Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A patient received treatment for diabetes at VA facilities from 2016 to 2022. In early 2020, he reported worsening symptoms and expressed dissatisfaction with his medical care, believing negligence contributed to his condition. Two years later, he filed a complaint with the Office of the Inspector General, alleging improper diagnosis and treatment at VA facilities. He also submitted a Standard Form-95 (SF-95) to the Office of the General Counsel, naming himself as claimant and his wife as a witness and property owner. The agency denied his claim, and he was informed of his right to sue. The couple then filed a pro se lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligent medical care caused kidney disease. Subsequently, the wife filed her own SF-95, asserting power of attorney, but the agency denied this claim as duplicative and because the couple had already sought judicial remedy.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the wife’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, dismissed both plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred, and denied leave to amend as futile. The plaintiffs objected, but the district court adopted the recommendations and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court erred in finding the wife failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her property damage claim, because the administrative filing gave sufficient notice for that claim. However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the alternative ground that all claims were barred by the FTCA’s statute of limitations, as the plaintiffs’ injuries and property damages were or should have been known more than two years before the administrative claims were filed. The denial of leave to amend was also affirmed. View "Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas Department of Veteran Affairs" on Justia Law

David Ray Gunter, who had a mechanical heart valve and required daily anticoagulant medication (Coumadin), was arrested and detained at two North Carolina county jails. During his detention, Gunter did not consistently receive his prescribed medication, missing doses over several days due to failures by the contracted medical provider and jail staff. After his release, he suffered serious medical complications, including blood clots and subsequent surgeries. Gunter alleged these injuries were the result of inadequate medical care during his incarceration.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for defendants on Gunter’s constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including deliberate indifference and Monell claims, finding insufficient evidence that jail officials or contracted medical providers acted with deliberate indifference or that county policies caused the deprivation. The district court also granted summary judgment to Southern Health Partners, Inc. (SHP) on the medical malpractice claim, finding that Gunter’s expert testimony did not establish a breach of the standard of care by SHP, and excluded expert evidence it found speculative. However, the district court found genuine disputes of fact regarding medical malpractice claims against two individual medical providers, but ultimately found no proximate cause. The district court denied Gunter’s motion to compel deposition of the defendants’ expert as untimely and granted a motion to strike a post-deposition declaration from Gunter’s expert.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Gunter’s deliberate indifference claim against the medical provider defendants, the Monell claim against the counties, and the medical malpractice claims against SHP and two medical providers, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained. The appellate court also reversed the exclusion of certain expert testimony and the grant of the motion to strike, but affirmed the denial of the motion to compel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Swink v. Southern Health Partners Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Stanford, an incapacitated resident of a Mississippi nursing facility, suffered severe burns after starting a fire in his room. The Mississippi State Department of Health determined that the nursing center failed to adequately supervise Stanford and maintain a safe environment, citing the facility for violating federal regulations regarding the safety and supervision of residents. Stanford, through his conservator, brought a lawsuit alleging negligence and medical malpractice against the nursing facility and related entities.Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement signed in 2017 by Stanford’s brother, Russell Phillips, who acted as Stanford’s health surrogate during his admission. Stanford opposed arbitration, arguing that the agreement was invalid because Phillips lacked authority under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act to bind Stanford, since Stanford’s adult son—a higher-priority family member under the statute—was reasonably available and willing to serve as surrogate. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held that Phillips was not a proper surrogate under the statute and denied the motion to compel arbitration.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to both the denial of arbitration and interpretation of state law. The Fifth Circuit determined that the key issue was whether, under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, a health care provider must ensure that no higher-priority family member is “reasonably available” before accepting decisions from a lower-priority family member acting as surrogate. Noting the statutory ambiguity and lack of controlling Mississippi precedents, the Fifth Circuit did not resolve the merits but instead certified this question of state law to the Mississippi Supreme Court for authoritative interpretation. View "Stanford v. Brandon Nursing" on Justia Law

