Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

In 2013, the Governor of Wisconsin signed into law a statute that prohibits a doctor, under threat of heavy penalties, from performing an abortion unless he has admitting privileges at a hospital no more than 30 miles from the clinic in which the abortion is performed. Wis. Stat. 253.095(2). Planned Parenthood and others challenged the law under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court noted that the seven doctors affected by the law had applied for, but after five months, had not been granted, admitting privileges; that all Wisconsin abortion clinics already have transfer agreements with local hospitals to facilitate transfer of clinic patients to the hospital emergency room. A hospital emergency room is obliged to admit and to treat a patient requiring emergency care even if the patient is uninsured, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd(b)(1). Had enforcement of the law, with its one-weekend deadline for compliance, not been stayed, two of the state’s four abortion clinics would have had to shut down and a third clinic would have lost the services of half its doctors. View "Planned Parenthood of WI v. Van Hollen" on Justia Law

Before he committed suicide in September 2012, twenty-two-year old Christopher Landry had been under the care of appellant, psychiatrist Crit Cooksey. In August 2012, Dr. Cooksey prescribed both Seroquel and Cymbalta for Christopher, two drugs that contained "black box warnings" warning of an increased risk of suicidal thinking and behavior in young adults and recommended that medical professionals prescribing the drugs monitor patients for worsening or emergent suicidal thoughts and behavior. Following Christopher's death, his parents, appellees Lisa and Michael Landry, began investigating a potential medical malpractice, wrongful death, and survival action against Dr. Cooksey and made multiple requests for copies of Christopher's psychiatric records. Dr. Cooksey on each occasion refused to produce the records, claiming they were protected from disclosure by Georgia's psychiatrist-patient privilege. Appellees filed a complaint seeking a permanent injunction directing Dr. Cooksey to turn over all of Christopher's psychiatric records. The trial court, without reviewing Dr. Cooksey's files, concluded that equity supported appellees' position and issued an injunction directing Dr. Cooksey to produce to appellees "all records pertaining to the medical treatment and history of Christopher Landry." Dr. Cooksey appealed the trial court's order and filed a motion for an emergency stay which was granted. Upon further review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred to the extent it exercised its equitable powers to order the production of information protected from disclosure by Georgia law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the trial court in part and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cooksey v. Landry" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, Leslie Milliun's conservator, filed a negligence suit against Defendant hospital, alleging that, while in Defendant's care, Leslie suffered severe respiratory dysfunction which resulted in Leslie's severe brain injury. The trial court rendered summary judgment in favor of Defendant because Plaintiff failed to offer the requisite expert testimony to create an issue of material fact regarding Defendant's alleged negligence as the proximate cause of Leslie's injuries. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court erred in (1) refusing to admit certain medical records of Leslie's treating physicians as expert opinion on causation, and (2) concluding that its order granting Plaintiff's motion for the appointment of a commission so Leslie's out-of-state treating physicians could be deposed should be withdrawn because the physicians could not be compelled to offer expert opinion on causation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly determined that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to admit certain statements contained within the medical records to establish a causal connection between Leslie's injuries and the alleged negligence.View "Milliun v. New Milford Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Dr. Florian Cortese after Plaintiff’s small intestine was perforated during a procedure performed by Cortese. The trial court denied Cortese’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and also denied Cortese’s motions for summary judgment and to preclude Plaintiff from presenting unpleaded claims at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in determining that it had jurisdiction to consider arguments Plaintiff had not specifically presented to the Montana Medical Legal Panel; and (2) the Court should not suspend the Rules of Appellate Procedure to consider the district court’s denial of Cortes’s remaining motions. View "Pickett v. Cortese" on Justia Law

Bay Area Physicians for Women ("BAPW") petitioned for a writ of mandamus to direct the Baldwin Circuit Court to vacate an order entered by that court on November 8, 2012, which reinstated a medical-malpractice case filed against BAPW and transferred the case to the Mobile Circuit Court. The Supreme Court concluded BAPW did not include a statement of circumstances constituting good cause for the Supreme Court to consider vacating the November 8, 2012 order, notwithstanding that it was filed more than seven months after the Baldwin Circuit Court entered it. Accordingly, insofar as BAPW's petition for a writ of mandamus sought vacatur of the Baldwin Circuit Court's order, the Court dismissed the petition as untimely. View "White v. Bay Area Physicians for Women" on Justia Law

Plaintiff attempted to file a medical malpractice action against Defendant by mailing the summons and petition via unrestricted certified mail to Defendant's business address. Defendant received the petition and filed an answer asserting several affirmative defenses. After participating in the discovery process, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Plaintiff had failed to substantially comply with the statutory requirements for service of process, and Defendant's actual notice of the lawsuit did not confer personal jurisdiction on the district court. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff's service of process in this case was invalid; but (2) the district court erred in dismissing the case without permitting Plaintiff the additional time set forth in Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-203(b) in which to obtain valid service of process.View "Fisher v. DeCarvalho" on Justia Law

