Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Fatima Belhak experienced complications during childbirth, leading Dr. Denice Smith to perform an episiotomy. Post-delivery, Belhak suffered from pain and infection due to a misdiagnosed fourth-degree laceration, which required delayed reconstructive surgery. Belhak and her husband sued Smith and her employer, Women’s Care Specialists, P.C., for negligence.The Iowa District Court for Scott County held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict favoring Belhak, awarding her $3.25 million in damages. Smith moved for a new trial, citing insufficient evidence and misconduct by Belhak’s lawyer during closing arguments. The district court denied the motion. Smith appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the jury verdict, finding insufficient evidence to support one of the negligence claims.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals decision, affirming the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial based on alleged misconduct by Belhak’s lawyer. The court also held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that Smith’s use of 4-0 sutures, which were too weak, caused the wound to break down, leading to infection and delayed surgery. The court concluded that the jury could reasonably infer causation from the expert testimony provided. View "Belhak v. Smith" on Justia Law

Giorgio Webster sued Dr. Jeffrey Osguthorpe and Summit Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery, PC, for dental malpractice related to a biopsy. On December 8, 2020, a mandatory case evaluation resulted in an award for Webster, which he accepted, but the defendants rejected. The case proceeded to trial after multiple settlement conferences and facilitations. The jury awarded Webster $68,000 in past economic damages and $2.682 million in noneconomic damages, which was later adjusted to $565,000 due to statutory caps. Webster sought costs, statutory interest, and attorney fees as case-evaluation sanctions under the former MCR 2.403(O), which allowed such sanctions before its amendment on January 1, 2022.The Macomb Circuit Court granted Webster's request for sanctions, applying the former rule, and the parties agreed on reasonable attorney fees. The trial court entered an amended judgment reflecting these fees, statutory interest, and costs. The defendants appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the sanctions award, stating that the trial court should not have applied the former rule since the verdict was substantially higher than the case-evaluation award, causing no injustice to Webster.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court had the discretion to apply the former MCR 2.403(O) under MCR 1.102, which allows a court to apply former rules if applying the current rules would work an injustice. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, as Webster had relied on the former rule when making strategic decisions, and all relevant actions occurred before the rule change. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed in part, and the trial court's award of case-evaluation sanctions was reinstated. View "Webster v. Osguthorpe" on Justia Law

Renaissance Medical Foundation (the Practice) is a nonprofit health organization certified by the Texas Medical Board. The Practice employed Dr. Michael Burke, a neurosurgeon, to provide medical services to its patients. Rebecca Lugo brought her daughter to Doctors Hospital at Renaissance for brain surgery performed by Dr. Burke. The surgery resulted in permanent neurological damage to Lugo’s daughter. Dr. Burke later expressed that a retractor used during the procedure migrated into the child’s brainstem, causing the injury. Lugo filed a lawsuit alleging negligence by Dr. Burke and sought to hold the Practice vicariously liable for his actions.The trial court denied the Practice’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that it could not be held vicariously liable for Dr. Burke’s negligence because it did not control the manner in which he provided medical care and that Dr. Burke was an independent contractor. The court concluded that Dr. Burke’s employment agreement granted the Practice sufficient control over him to trigger vicarious liability. The court authorized a permissive interlocutory appeal of the ruling.The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that Dr. Burke was an employee of the Practice under traditional common-law factors and was acting within the scope of his employment when the alleged negligence occurred. The Practice then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a nonprofit health organization may not be held vicariously liable if exercising its right of control regarding the alleged negligence would interfere with its employee physician’s exercise of independent medical judgment. The court concluded that the Practice did not conclusively demonstrate such interference and affirmed the denial of the Practice’s motion for summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "RENAISSANCE MEDICAL FOUNDATION v. LUGO" on Justia Law

