. In this case, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, does not support the conclusion that the surgeon was negligent in recommending that plaintiff undergo the gastric re-sleeve surgery where she suffered from morbid obesity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Flores v. Liu" on Justia Law
Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc.
In 2015, inmate Peterson suffered from genital warts. Davida, a Stateville Correctional Center physician employed by Wexford, prescribed a topical medication (Podocon-25), which is caustic and should be applied sparingly, then removed thoroughly. PODOCON-25's packaging states that “PODOCON-25© IS TO BE APPLIED ONLY BY A PHYSICIAN” and warns of multiple potential “ADVERSE REACTIONS.” Davida did not apply the Podocon-25, nor did the nurses, who instructed Peterson to apply the treatment himself. He did so and suffered personal injuries.In 2016, Peterson filed a pro se complaint against Davida, the nurses, and Illinois Department of Corrections officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He alleged that the officer-defendants destroyed his shower pass permits, issued as part of his treatment, or failed to intervene to correct the situation. The court granted Peterson leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismissed his claims except as to three correctional officers. After obtaining counsel, Peterson filed an amended complaint, adding Wexford. The parties stipulated to dismissal without prejudice on January 25, 2018. On January 21, 2019, Peterson filed the operative complaint, claiming deliberate indifference under section 1983 and negligence under Illinois law against Davida, the nurses, and Wexford. The district court dismissed, finding that the complaint failed to sufficiently allege that the defendants had the requisite state of mind for deliberate indifference and that Peterson’s negligence claims were untimely because his 2016 complaint did not contain those allegations; the relation-back doctrine governs only amendments to a complaint, not a new filing.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claims but reversed as to the negligence claims. The court did not consider 735 ILCS 5/13-217, under which plaintiffs have an “absolute right to refile their complaint within one year” of its voluntary dismissal. View "Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law
Razmzan v. United States
After defendant was sued for medical malpractice in state court, he removed the case to federal court and moved to substitute the United States as defendant. Defendant claimed that the alleged malpractice occurred within the scope of his employment at a federally deemed community health center, entitling him to immunity and the substitution of the United States as the defendant under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act (FSHCAA). The district court concluded that some of the alleged malpractice occurred outside the scope of defendant's employment because he had billed for some of his services privately, in contravention of the Federal Tort Claims Act Health Center Policy Manual. Therefore, the district court concluded that defendant was not covered by the FSHCAA implementing regulation. The district court denied substitution of the United States as to that conduct, remanding the case in part to state court. The government argues that the Second Circuit lacks jurisdiction to entertain this appeal because defendant appealed from an unreviewable remand order.The Second Circuit held that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1447(d), remand orders are unreviewable except in cases that were originally removed under 28 U.S.C. 1442 or 1443. The court concluded that, because defendant removed this case under section 1442, the court is not barred from reviewing the district court's remand order. On the merits, the court concluded that defendant was acting within the scope of his employment under the relevant law—New York law—for the acts for which he billed privately. Therefore, the FTCA Manual is not entitled to deference to the extent that it provides otherwise. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Razmzan v. United States" on Justia Law
Steed v. Rezin Orthopedics and Sports Medicine, S.C.
On January 29, 2009, Glenn suffered a partial tear of his Achilles tendon. On February 17, Glenn sought treatment from Dr. Treacy at Rezin Orthopedics. Glenn was 42 years old and borderline obese. Dr. Treacy’s treatment plan included placing Glenn’s lower right leg in a plantar flexion position, set in a plaster cast for six weeks. Dr. Treacy memorialized his recommendation for Glenn to return for a follow-up appointment in two weeks in an invoice. Glenn required an appointment within a day or two for cast placement because he had driven himself to the appointment. Dr. Treacy directed the receptionist (Decker) to schedule a two-week follow-up appointment. Decker scheduled Glenn’s casting appointment for February 19 at another office. After Glenn’s leg was casted, the receptionist, Hare, scheduled Glenn’s follow-up appointment for March 13, more than three weeks after his initial appointment. On February 25, Glenn telephoned Rezin. The receptionist, Popplewell, rescheduled Glenn’s follow-up visit for March 12. On March 8, Glenn died of a pulmonary embolism.In a wrongful death and survival action, a jury returned a defense verdict. Glenn’s administrator appealed only the verdict in favor of Rezin. The appellate court reversed with directions to enter judgment n.o.v. in favor of the estate. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the verdict. The evidence supported a conclusion that Rezin’s failures did not proximately cause Glenn’s death. Glenn’s death was not a reasonably foreseeable result of Rezin's failure to schedule his follow-up appointment within two weeks of his initial appointment. View "Steed v. Rezin Orthopedics and Sports Medicine, S.C." on Justia Law
