Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Appellant Alesa Easterling brought this medical malpractice suit against Respondent Eric Kendall, M.D., alleging that Kendall was negligent in failing to diagnose her with a carotid artery dissection, and that such misdiagnosis delayed her treatment and resulted in her suffering permanent neurological damage. At trial, the district court granted Kendall’s motion for a directed verdict. The district court concluded that Easterling failed to prove a medical malpractice claim because she failed to present expert testimony to show that Kendall’s misdiagnosis was the proximate cause of her injuries. Easterling appealed, contending that expert testimony was not required under Idaho law to prove proximate cause in a medical malpractice action. Additionally, Easterling appealed the district court’s orders excluding opinion testimony from Easterling’s retained expert and treating physicians on the issue of causation and denying her motion to present rebuttal opinion testimony on causation in her case in chief. Kendall requested attorney fees on appeal. As to Easterling's claims of error on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. The Court found Kendall was not entitled to attorney fees on appeal. View "Easterling v. Kendall, M.D." on Justia Law

John Wickel appealed a district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing his claims for medical malpractice against Dr. David Chamberlain. Wickel sought treatment from Dr. Chamberlain for internal and external hemorrhoids. After Wickel was anesthetized, Dr. Chamberlain discovered an anal fissure. Dr. Chamberlain believed, based upon his discussions with Wickel prior to surgery, that the best course was to treat the anal fissure while Wickel was under anesthesia in order to address all issues in one operation. Dr. Chamberlain performed a fissurectomy and an internal lateral sphincterotomy. Following surgery, Wickel experienced significant pain and developed a perianal abscess. Wickel had several post-operation appointments with Dr. Chamberlain to address ongoing pain. At Wickel’s March 3, 2010, appointment, Dr. Chamberlain noted that the abscess appeared healed and released Wickel from his care. The pain continued, and Wickel returned to Dr. Chamberlain’s office on March 17, 2010, at which time Dr. Chamberlain diagnosed Wickel with a chronic anal fistula and recommended colorectal surgery. Wickel then saw Drs. William Peche and Peter Bossart in Salt Lake City, Utah. Dr. Peche performed a procedure in June of 2010 and noted that the staple line from the PPH procedure was too close to the dentate line which resulted in physical damage to Wickel’s sphincter. After minimal improvement, Wickel saw Dr. Bossart. Dr. Bossart performed an anal fistulectomy in August of 2010. By 2012, Wickel still suffered discomfort and incontinence. An independent medical exam opined that Wickel’s pain following the surgery by Dr. Chamberlain was attributable to improper placement of the staple line within the anal canal. After the district court granted Dr. Chamberlain’s motion for summary judgment, Wickel moved for reconsideration, which the district court denied. Wickel appealed and Dr. Chamberlain cross-appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court remanded the matter to the district court for entry of a final judgment conforming to the requirements of I.R.C.P. 54(a), and Wickel filed a second motion for reconsideration. The district court denied Wickel’s second motion for reconsideration, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion. Following entry of a final judgment, both parties amended their notices of appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred in concluding it lacked jurisdiction to decide the second motion for reconsideration; as a result, the district court did not reach the merits of Wickel's motion or Dr. Chamberlain's cross-appeal. The Supreme Court vacated the order denying Wickel’s second motion for reconsideration and remanded for further proceedings. View "Wickel v. Chamberlain" on Justia Law

During Vivian Harrison’s divorce proceeding to Kirk Harrison, Kirk hired psychiatrist Norton Roitman to conduct a psychiatric analysis of Vivian. Without meeting with or examining Vivian, Dr. Roitman submitted to the court a written report diagnosing Vivian with a personality disorder. Vivian subsequently filed a complaint against Dr. Roitman, alleging that his statements constituted, inter alia, medical malpractice and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted Roitman’s motion to dismiss, concluding that Dr. Roitman was absolutely immune from liability for each of Vivian’s causes of action because he was a witness preparing an expert report in connection with the matter in controversy at the time he made the statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even if the allegations contained in Vivian’s complaint were true, Dr. Roitman's defense of absolute immunity precluded her claim. View "Harrison v. Roitman" on Justia Law