Appellants filed complaints alleging claims for malpractice and wrongful death against Appellees Dr. Jeffrey Kirchner, Arkansas Health Group, Baptist Health, and Baptist MedCare, Inc. for medical injury and the wrongful death of Alfred Spires. The circuit court dismissed Appellants' complaint with prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err by (1) granting judgment in favor of Appellees before the completion of discovery; (2) dismissing the complaint against Kirchner for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; and (3) dismissing the complaint against Arkansas Health, Baptist Health, and Baptist MedCare on the ground that Appellants' claims were barred by the statute of limitations.View "Worden v. Kirchner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a health care liability action against Defendant, a physician. Plaintiff's original complaint was filed prior to the effective date of the pre-suit notice requirements of Tenn. Code Ann. 29-26-121. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his original action. Plaintiff subsequently filed his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff's second action was barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff responded that (1) his pre-suit notice commenced his new action prior to the expiration of the one-year saving statute; and (2) alternatively, section 29-26-121 extended the saving statute by 120 days. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff's action was commenced by the filing of his second health care liability complaint rather than by providing pre-suit notice; and (2) a plaintiff who files his initial action prior to the effective date of section 29-26-121 dismisses his original action, properly provides pre-suit notice, and refiles his action after the effective date of section 29-26-121 is entitled to the 120-day extension.View "Rajvongs v. Wright" on Justia Law

Within days of his twenty-seventh birthday, Clyde Snider, Jr., was hospitalized for a suspected myocardial infarction. A few months later, after complaining of chest pains, he went to a second doctor and different hospital facility. He would later receive a pacemaker. Snider sustained an unrelated injury to the area of his pacemaker, when on his return home from the hospital, his two-year-old daughter ran to greet him, jumped into his arms, and struck his chest which caused an injury to the surgical site. Returning to the hospital where he was first treated for cardiac troubles, Snider's treating physician recommended that the pacemaker be removed when he found symptoms of infection at the pacemaker site. The next day the pacemaker was removed. Subsequently, Snider sued Dr. Robin Yue, the physician who recommended he receive the pacemaker. The medical review panel concluded that Dr. Yue had failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care and that his conduct was a factor in the "minor resultant damage." The case was tried before a jury, which ruled in favor of Dr. Yue, finding that Snider had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Dr. Yue breached the applicable standard of care. Snider's subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for new trial was denied by the district court judge, who stated that the jury verdict was not clearly contrary to the law and evidence. The appellate court reversed and ruled in favor of Snider and against the doctor on the issue of liability and remanded the matter to the district court to allow the parties an opportunity to complete the record as to damages. The doctor contended on appeal that the appellate court erred: in failing to adhere to the proper standard of review; in substituting its judgment on the weight of evidence, evaluation of facts, and determinations of credibility for those of the jury; in reversing the jury verdict on liability; and in its interpretation and application of the Uniform Consent Law. After its review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that because the jury concluded Snider gave informed consent in this matter, Dr. Yue did not breach the standard of care. The appellate court attributed legal error to the jury's finding because Dr. Yue did not comply with Subsection (E) of LSA-R.S. 40:1299.40. However, as compliance with the requirement of informed consent was alternatively attainable under Subsection (A) or (C), the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred. The appellate court should have applied a manifest error standard of review to the jury's factual finding that informed consent was given in this case. Therefore, the Court reversed the appellate court decision, and remanded the case back to that court with instructions to consider and rule upon Snider's assignments of error. . View "Snider v. Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Physicians Liability Insurance Company (PLICO) insured Defendant Mark Valentine pursuant to a claims made policy with a policy period from July 1, 2004, to December 31, 2006. On November 1, 2004, Valentine operated on David Wurtz. As a result of Valentine's negligence during the operation, Wurtz died. On March 10, 2005, the Oklahoma Board of Medical Licensure held a hearing to determine whether Valentine should be disciplined. At the hearing, the Board revoked Valentine's license. On March 22, 2005, PLICO notified Valentine by letter that the policy had been cancelled effective March 10, 2005, with "Company's Decision" stated as the reason for cancellation and offered to sell him tail coverage. That letter was followed by another that addressed the premium refund issues and stated that the policy had been cancelled at Valentine's request. On June 2, 2005, Wurtz' personal representative, Tracey Chandler, filed suit against Valentine and others for the wrongful death of Wurtz. Valentine forwarded the petition and summons served on him to PLICO; PLICO sent Valentine a letter denying coverage because the claim was not made until after the policy was cancelled and asserting the policy exclusion for acts performed while under the influence of intoxicating substances. Valentine's debts were discharged in bankruptcy in early 2006. Chandler filed a motion for summary judgment against Valentine; Valentine entered into a Consent Judgment with Chandler in the amount of $2,250,000.00. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Chandler and ruled that Valentine was entitled to a set off by virtue of settlements with other parties in the amount of $1,275,000.00. Chandler filed garnishment proceedings against PLICO in May of 2008. Chandler asserted that Valentine was indebted to Chandler. PLICO denied any indebtedness asserting a lack of coverage under any insurance policy. Both Chandler and PLICO filed motions for summary judgment in the garnishment action. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Chandler, holding that cancellation of the policy violated section 3625 of title 36 and was therefore void. The issue in this matter was whether an insurer may agree to cancel a "claims made" policy with the knowledge that a potential claim is pending without violating the statutory prohibition on retroactive annulment of an insurance policy following the injury, death, or damage for which the insured may be liable. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that it may not and affirmed the trial court. View "Chandler v. Valentine" on Justia Law