Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

During the early months of the COVID-19 pandemic, a patient received medical care that included a hysterectomy performed by a physician at a local medical center. Following the procedure, the patient experienced significant complications, including infection, sepsis, and additional surgeries, which led to prolonged recovery and ongoing health issues. The patient and her husband filed a lawsuit against the physician, the medical practice, and the hospital, alleging negligence and gross negligence in the performance of the surgery and subsequent care.The defendants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that they were immune from civil liability under North Carolina’s Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act, which was enacted in response to the pandemic. They asserted that the Act provided them with immunity because the care was rendered during the pandemic and was impacted by it, and that the complaint did not allege bad faith. The Superior Court in Pitt County denied the motions to dismiss. The defendants appealed, and the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order, holding that the requirements for statutory immunity under the Emergency Act were not met on the face of the complaint and that the denial of the motions to dismiss was not immediately appealable as a matter of right.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case and held that the trial court’s denial of the motions to dismiss was an interlocutory order and not immediately appealable. The Court concluded that the Emergency Act provides immunity from liability, not from suit, and therefore does not create a substantial right warranting immediate appeal. The Court also found that the denial of the motions did not implicate personal jurisdiction under the relevant statute. As a result, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Land v. Whitley" on Justia Law

An 84-year-old man with a history of dementia was admitted to a hospital after several falls and subsequently transferred to a nursing home for rehabilitation. His wife, acting as his “Authorized Representative,” signed an optional arbitration agreement as part of his admission paperwork. During his stay, the man developed a pressure wound that became septic, leading to his removal from the facility and subsequent death. The wife, as personal representative of his estate, filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the nursing home and its administrator, alleging medical negligence and asserting that the man was incompetent and unable to make decisions for himself at the time of admission.The Mobile Circuit Court reviewed the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, which was based on the signed agreement. The wife opposed the motion, arguing she lacked authority to bind her husband to arbitration because he was permanently incapacitated due to dementia. She provided medical records and her own affidavit to support her claim of his incapacity. The defendants countered with evidence suggesting the man had periods of lucidity and was not permanently incapacitated. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration and later denied a postjudgment motion by the defendants that included additional medical records.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It held that the wife did not meet her burden to prove the man was permanently incapacitated or temporarily incapacitated at the time the arbitration agreement was executed. The Court found that the evidence showed the man had lucid intervals and was at times alert and able to communicate, and that no contemporaneous evidence established incapacity at the time of signing. The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the case, holding that the arbitration agreement was enforceable. View "Mobile Nursing and Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Sliman" on Justia Law

A woman died after being treated at a hospital and left behind two minor children. Her mother took custody of the children following a juvenile court order that granted her authority over their care. The mother, acting as custodian, sent pre-suit notice to the health care providers she believed responsible for her daughter’s death, identifying herself as the “claimant authorizing the notice” but not mentioning the minor children. She later filed a wrongful death lawsuit, initially on her own behalf and on behalf of the children, but ultimately pursued the claim solely for the children.The Circuit Court for Anderson County first granted, then vacated, the defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding that the mother had substantially complied with the pre-suit notice requirements and that the omission of the children’s names did not prejudice the defendants. The court also found that while the children held the right to the claim, the mother was the claimant on their behalf. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed this decision, holding that the pre-suit notice was deficient because it failed to identify the children as claimants, and that this failure prejudiced the defendants. The appellate court did agree that the mother had standing to bring the suit on behalf of her grandchildren.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. The Court held that under Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(a)(2)(B), the “claimant authorizing the notice” is the person who asserts the right and formally approves giving pre-suit notice. Since the minor children could not act for themselves, their legal custodian was the proper person to authorize notice and file suit on their behalf. The Court concluded that the mother complied with the statutory pre-suit notice requirements and remanded the case to the circuit court. View "Denson ex rel. Denson v. Methodist Medical Center of Oak Ridge" on Justia Law

