Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Late one afternoon, Eugene Jennings was driving a tractor-trailer truck for his employer, All State Enterprise, Inc., in Custer County. As he negotiated a curve on Highway 69, his truck flipped over and crushed the vehicle in the oncoming lane driven by Timothy Trenshaw, killing him instantly. Jennings reported injuries and was transported to Parkview Hospital, where he discussed how he was injured with an emergency department physician. The physician documented these statements in Jennings's medical records.The district attorney's office for the Eleventh Judicial District charged Jennings with vehicular homicide and careless driving resulting in injury. Trenshaw's sister and son sued Jennings and All State in a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs obtained a police report containing a screenshot of Jennings's medical records, which included his description of the collision. Jennings filed a motion for a protective order, which the district court granted, prohibiting Plaintiffs from possessing or further disclosing Jennings's medical records. However, the district court later reviewed the screenshot in camera and ruled that five sentences describing the collision were not privileged, dissolving the protective order and requiring Jennings to disclose those sentences.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that medical records containing information provided by a patient to a physician during treatment are protected by the physician-patient privilege. The court concluded that the district court erred in reviewing the screenshot and conducting a sentence-by-sentence analysis. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause, emphasizing that the proper method for Plaintiffs to learn about the facts of the collision is through discovery directed at Jennings, not by accessing his privileged medical records. View "Gardne v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jacqueline Statham suffered injuries during a hysterectomy performed by Dr. David S. Quang, assisted by Dr. Tan-Loc Nguyen and a medical student. The medical student, under the supervision of the defendant physicians, improperly inserted a sponge stick into Statham's rectum instead of her vagina, leading to a rectovaginal fistula. Statham sued the physicians and their medical practice, alleging professional negligence, negligent supervision, and vicarious liability for the medical student's actions.The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, ruling they could not be held vicariously liable for the medical student's negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with the lead opinion concluding that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not impose vicarious liability on the physicians and that the evidence did not support vicarious liability under general agency principles or the borrowed servant doctrine.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not provide a basis for vicarious liability. The court also agreed that the borrowed servant doctrine did not apply as an independent basis for imposing vicarious liability. However, the court disagreed with the conclusion that the defendant physicians could not be held vicariously liable under general agency principles. The court held that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a physician can be vicariously liable for a medical student's negligence if the student was acting as the physician's servant in furtherance of the physician's goals and within the scope of the physician's business.The Supreme Court found that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendant physicians were vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Therefore, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of vicarious liability. View "STATHAM v. QUANG" on Justia Law

The case involves a healthcare liability action filed by the plaintiff, Payton Castillo, against CHI Memorial Hospital and other entities and physicians, alleging negligence in the care provided to her husband, who died shortly after being discharged from the hospital's emergency room. The defendants sought a protective order based on the quality improvement committee (QIC) privilege under Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-272 to prevent inquiry into a meeting held by the hospital and the decedent's family. The trial court denied the defendants' motion.The Hamilton County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case and denied the defendants' motion for a protective order, finding that statements made during the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the statements made in the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the QIC privilege applied to statements made during the meeting that were based on information obtained during the QIC process. However, the court found that Memorial waived the privilege when hospital management voluntarily disclosed the privileged information during the meeting with Mrs. Castillo. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on separate grounds and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Castillo v. Rex" on Justia Law

PorterCare Adventist Health Systems had inadequate surgical-sterilization procedures for about two years, leading to over $40 million in liability from thousands of patients' claims. PorterCare sought coverage from AdHealth, its excess-liability insurer, for the full $40 million policy limit, arguing that the claims arose from one medical incident. AdHealth refused coverage, asserting that a medical incident covers injuries to a single person, not multiple people, and filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment. PorterCare counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted summary judgment to AdHealth, agreeing with its interpretation that a medical incident is limited to the acts or omissions causing injury to one person. The court found that AdHealth owed coverage only for the claims of a single patient that trigger the excess policy’s liability threshold, not for multiple patients' claims grouped together.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the policy’s definition of “medical incident” unambiguously applies to the injuries of a single person. Therefore, AdHealth is liable only for individual claims exceeding PorterCare’s $2 million self-insurance retention, not for the aggregated claims of multiple patients. View "Adhealth, Limited v. PorterCare Adventist Health Systems" on Justia Law

