Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the motion of the trial court denying the State's motion to dismiss this medical malpractice action on the basis of sovereign immunity, holding that the trial court did not err.James Caverly died while under the medical care of the employees of the John Dempsey Hospital at the University of Connecticut Health Center. Plaintiff, administrator of the decedent's estate, brought a medical malpractice action against the State, doing business as UCONN Health Center/John Dempsey Hospital, pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-160(b). The State filed a motion to dismiss the action, arguing that because Plaintiff had received a settlement payment from a joint tortfeasor in connection with the decedent's death. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that section 4-160b(a) applies only to subrogated or assigned claims and not to payments made by joint tortfeasors. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied the State's motion to dismiss. View "Caverly v. State" on Justia Law

The First Circuit vacated the order of the district court dismissing Plaintiffs' action seeking damages for medical malpractice, holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to apply the requisite exceptional-circumstances test.Plaintiffs commenced this civil action in federal court alleging negligence under Puerto Rico law leading to the death of their mother. Approximately one month earlier, a larger group of plaintiffs brought a similar medical malpractice suit in the superior court of Puerto Rico also arising from the decedent's death. A defendant in both cases filed a motion in federal court to stay or dismiss the federal court proceeding. The district court granted the motion, finding the "prior pending action" doctrine applicable. The First Circuit vacated the order below, holding that the district court erred in applying the "prior pending action" doctrine in lieu of the test set forth in Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) and its progeny. View "Maldonado-Cabrera v. Anglero-Alfaro" on Justia Law

The University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) appealed a county court judgment granting Genevieve Jensen’s motion for extension of time to serve process on the attorney general and its decision denying UMMC’s motion for summary judgment based on a statute of limitations defense. Since Jensen failed to articulate good cause for an extension of time to serve process, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the county court abused its discretion by granting her motion for extension, it reversed the county court’s decision and dismissed Jensen’s case with prejudice. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Jensen" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the decision of the trial court denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's medical negligence claims, holding that Texas Medical Liability Act applied, and therefore, Plaintiff's failure to serve an expert report on Defendants was fatal to her claims.At issue was (1) whether Plaintiff's claims that Defendants negligently administered various treatments that caused scarring and discoloration to her skin constituted "health care liability claims" under the Act, and (2) whether the Act prohibited Plaintiff from filing an amended petition after the Act's deadline for serving expert reports. The Supreme Court held (1) Plaintiff's claims constituted health care liability claims subject to the Act's expert report requirements; (2) the Act did not prohibit Plaintiff from filing an amended petition; and (3) because Plaintiff failed timely to serve an expert report, Plaintiff's claims must be dismissed under the Act. View "Lake Jackson Medical Spa, Ltd. v. Gaytan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted a petition for a writ of mandamus and directed the court of appeals to vacate its order granting relief and to instruct the trial court to vacate the order it issued in compliance with the court of appeals' directive, holding that a facility's general policies and procedures fall outside the scope of pre-report discovery permitted in medical-liability cases.Kenneth Smith, on behalf of his wife, Donna Smith, brought this action alleging that Donna fell multiple times while in the care of a nursing facility owned by LCS SP, LLC. Before Smith served LCS with an expert report he requested LCS's general operating policies and procedures for the five years before he brought suit. When LCS objected, Smith moved to compel the discovery. The trial court denied the motion, delaying the discovery until after Smith served LCS with the expert report required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 74.351(s). Smith petitioned for mandamus relief, which the court of appeals conditionally granted. LCS then petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion when it declined to compel the requested discovery. View "In re LCS SP, LLC" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court entering judgment in accordance with the jury's verdict finding Doctors' Center Hospital (Manati), Inc. (Doctors' Center) liable for eight percent of a more than $14 million total award, holding that there was no error.This lawsuit stemmed from obstetric care provided to Plaintiff, Jeanette Rodriguez-Valentin in connection with the birth of her son, DALR. The jury found Doctors' Center liability and awarded damages. The jury apportioned ninety-two percent of that liability to two treating physicians with whom Plaintiff settled prior to trial and apportioned to Doctors' Center the remaining amount of $1,143,680. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err or abuse its discretion in deferring to the jury's evaluation of the evidence; and (2) did not err in denying Doctors' Center's motions for judgment as a matter of law, for a new trial, or for remittitur. View "Rodriguez-Valentin v. Doctors' Center Hospital (Manati), Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that Cal. Civ. Code 3333.2 applies to a physician assistant who has a legally enforceable agency relationship with a supervising physician and provides services within the scope of that agency relationship, even if the physician violates his obligation to provide adequate supervision.Under a provision of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), damages for noneconomic losses shall not exceed $250,000 in any action for injury against a healthcare provider based on "professional negligence." At issue before the Supreme Court was whether section 3333.2 applies to actions against physician assistants who are nominally supervised by a doctor but receive minimal or no supervision when performing medical services. The Supreme Court held that a physician assistant practices within the scope of her license for purposes of MICRA’s cap on noneconomic damages when the physician assistant acts as the agent of a licensed physician, performs the type of services authorized by that agency relationship, and does not engage in an area of practice prohibited by the Physician Assistant's Practice Act. See Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, former 3502, subd. (d). View "Lopez v. Ledesma" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing order of the circuit court denying the motion of Legacy Health Services, Inc. Cambridge Place Group, LLC, and Cambridge Place Properties, LLC (collectively, Defendants) to dismiss or stay this lawsuit and compel arbitration of the medical malpractice claims brought by Christopher Jackson, as guardian for Christine Jackson, his mother, holding the court of appeals erred.At issue was whether Christopher possessed the authority, as his mother's guardian, to enter a voluntary arbitration agreement that was not a prerequisite to the provision of care or services to his ward. The circuit court concluded that Christopher did not have that authority. The court of appeals reversed, holding that a guardian's authority to enter into contracts generally is within the ambit of what is reasonably inferable from the relevant statutes. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) guardians have the authority to bind their wards to contracts that limit or deprive the civil rights of their wards only to the extent necessary to provide needed care and services to the ward; and (2) because the arbitration agreement was not necessary to provide care or services to Christine, Christopher lacked the authority to enter into the arbitration agreement. View "Jackson v. Legacy Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