A husband and wife brought a lawsuit after the wife suffered a pelvic fracture during a forceps-assisted delivery performed by a doctor at a women’s health group. They alleged that the doctor failed to obtain the wife’s informed consent by not disclosing the risks associated with the procedure. The plaintiffs claimed that this omission violated Massachusetts law and sought damages for the resulting injury.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts handled the case initially. During pretrial proceedings, the defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses, arguing that the plaintiffs had not made their experts available for deposition as required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The plaintiffs did not respond to this motion, and the District Court granted it, excluding the expert testimony. The plaintiffs later failed to appear at a pretrial conference, citing email issues, and only addressed the missed conference, not the exclusion of their experts. The District Court declined to vacate its order striking the experts, finding the plaintiffs’ delay and lack of explanation unjustified. Subsequently, the District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that expert testimony was necessary to support the informed consent claim under Massachusetts law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the District Court’s decisions. The appellate court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to reconsider the order striking the expert witnesses, given the plaintiffs’ prolonged inaction and failure to address the underlying issues. The First Circuit also held that, under Massachusetts law, expert testimony was required to establish that the risk of pelvic fracture from a forceps-assisted delivery was more than negligible, and thus, summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "Meka v. Haddad" on Justia Law

A nursing home resident’s legal representative, acting under a durable power of attorney, sued a nursing home for alleged medical negligence during the resident’s stay. Upon admission, the representative signed several documents, including an agreement to arbitrate any disputes arising from the resident’s care. The representative later claimed not to recall signing the documents but did not dispute her signature. The nursing home moved to compel arbitration based on the signed agreement, which expressly stated it was governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).The District Court of McCurtain County, Oklahoma, held a hearing on the motion to compel arbitration. The court found that a valid arbitration agreement existed, signed by both an authorized agent of the nursing home and the legal representative. The court determined that the FAA applied due to the involvement of interstate commerce and that the Oklahoma Nursing Home Care Act’s (NHCA) prohibition of arbitration agreements was preempted by federal law. The court granted the nursing home’s motion to compel arbitration and stayed the judicial proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the FAA preempts the NHCA’s categorical prohibition of arbitration agreements in the nursing home context when interstate commerce is involved and the agreement expressly invokes the FAA. The court found the arbitration agreement was validly executed and not unconscionable, distinguishing this case from prior Oklahoma precedent and aligning with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed the district court’s order compelling arbitration. View "Thompsonl v. Heartway Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought medical care for severe headaches and related symptoms from various providers in Oklahoma and Missouri, including Freeman Health System (FHS) and Dr. Gulshan Uppal in Joplin, Missouri. After multiple visits and treatments, she was ultimately diagnosed with serious neurological conditions and suffered lasting health consequences. She alleged that several healthcare providers, including FHS and Dr. Uppal, negligently diagnosed, treated, and discharged her.She filed suit in the District Court of Ottawa County, Oklahoma, naming multiple defendants. FHS and Dr. Uppal moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing their actions and contacts were insufficient for Oklahoma courts to exercise jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, finding it lacked both general and specific personal jurisdiction over these defendants, primarily because the relevant treatment occurred in Missouri and the claims did not arise from FHS’s Oklahoma contacts. The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals affirmed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the district court erred by only considering whether the suit “arose out of” the defendants’ contacts with Oklahoma, and not whether it “related to” those contacts, as required by the two-pronged standard for specific personal jurisdiction clarified in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana 8th Judicial District Court. The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff met her burden regarding FHS’s contacts with Oklahoma, warranting further proceedings to determine if her claims “relate to” those contacts. However, the plaintiff failed to show sufficient contacts for personal jurisdiction over Dr. Uppal. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court’s opinion, affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Dr. Uppal, reversed the dismissal of FHS, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barfell v. Freeman Health System" on Justia Law

An adolescent female, who was continuously enrolled as a dependent under her mother’s Kaiser health care plans from 2005 to 2023, received gender-affirming medical care between the ages of 13 and 17. After experiencing negative outcomes and later detransitioning, she filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, The Permanente Medical Group, and several individual providers. The claims alleged that the care provided was not medically justified, that risks were not adequately disclosed, and that the providers failed to meet the standard of care in both treatment and informed consent.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County reviewed Kaiser’s petition to compel arbitration, which was based on arbitration provisions in the health plan documents. Kaiser argued that the plaintiff, as a dependent, was bound by arbitration agreements incorporated in the evidence of coverage and benefits booklets for both the union-based and self-funded plans. The trial court found that Kaiser failed to establish the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, noting that the relevant documents referenced in the enrollment forms were not provided, and there was no evidence of the plaintiff or her mother expressly agreeing to the specific arbitration provisions Kaiser sought to enforce. The court denied the petition to compel arbitration and later denied Kaiser’s motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that Kaiser did not meet its burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the existence of a valid and binding arbitration agreement covering the controversy. The court emphasized that mere enrollment and general references to arbitration were insufficient; the precise arbitration provision must be clearly incorporated and agreed to. The order denying the petition to compel arbitration was affirmed. View "Brockman v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals" on Justia Law