An employee, Sharon Dunn, was injured while working as an emergency-department nurse for East Texas Medical Center Athens (ETMC Athens), a nonsubscriber to the Texas workers’ compensation program. Dunn alleged that an emergency medical technician (EMT), who was not employed by ETMC Athens, negligently pushed a stretcher into her, causing a serious back injury. Dunn initially sued the EMT and his employer, but those claims were dismissed due to her failure to timely serve an expert report as required by the Texas Medical Liability Act. Dunn then amended her pleadings to assert negligence claims against ETMC Athens.The trial court granted ETMC Athens's motion to designate the EMT and his employer as responsible third parties under the Texas proportionate-responsibility statute. However, eleven months later, Dunn moved to strike the designations, arguing that her suit was an action to collect workers’ compensation benefits, to which the proportionate-responsibility statute does not apply. The trial court granted Dunn’s motion, and the court of appeals denied ETMC Athens’s petition for mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by striking the designations. The court held that the proportionate-responsibility statute applies because Dunn’s negligence claim against ETMC Athens is not an action to collect workers’ compensation benefits under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The court also held that the Act does not prohibit nonsubscribing employers from designating responsible third parties and that there was sufficient evidence of the third parties’ responsibility. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted ETMC Athens’s petition for mandamus relief, ordering the trial court to vacate its order striking the designations. View "IN RE EAST TEXAS MEDICAL CENTER ATHENS" on Justia Law

Shannon Reed arrived at Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle's emergency room with severe chest pain, nausea, shortness of breath, and numbness in his left arm. Dr. Keith McCoy ordered several tests, including EKGs and Troponin measurements. Despite Reed's fluctuating pain levels, he was discharged with a diagnosis of unspecified chest pain and instructions to follow up with a cardiologist. Reed died later that night. Oliver Miller, on behalf of Reed's wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed medical negligence claims against the hospital, United Emergency Services, and Dr. McCoy.The Lowndes County Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact for the jury to determine. The defendants argued that Miller's claims failed due to lack of causation, as affidavits from cardiologists indicated they would not have admitted Reed even if consulted. The court found that Miller's experts provided sufficient evidence of breaches in the standard of care that could have contributed to Reed's death.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's denial of summary judgment in part, while reversing and rendering in part. The court held that Miller failed to establish causation for the claim that Dr. McCoy should have admitted Reed to the hospital, as the on-call cardiologists would not have admitted him. However, the court found that Miller's other claims, including improper discharge and failure to report pain increase, presented genuine issues of material fact. The case was remanded to the Lowndes County Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "United Emergency Services of Mississippi, Inc. v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 2003, Sarah Ramey underwent a urethral dilation performed by Dr. Edward Dunne, which resulted in severe pain and subsequent debilitating medical conditions. Over the next fourteen years, Ramey sought medical advice from numerous doctors to determine the cause of her ailments. In 2017, Drs. Mario Castellanos and Lee Arnold Dellon linked her symptoms to the 2003 procedure. Ramey filed a lawsuit against Dr. Dunne and Foxhall Urology in 2019.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bifurcated trial to determine if Ramey’s claim was barred by the statute of limitations. The jury found that Ramey failed to file her suit within the three-year statute of limitations. Ramey then filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial, arguing that the trial court erred in its rulings and jury instructions. The trial court denied her motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying Ramey’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, as there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Ramey had received medical opinions linking her symptoms to the urethral dilation before 2017. The court also found that Ramey waived her claim regarding the jury instructions by affirmatively agreeing to them during the trial.However, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in not granting a new trial based on the improper invocation of inquiry notice by appellees’ counsel during rebuttal closing arguments. The court found that the trial court’s corrective instruction was insufficient to mitigate the prejudicial impact of the improper argument. Consequently, the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Ramey v. Foxhall Urology, Chartered" on Justia Law

