Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A baby, S.K., was injured during labor and delivery, allegedly due to the negligence of the delivering doctor, Dr. Goodman, who used a Mityvac obstetrical vacuum delivery system. The plaintiff, S.K.'s conservator, claimed that the use of the vacuum caused brain damage to S.K. and sought damages from Dr. Goodman’s employer, Obstetric & Gynecologic Associates of Iowa City and Coralville, P.C. (the clinic).A jury in the Iowa District Court for Johnson County found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages. The clinic appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting a package insert from the vacuum, which contained hearsay statements about when the vacuum should not be used and potential harms from its use. The clinic contended that the insert's admission violated Iowa’s hearsay rule and prejudiced the trial's outcome.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the clinic. The court found that the package insert contained hearsay and did not fit within any recognized exceptions, including the residual exception and the market reports exception. The court noted that the insert's admission was prejudicial, as it directly addressed a central dispute in the case and was emphasized in the plaintiff's closing argument. The court concluded that the erroneous admission of the insert deprived the clinic of a fair trial.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The court also addressed a procedural issue raised by the clinic regarding the plaintiff's certificate of merit affidavit, ultimately denying the clinic's motion to reverse on those grounds. View "S.K. v. Obstetric & Gynecologic Associates of Iowa City and Coralville, P.C." on Justia Law

The case revolves around a medical malpractice claim filed by Darrin P. Miller against Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp. and several medical professionals. The claim arose from the death of Miller's wife, Meredith, who died after a car accident when an endotracheal tube was incorrectly placed in her esophagus instead of her trachea. Miller alleged that the medical providers breached the standard of care by incorrectly performing the intubation and failing to identify and correct the error.The defendants sought dismissal of the case on two grounds: the expert's certificate of merit was not signed under oath as required by Iowa Code section 147.140, and the expert, an anesthesiologist, was not qualified to testify against the defendant surgeons or respiratory therapist. The district court denied the defendants' motions, ruling that the expert's unsworn but signed letter substantially complied with the affidavit requirement and that the expert's qualifications satisfied section 147.139.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the district court's decision. The court held that the expert's signed but unsworn report did not substantially comply with section 147.140's affidavit requirement, and this violation was not cured by the expert's sworn declaration served over three months after the statutory deadline. The court did not reach the question of whether the expert anesthesiologist was qualified under section 147.139 to testify against these defendants. The case was remanded for dismissal of the medical malpractice claims with prejudice. View "Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp." on Justia Law

In Iowa, a ten-year-old boy was treated at the University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC) for a dislodged feeding tube and died the next day. The boy's mother filed administrative tort claims on behalf of the child's estate prior to being appointed as the estate's administrator. The child's parents also individually claimed loss of consortium. The claims were dismissed by the district court, which ruled that the mother lacked authority to file a claim on behalf of the estate prior to her official appointment, and that the parents had not properly filed individual administrative tort claims.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the district court was correct to dismiss the parents' individual claims as no individual administrative tort claims were filed. However, the court determined the district court had erred in dismissing the estate's claims, arguing that the mother's administrative tort claims were valid despite her not being appointed as the estate's administrator at the time of filing. The court explained that a representative may act to protect an estate's interests before being officially appointed and can ratify pre-appointment acts, granting them the same effect as acts that would occur after appointment. The court also confirmed that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to permit the plaintiffs' new evidence. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Anderson v. State of Iowa" on Justia Law