Adria Snover, represented by her spouse and guardian ad litem, suffered permanent brain injury and entered a coma following complications during a cesarean section. She sued Dr. Aruna Gupta, Riverside Community Hospital, and another doctor, alleging negligent diagnosis and treatment. Before trial, Snover settled with the hospital for $2.5 million and with the other doctor for $1 million. The hospital’s settlement included $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son for waiving a potential future wrongful death claim. The case proceeded to trial solely against Dr. Gupta.A jury in the Riverside County Superior Court awarded Snover $17,458,474 in total damages: $7,458,474 in economic damages and $10 million in noneconomic damages. The jury found Gupta 15 percent at fault, the other doctor 80 percent, and a nurse 5 percent. After trial, the court applied the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) cap to the noneconomic damages, reducing them to $250,000, and then held Gupta liable for 15 percent of that amount ($37,500). For economic damages, the court used the Mayes rule, first applying the MICRA cap, then calculating the percentage of economic damages and applying that percentage to the settlement amounts, resulting in a setoff of $3,142,750. The court did not exclude the $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son from the setoff calculation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court correctly applied the MICRA cap before apportioning liability for noneconomic damages among health care providers, consistent with Gilman v. Beverly California Corp. and Rashidi v. Moser. The court also affirmed the use of the Mayes rule for calculating the economic damages setoff and found no abuse of discretion in including the $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son. The judgment was affirmed. View "Snover v. Gupta" on Justia Law

A patient underwent a laparoscopic bilateral tubal ligation and endometrial ablation performed by a physician at a women’s clinic. About a week after the procedure, she experienced severe abdominal pain and was hospitalized for sepsis. An exploratory surgery revealed a perforated small bowel, which was surgically repaired. The patient subsequently recovered.The patient filed a medical negligence lawsuit in the Hinds County Circuit Court against the clinic and the physician, attaching the required certificate of expert consultation to her complaint. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supporting their motion with an expert affidavit. The plaintiff did not timely file an expert affidavit or testimony in response. On the day before the scheduled summary judgment hearing, she filed a response without any expert affidavit. The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion and granted her an additional thirty days to obtain an expert affidavit. After she submitted an expert affidavit and a second hearing was held, the circuit court again denied summary judgment, finding that the competing expert affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment de novo and its grant of additional time for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that, in medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff must produce sworn expert testimony to survive summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide such testimony before the initial hearing and that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting additional time without a specific finding of diligence or good faith. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Lakeland Premier Women's Clinic, PLLC v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A woman with COVID-19 and multiple underlying health conditions was admitted to a hospital and then transferred to a skilled nursing facility for ongoing treatment. During her stay at the facility, she was under the care of a physician who prescribed various treatments for her COVID-19 infection. Despite these interventions, her condition deteriorated, and she developed additional complications, including pressure wounds and dehydration. After being discharged from the facility without hospice or home health arrangements, she was readmitted to the hospital, where her condition continued to decline. She was eventually discharged home under hospice care and died shortly thereafter. Her surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the facility and physician were negligent in her care.The District Court of Garfield County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they were immune from liability under both the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act and Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Limited Liability Act. The district court reasoned that the acts and omissions in question were incident to the provision of care for a COVID-19 patient and thus fell within the scope of the immunity statutes. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of immunity. The court found that the defendants failed to provide evidence establishing a causal relationship between the administration or use of covered countermeasures and the plaintiff’s injuries, as required for PREP Act immunity. Additionally, the court determined that the defendants did not meet the evidentiary burden to show the requisite impact under the state COVID-19 Act, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding gross negligence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AUSTBO v. GREENBRIAR" on Justia Law

A mother, acting on behalf of her mentally incapacitated adult daughter, brought suit against a hospital, its health partners, and a registered nurse after her daughter suffered an anoxic brain injury. The injury occurred when the nurse, while cleaning the patient, dislodged the patient’s cuffed tracheostomy tube, which had been placed to treat COVID-19 pneumonia. The tube was out for approximately seven minutes, resulting in cardiac arrest and brain injury. The patient had been admitted with COVID-19 and was receiving oxygen through the tracheostomy at the time of the incident.The defendants moved to dismiss the case in the District Court of Oklahoma County, arguing that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act provided them immunity from suit and liability, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court considered documentary evidence submitted by the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the district court, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the defendants were not immune from suit.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the cuffed tracheostomy was a “covered countermeasure” under the PREP Act, the claims had a causal relationship with the administration and use of that countermeasure, and the defendants qualified as “covered persons.” The court found that the PREP Act confers both immunity from liability and suit for such claims, except for willful misconduct, which must be brought exclusively in federal court. Therefore, Oklahoma courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "FRANKLIN v. OU MEDICINE" on Justia Law