Mario Mancini, an inmate at FCI Sandstone, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for medical malpractice. Mancini alleged that the government caused him permanent injury by negligently delaying necessary medical care. He experienced neck and back pain from a prior workplace injury, which worsened in 2017. Despite reporting increasing pain and numbness, his MRI and subsequent surgery were delayed. Mancini claimed these delays resulted in permanent nerve damage, loss of strength, muscle atrophy, numbness, and pain.The United States District Court for the District of Minnesota dismissed Mancini's FTCA claim. The court found that Mancini's expert affidavit, provided by Dr. Gary Wyard, failed to meet the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 145.682. The affidavit did not adequately define the standard of care, explain how the government deviated from that standard, or establish a causal connection between the delays and Mancini's injuries. The court also excluded Dr. Wyard's testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert, citing factual errors and a lack of methodology in his affidavit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Dr. Wyard's affidavit did not satisfy the statutory requirements of Minn. Stat. § 145.682. The affidavit lacked specific details about the standard of care and failed to outline a chain of causation between the government's actions and Mancini's injuries. The court also upheld the exclusion of Dr. Wyard's testimony under Rule 702 and Daubert. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case with prejudice, as Mancini did not correct the deficiencies in the affidavit within the provided safe-harbor period. View "Mancini v. United States" on Justia Law

An inmate at the Hancock County Jail, Monica J. Johnson, died by suicide after being incarcerated from September 21 to September 29, 2018. Her estate and surviving spouse filed a medical malpractice notice of claim against Hancock County and several county officials and employees, alleging negligence in her care. The County and its employees, along with Jail Housing Officer Kayla Dumond, appealed the Superior Court's denial of their motions for summary judgment.The Superior Court (Penobscot County) denied the motions for summary judgment, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Maine Health Security Act (MHSA) applied to the defendants and that the defendants had not demonstrated immunity under the Maine Tort Claims Act (MTCA). The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the interlocutory appeal.The court concluded that the issue of whether the defendants are "health care providers" under the MHSA is not immediately appealable. Additionally, the court decided to defer to the federal court on the issue of immunity under the MTCA, as the federal court is handling a related case involving the same parties and facts. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, allowing the MHSA screening process to proceed, with the understanding that the federal court will continue with the litigation once the screening process is completed. View "Carney v. Hancock County" on Justia Law

Fatima Shaw-McDonald filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia, P.C. after suffering vision loss following cataract surgery. While the lawsuit was pending, she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy but did not initially disclose the lawsuit in her bankruptcy filings. Eye Consultants moved to dismiss the lawsuit, arguing that Shaw-McDonald no longer had standing to pursue it because her interest in the lawsuit had transferred to the bankruptcy trustee. Shaw-McDonald later amended her bankruptcy filings to include the lawsuit and obtained a discharge from the bankruptcy court.The circuit court dismissed the medical malpractice case, concluding that Shaw-McDonald lost standing when she filed for bankruptcy. The court relied on the precedent set by Kocher v. Campbell, which held that a plaintiff loses standing when a cause of action becomes part of the bankruptcy estate. Shaw-McDonald appealed the decision.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed the circuit court's decision, holding that Shaw-McDonald had standing to maintain her medical malpractice action. The court reasoned that once the bankruptcy trustee abandoned the claim, it reverted to Shaw-McDonald as if no bankruptcy petition had been filed.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Shaw-McDonald did not lose standing permanently when she filed for bankruptcy; rather, her standing was temporarily suspended. The court concluded that the appropriate remedy was to hold the medical malpractice case in abeyance until the bankruptcy proceedings were resolved, rather than dismissing it. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Eye Consultants of Northern Virginia P.C. v. Shaw-McDonald" on Justia Law