In this case, Charlene and Michael Jorgensen sued Dr. Adam Smith, his professional corporation (Adam Smith, M.D., P.C.), and Tri-State Specialists, L.L.P., a clinic that employed Dr. Smith, after Charlene underwent surgeries in 2016 and 2018 that they allege were botched by Dr. Smith. They specifically claim that Tri-State was negligent in retaining Dr. Smith despite knowledge of his unfitness to practice surgery. The Supreme Court of Iowa considered whether the Jorgensens were required to produce a "certificate of merit affidavit" containing an expert’s opinion that the clinic had breached the applicable standard of care by retaining Dr. Smith, under Iowa Code section 147.140 (2018). The court found that this requirement did not apply to the Jorgensens' claim of negligent retention. While Tri-State is considered a "health care provider" as per the definition in the Iowa Code, the language of the statute requiring a certificate of merit refers to negligence in the practice of a profession, occupation, or in patient care. The court concluded that in the context of section 147.140, the term "occupation" does not encompass the activities of entities such as Tri-State. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision denying Tri-State's motion for summary judgment. View "Jorgensen v. Smith" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of Iowa, the plaintiff, Renee Hummel, brought a medical malpractice suit against the defendants, Adam B. Smith, Adam Smith, M.D., P.C., and Tri-State Specialists, L.L.P. The defendants requested an interlocutory review of a lower court order that denied their motion to strike and for summary judgment. The issue at the heart of the defendants' motion was that the expert who signed the plaintiff's certificate of merit did not have an active license to practice medicine.The Supreme Court of Iowa reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case. The court determined that an expert who signs a plaintiff's certificate of merit in a medical malpractice case must have an active license to practice medicine. Therefore, the lower court erred in denying the defendants' motion to strike and for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff's certificate of merit was signed by an expert without an active medical license. View "Hummel v. Smith" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Iowa, the appellants, the estate and family of Deanna Dee Fahrmann, had filed a wrongful-death action against ABCM Corporation and two of its employees, alleging nursing home malpractice. The appellants failed to serve a certificate of merit affidavit, required under Iowa Code section 147.140, signed by a qualified expert within sixty days of the defendants’ response to the claim. Instead, they served initial disclosures, signed only by their counsel, that named their expert within the statutory sixty-day deadline. After the deadline, the defendants moved to dismiss the case for noncompliance, and the appellants served a certificate signed by their expert and argued that they substantially complied with the statute. The district court dismissed the case based on the mandatory language of the statute.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the case. The court held that the plaintiffs' initial disclosure, signed only by their counsel, did not comply with or substantially comply with the certificate of merit requirement under section 147.140 of the Iowa Code. The law unambiguously required the plaintiffs to timely serve a certificate of merit affidavit signed under oath by a qualified expert stating the expert’s familiarity with the applicable standard of care and its breach by the defendants unless the parties extend the deadline by agreement or the plaintiffs show good cause to move for an extension within the sixty-day deadline. The plaintiffs' untimely service of a certificate signed by their expert did not constitute substantial compliance with the statute. Therefore, dismissal was mandatory under the plain language of the statute. View "The Estate of Deanna Dee Fahrmann v. ABCM Corporation" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's dismissal of the medical malpractice action brought by the Estate of Roberta Butterfield against Chautauqua Guest Home, Inc., a nursing home, holding that the Estate was not required to serve a certificate of merit affidavit on Chautauqua in this case.While the Estate brought its action it did not serve a certificate of merit on Chautauqua. Chautauqua filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it with prejudice under Iowa Code 147.140. The district court granted the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of the Estate's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the certificate of merit requirement set forth in section 147.140 does not apply to plaintiffs who need experts solely for causation, as opposed to the standard of care or breach; and (2) remand was required to establish which of the Estate's claims survived the failure to file the certificate of merit. View "Estate of Butterfield v. Chautauqua Guest Home, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court granting summary judgment for Defendants in this medical malpractice action, holding that a plaintiff who files a noncompliant certificate of merit and then voluntarily dismisses the case need not rely on the certificate filed in the first case when bringing a second action.Plaintiffs timely filed a certificate of merit affidavit in their medical malpractice action but voluntarily dismissed the case when Defendants challenged the qualifications of the expert witness that signed the affidavit. Thereafter, Plaintiffs refiled their case, providing a certificate of merit affidavit signed by a different expert witness. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis that the certificate of merit in the first case was deficient. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, holding that Defendants were not entitled to dismissal of their case with prejudice. View "Kirlin v. Monaster" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case the Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court vacating Plaintiff's prior voluntary dismissal of her action without prejudice and dismissing the case with prejudice, holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Defendant's motion to dismiss.Plaintiff filed a medical negligence suit against Defendant. When Plaintiff failed to file a certificate of merit affidavit Defendant moved to dismiss her petition with prejudice. That same day, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed her petition under Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.943. The district court subsequently granted Defendant's motion to dismiss, dismissing Plaintiff's claims with prejudice. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that her voluntary dismissal terminated the case. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal was self-executing and ended the case, and therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on Defendant's motion to dismiss. View "Ronnfeldt v. Shelby County Chris A. Myrtue Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Defendants in this medical malpractice action, holding that Defendants were not estopped from asserting the statute of repose defense, which applied to the facts of this case.In 2004, a benign cyst was detected on Linda Berry's right kidney. In 2009, Dr. Paul Grossman treated Berry for colitis, and a radiologist noted that the mass had grown in size, but no one mentioned this to Berry. In 2016, Berry was treated for renal cancer. Berry died from cancer in 2019. In 2018, Berry filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants for failing to disclose the kidney mass in 2009. Defendants moved for summary judgment based on the six-year statute of repose found in Iowa Code 614.1(9). The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants, rejecting Plaintiffs' reliance on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to avoid the six-year bar. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Berry could not rely on fraudulent concealment to estop Defendants from asserting the six-year statute of repose as a defense to Berry's claims. View "Downing v. Grossman" on Justia Law