After all defendants to the original complaint filed responsive pleadings in Mary Meeks’s medical malpractice suit, Meeks obtained leave of court and filed a first amended complaint, adding as a defendant the manufacturer of a medical device, Hologic, Inc. A doctor performed an outpatient diagnostic hysteroscopy and an endometrial ablation on Meeks at the Northwest Regional Medical Center in Clarksdale using a Novasure medical device manufactured and sold by Hologic to treat Meeks’s menorrhagia. Meeks did not serve the first amended complaint on Hologic but instead filed a second amended complaint without leave of court or permission from all defendants. Hologic filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Meeks’s claims against Hologic were federally preempted and that Meeks’s claims additionally were barred by the statute of limitations. Because Meeks failed to obtain leave of court or permission from the defendants to file the second complaint, and because the first was never served on Hologic, the Supreme Court found that the statute of limitations had expired against Hologic and that the trial court properly granted Hologic’s motion to dismiss. View "Mary Meeks v. Hologic, Inc." on Justia Law

Alan and Linda Anderson filed a medical malpractice action against Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital but failed to designate an expert timely in accordance with the scheduling order imposed by the Circuit Court. The Andersons filed their expert designation out of time, along with a motion for continuance. The hospital moved to strike the expert designation and moved for summary judgment. The circuit court granted a continuance to the Andersons and denied both the hospital’s motion to strike and its motion for summary judgment. The hospital filed an interlocutory appeal to challenge the denial of its motion for summary judgment. But after review, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court. View "Sharkey Issaquena Community Hospital v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Hawver claims that the Jackson, Michigan, Center for Family Health a federally qualified health center, caused her mother’s death by providing negligent medical care. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides the exclusive remedy for claims against federally qualified health centers such as Family Health, 42 U.S.C. 233. By the time Hawver filed suit, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to claims under the Act had run. The district court dismissed, holding that failure to satisfy the Act’s statute of limitations requirements doubles as a failure to satisfy the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of the federal courts and precludes equitable tolling. After the district court’s decision, the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision, United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, held that the Act’s statute of limitations requirements do not implicate the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal courts and that equitable tolling may save a late claim in some circumstances. The Sixth Circuit remanded to the district court to determine whether equitable tolling saves Hawver’s claim. View "Hawver v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint against Defendant, a medical doctor, alleging claims based on medical negligence, Defendant’s failure to obtain informed consent, and battery. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to the medical battery claim. After a trial as to Plaintiffs’ informed consent claim, the jury returned a verdict for Defendant. The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) the district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs’ battery claim; but (2) the district court erred by excluding expert testimony that a fine-needle aspiration biopsy was a viable non-surgical alternative to a surgical biopsy. View "Bradley v. Sugarbaker" on Justia Law

While being treated at South Nassau Communities Hospital by medical professionals employed by Island Medical Physicians, P.C. (collectively, Defendants), Lorraine Walsh was treated with medication that impaired her ability to safely operate an automobile. Afterwards, Walsh drove herself from the Hospital and was involved in an accident that injured Edwin Davis. Davis and his wife (together, Plaintiffs) brought this action against Defendants. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Defendants did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs to warn Walsh that the medication Defendants gave to Walsh either impaired or could have impaired her ability to safely operate a motor vehicle following her departure from the Hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified by denying Defendants’ motions to dismiss the complaint, holding that where a medical provider has administered to a patient medication that impairs or could impair the patient’s ability operate an automobile safely, the medical provider has a duty to third parties to warn the patient of that danger. View "Davis v. S. Nassau Communities Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was admitted to the intensive care unit at the Sanford USD Medical Center (Hospital) after being struck in the throat and head during an altercation. Plaintiff insisted on leaving the Hospital against medical advice. After Plaintiff left the Hospital, he brutally assaulted his neighbors. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to multiple charges related to the assault but was found not guilty by reason of mental illness. Plaintiff later brought this suit against the Hospital, alleging that the Hospital negligently failed to assess his mental condition after he insisted on leaving against medical advice, which made him a danger to himself and others. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on the grounds that S.D. Codified Laws 34-12C-7 applied, which provides good faith immunity to health care providers who follow a patient’s direction for his or her own health care, and that Plaintiff alleged no facts alleging bad faith. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court correctly found that section 34-12C-7 applies and that there was no disputed issue of material fact that the Hospital acted in good faith. View "Klein v. Sanford USD Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

In 2010, Dr. James Peoples treated Mattie Aldridge for recurrent deep-vein thrombosis. During her stay at the hospital, Dr. Peoples placed Aldridge on anticoagulation therapy. Almost two months later, after she had been transferred into the care of Trinity Mission Health & Rehabilitation of Clinton (“Trinity”), Aldridge presented to St. Dominic with a brain bleed. And two months after that, Aldridge died. The following year, Tamara Glenn, Aldridge’s daughter, filed suit alleging that Dr. Peoples negligently had caused Aldridge’s death by prescribing Coumadin. Dr. Peoples filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Glenn v. Peoples" on Justia Law