Ireille Williams-Bush, a 35-year-old woman, was taken to Medical City Arlington Hospital with symptoms indicative of a pulmonary embolism. However, she was diagnosed with a non-ST-elevated myocardial infarction and admitted under that diagnosis. The consulting cardiologist did not screen her for a pulmonary embolism. She was discharged in stable condition but died three days later from clotting in her heart and lungs. Her husband, Jared Bush, sued the hospital and associated physicians for negligence, focusing on the hospital's failure to have adequate protocols to ensure proper diagnosis and treatment.The trial court initially found the expert report by Dr. Cam Patterson, which supported Bush's claims, to be adequate. However, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas reversed this decision, deeming the report conclusory regarding causation and dismissing the claims against the hospital with prejudice. The appellate court held that the expert's opinions did not sufficiently explain how the hospital's policies could have influenced the medical decisions made by the physicians.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate. The court concluded that Dr. Patterson's report provided a fair summary of the standard of care, the hospital's breach, and the causal relationship between the breach and Williams-Bush's death. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "BUSH v. COLUMBIA MEDICAL CENTER OF ARLINGTON SUBSIDIARY, L.P." on Justia Law

Douglas Wilson underwent hip replacement surgery at Shenandoah Medical Center (SMC) and was injured in a fall while recovering. He and his wife sued the hospital for professional negligence in his postoperative care. They identified a nursing expert but failed to certify this expert by the agreed deadline. The certification was only made three months later, after SMC moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs argued that expert testimony was not required and blamed defense counsel’s silence for missing the deadline.The Iowa District Court for Page County found good cause for the delay, citing defense counsel’s silence and ongoing scheduling negotiations. The court did not decide whether expert testimony was necessary. SMC appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the plaintiffs had not shown good cause.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the district court abused its discretion in finding good cause for the plaintiffs’ delay. The court held that defense counsel is not obligated to remind opposing counsel of expert certification deadlines and that an adversary’s silence cannot excuse missing the statutory deadline by three months. The court emphasized that the plaintiffs’ three-month delay was a serious deviation and that the lack of prejudice to the defendant alone was insufficient to establish good cause.The Iowa Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the district court’s judgment, and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the plaintiffs’ claims require expert testimony to avoid summary judgment. View "Wilson v. Shenandoah Medical Center" on Justia Law

Melissa Hubbard sought medical treatment from Dr. Carol Neuman for reproductive health issues and was diagnosed with severe endometriosis. Dr. Neuman advised Hubbard to consider removing her left fallopian tube and ovary, but Hubbard did not consent. Dr. Neuman then referred Hubbard to Dr. Michael McGauley for colon surgery. Hubbard alleges that Dr. Neuman and Dr. McGauley planned the surgery without her knowledge, including a recommendation by Dr. Neuman to remove Hubbard’s ovaries, which Dr. McGauley ultimately did during the surgery.The Rock County Circuit Court denied Dr. Neuman’s motion to dismiss Hubbard’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Dr. Neuman argued that she was not the physician who removed Hubbard’s ovaries and thus not liable under Wisconsin’s informed consent statute, WIS. STAT. § 448.30. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision, concluding that Hubbard’s allegations were sufficient to claim that Dr. Neuman was a “physician who treats a patient” under the statute.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that Hubbard’s complaint sufficiently alleged that Dr. Neuman was involved in the treatment process, even though she did not perform the surgery herself. The court emphasized that when examining the sufficiency of a complaint, all facts and reasonable inferences must be accepted as true. The court concluded that Hubbard’s allegations, if true, could entitle her to relief under the informed consent statute, thus Dr. Neuman’s motion to dismiss was properly denied. View "Hubbard v. Neuman" on Justia Law

Jacob Severson sought treatment from Dr. Shabnum Gupta at a Sanford facility in Fargo for the removal of four genital warts using cryotherapy. Following the procedure, Severson experienced blistering and scarring in the genital area and returned to Sanford multiple times for treatment. He later sought mental health support, claiming the procedure caused his issues. Severson also visited a dermatologist for additional warts and was referred to the urology department for a physical abnormality. In January 2024, Severson filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Sanford and Dr. Gupta.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied Severson's motion to amend his complaint. Severson argued that his claim fell under exceptions to the North Dakota Century Code (N.D.C.C.) § 28-01-46, which requires an expert affidavit in medical negligence cases. He claimed his case involved an "obvious occurrence" of negligence, which does not require expert testimony. The district court disagreed, finding that the intricacies of cryotherapy and its potential adverse effects were not within the knowledge of a layperson and that the wrong organ exception did not apply.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Severson's claim did not meet the "obvious occurrence" exception and that he failed to provide the required expert affidavit within three months of commencing the lawsuit. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Severson's motion to amend his complaint to allege medical battery, as the amendment would have been futile based on the existing record. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Severson v. Gupta" on Justia Law

