Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was treated by a surgeon at Central Maine Medical Center (CMMC) for abdominal pain. The doctor informed Plaintiff that he may be suffering from either hepatic or pancreatic cancer, which has a very low survival rate. Several weeks later, test results revealed that Plaintiff actually suffered from B-cell non-Hodgkins lymphoma, which has a five-year survival rate of up to ninety percent. Plaintiff complained, and CMMC’s president sent a letter to Plaintiff that CMMC claimed was “an expression of sympathy or benevolence” and an “offer to compromise.” Plaintiff subsequently filed a medical malpractice action against CMMC. CMMC moved to exclude from evidence the letter from CMMC’s president to Plaintiff, but the trial court admitted into evidence a redacted version of the letter. The jury returned a $200,000 verdict in Plaintiff’s favor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the superior court (1) did not err by admitting the portion of the letter that contained an admission of fault, as statements of fault are admissible under the Apology Statute; and (2) properly concluded that the statements contained in the letter were not made as part of a settlement negotiation or mediation. View "Strout v. Cent. Me. Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Thelma Johnson took her 15-year-old son Shaquille to the emergency department at Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital; a week earlier, Shaquille had undergone arthroscopic knee surgery. Shaquille complained of chest pain; was first seen by a nurse; and then examined by Dr. Price Omondi. The doctor noted that Shaquille had undergone surgery a week earlier; he inquired about Shaquille's medical history and family history and conducted a physical examination. Dr. Omondi ruled out multiple ailments, specifically, pulmonary embolism as causes of Shaquille's pain. Dr. Omondi diagnosed Shaquille with pleurisy and discharged him from the hospital with a prescription for an anti-inflammatory pain reliever, and instructions to return to the emergency department if his symptoms continued. Two weeks later, Shaquille returned to the emergency department, and died of a bilateral pulmonary embolism. Thelma Johnson and her husband sued Dr. Omondi and Southwest Emergency Physicians, P.C., for medical malpractice. Dr. Omondi moved for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals in to determine whether the appellate court properly applied the standards for a medical malpractice claim in a hospital emergency department as found in OCGA 51-1-29.5 (c). Finding that the plurality opinion of the Court of Appeals erred, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Omondi" on Justia Law

After plaintiff's daughter was born with permanent nerve damage in her right shoulder and arm, plaintiff filed suit against the physician who performed the delivery of plaintiff's daughter. The court concluded that the proper standard for review of the district court's order granting the motion in limine is abuse of discretion, not plain error; the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of plaintiff's experts because the experts' opinions did not fit the specific facts of this case; the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of informed consent where the record did not support the contention that the physician's expert testified the risk factors present in this case required a physician to warn a patient about the possibility of a permanent injury; and the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the district court should have granted her a new trial based on allegedly prejudicial and inflammatory comments made by defense counsel during closing arguments. View "Lawrey v. Kearney Clinic, P.C., et al." on Justia Law

Dr. Ann M. Mottershaw and The Radiology Group, LLC, appealed a trial court's order granting a motion for a new trial filed by plaintiff Shannon Ledbetter, as administrator of the estate of Venoria Womack. These appeals primarily concerned whether the trial court exceeded its discretion in ordering a new trial based on the jury's exposure to certain evidence that the trial court had excluded by an order granting a motion in limine. After careful consideration of defendants' arguments and the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. View "Mottershaw v. Ledbetter" on Justia Law

Bobbie Troup, in her capacity as the administrator of the estate of Easter Dawkins, filed suit alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death against Petitioners. During the trial proceedings, Troup filed a petition requesting that Petitioners be required to pay for the cost of five expert witnesses who had appeared to testify on her behalf on the scheduled trial date but did not testify because the circuit court had granted a motion for continuance made by Petitioners. The circuit court entered an order directing Petitioner to pay Troup for expert-witness costs associated with the continuance of the trial. Petitioners petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition or, in the alternative, a writ of certiorari, against the circuit court, contending that the court exceeded its authority and abused its discretion in ordering them pay the expert-witness costs of Troup. The Supreme Court denied the petitions, as Petitioners had an adequate remedy in the form of an appeal.View "Moore v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

In 2005, Dr. Eugene Libby, an orthopedic surgeon, performed surgery on Megan Hamilton’s left knee. In an effort to combat a serious infection that had developed in the knee, Dr. Libby performed another surgery on Hamilton’s knee in 2006. The infection persisted. In 2010, Hamilton brought a claim for injury against Dr. Libby. Dr. Libby filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Hamilton’s claims were barred by the three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations. The district court denied the motion. Dr. Libby subsequently filed a petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted the petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.097(2)’s three-year limitation period begins to run when there is an appreciable manifestation of the plaintiff’s injury, regardless of whether the plaintiff was aware of the injury’s cause; and (2) because Hamilton suffered appreciable harm to her knee more than three years before she filed her complaint, the district court was required to grant summary judgment in Dr. Libby’s favor. View "Libby v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Cout" on Justia Law

Decedent died on March 25, 2011 from cervical cancer. On July 1, 2011, Decedent's Estate commenced this medical malpractice action, alleging that Defendant, Decedent’s physician, had negligently failed to perform a recommended endocervical biopsy and that this mistake led to a late diagnosis of Decedent’s cancer and ultimately resulted in her death. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds because the complaint was filed more than two years after Defendant allegedly failed to perform the endocervical biopsy. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Estate filed its complaint within a reasonable time, and therefore, Defendant was not entitled to summary judgment. View "David v. Kleckner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Thomas Baird appealed on a number of grounds after a jury found in favor of defendants-appellees, Frank R. Owczarek, M.D., Eye Care of Delaware, LLC, and Cataract and Laser Center, LLC. The litigation stemmed from a LASIK procedure plaintiff received, in which he alleged that as a result of the surgery, he developed ectasia, a vision-threatening corneal disease through the medical negligence of the doctor and centers. Upon review of the issues plaintiff raised on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court’s failure to conduct any investigation into alleged egregious juror misconduct (internet research), which violated the Superior Court’s direct instruction to refrain from consulting outside sources of information, constituted reversible error. In addition, the Superior Court’s failure to exclude evidence of informed consent in this medical negligence action also constituted reversible error. Accordingly, the judgments of the Superior Court were reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Baird v. Owczarek, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed wrongful death and lost chance of recovery claims against Defendants-health care providers. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their first case but refiled the same claims in a second case. The trial court dismissed the second case for failure to file health care affidavits as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.225. In their third case, Plaintiffs refiled their petition, along with the required affidavits. The trial court dismissed the third case as barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the second and third cases, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to preserve their constitutional challenges to section 538.225 and failed to show they had substantially complied with the statute; and (2) the trial court correctly applied the statute of limitations in finding that the claims in the third case were time barred. View "Mayes v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City" on Justia Law

Melissa and Corey Waddoups sued Intermountain Health Care (IHC), among other defendants, alleging negligent credentialing after Dr. Barry Noorda performed several gynecological procedures on Melissa at an IHC facility. At issue in this case was Utah Code Ann. 78B-3-425, which prohibits a cause of action for negligent credentialing. Because Plaintiffs' negligent credentialing claim accrued before the enactment of the statute, the federal district court certified a question to the Supreme Court, asking whether section 78B-3-425 retroactively applied to bar negligent credentialing claims that arose prior to its enactment. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, holding that because section 78B-3-425 is a substantive amendment and contains no expression of retroactivity, it does not apply retroactively and therefore did not bar Plaintiffs' claim, which arose prior to its enactment. View "Waddoups v. Noorda" on Justia Law