The case concerns the medical treatment of a fifty-eight-year-old man who suffered a shoulder injury and subsequently died from septic shock, acute septic arthritis, metabolic acidosis, and renal failure. After his initial visit to the emergency department, he was diagnosed with rotator cuff tendinitis and cellulitis, and discharged with antibiotics. His condition worsened over several weeks, leading to multiple emergency department visits and consultations with various medical providers, including nurse practitioner Michael Collins. Collins attended to the patient on August 4-5, 2020, and discharged him after administering fluids and pain medication, advising follow-up with orthopedics. The patient returned to the hospital two days later in a deteriorated state, was diagnosed with sepsis and septic arthritis, and died shortly thereafter.The plaintiff, acting as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a medical malpractice action in the Massachusetts Superior Court against several providers, including Collins. The plaintiff submitted an offer of proof supported by medical records and expert opinion, alleging that Collins failed to meet the standard of care by not recognizing symptoms of septic arthritis, failing to order appropriate imaging and bloodwork, and not admitting the patient for further treatment. Collins and other defendants requested a medical malpractice tribunal under G. L. c. 231, § 60B. The tribunal found the plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability against Collins, leading to dismissal of the claims after the plaintiff did not post the required bond.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the tribunal’s decision. It held that the tribunal erred in finding the plaintiff’s offer of proof insufficient, as the expert opinion was factually based and rooted in the medical records, and adequately raised a legitimate question of liability and causation. The Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s claims against Collins to proceed without posting a bond. View "Bennett v. Collins" on Justia Law

The plaintiff underwent a vein-ablation procedure on her right leg in August 2016, performed by a physician other than the defendant. She subsequently developed an infection and was treated by the defendant, who performed several irrigation and debridement procedures over the following months. In March 2017, a 4" x 4" piece of gauze was removed from the plaintiff’s wound, raising questions about whether it had been negligently left in the wound during one of the defendant’s procedures or during subsequent wound care. The plaintiff filed a medical-malpractice complaint in July 2018, alleging that the defendant left a sponge in her body during a September 2016 surgery, which the defendant denied ever performing.The Shelby Circuit Court initially denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with her claims. After depositions and further discovery, the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to correct the date of the alleged negligent procedure from September 21, 2016, to October 26, 2016, but continued to reference a vein ablation rather than the actual irrigation and debridement procedure. The defendant moved to strike the amended complaint, arguing undue delay and lack of specificity as required by the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA). The circuit court denied the motion to strike and allowed the amendment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus. It held that the plaintiff’s delay in amending her complaint was truly inordinate and unexplained, especially given the information available to her and the defendant’s repeated assertion of his rights under AMLA § 6-5-551. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by allowing the amendment and directed it to vacate its order granting leave to amend and to strike the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. The petition for writ of mandamus was granted. View "Ex parte Taylor" on Justia Law

The plaintiff received medical care at Sanford medical facilities in Fargo, North Dakota, in April 2022. He alleged that Sanford and its staff, including nurse Shannon Mulinex, refused to provide him pain medication, verbally abused and humiliated him, failed to investigate his complaints, engaged in a pattern of hostile conduct, and discharged him against his wishes. Based on these events, he brought six claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), as well as claims for general negligence, defamation, discrimination, and violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the case after Sanford moved for summary judgment. Sanford argued that the plaintiff failed to serve an expert affidavit within three months as required by North Dakota law for professional negligence claims, and that the IIED claims did not allege conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous. The district court denied the plaintiff’s oral motion for a continuance, finding he had received adequate notice of the hearing. The court granted summary judgment, dismissing all claims, concluding that several IIED claims required an expert affidavit and the remaining IIED claims did not meet the legal threshold for extreme and outrageous conduct. A supplemental order granted summary judgment to Mulinex for the same reasons.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance, that the plaintiff had not preserved the issue of additional discovery for appeal, and that the requirement for an expert affidavit applied to IIED claims involving medical decisions. The court further held that the conduct alleged in the remaining IIED claims did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law. The amended judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "McMahon v. Sanford" on Justia Law