Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Jeane Whitfield filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Dennis Schimpf and Sweetgrass Plastic Surgery, LLC, alleging negligence in performing breast augmentation-mastopexy surgery and in post-operative care. Whitfield experienced complications post-surgery, including severe pain and wound issues, leading her to seek further medical attention and additional surgeries. She claimed Schimpf's negligence caused her injuries and inadequate post-operative care exacerbated her condition.The jury in the Circuit Court of Charleston County found in favor of Schimpf and Sweetgrass, determining that Whitfield did not prove the defendants deviated from the standard of care. Whitfield appealed, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Whitfield then petitioned for a writ of certiorari to the South Carolina Supreme Court, challenging two evidentiary rulings: the exclusion of evidence to show bias of Sweetgrass' office manager, Vicky Tolbert, and the admission of testimony from Schimpf's expert witnesses based on their Rule 35 examinations of Whitfield.The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the admission of the expert testimony but erred in affirming the exclusion of evidence of Tolbert's bias. The Supreme Court held that evidence of Tolbert's sexual relationship with Schimpf, her salary, and the free cosmetic procedures she received was relevant to show potential bias and should have been admitted. The Court determined that excluding this evidence was prejudicial to Whitfield's case, as it impacted the jury's ability to assess Tolbert's credibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Whitfield v. Schimpf" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Steven Luppold, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit after an above-the-knee amputation of his left leg. He alleged that the negligence of three healthcare providers—Susan Hanlon, a registered nurse; Charles Loucraft, a physician assistant; and Carlos Flores, a nurse practitioner—led to his injury. Luppold visited the emergency department at Lowell General Hospital twice in March 2015, complaining of severe foot pain and discoloration. Despite these symptoms, he was discharged without proper diagnosis or treatment, leading to the eventual amputation.In the Superior Court, a jury awarded Luppold $20 million in damages, finding Hanlon, Loucraft, and Flores negligent. Hanlon moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, to set aside the verdict, or for remittitur, arguing that the trial judge erred in not allowing cross-examination about a high-low settlement agreement between Loucraft and Flores, and that the jury instructions on factual causation were incorrect. The trial judge denied her motion, and Hanlon appealed.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's decision to exclude cross-examination about the high-low settlement agreement, as Hanlon failed to demonstrate how the agreement caused bias or changed testimony. The court also upheld the jury instructions on factual causation, determining that they correctly conveyed the "but-for" causation standard required by law. Additionally, the court rejected Hanlon's argument that she was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict, finding sufficient evidence that her actions fell below the standard of care and contributed to Luppold's injury.Finally, the court affirmed the assessment of prejudgment interest on the entire damages award, including future pain and suffering, as required by Massachusetts law. The judgment and the order denying Hanlon's posttrial motions were affirmed. View "Luppold v. Hanlon" on Justia Law

A three-year-old child, Charlie L., was brought to the emergency department at PIH Health Hospital-Whittier with abdominal pain. The emergency department physician ordered "stat" X-ray and ultrasound images, which were remotely reviewed by Dr. Peyman Kangavari, an on-call radiologist. Dr. Kangavari reported that the images showed no bowel obstruction. The child was discharged but returned to the hospital shortly after with severe symptoms, leading to multiple surgeries and long-term health issues.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Charlie L., through his mother, filed a negligence action against Dr. Kangavari, alleging medical malpractice for failing to diagnose the bowel obstruction. Dr. Kangavari moved for summary judgment, supported by an expert declaration from Dr. John Lieu, asserting adherence to the standard of care. Charlie L. opposed the motion with an expert declaration from Dr. Ravi Srinivasa. The trial court ruled that Health and Safety Code section 1799.110 applied, requiring stricter qualifications for expert witnesses in emergency medical cases. The court found Dr. Lieu qualified but Dr. Srinivasa not, and granted summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1799.110’s stricter qualifications for expert witnesses apply to on-call radiologists providing emergency medical services. The court found that neither Dr. Lieu nor Dr. Srinivasa met the qualifications required under section 1799.110. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Charlie L. v. Kangavari" on Justia Law