Robin Roebuck, who had previously undergone a heart transplant, was hospitalized at the Mayo Clinic in Arizona in April 2020 for COVID-19. During his stay, an arterial blood gas test was performed as part of his treatment, which led to complications requiring surgery and resulting in significant scarring and reduced function in his right arm and hand. In January 2021, Roebuck filed a medical negligence lawsuit against the Mayo Clinic and two of its medical professionals, alleging that the test was negligently performed. He did not claim gross negligence.The Superior Court of Maricopa County initially denied Mayo Clinic’s motion to dismiss, finding that Roebuck had sufficiently alleged the test was part of his heart treatment rather than COVID-19 care. After discovery, the court determined the test was related to COVID-19 treatment and granted summary judgment for Mayo Clinic, holding that Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-516 provided immunity from ordinary negligence claims during the pandemic, requiring proof of gross negligence or willful misconduct instead. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that § 12-516’s bar on ordinary negligence claims for pandemic-related medical care violated the Arizona Constitution’s anti-abrogation clause.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case and held that § 12-516(A) unconstitutionally abrogates the right to recover damages for injuries caused by ordinary negligence by health care providers during a public health emergency. The Court found that gross negligence is not a reasonable alternative to ordinary negligence and that the statute’s limitation impermissibly abolishes a protected right of action. The Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, while vacating part of the court of appeals’ reasoning and replacing it with its own. View "ROEBUCK v MAYO CLINIC" on Justia Law

A Georgia corporation operates several hospitals and clinics in west Georgia and, through an affiliated entity, also operates a small hospital and clinics in east Alabama. An Alabama resident sought treatment at the Alabama hospital and was subsequently transferred by ambulance to the corporation’s Georgia facility for a heart-catheterization procedure. The procedure was performed by a Georgia-based physician employed by the corporation, who is not licensed in Alabama and has never practiced there. The patient alleges that the physician’s negligence during the procedure in Georgia caused him to suffer renal failure and require further medical intervention. The patient sued both the corporation and the physician in the Randolph Circuit Court in Alabama, asserting claims under both Alabama and Georgia medical liability statutes and alleging the corporation’s vicarious liability for the physician’s actions.The physician and the corporation moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that venue was improper. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but denied the corporation’s motion to dismiss. The corporation then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against it.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama, as it was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business there. However, the Court found that specific personal jurisdiction existed because the patient’s treatment began at the Alabama facility operated by the corporation, and the subsequent care in Georgia was sufficiently related to the corporation’s activities in Alabama. The Court also concluded that the corporation had not demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal based on improper venue, as it had not adequately addressed whether Alabama’s venue statute applied to claims brought under another state’s law. The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Melissa Allen experienced multiple seizures at home and was taken to Lowell General Hospital, where she was found to be seven months pregnant and suffering from severe hypertension. Dr. Fernando Roca, an obstetrician affiliated with Lowell Community Health Center (LCHC), determined an emergency caesarian section was necessary. After the procedure, Allen suffered a devastating neurological injury and died eleven days later at a Boston hospital. The cause of death was listed as intracranial hemorrhage and eclampsia.Brad O'Brien, as personal representative of Allen’s estate, initially filed a wrongful death medical malpractice suit in Massachusetts state court against Dr. Roca and the hospital. At the time of the incident, Dr. Roca was employed by LCHC, a federally funded health center deemed under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to have federal employee status for certain purposes. The United States substituted itself as defendant and removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which dismissed the suit as time-barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). On O'Brien’s first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the substitution order due to reliance on the wrong statutory basis and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again substituted the United States as defendant and dismissed the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Secretary’s regulation allowing for “pre-deeming” FTCA coverage in certain hospital on-call scenarios was consistent with the PHSA, and that Dr. Roca’s treatment of Allen fell within this coverage. The court also held that O’Brien’s claim was untimely under the FTCA’s statute of limitations and that the FTCA’s savings clause did not apply. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "O'Brien v. United States" on Justia Law