Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, who is a type 1 diabetic, received treatment from the defendants for foot pain following an injury. Over several visits in January 2017, the treating physician diagnosed cellulitis and prescribed antibiotics and pain medication, but did not diagnose a fracture. Subsequent evaluation by a podiatrist revealed a dislocated fracture and other breaks in the foot, which ultimately led to multiple surgeries and the amputation of the plaintiff’s left leg below the knee. The plaintiff alleged that the physician misdiagnosed his condition, causing him to continue using the injured foot and suffer further harm.A jury trial was held in the Circuit Court of Adams County, and after six days of testimony, the jury deliberated and returned a verdict for the defendants. During deliberations, the jury sent several notes to the court, including one from a juror who expressed personal belief in the physician’s negligence but agreed to sign the verdict for the defendants to end deliberations. The plaintiff’s counsel moved for a mistrial based on this note, but the trial court denied the motion, gave the jury a supplemental Prim instruction to guide further deliberations, and subsequently polled the jury after the verdict was reached. All jurors affirmed the verdict. The trial court also denied motions for a new trial and for additional polling of jurors.The Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the trial court’s rulings, finding no abuse of discretion. Upon further appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a mistrial or refusing to conduct additional polling. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, upholding the verdict for the defendants. View "Schilling v. Quincy Physicians & Surgeons Clinic, S.C." on Justia Law

Jack Rose was a resident at Oakland Manor, a skilled nursing facility in Iowa. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Rose was hospitalized and later returned to the facility, where he was placed in precautionary isolation following public health guidance. After attending off-site medical appointments, he was again isolated but was subsequently hospitalized for a suspected stroke and tested positive for COVID-19. Rose died in the hospital, with COVID-19 listed as the immediate cause of death. A federal inspection later found Oakland Manor had failed to fully comply with recommended infection-control protocols, including inconsistent use of personal protective equipment and incomplete isolation measures.The plaintiffs, Rose’s sons, brought wrongful death and other related claims against Oakland Manor, alleging reckless and willful misconduct in failing to follow federal and state COVID-19 prevention guidelines. The Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County granted summary judgment in favor of Oakland Manor, holding that the plaintiffs' evidence—primarily a federal inspection report and an expert witness disclosure—did not establish reckless or willful misconduct as required to overcome statutory immunity provided to health care providers for COVID-19-related injuries. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, finding insufficient evidence of recklessness and, in addition, lack of qualified evidence regarding causation.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding recklessness or willful misconduct under Iowa Code section 686D.6(2). The Court vacated the portion of the Court of Appeals decision related to causation, holding that the deficiencies at Oakland Manor amounted at most to negligence, not recklessness, and thus statutory immunity applied. View "Rose v. Oakland Healthcare Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Harold Berk, while traveling in Delaware, suffered a fractured ankle and sought treatment at Beebe Medical Center, where Dr. Wilson Choy recommended a protective boot. Berk alleged that hospital staff improperly fitted the boot, worsening his injury, and that Dr. Choy failed to order an immediate follow-up X-ray, resulting in delayed treatment and the need for surgery. Berk, a citizen of another state, filed a medical malpractice suit in federal court against both the hospital and Dr. Choy under Delaware law.Delaware law requires that a medical malpractice complaint be accompanied by an affidavit of merit from a medical professional. Berk requested an extension to file this affidavit, which was granted, but ultimately failed to secure the required affidavit and instead filed his medical records under seal. The United States District Court for the District of Delaware dismissed Berk’s suit for failing to comply with Delaware’s affidavit of merit statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding the state law substantive and applicable in federal court because, in its view, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address the affidavit requirement.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that Delaware’s affidavit of merit requirement does not apply in federal court. The Court reasoned that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which governs the information a plaintiff must provide at the outset of a lawsuit, sets the standard for pleadings and does not require supporting evidence such as an affidavit. Because Rule 8 is a valid procedural rule under the Rules Enabling Act and regulates the manner and means by which claims are presented, it displaces the contrary Delaware law. The Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Berk v. Choy" on Justia Law

