Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Santana-Concepcion underwent exploratory brain surgery around a “symptomatic arachnoid cyst” during which a neurosurgeon placed a shunt to relieve pressure created by the cyst. Santana-Concepcion, along with her husband and four children, later filed suit against the neurosurgeon and the hospital at which the surgery was performed, alleging medical malpractice and lack of informed consent. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants, holding (1) the claims of Santana-Concepcion and her adult children were time-barred; (2) the medical malpractice claim of Santana-Concepcion’s minor children was foreclosed by the “error of judgment” defense; and (3) the informed consent claim of the minor children failed on the element of causation. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court properly granted summary judgment on (1) the medical malpractice claims of Santana-Concepcion and her adult children and the informed consent claims of the adult children, as they were not filed within the limitations period; (2) the minor plaintiffs’ medical malpractice claims, as they were unable to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to the application of the “error of judgment” defense; and (3) the informed consent claims of the minor plaintiffs for lack of causation. View "Santana-Concepcion v. Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc." on Justia Law

In August 2002, plaintiff William Vaughan went to the emergency room at St. Vincent Hospital complaining of symptoms that included abdominal pain. In this medical negligence case, Vaughan alleged that, as the result of a communication failure between a surgeon and a contract radiologist, St. Vincent failed to tell Vaughan about a cancer diagnosis. The district court granted summary judgment for St. Vincent because Vaughan did not specifically plead vicarious liability relating to the radiologist, St. Vincent's apparent agent, and failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact through expert testimony. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that Vaughan's complaint adequately notified St. Vincent that one or more of its employees or agents was negligent and that genuine issues of material fact required resolution at a trial on the merits. View "Vaughan v. St. Vincent Hospital" on Justia Law

The mother of sixteen-month-old Max Zohar (collectively, the Zohars), filed a medical malpractice complaint against multiple defendants, including a physician, a nurse, and several EmCare entities (collectively, Respondents), asserting claims of medical malpractice, professional negligence and vicarious liability after Max’s finger was amputated. The Zohars attached an expert affidavit specifying the allegedly negligent activities of several individuals, but the affidavit did not identify Respondents by name. The district court granted Respondents’ motions to dismiss, concluding that the expert affidavit was deficient because it did not specifically name Respondents as negligent parties. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a court should read a medical malpractice complaint and affidavit of merit together when determining whether the affidavit meets the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071; and (2) in this case, the expert affidavit, while it failed to specifically name allegedly negligent defendants, adequately supported the allegations of medical malpractice against Respondents and provided adequate notice to Respondents of the claims against them, and therefore the district court erred in finding that the expert affidavit was inadequate to support the Zohars’ allegations of medical malpractice against Respondents. View "Zohar v. Zbiegien" on Justia Law

Luvetta Goff died as a result of complications from elective surgery performed by Appellants at the University of Kentucky Hospital (UK Hospital). Goff’s estate filed a wrongful death and medical malpractice action against Appellants. During discovery, the estate requested an “incident” or “event” report generated by a UK Hospital nurse concerning the surgery through the UK Healthcare Safety Evaluation System. Appellant sought a protective order concerning the report, arguing that it fell within the federal privilege created by the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005. The court of appeals granted Appellants the writ. The Supreme Court reversed the opinion of the court of appeals regarding the scope of the privilege under the Act, holding (1) the court of appeals was misguided in its ultimate limitations on the scope of the privilege; and (2) information normally contained in an incident report is not privileged under the Act and may be discovered, following an in camera review, and its information compelled. Remanded. View "Tibbs v. Circuit Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint in 2010 alleging wrongful death and medical malpractice against healthcare providers (Defendants). During pretrial discovery, Plaintiff filed two separate motions to compel, which the trial court denied. Prior to trial, Plaintiff took a voluntary nonsuit. In 2010, Plaintiff filed a new complaint against the same defendants alleging the same cause of action. The trial court entered an agreed order incorporating the discovery conducted and taken in the 2010 action into the 2012 action. After the jury returned a defense verdict, Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial and to reconsider certain evidentiary rulings, challenging the trial court’s denial of her motions to compel in the nonsuited action. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the trial court’s agreed order did not expressly incorporate the motions, objections, or rulings made by the court in the 2010 nonsuit action into the 2012 action, these rulings could not be challenged in this appeal. View "Temple v. Mary Washington Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s decedent received medical care and treatment from Defendants and, thereafter, died in August 2007. Plaintiff extended the two-year statute of limitations contained in Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-555 until November 2009, at which point Plaintiff sent a summons and complaint to a marshal and requested that Defendants be served. Due to an error on the part of the marshal, the trial court dismissed the claims against Defendants in April 2011 for improper service. In December 2011, Plaintiff commenced the present wrongful death action. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss on the basis of the two-year statute of limitations, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-592, the accidental failure of suit statute, did not operate to save Plaintiff’s action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly determined that section 52-592 did not save the action. Remanded. View "Dorry v. Garden" on Justia Law