Borman v. Brown
Alice Borman filed this action against defendants Tara Brown, M.D. and North County Eye Center, Inc. (NCEC). Borman alleged that she sought treatment from defendants for a “droopy eyelid and brow.” According to Borman, Dr. Brown told Borman that Brown could perform a “brow lift” to correct the problem, but that a brow lift would not be covered by Borman’s insurance. Borman further alleged that Dr. Brown told
Borman that she could instead perform a blepharoplasty, which would be covered by Borman’s insurance. Borman further claimed that Dr. Brown’s statement that a brow lift would not be covered by Borman’s insurance was false, and that Dr. Brown had no reasonable basis for making the statement. Borman alleged that she relied on Dr. Brown’s representations and agreed to undergo a blepharoplasty. After undergoing the blepharoplasty, Borman claimed that she continued to have physical difficulties with her eyelid and her brow. Borman consulted another doctor who advised Borman that Dr. Brown had “performed the wrong procedure and that a brow[ ]lift should have been performed instead.” The trial court denied Borman's motion for summary judgment, denied the motion for summary adjudication of the professional negligence and lack of informed consent causes action, but granted the motion for summary adjudication as to Borman’s fraud and deceit and battery causes of action. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, and awarded costs to defendants as prevailing parties. Borman appealed, arguing the trial court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary adjudication with respect to her fraud and deceit cause of action, because the trial court should have permitted her to “proceed at trial on a claim for ‘[n]egligent [m]isrepresentation.’ ” The Court of Appeal concluded the record contained evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Dr. Brown intended for Borman to rely on her statement that a brow lift would not be covered by Borman’s insurance. Since that was the sole element of a negligent misrepresentation theory of liability that the trial court found Borman would be unable to prove, the Court further concluded the trial court erred in granting summary adjudication of Borman’s fraud and deceit cause of action. The trial court's postjudgment cost order, and the order granting summary adjudication of Brown’s fraud and deceit cause of action were both reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Borman v. Brown" on Justia Law
Cutting v. Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A.
The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed this appeal from an order of the superior court denying Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A.'s motion to dismiss Carol Cutting's complaint for medical malpractice, holding that Down East had not established that this was the rare case that warranted the application of the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule.Cutting filed a federal malpractice action against Down East asserting counts for failure to obtain informed consent and medical malpractice. The federal court dismissed the federal malpractice case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Cutting then filed a complaint in the state superior court asserting the same causes of action as those in her federal malpractice case. Down East filed a motion to dismiss on claim preclusion grounds. The superior court denied the motion, and Down East appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that this appeal does not come within the judicial economy exception to the final judgment rule. View "Cutting v. Down East Orthopedic Associates, P.A." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Medical Malpractice
Filosa v. Alagappan
Filosa began complaining of headaches in 2004-2005. By 2010, the headaches were constant with acute episodes. In 2010, his doctor ordered an MRI. Dr. Alagappan, a radiologist, interpreted the results and did not detect any abnormalities. Filosa’s headaches worsened. He began taking antidepressants. Filosa’s symptoms affected his performance at work. He took medical leaves of absence in 2011 and 2012. He described vision problems, eye strain, extreme fatigue, and an inability to concentrate. Filosa’s employer demoted him for performance problems. Filosa asked a doctor whether he might have a brain tumor. His doctor dismissed the suggestion, saying nothing in Filosa’s blood work indicated he had cancer and that he had already had a negative MRI. In 2014, his headaches were sometimes incapacitating. He again raised the possibility of a tumor. He was referred to a neurologist and underwent brain imaging. He was told in December 2014 that the test showed a cyst or a tumor in his brain. A re-review of the 2010 MRI imaging showed a “relatively subtle” mass, which had increased. Filosa underwent surgery, which caused adverse physical effects. Filosa sued for medical negligence in 2016 based on the failure to diagnose the brain mass after his 2010 MRI. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing the statute of limitations. The court of appeal reversed. There is a triable issue of fact as to the date of Filosa’s injury and his discovery of the injury, View "Filosa v. Alagappan" on Justia Law
Ex parte Johnson & Johnson et al.