Father Constantine P. Rogakos, an 86-year-old retired Greek-Orthodox priest, visited Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center for an outpatient abdominal ultrasound. He used a cane due to a shuffled gait and had a history of falls. At the hospital, he was provided a wheelchair to reach the waiting room. In the ultrasound room, he was instructed to change into a medical gown. While changing, he leaned on a wheeled hospital stretcher, which moved, causing him to fall and sustain severe injuries. He later died from these injuries.The Administrator of his estate filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the hospital, alleging negligence by the sonographer, Joanna Regan, for failing to assist and ensure the stretcher's wheels were locked. The circuit court denied the hospital's motion to strike and refused to allow a hospital stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $2,000,000. The hospital's post-trial motions were denied.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's decisions, including the admissibility of Father Rogakos' statements under the Dead Man’s Statute, the refusal to grant a multiple causes jury instruction, and the exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. It held that the Dead Man’s Statute did not preclude the introduction of Father Rogakos' statements as they were conveyed by non-interested witnesses. The court also found no error in the circuit court's refusal to grant the multiple causes jury instruction, exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit, and denial of the hospital's motion to strike, as the evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center v. Rogakos-Russell" on Justia Law

Marites Murphy was involved in a head-on car collision in Petaluma in February 2020. Fire Department paramedics Jude Prokop and Shay Burke responded to the scene. Murphy repeatedly told the paramedics she was not injured and did not want medical assistance, even after being warned she might have a serious injury. The paramedics assessed her capacity to refuse treatment and left the scene. Hours later, Murphy suffered a debilitating stroke due to a hypertensive crisis triggered by the collision. She sued the City of Petaluma and the paramedics for medical negligence, alleging they failed to properly assess her condition and transport her to a hospital.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the paramedics did not assume a duty of care to provide the medical assistance Murphy claimed was owed. The court found that the paramedics did not initiate medical care but merely offered it, which Murphy refused.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that the paramedics did not owe Murphy a duty to provide medical assistance under the negligent undertaking doctrine because she repeatedly refused such assistance. The court distinguished this case from others where first responders had undertaken to provide medical care. The court concluded that the paramedics' actions did not increase the risk of harm to Murphy and that they left her in the same condition as when they arrived. Therefore, the paramedics did not assume a duty to provide the level of medical care Murphy alleged was required. View "Murphy v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa Lombardo, Daniel Bates, and James Bates sued Gramercy Court as heirs of Elizabeth Stein, alleging wrongful death, negligence, elder abuse, and gross negligence due to the care Stein received at Gramercy Court's nursing facility. Stein developed bedsores and died shortly after being transferred back to the hospital. Gramercy Court petitioned to compel arbitration based on an agreement Lombardo signed on Stein's behalf, but the trial court denied the petition.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that Stein's durable power of attorney did not grant Lombardo the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Stein's behalf. The court also determined that Stein did not give Lombardo ostensible authority through her actions. Additionally, the court ruled that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Lombardo's or the other plaintiffs' individual claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Lombardo did not have actual or ostensible authority to bind Stein to the arbitration agreement. The durable power of attorney did not explicitly grant Lombardo the authority to enter into arbitration agreements, and there was no evidence that Stein's conduct led Gramercy Court to believe Lombardo had such authority. The court also concluded that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the plaintiffs' individual claims, as Lombardo was not a party to the agreement in her individual capacity. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying Gramercy Court's petition to compel arbitration. View "Lombardo v. Gramercy Court" on Justia Law