A woman with dementia became a resident at a memory care facility in Montana in June 2021. She died in November 2021 after suffering infections and complications. Her son, acting both individually and as personal representative of her estate, filed suit against the facility and related entities in November 2023, alleging claims including wrongful death, negligence, infliction of emotional distress, elder abuse, unjust enrichment, and contract rescission. The claims centered on allegations that the facility’s staff failed to provide adequate care, leading to the woman’s injuries and death. The original complaint, and a subsequent first amended complaint filed in November 2024, were never served on any defendant.The Montana Eleventh Judicial District Court, Flathead County, dismissed all claims with prejudice in March 2025, finding that the son’s claims were medical malpractice actions subject to the two-year statute of limitations and six-month service requirement under Montana law. The court concluded that because the complaints were not timely served, and the amended complaint was filed after the statute of limitations had expired, the claims were time-barred. The court also rejected arguments that the filing of the original complaint tolled the statute or that the amended complaint related back to the original complaint.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana held that the care-related claims (Counts I-VI) were medical malpractice claims subject to the statutory time limits and service requirements, and affirmed their dismissal as time-barred. However, the court found that the unjust enrichment and contract rescission claims (Counts VII and VIII) were not medical malpractice claims and were not subject to those limitations. The Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of those two counts and remanded for further proceedings solely on those claims. View "Estate of Athy v. Edgewood" on Justia Law

After experiencing medical complications following a delayed appendectomy, a nineteen-year-old patient brought a medical malpractice action against a hospital, its corporate affiliate, and several health care providers. The patient had gone to the hospital's emergency department with abdominal pain and other symptoms and was initially diagnosed with a urinary tract infection and discharged. She returned the next day with worsening pain, was diagnosed with acute appendicitis, and underwent surgery after a twelve-hour delay. The appendicitis had perforated, resulting in additional surgeries and complications, including abdominal abscess and pleural effusion, and a prolonged hospital stay.The patient filed her complaint in the Superior Court, alleging negligence and adverse consequences from delayed diagnosis and treatment. She moved to impound her medical records, arguing for their confidentiality, but the judge denied her motion, citing failure to show good cause and allowing her to refile with more specificity, which she declined. She also sought a protective order, which was similarly denied. For the medical malpractice tribunal process, the plaintiff submitted an expert opinion letter without her medical records. The tribunal found the offer of proof insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability for judicial inquiry. The plaintiff failed to post the required bond within thirty days of the tribunal’s finding, resulting in dismissal of her claims. The Appeals Court affirmed both the dismissal and the denial of impoundment.On further appellate review, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the judge did not abuse discretion in denying impoundment of the medical records, as the plaintiff failed to provide particularized information or establish good cause. The court also held that the medical malpractice tribunal did not err in finding the offer of proof insufficient, as it lacked specific information regarding each defendant’s conduct. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed both the denial of the impoundment motion and the judgment of dismissal. View "DosSantos v. Beth Israel Deaconess Hospital-Milton, Inc." on Justia Law

Renee Jauregui brought a medical malpractice claim against Dr. Shannon J. Cothran, her OB/GYN, alleging that between May and October 2018 she repeatedly informed Dr. Cothran about a lump in her breast during pregnancy-related visits. Jauregui stated that Dr. Cothran dismissed her concerns, diagnosing a clogged milk duct and assuring her that the lump was normal and would resolve itself. At her postpartum visit in October 2018, Jauregui was told to monitor the lump and call if there were changes. When Jauregui noticed a change in July 2019, she returned for a follow-up in August, resulting in a diagnosis of metastatic breast cancer.The Circuit Court of Fairfax County granted Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar, finding that Jauregui’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The court determined there was neither a continuous nor substantially uninterrupted course of examination or treatment after October 2018, thus the continuing treatment rule did not apply. The court concluded that no ongoing physician-patient relationship existed regarding the breast lump after the October 2018 appointment.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the continuing treatment rule does not require specific treatment and that Jauregui’s return in August 2019, pursuant to Dr. Cothran’s prior instructions, established a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of examination for the same condition.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court did not err in sustaining Dr. Cothran’s plea in bar. It clarified that the continuing treatment rule requires a mostly continuous physician-patient relationship regarding a specific malady, and found that the ten-month gap between appointments constituted a substantial interruption. The Supreme Court of Virginia reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment, holding that Jauregui’s claim was time-barred. View "Cothran v. Jauregui" on Justia Law

