Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Banuelos claimed that she was unlawfully charged per-page fees for copies of her UW Hospitals medical records which were provided in an electronic format. UW Hospitals argued that section 146.83(3f) is silent as to fees for electronic copies of patient healthcare records and does not prohibit a healthcare provider from charging fees for providing such copies. Banuelos argued that because fees for electronic copies are not enumerated in the statutory list of permissible fees that a healthcare provider may charge, the fees charged here are unlawful under state law. The court of appeals agreed with Banuelos and determined that Wis. Stat. 146.83(3f) does not permit a healthcare provider to charge fees for providing copies of patient healthcare records in an electronic format.The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed. Although section 146.83(3f) provides for the imposition of fees for copies of medical records in certain formats, it does not permit healthcare providers to charge fees for patient records in an electronic format. Although Wisconsin statutes previously permitted a charge for the provision of electronic copies of patient health care records, that language has been repealed. View "Banuelos v. University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's dismissal of the medical malpractice action brought by the Estate of Roberta Butterfield against Chautauqua Guest Home, Inc., a nursing home, holding that the Estate was not required to serve a certificate of merit affidavit on Chautauqua in this case.While the Estate brought its action it did not serve a certificate of merit on Chautauqua. Chautauqua filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it with prejudice under Iowa Code 147.140. The district court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the Estate's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the certificate of merit requirement set forth in section 147.140 does not apply to plaintiffs who need experts solely for causation, as opposed to the standard of care or breach; and (2) remand was required to establish which of the Estate's claims survived the failure to file the certificate of merit. View "Estate of Butterfield v. Chautauqua Guest Home, Inc." on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) appeals the denial of its motion for summary judgment. Vincent Kelly was injured in a forklift accident at his workplace on August 14, 2019. His left foot was crushed. Kelly was taken to Mississippi Baptist Medical Center and then was transferred to UMMC. Kelly was then evaluated and treated by an orthopedic surgeon. Upon return to UMMC, he complained of uncontrolled pain and discoloration of his third and fourth toes, which he said had turned black the previous day. UMMC orthopedic surgeon Patrick Bergin, M.D., took over Kelly’s care. The next day, Dr. Bergin performed a surgical evaluation of Kelly’s left foot and toes. Dr. Bergin determined that Kelly’s third and fourth toes were dysvascular and in need of amputation. Dr. Bergin then proceeded to amputate the two toes and obtained wound cultures, which confirmed infection. After the procedure, Dr. Bergin continued to provide care to Kelly for his wounds and infection. Kelly filed this lawsuit and a claim for medical malpractice, alleging UMMC’s physicians failed to properly treat the injury during his first visit and surgery. UMMC argued upon denial of summary judgment that Kelly’s expert witness lacked qualifications, rendering him unable to prove the required elements of medical malpractice. To this, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed and reversed the denial of summary judgment. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Kelly" on Justia Law

A patient filed a complaint concerning Dr. Dore, a Board-certified psychiatrist. The Board discovered suspected irregularities in Dore's prescription of controlled substances. Dore declined to answer questions. The Board served her with an investigative subpoena seeking medical records supporting the prescription of the controlled substances to a family member and with investigative interrogatories requesting information about the family member's treatment and employment with Dore. Dore refused to produce the records and objected to the interrogatories. Her family member objected to the subpoena.The Board sought an order compelling compliance and provided reports from the Controlled Substance Utilization Review and Evaluation System (CURES) database. A Board-certified psychiatrist opined it was necessary to obtain the family member’s medical records to evaluate whether Dore complied with the standard of care, noting an AMA ethics opinion counseling physicians against treating family members except in emergencies. Dore's expert, a psychiatrist and licensed California attorney, disagreed with the assertion that prescribing controlled substances to family members presumptively violates the standard of care. The family member explained his reason for seeking treatment from Dore, identifying the medications she prescribed, and describing the treatment she provided.The court of appeal affirmed the trial court, which ordered compliance, impliedly concluding the Board established good cause to justify the production of the family member’s private medical information. The Board had a compelling interest in investigating Dore’s allegedly improper conduct. View "Kirchmeyer v. Helios Psychiatry Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiffs' asserted medical malpractice claim against Dr. Julie Kuykendall and Great Falls Obstetrical and Gynecological Associations (collectively, Defendants), holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Plaintiffs' medical malpractice claim due to a failure to present sufficient supporting expert medical testimony.Stephanie Kipfinger gave birth to a son, E.C., who was ultimately diagnosed with hypoxic ischemic encephalopathy, cerebral palsy, developmental delay, and microcephaly. Kipfinger and Ben Cunningham (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action against Defendants, asserting a medical malpractice claim regarding Dr. Kuykendall's care of Stephanie and E.C. The district court concluded that Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on the causation element of Plaintiffs' medical malpractice claim against Defendants. View "Kipfinger v. Great Falls Obstetrical & Gynecological Associates" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from a judgment of dismissal of his medical negligence claim against Defendant County of Santa Clara, after the trial court sustained the County’s demurrer without leave to amend on statute of limitations grounds.