In the medical negligence action, the Supreme Court reversed the order of the superior court denying Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial following a jury verdict in favor of Defendant, holding that the trial justice was clearly wrong in denying Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant deviated from the appropriate standard of care by failing properly to perform and document assessments of a newborn's intravenous line site. The jury returned a verdict for Defendant. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that Defendant repeatedly engaged in unfair and prejudicial action before the jury. The trial justice denied the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial justice erred in finding that Defendant's closing argument did not result in prejudice to Plaintiffs. View "Baker v. Women & Infants Hospital of R.I." on Justia Law

Relatives of Saldana, who died from COVID-19 at Glenhaven nursing home, sued Glenhaven in California state court, alleging state-law causes of action. Glenhaven removed the case to federal court. The Ninth Circuit affirmed a remand to state court,The district court lacked jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 1442, because Glenhaven did not act under a federal officer or agency’s directions when it complied with mandatory directives from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the Department of Health and Human Services.The claims were not completely preempted by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act, which provides immunity from suit when the HHS Secretary determines that a threat to health constitutes a public health emergency, but provides an exception for an exclusive federal cause of action for willful misconduct. A March 2020 declaration under the Act provided "liability immunity for activities related to medical countermeasures against COVID-19.” The Act does not displace non-willful misconduct claims related to the public health emergency, nor did it provide substitute causes of action. The federal scheme was not so comprehensive that it entirely supplanted state law claims.The district court did not have jurisdiction under the embedded federal question doctrine, which applies if a federal issue is necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress. View "Saldana v. Glenhaven Healthcare LLC" on Justia Law