C.B., a 34-year-old man with developmental and psychiatric disabilities, died while residing at the Valley Ridge Center for Intensive Treatment, a secure state-run facility operated by the New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. Although C.B. was admitted voluntarily, the facility imposed substantial restrictions on his liberty, including limits on leaving the premises and accessing medical care. In the days leading up to his death from cardiomyopathy, C.B. exhibited clear symptoms of heart failure and repeatedly asked staff for help, but his pleas were allegedly ignored or inadequately addressed by his caretakers.J.M., C.B.’s mother and administrator of his estate, brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York, alleging violations of C.B.’s substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state law claims for negligence and medical malpractice. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the federal claim, holding that C.B., as a voluntarily admitted resident, had no constitutional right to adequate medical care, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. The court also denied J.M.’s motion to amend her complaint to add a new defendant, finding lack of diligence.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that C.B. was entitled to substantive due process protections regardless of his voluntary admission status. The court clarified that when the state exercises sufficient control over a resident’s life such that the individual cannot care for himself, due process guarantees apply, consistent with Youngberg v. Romeo, Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, and DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services. The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "J.M. v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Ana Faiaipau, an elderly woman recovering from heart surgery, was transferred to a long-term acute care hospital operated by Kindred Healthcare. During her stay, Ana allegedly suffered neglect, including lack of dialysis, malnutrition, inadequate hygiene care, and failure to properly monitor her ventilator. The ventilator became disconnected, leading to a severe anoxic brain injury and Ana’s subsequent death. Ana’s daughters, Jennifer and Faamalieloto, acting both individually and as successors in interest, filed suit against Kindred for negligence, elder neglect, fraud, violation of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL), and wrongful death.The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed Kindred’s motion to compel arbitration based on agreements signed by Jennifer as Ana’s legal representative. The court granted arbitration for survivor claims brought on behalf of Ana, including negligence, elder neglect, fraud, and UCL claims, but denied arbitration for Jennifer and Faamalieloto’s individual claims for wrongful death, fraud, and violation of the UCL. The court also stayed litigation of the individual claims pending arbitration.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the appeal. Citing the California Supreme Court’s decision in Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc., the appellate court held that the wrongful death claim—premised on failure to monitor and reconnect Ana’s ventilator—constituted professional negligence and must be arbitrated under the arbitration agreement. However, the court affirmed the denial of arbitration for Jennifer and Faamalieloto’s individual fraud and UCL claims, finding Kindred had not shown that the agreement bound them in their individual capacities. The order was modified to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claim and affirmed as modified. View "Faiaipau v. THC-Orange County, LLC" on Justia Law

A patient was admitted to a hospital for liver disease and, while in an altered mental state, fell while accompanied by a caregiver. She suffered a fractured hip, requiring surgery, and was later discharged. The patient filed a negligence lawsuit against the hospital, alleging a failure to prevent or appropriately respond to her fall. During discovery, she requested all incident reports related to her fall. The hospital identified an Incident Report and a Root Cause Analysis but refused to produce them, invoking federal and state privileges that protect certain internal analyses and reports of medical errors.The McCracken Circuit Court ordered the hospital to produce the Incident Report and to provide the Root Cause Analysis with redactions for portions covered by federal privilege. The trial court found that the Incident Report and parts of the Root Cause Analysis contained factual information not otherwise available in the patient's medical records and ruled that such information should be discoverable. The Court of Appeals reviewed the trial court's order after the hospital sought a writ of prohibition. It held that the Incident Report was not privileged under federal or state law but concluded the Root Cause Analysis was fully protected by federal privilege, even its factual portions, and thus could not be disclosed.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals. The court held that the federal Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act privilege protected the entire Root Cause Analysis from disclosure, with no exception for factual information within the document. However, it held that the Incident Report was not protected by either the federal or state privileges because it was generated in compliance with regulatory obligations, not as part of the hospital's privileged peer review or patient safety evaluation system. As a result, the Incident Report was discoverable, while the Root Cause Analysis was not. View "BAPTIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM, INC. V. KITCHEN" on Justia Law

An elderly woman with significant medical issues, including heart and lung conditions, was a resident at a nursing home from 2018 until her death in December 2020. In late November 2020, she tested positive for COVID-19 and was transferred to a COVID unit within the facility. On December 3, 2020, she was found unresponsive by staff but did not receive immediate medical intervention for nearly five hours. She was eventually transported to a hospital, where she died the same day from acute respiratory distress. Her medical records indicated care being provided after her death, raising questions about record accuracy. Her estate administrator brought suit against the nursing home and related parties, alleging negligence, medical negligence, wrongful death, and other claims, asserting that her death resulted from neglect rather than COVID-19 itself.The case was first reviewed by the Graves Circuit Court, which granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were immune under Kentucky’s COVID-19 immunity statute (KRS 39A.275). The court found that the decedent died from COVID-19 as evidenced by her death certificate and that no gross negligence had been sufficiently shown. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, reasoning that immunity applied under the statute because COVID-19 was a factor and that the plaintiff failed to present sufficient proof of gross negligence.Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the lower courts’ decisions. It held that summary judgment was inappropriate because there remained genuine issues of material fact as to whether the woman's injuries and death were actually caused by COVID-19 or by the nursing home's alleged neglect. The Court clarified that the immunity statute requires a causal connection between the harm and COVID-19, and does not automatically apply to all injuries during the emergency period. The case was remanded for additional proceedings and further discovery. View "JACKSON V. MAYFIELD KY OPCO, LLC" on Justia Law