Late one afternoon, Eugene Jennings was driving a tractor-trailer truck for his employer, All State Enterprise, Inc., in Custer County. As he negotiated a curve on Highway 69, his truck flipped over and crushed the vehicle in the oncoming lane driven by Timothy Trenshaw, killing him instantly. Jennings reported injuries and was transported to Parkview Hospital, where he discussed how he was injured with an emergency department physician. The physician documented these statements in Jennings's medical records.The district attorney's office for the Eleventh Judicial District charged Jennings with vehicular homicide and careless driving resulting in injury. Trenshaw's sister and son sued Jennings and All State in a wrongful death action. Plaintiffs obtained a police report containing a screenshot of Jennings's medical records, which included his description of the collision. Jennings filed a motion for a protective order, which the district court granted, prohibiting Plaintiffs from possessing or further disclosing Jennings's medical records. However, the district court later reviewed the screenshot in camera and ruled that five sentences describing the collision were not privileged, dissolving the protective order and requiring Jennings to disclose those sentences.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and held that medical records containing information provided by a patient to a physician during treatment are protected by the physician-patient privilege. The court concluded that the district court erred in reviewing the screenshot and conducting a sentence-by-sentence analysis. The Supreme Court made absolute the order to show cause, emphasizing that the proper method for Plaintiffs to learn about the facts of the collision is through discovery directed at Jennings, not by accessing his privileged medical records. View "Gardne v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jacqueline Statham suffered injuries during a hysterectomy performed by Dr. David S. Quang, assisted by Dr. Tan-Loc Nguyen and a medical student. The medical student, under the supervision of the defendant physicians, improperly inserted a sponge stick into Statham's rectum instead of her vagina, leading to a rectovaginal fistula. Statham sued the physicians and their medical practice, alleging professional negligence, negligent supervision, and vicarious liability for the medical student's actions.The trial court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants, ruling they could not be held vicariously liable for the medical student's negligence. The Court of Appeals affirmed, with the lead opinion concluding that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not impose vicarious liability on the physicians and that the evidence did not support vicarious liability under general agency principles or the borrowed servant doctrine.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and agreed with the Court of Appeals that OCGA § 51-1-38 did not provide a basis for vicarious liability. The court also agreed that the borrowed servant doctrine did not apply as an independent basis for imposing vicarious liability. However, the court disagreed with the conclusion that the defendant physicians could not be held vicariously liable under general agency principles. The court held that under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a physician can be vicariously liable for a medical student's negligence if the student was acting as the physician's servant in furtherance of the physician's goals and within the scope of the physician's business.The Supreme Court found that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the defendant physicians were vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Therefore, the court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment to the defendants on the issue of vicarious liability. View "STATHAM v. QUANG" on Justia Law

The case involves a healthcare liability action filed by the plaintiff, Payton Castillo, against CHI Memorial Hospital and other entities and physicians, alleging negligence in the care provided to her husband, who died shortly after being discharged from the hospital's emergency room. The defendants sought a protective order based on the quality improvement committee (QIC) privilege under Tennessee Code Annotated section 68-11-272 to prevent inquiry into a meeting held by the hospital and the decedent's family. The trial court denied the defendants' motion.The Hamilton County Circuit Court initially reviewed the case and denied the defendants' motion for a protective order, finding that statements made during the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the statements made in the meeting were not protected by the QIC privilege.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and held that the QIC privilege applied to statements made during the meeting that were based on information obtained during the QIC process. However, the court found that Memorial waived the privilege when hospital management voluntarily disclosed the privileged information during the meeting with Mrs. Castillo. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on separate grounds and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Castillo v. Rex" on Justia Law