Johnson & Johnson and other pharmaceutical defendants sought mandamus relief from an Alabama circuit court order that refused to transfer venue of the underlying lawsuit to the Jefferson County, Alabama circuit court, on grounds that venue in Conecuh County was not proper as to all plaintiffs, or alternatively, on the basis that convenience of the parties and/or the interest of justice required it. In 2019, the plaintiffs filed a complaint at the Conecuh Circuit Court against numerous defendants that, they averred, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and/or dispensed opioid medications throughout Alabama in a manner that was misleading, unsafe, and resulted in drug addiction, injury, and/or death to Alabama citizens. The complaint asserted claims of negligence, nuisance, unjust enrichment, fraud and deceit, wantonness, and civil conspiracy. The manufacturer defendants moved to transfer the case to Jefferson County, reasoning that because 8 of the 17 plaintiffs either had a place of business in Jefferson County or operated hospitals in Jefferson County or adjacent counties, logic dictated that a large percentage of the witnesses for those plaintiffs (i.e., prescribing doctors, hospital administrators, etc.) and their evidence were located in or around Jefferson County. After a review of the circuit court record, the Alabama Supreme Court determined defendants did not demonstrate a clear, legal right to transfer the underlying case from Conecuh to Jefferson County. Therefore, the petition was denied. View "Ex parte Johnson & Johnson et al." on Justia Law
McGill v. Szymela
Janice and Timothy McGill appealed a circuit court judgment against them in their medical-malpractice lawsuit against Victor Szymela, M.D. The McGills alleged that Dr. Szymela failed to properly perform Janice's temporomandibular-joint total-replacement ("TJR") surgery. Janice sought treatment to relieve her temporomandibular-joint ("TMJ") disorder. Janice had been experiencing clicking and locking of her jaw and excruciating jaw and ear pain. Janice alleged that she experienced distinct, worse pain immediately after the surgery and that the new pain did not resolve with time. She continued to experience popping in her jaw. She alleged that her overbite was exacerbated by the surgery. She also alleged that she could not open her mouth as wide as previously and that she lost sensation in her lips, which diminished her ability to speak clearly. Janice sought treatment from Dr. Michael Koslin, who referred Janice to a pain-management specialist. Ultimately, Janice's providers determined that her pain was unresponsive to conservative treatment. In 2017, Dr. Koslin surgically removed the prosthesis. Several weeks later, Dr. Koslin implanted custom joints. Janice alleged Dr. Koslin's treatment relieved her pain. In March 2016, Janice sued Dr. Szymela, alleging that he breached the standard of care for an oral and maxillofacial surgeon by failing to properly assess the source of Janie's pain or install the prosthesis correctly. The McGills identified Dr. Louis G. Mercuri as one of their expert witnesses regarding oral and maxillofacial surgery. On Dr. Szymela's motion, the trial court ruled that Dr. Mercuri did not qualify as a "similarly situated health care provider" under § 6-5-548(c)(4), Ala. Code 1975, because he had not practiced in Dr. Szymela's specialty within the year preceding Dr. Szymela's alleged breach. Thus, the court excluded Dr. Mercuri as a witness. At the close of all evidence, on Dr. Szymela's motion, the trial court entered a partial judgment as a matter of law ("JML") in favor of Dr. Szymela. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court did not exceed its discretion by excluding the testimony of Dr. Mercuri on the basis that he was not statutorily qualified as an expert. And because the McGills did not present or point to substantial evidence of the standard of care for Dr. Szymela's performance of Janice's TJR surgery, the trial court properly entered a JML on the claims relating to the surgery. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "McGill v. Szymela" on Justia Law
Crowson v. Washington County State, Utah
Martin Crowson was an inmate at the Washington County Purgatory Correctional Facility (the “Jail”) when he began suffering from symptoms of toxic metabolic encephalopathy. Nurse Michael Johnson and Dr. Judd LaRowe, two of the medical staff members responsible for Crowson’s care, wrongly concluded Crowson was experiencing drug or alcohol withdrawal. On the seventh day of medical observation, Crowson’s condition deteriorated and he was transported to the hospital, where he was accurately diagnosed. After Crowson recovered, he sued Johnson, LaRowe, and Washington County under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court denied motions for summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity by Johnson and LaRowe, concluding a reasonable jury could find both were deliberately indifferent to Crowson’s serious medical needs, and that it was clearly established their conduct amounted to a constitutional violation. The district court also denied the County’s motion for summary judgment, concluding a reasonable jury could find the treatment failures were an obvious consequence of the County’s reliance on LaRowe’s infrequent visits to the Jail and the County’s lack of written protocols for monitoring, diagnosing, and treating inmates. Johnson, LaRowe, and the County filed consolidated interlocutory appeals, raising threshold questions of jurisdiction. Johnson and LaRowe challenged the denial of qualified immunity, while the County contended the Tenth Circuit should exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review the district court’s denial of its summary judgment motion. The Tenth Circuit exercised limited jurisdiction over Johnson’s and LaRowe’s appeals pursuant to the exception to 28 U.S.C. 1291, carved out for purely legal issues of qualified immunity through the collateral order doctrine. The Court held Johnson’s conduct did not violate Crowson’s rights and, assuming without deciding LaRowe’s conduct did, the Court concluded LaRowe’s conduct did not violate any clearly established rights. The Court's holding was "inextricably intertwined with the County’s liability on a failure-to-train theory," so the Court exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction to the extent Crowson’s claims against the County rested on that theory. However, under Tenth Circuit binding precedent, the Court's holdings on the individual defendants’ appeals were not inextricably intertwined with Crowson’s claims against the County to the extent he advanced a systemic failure theory. The district court's denial of summary judgment to Johnson, LaRowe, and the County on the failure-to-train theory was reversed, and the remainder of the County’s appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "Crowson v. Washington County State, Utah" on Justia Law