Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A Georgia corporation operates several hospitals and clinics in west Georgia and, through an affiliated entity, also operates a small hospital and clinics in east Alabama. An Alabama resident sought treatment at the Alabama hospital and was subsequently transferred by ambulance to the corporation’s Georgia facility for a heart-catheterization procedure. The procedure was performed by a Georgia-based physician employed by the corporation, who is not licensed in Alabama and has never practiced there. The patient alleges that the physician’s negligence during the procedure in Georgia caused him to suffer renal failure and require further medical intervention. The patient sued both the corporation and the physician in the Randolph Circuit Court in Alabama, asserting claims under both Alabama and Georgia medical liability statutes and alleging the corporation’s vicarious liability for the physician’s actions.The physician and the corporation moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Alabama court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that venue was improper. The circuit court dismissed the claims against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but denied the corporation’s motion to dismiss. The corporation then petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to dismiss the claims against it.The Supreme Court of Alabama held that the corporation was not subject to general jurisdiction in Alabama, as it was neither incorporated nor had its principal place of business there. However, the Court found that specific personal jurisdiction existed because the patient’s treatment began at the Alabama facility operated by the corporation, and the subsequent care in Georgia was sufficiently related to the corporation’s activities in Alabama. The Court also concluded that the corporation had not demonstrated a clear legal right to dismissal based on improper venue, as it had not adequately addressed whether Alabama’s venue statute applied to claims brought under another state’s law. The petition for a writ of mandamus was denied. View "Ex parte Tanner Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Melissa Allen experienced multiple seizures at home and was taken to Lowell General Hospital, where she was found to be seven months pregnant and suffering from severe hypertension. Dr. Fernando Roca, an obstetrician affiliated with Lowell Community Health Center (LCHC), determined an emergency caesarian section was necessary. After the procedure, Allen suffered a devastating neurological injury and died eleven days later at a Boston hospital. The cause of death was listed as intracranial hemorrhage and eclampsia.Brad O'Brien, as personal representative of Allen’s estate, initially filed a wrongful death medical malpractice suit in Massachusetts state court against Dr. Roca and the hospital. At the time of the incident, Dr. Roca was employed by LCHC, a federally funded health center deemed under the Public Health Service Act (PHSA) to have federal employee status for certain purposes. The United States substituted itself as defendant and removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, which dismissed the suit as time-barred under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). On O'Brien’s first appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the substitution order due to reliance on the wrong statutory basis and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court again substituted the United States as defendant and dismissed the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the Secretary’s regulation allowing for “pre-deeming” FTCA coverage in certain hospital on-call scenarios was consistent with the PHSA, and that Dr. Roca’s treatment of Allen fell within this coverage. The court also held that O’Brien’s claim was untimely under the FTCA’s statute of limitations and that the FTCA’s savings clause did not apply. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "O'Brien v. United States" on Justia Law

A woman was injured when a heat lamp manufactured by a company made contact with her foot during an acupuncture session performed by a physician. She initially sued the physician and his employer for medical malpractice. The physician then filed a third-party complaint against the manufacturer, alleging product liability. The injured woman subsequently filed a direct product liability claim against the manufacturer. The manufacturer raised special defenses, asserting that both the woman and the physician bore comparative responsibility for her injuries and that, if found liable, it would be entitled to contribution from the physician. Before trial concluded, the physician withdrew his third-party complaint. The jury found the manufacturer 80 percent responsible and the physician 20 percent responsible for the woman’s damages.After judgment was rendered, the Connecticut Appellate Court reversed the judgment as to the medical malpractice claim against the physician for lack of personal jurisdiction but affirmed the product liability judgment, including the jury’s allocation of comparative responsibility. The Connecticut Supreme Court denied the manufacturer’s petition for certification to appeal, and the woman withdrew her appeals after receiving payment in satisfaction of the judgment.The manufacturer and its insurer then filed a contribution action against the physician, seeking to recover 20 percent of the amount paid to the injured woman. The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer. On appeal, the physician argued that he was not a party subject to the comparative responsibility provisions of the Connecticut Product Liability Act and that the contribution action was untimely.The Connecticut Supreme Court held that all defendants in an action involving a product liability claim, regardless of whether they are product sellers, are subject to comparative responsibility under the statute. The Court also held that a contribution action is timely if brought within one year after all appellate proceedings in the underlying action are final. The judgment in favor of the manufacturer and its insurer was affirmed. View "Health Body World Supply, Inc. v. Wang" on Justia Law

