Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Parents, individually and on behalf of their daughter (Daughter), filed a medical malpractice action against Hospital under respondeat superior, alleging that Hospital's employee, an obstetrical nurse (Nurse), breached the standard of care which caused permanent injury to Daughter. The jury returned a verdict for Hospital. The court of appeals affirmed. Parents appealed, contending that one jury instruction erroneously directed the jury to apply a community nursing standard of care when all of their twelve negligence claims were governed by a national standard. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the instruction given was correct for the negligence allegation based upon chain of command because it was governed by a community standard of care. View "Bates v. Dodge City Healthcare Group" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued her doctor, who mistakenly removed her left ovary during a laparoscopic surgery intended to take the right ovary, and a jury awarded her $759,680 in damages. The district court reduced that amount by $425,000 because of a state law limiting non-economic damages in personal injury lawsuits and a posttrial ruling finding Plaintiff's evidence of future medical expenses insufficient. Both sides appealed. The Supreme Court (1) upheld Kan. Stat. Ann. 60-19a02, which operated to cap Plaintiff's jury award for non-economic damages, as applied to Plaintiff; (2) reversed the district court's decision to strike the jury's award for Plaintiff's future medical expenses and remanded the case with instructions to reinstate that award; and (3) denied the doctor's trial error claims. View "Miller v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant, a medical doctor practicing medicine in Kansas and Missouri, appealed from the district court's order denying her petition to revoke an administrative subpoena issued by the Kansas Board of Healing Arts. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's determination that Appellant was not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking relief from the district court under Kan. Stat. Ann. 65-2839a(b)(3)(B). On the merits of the appeal, the Court affirmed the district court's denial of Appellant's petition based on its conclusion that the Board had authority under the Kansas Healing Arts Act to investigate and subpoena Appellant, a Kansas licensee who was practicing under the Act, even though the investigation was based upon her practice of medicine in Missouri. View "Ryser v. State" on Justia Law

John Brennan sued his physician, who had a $200,000 professional liability insurance policy, for medical malpractice. The insurer was declared insolvent after Brennan filed his claim but before he recovered. The insurer's insolvency triggered the Kansas Insurance Guaranty Association's (KIGA) statutory obligation to cover the insurer's obligations to the extent provided by the Kansas Insurance Guaranty Association Act. KIGA, which intervened in the suit, denied liability because Brennan received medical reimbursements from his personal health insurance policy that totaled more than the insolvent insurer's policy limits. The dispositive issue was whether Brennan's due process rights were violated by a retroactive statutory amendment permitting KIGA to offset Brennan's personal health insurance benefits against its liability on the insolvent insurer's $200,000 policy. The district court declared the statute's retroactive feature unconstitutional and entered judgment against KIGA for $200,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the retroactivity provision violated due process, and (2) Brennan's rights were governed by the preamended statute. View "Brennan v. Kan. Ins. Guar. Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2004, Plaintiff sued Defendant, a doctor, alleging negligence. Attorney Scott Mann represented Plaintiff, and an attorney from Bretz Law Offices allegedly agreed to assist as co-counsel. The district court judge granted Defendant's motion to disqualify the Bretz firm and Mann from continued representation of Plaintiff because an associate at Defendant's attorney's firm had left there and gone to work for the Bretz firm. In 2009, Mann entered his appearance for Plaintiff in district court. The district judge granted Defendant's motion to disqualify Mann. On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district judge abused his discretion in extending the 2004 imputed disqualification of the Bretz firm to Mann because (a) there was no substantial competent evidence to support the legal conclusion that Mann must also be subject to imputed disqualification, and (b) the district judge failed to conduct an appropriate legal analysis of whether Mann was part of the Bretz firm; (2) the district judge's imputed disqualification of the Bretz firm in 2004 exerted no preclusive effect in the 2009 dispute over Mann's status; and (3) Mann was not subject to disqualification in 2009 because he was not likely to be a necessary witness on causation. View "Venters v. Sellers" on Justia Law