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. Plaintiff contended the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer because the applicable statute of limitations is three years when both MICRA and section 945.6 apply, not one year. Except in circumstances inapplicable here, “any suit brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented” must be brought within six months after the County’s rejection of the claim. The court held that, here, where both section 945.6 and MICRA apply, Plaintiff was obligated to meet the deadlines set forth in both statutes.   Further, the court held the allegations of the fac do not support a delayed discovery exception to the one-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff failed in the FAC to plead specific facts to show he could not have earlier made this discovery, even with reasonable diligence. Accordingly, because Plaintiff filed his suit more than a year after his amputation, the trial court did not err in sustaining the County’s demurrer on statute of limitations grounds. View "Carrillo v. County of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendants St. Joseph Hospital and Catholic Health System of Long Island, Inc. for injuries he sustained at St. Joseph Hospital, where he was admitted in March 2020 with COVID-19. Plaintiff brought claims for malpractice, negligence, and gross negligence in New York state court. Defendants removed the case to the New York district court and moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Defendants asserted state and federal immunities under the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (“EDTPA”) and the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (“PREP Act”). The district court denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss.   The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded with directions to remand the case to state court. The court concluded that removal to federal court was improper because the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. First, Plaintiff’s state-law claims are not completely preempted by the PREP Act. Second, there is no jurisdiction under the federal-officer removal statute because Defendants did not “act under” a federal officer. Finally, Plaintiff’s claims do not “arise under” federal law. View "Solomon v. St. Joseph Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff suffered a stroke on August 18, 2009. He was hospitalized at St. John’s Regional Medical Center for two weeks, followed by a month in St. John’s inpatient rehabilitation facility. He entered Oxnard Manor, a skilled nursing facility, on October 3. Four days later, on October 7, Plaintiff signed an arbitration agreement. It stated that he gave up his right to a jury or court trial, and required arbitration of claims arising from services provided by Oxnard Manor, including claims of medical malpractice, elder abuse, and other torts. Plaintiff remained a resident at Oxnard Manor until his death nine years later, individually and as Plaintiff’s successors in interest, sued Oxnard Manor for elder abuse/neglect, wrongful death, statutory violations/breach of resident rights, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Oxnard Manor filed a petition to compel arbitration. Both sides relied on medical records to demonstrate whether Plaintiff had the mental capacity to consent to the arbitration agreement.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that evidence here that Plaintiff scored below the level necessary to “solve complex problems such as managing a checking account” supports the conclusion that he was unable to manage his financial affairs. But regardless of whether the presumption of Civil Code section 39, subdivision (b) applied, substantial evidence established that Plaintiff lacked the capacity to enter an arbitration agreement. View "Algo-Heyres v. Oxnard Manor" on Justia Law

This case arose from a medical malpractice action involving a partial foot amputation and sentinel lymph node biopsy (“SLNB”). John Beebe was diagnosed with aggressive melanoma on his foot. After his diagnosis, oncology specialists recommended a forefoot amputation and a SLNB. The SLNB involved the removal of a lymph node near John’s stomach to assist the oncologist with staging the cancer. Both procedures were performed at North Idaho Day Surgery, LLC, d/b/a Northwest Specialty Hospital (“NWSH”), after which the removed forefoot was placed into a pathology specimen bag and the lymph node was placed in a specimen cup. Purportedly, both specimens were subsequently placed in a second sealed bag, which was then placed in a locked drop box at NWSH for pickup by Incyte Pathology, Inc. Two days after the surgeries, NWSH received notice from Incyte that the lymph node was missing. NWSH subsequently searched the operating rooms, refrigerators, and the dumpster, but did not find the missing specimen. The Beebes filed a complaint against NWSH for medical malpractice and negligence and against Incyte for simple negligence. They later amended their complaint to add Cheryl’s claim for loss of consortium. The Beebes appealed the jury verdict in favor of NWSH, arguing the district court erred when it granted summary judgment for NWSH and dismissed Cheryl’s loss of consortium claim prior to trial. The Idaho Supree Court vacated the jury verdict because the district court gave a “but for” jury instruction on the issue of proximate cause instead of a “substantial factor” instruction. Further, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the district court’s grant of summary judgment and dismissal of Cheryl’s loss of consortium claim. View "Beebe v. North Idaho Day Surgery, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by Defendants Baptist Health Medical Center-Little Rock and Diamond Risk Insurance, LLC (collectively, Baptist) of the order of the circuit court denying Baptist's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's medical malpractice complaint, holding that the circuit court's order was not a final, appealable order.Plaintiff brought this complaint alleging that, for almost three months in 2021, he was a patient at Baptist fighting COVID-19 and was subjected to negligent care and treatment. Baptist filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that it was immune from suit pursuant to Executive Order 20-52, which established that healthcare providers were immune from liability while treating patients with COVID-19. The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court denied Defendants' subsequent appeal, holding this Court lacked jurisdiction because the immunity at issue was one of liability rather than immunity from suit. View "Baptist Health v. Sourinphoumy" on Justia Law