A woman, acting as conservator for her mother, filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and ordinary negligence against a hospital and a nurse practitioner. The mother had suffered a stroke, became permanently disabled, and was transferred to the hospital for long-term care. During her stay, she developed a severe tongue injury that ultimately required amputation. The conservator was appointed nearly two years after the injury, and the lawsuit was filed more than two years after the alleged malpractice occurred. The plaintiff argued that the statute of limitations should be tolled due to the mother’s mental incompetence.The Superior Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the two-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions under Georgia law was not tolled for mental incompetence, based on the “nontolling” provision in OCGA § 9-3-73(b). The court relied on the Supreme Court of Georgia’s prior decision in Deen v. Stevens, which upheld the constitutionality of this provision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it was bound by Deen and rejecting the plaintiff’s equal protection challenge to the statute.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed whether Deen controlled the case and whether the statute’s treatment of mentally incompetent medical malpractice plaintiffs violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court held that Deen was controlling and that the statute’s classification was subject to rational basis review. The court found that the legislative decision not to toll the statute of limitations for mentally incompetent plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases was rationally related to legitimate state interests, such as ensuring affordable healthcare and preventing stale claims. The court also rejected new arguments regarding the expert affidavit requirement. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "WILLIAMS v. REGENCY HOSPITAL COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at a North Carolina state prison in February 2016, Manuel Moreno developed flu-like symptoms and sought medical attention. A nurse examined him and recorded slightly elevated respiration, but otherwise normal vital signs. Dr. Carol Bosholm, the on-duty physician, did not personally examine Moreno but reviewed the nurse’s notes, diagnosed sinus congestion and pharyngitis, and prescribed antibiotics. That same day, several inmates from Moreno’s housing area also reported similar symptoms, and some tested positive for influenza. Dr. Bosholm ordered Moreno and others to be quarantined for seventy-two hours, leaving general instructions for monitoring but no specific orders to check oxygen saturation or respiratory rates. Over the weekend, medical staff made routine rounds, but there is no record that Moreno’s oxygen or respiration were measured, nor that he reported worsening symptoms. By Monday, Moreno’s condition had deteriorated significantly, leading to hospitalization, a seizure, and long-term complications.Moreno filed suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, alleging state law medical malpractice and gross negligence, as well as a federal claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court excluded his expert’s testimony on the standard of care for the malpractice claim, finding the expert did not meet North Carolina’s requirements for such testimony. At trial, the court granted Dr. Bosholm’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on all claims, concluding Moreno failed to present sufficient evidence of causation, breach of the standard of care, or the heightened culpability required for gross negligence and deliberate indifference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 601 required application of North Carolina’s expert competency rule for medical malpractice claims, and that Moreno’s expert was properly excluded. The court also found insufficient evidence to support the gross negligence and deliberate indifference claims, upholding judgment for Dr. Bosholm. View "Moreno v. Bosholm" on Justia Law

The case concerns the death of Skyler A. Womack, a dependent adult with disabilities who resided at a 24-hour skilled nursing facility operated by Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc. After Skyler’s death, his parents filed suit against the facility, alleging that neglect—including understaffing, failure to maintain the facility, and inadequate provision of basic needs—led to his injuries and death. The claims included survivor actions and a wrongful death claim. Notably, Skyler had signed an arbitration agreement upon admission, which stated that any medical malpractice disputes would be subject to arbitration and purported to bind his heirs.In the Los Angeles County Superior Court, Silverscreen moved to compel arbitration of all claims based on the arbitration agreement and the California Supreme Court’s decision in Ruiz v. Podolsky. The trial court compelled arbitration of the survivor claims but denied arbitration for the parents’ wrongful death claim, reasoning that the claim was based on neglect under the Elder Abuse Act, not professional negligence. The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the wrongful death claim was subject to arbitration because it was based on professional negligence as defined by the agreement and relevant statutes.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The Court held that the exception recognized in Ruiz v. Podolsky applies only to wrongful death claims that are based on medical malpractice as defined by the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), specifically disputes about whether medical services were improperly rendered. The Court clarified that not all wrongful death claims against health care providers fall within this exception—claims based on custodial neglect, as opposed to professional negligence in medical care, are not subject to arbitration under section 1295 and Ruiz. The Court remanded the case to allow plaintiffs to amend their complaint to clarify the basis of their wrongful death claim. View "Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