In 2008, Shields, an Illinois prisoner was lifting weights and ruptured the pectoralis tendon in his left shoulder. Although he received some medical attention, he did not receive the prompt surgery needed for effective treatment. Due to oversights and delays by those responsible for his medical care, too much time passed for surgery to do any good. He has serious and permanent impairment that could have been avoided. After his release from prison, Shields filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that several defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that Shields was the victim not of any one person’s deliberate indifference, but of a system of medical care that diffused responsibility for his care to the point that no single individual was responsible for seeing that he timely received the care he needed. As a result, no one person can be held liable for any constitutional violation. Shields’ efforts to rely on state medical malpractice law against certain private defendants also failed. View "Shields v. IL Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

The government appealed the district court's award of damages in a medical malpractice suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., contending that the district court should have applied the Texas periodic payment statutory scheme, Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code 74.501-507. The court agreed, vacating the district court's judgment insofar as it failed to fashion a damages award similar to that contemplated by the Texas periodic payment statutory scheme and awarded post-judgment interest not in compliance with 31 U.S.C. 1304(b)(1)(A). The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Lee, Sr., et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

On April 19, Plaintiff sent a proposed medical malpractice complaint to the Indiana Department of Insurance by way of FedEx Priority Overnight. On April 21, the Department received the proposed complaint and filed-stamped it that same day. April 21 was one day after the expiration of the applicable two-year statute of limitations. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the proposed complaint was considered “filed” upon receipt rather than upon deposit with a private delivery service. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court granted transfer and reversed the entry of summary judgment in favor of Defendants, holding (1) the commencement of a medical malpractice action occurs when a copy of the proposed complaint is deposited for mailing by registered or certified mail or by a designated private delivery service; and (2) Plaintiff’s action was deemed filed, and her action commenced, on April 19, which was within the applicable statute of limitations. View "Moryl v. Ransone" on Justia Law

In a medical malpractice action, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the Superior Court erred by denying appellants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, and by excluding certain evidence. Dr. Jennifer Barlow performed a Caesarean section on Laura Cooney-Koss to deliver her baby. There were no apparent complications from the delivery, and Laura was discharged from the hospital three days later. A month later, Laura experienced heavy vaginal bleeding, and she returned to the hospital. In an attempt to slow or stop her bleeding, a hospital physician determined that Laura would need a dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedure. Dr. A. Diane McCracken performed the D&E; further attempts to stop the bleeding were unsuccessful. McCracken decided to perform a hysterectomy, believing that Laura would die otherwise. The doctor removed Laura's uterus, and Laura eventually stopped bleeding. Laura and her husband, Jerome Koss, filed a complaint against McCracken, Barlow, their employer, All About Women of Christiana Care, Inc., and Christiana Care Health Services, Inc., alleging that McCracken negligently failed to undertake an appropriate number of conservative treatment options to stop Laura's bleeding before performing the hysterectomy, which was unnecessary. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Kosses. The Superior Court denied McCracken's motions for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial. Upon review of the Koss' arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court correctly determined that appellees' medical expert evidence supported a verdict in their favor. Thus, its denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law is affirmed. The trial court's evidentiary rulings, however, constituted an abuse of discretion requiring a new trial. View "Cooney-Koss v. Barlow" on Justia Law