A physician sexually assaulted a twelve-year-old boy during a medical examination that required touching the child's genitals. The child's parents filed a medical malpractice complaint, including a negligent-credentialing claim against the hospital employing the physician. After settling with the hospital, the family sought excess compensation from the Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that neither the sexual assault nor the hospital’s negligence fell within the Medical Malpractice Act (MMA). The trial court denied the motion.The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, granting summary judgment to the defendants. The appellate court held that the defendants could challenge the MMA’s applicability post-settlement, that a negligent-credentialing claim must be based on an underlying act of medical malpractice, and that the physician’s sexual misconduct did not constitute medical malpractice. One judge dissented, arguing that the negligent-credentialing claim need not rest on underlying medical malpractice and that the physician’s misconduct did constitute malpractice.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment. The court held that the Fund could challenge whether a claim falls within the MMA after a settlement. It also held that a negligent-credentialing claim falls within the MMA only if the credentialed physician commits an act of medical malpractice. Finally, the court concluded that claims based on sexual assault by a physician during an authorized medical examination can fall within the MMA if the misconduct stems from an inseparable part of the health care being rendered. The court found that the physician’s sexual misconduct in this case fit within this narrow category, and thus, the defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Department of Insurance v. Doe" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, Larissa Marland, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Norman Marland, filed a medical malpractice claim against the University of Connecticut Health Center and related entities. The decedent had been treated at the hospital and was later admitted to the intensive care unit, where he fell and subsequently died. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital staff breached the standard of care owed to the decedent.The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the claims commissioner, including a physician’s opinion letter. The claims commissioner failed to resolve the claim within the statutory two-year period and an additional one-year extension granted by the General Assembly. Despite this, the commissioner eventually authorized the plaintiff to sue the state. The plaintiff then filed the present action in the Superior Court.The state moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims commissioner’s waiver of sovereign immunity was invalid because it was issued after the expiration of the one-year extension. The trial court agreed and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the commissioner did not have the authority to grant the waiver beyond the extension period.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court improperly dismissed the plaintiff’s action. The court held that, once the claims commissioner authorizes suit and waives sovereign immunity, the state cannot challenge that decision in the Superior Court. The court emphasized that such challenges should be raised before the claims commissioner. The court reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case with direction to deny the state’s motion to dismiss. View "Marland v. University of Connecticut Health Center" on Justia Law

Kristen Walker gave birth to her son Henry at Baptist St. Anthony’s Hospital under the care of Dr. Rhodesia Castillo. Henry required resuscitation after birth due to asphyxiation during labor and allegedly suffered a stroke. The Walkers sued the hospital and Dr. Castillo for negligence, claiming their actions caused Henry’s permanent neurologic injury. They provided expert reports from an obstetrician, a neonatologist, and a nurse to support their claims. The defendants challenged the qualifications of the experts and the sufficiency of the reports, arguing they did not adequately explain the standards of care, breaches, and causation.The trial court overruled the defendants’ objections and denied their motion to dismiss, finding the reports provided a fair summary of the experts’ opinions as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh District of Texas reversed this decision, holding that the reports contained conclusory and incomplete language that did not sufficiently explain the cause of Henry’s brain injury.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the expert reports sufficiently explained causation and that the trial court correctly rejected the defendants’ other challenges. The court found that the reports from Drs. Tappan and Null together explained how breaches of the standard of care by Dr. Castillo and the nurses caused Henry’s injury. The court also determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the defendants’ objections to the experts’ qualifications. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Walker v. Baptist St. Anthony's Hospital" on Justia Law

A medical-malpractice action was filed by Kalvyn Stull and his family against Summa Health System and associated parties, alleging that improper medical treatment following a car accident caused severe brain damage to Kalvyn. During discovery, the plaintiffs requested the residency file of Dr. Mazen Elashi, a resident physician involved in the treatment. Summa Health System claimed the file was protected by the peer-review privilege under Ohio law, supported by an affidavit from Dr. Erika Laipply, which stated that the file was used exclusively for peer-review purposes.The trial court in Summit County held that Summa had not sufficiently demonstrated that the peer-review privilege applied, as the affidavit contained ambiguities and lacked specific details. The court granted the motion to compel the production of the residency file. Summa appealed, and the Ninth District Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that the affidavit was insufficient to establish the privilege due to its ambiguities and incomplete information.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that the presence of factual ambiguities in affidavit testimony does not alone determine whether the peer-review privilege applies. The court emphasized that the trial court has the authority to conduct further inquiry, including in camera review, to resolve the factual disputes and determine the applicability of the privilege. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth District Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for an in camera review of the residency file and any other necessary factual inquiry to resolve the legal question of whether the file is privileged. View "Stull v. Summa Health System" on Justia Law