An elderly man with multiple health conditions, including Parkinson’s disease and COPD, was admitted to a hospital due to worsening symptoms and hallucinations. During his stay, he became agitated and aggressive, prompting hospital staff to administer Zyprexa, a chemical restraint, after obtaining consent from his daughter. The medication was ordered as “every 4 hours,” but there was disagreement over whether this meant scheduled or as-needed administration. The patient received two doses, after which he suffered respiratory distress, was transferred to another hospital, and died a few days later from septic shock related to aspiration pneumonia.The Superior Court, Addison Unit, Civil Division, presided over a jury trial in August 2023. Both parties presented expert testimony on the standard of care for chemical restraints, and the plaintiff also introduced the hospital’s policy. The jury was asked whether the plaintiff had proven the applicable standard of care and answered “no.” As a result, the jury did not consider whether the standard was breached, causation, or damages. The plaintiff moved for a new trial under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 59, arguing that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the evidence was conflicting and that the jury’s verdict was not clearly wrong or unjust.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. The Court held that the trial court acted within its discretion, as the evidence regarding the applicable standard of care was conflicting and not so clear as to require overturning the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of a new trial. View "Watrous v. Porter Medical Center" on Justia Law

In October 2016, parents sought emergency medical care for their nineteen-month-old son, who was experiencing convulsions and seizures. The child was treated at three different medical facilities in Puerto Rico, including by Dr. Fernando Vega-Moral at HIMA San Pablo Bayamón hospital. After being transferred between hospitals, the child suffered cardiac arrest and died. The parents, along with other family members, initially filed a medical malpractice and negligence suit in Puerto Rico Commonwealth court against the medical centers and unnamed doctors, but did not specifically name Dr. Vega. That case was dismissed without prejudice in May 2018.Subsequently, in May 2019, the parents filed a new lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, this time naming Dr. Vega and others as defendants and asserting claims under Puerto Rico’s tort statutes. The district court dismissed some defendants and granted summary judgment to Dr. Vega, finding that the claims against him were time-barred. The court determined that, although the parents’ initial Commonwealth complaint was timely due to extensions following Hurricane María, the federal complaint did not toll the statute of limitations as to Dr. Vega because he was not named in the earlier suit. The court also denied the parents’ motion for reconsideration, holding that their new arguments and evidence should have been presented earlier.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The First Circuit held that Dr. Vega properly raised the statute of limitations defense and that, under Puerto Rico law, the burden shifted to the parents to show that the limitations period was tolled as to Dr. Vega. The parents failed to provide competent evidence to meet this burden. The court also found no abuse of discretion in denying reconsideration, as the parents’ new arguments and evidence were untimely. View "Cruz-Cedeno v. Vega-Moral" on Justia Law

An elderly man with significant medical needs was admitted to a skilled nursing facility, where a physician provided in-facility care. The physician was responsible for evaluating the patient, making treatment orders, and recording medical information. The complaint alleged that the physician performed only cursory examinations, failed to follow up on necessary tests, did not adequately address serious medical issues, and maintained illegible records. The patient’s condition deteriorated, leading to hospitalization and eventual death.The patient’s brother, acting as successor in interest and on behalf of the heirs, filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the facility, its operators, and the physician. The complaint included claims for elder neglect and financial abuse under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, as well as negligence and wrongful death. After settling with all defendants except the physician, the plaintiff proceeded against him alone. The physician demurred to the elder abuse claims, arguing that he did not have the requisite caretaking or custodial relationship with the patient and that the financial abuse claim was not viable. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the allegations amounted only to professional negligence, which is excluded from the Act’s heightened remedies.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that a physician’s negligent provision of medical services to an elder in a skilled nursing facility, without more, does not constitute “neglect” under the Act because the physician lacks the necessary robust caretaking or custodial relationship. The court also held that a financial abuse claim based solely on alleged professional negligence is not actionable under the Act. The judgment in favor of the physician was affirmed. View "Frankland v. Etehad" on Justia Law

A woman, acting individually and as the special administrator of her late husband’s estate, filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice lawsuit against a hospital and an emergency room physician. She alleged that the physician negligently failed to diagnose and treat her husband’s condition after he presented to the emergency room with head and neck pain following a blow to the head. The physician diagnosed abrasions and a closed head injury, but did not order cardiac tests. The patient was discharged and died that night from an apparent heart attack.The case was filed in the District Court for Douglas County, Nebraska. Over several years, the parties engaged in discovery, and the court issued multiple progression orders setting deadlines for, among other things, the disclosure of expert witnesses. The plaintiff did not disclose a medical expert by the required deadline. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that without expert testimony, the plaintiff could not prove her malpractice claim. Shortly before the summary judgment hearing, the plaintiff disclosed a new medical expert. The district court excluded the expert’s affidavit, both as a discovery sanction and under its inherent authority to enforce its progression orders, and granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the case with prejudice.The Nebraska Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert’s affidavit as a discovery sanction and remanded for further proceedings. On further review, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the late-disclosed expert under its inherent authority to enforce progression orders. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded with directions to affirm the district court’s judgment granting summary judgment to the defendants. View "Ricker v. Nebraska Methodist Health System" on Justia Law