Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Under the New Jersey Affidavit of Merit statute, plaintiff in a medical malpractice action must provide an affidavit from an equivalently credentialed physician attesting that there is a reasonable probability that the defendant physician’s treatment fell outside acceptable professional standards. Plaintiff Robert Buck sued defendant Dr. James Henry, who had diagnosed Buck as suffering from depression and insomnia and prescribed an anti-depressant and a sleep aid. Plaintiff alleged that Dr. Henry failed to properly treat him. In March 2009, Plaintiff provided an affidavit of merit signed by Dr. Larry Kirstein, a licensed psychiatrist, who concluded that Dr. Henry’s treatment fell outside acceptable standards. In April 2009, due to a clerical error, the trial court mistakenly issued an order stating that “all issues involving the Affidavit of Merit statute have been addressed” and “there is no need” for a Ferreira conference. Dr. Henry moved for summary judgment, claiming that the affidavits were not from equivalent specialists. The court found that Dr. Henry was a family-medicine specialist based on his certification and, thus, Plaintiff was required to obtain an affidavit from a specialist in family medicine. The court therefore granted Dr. Henry’s motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate and trial courts and remanded a Ferreira conference. The Court found Plaintiff acted in good faith in filing affidavits of merit from two different medical specialists; and if the conference had been conducted as required and the trial court found deficiencies, Plaintiff would have had additional time to submit an affidavit that conformed to the merit statute. View "Buck v. Henry" on Justia Law

After being diagnosed with prostate cancer, Philip Baker filed a notice of claim in accordance with the Health Security Act, alleging that his primary care physician violated the applicable standard of care by failing to refer him to a urologist earlier, thus delaying his diagnosis. The superior court granted partial summary judgment to the doctor, finding that the three-year statute of limitations barred Baker's claims for negligent acts or omissions occurring more than three years before he filed his notice. In so ruling, the court declined to recognize the continuing negligent treatment doctrine, which allows a patient to assert a cause of action for professional negligence based upon two or more related negligent acts or omissions by a health care provider or practitioner if some, but not all, of the acts or omissions occurred outside of the statute of limitations period. The Supreme Court vacated the partial summary judgment, holding that the language of the Health Security Act authorizes claims of continuing negligent treatment. Remanded. View "Baker v. Farrand" on Justia Law

Appellee Younus Ismail, M.D. appealed a trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment pertaining to claims made by Appellants Randy and Joy Paradise. Mr. Paradise was treated in the emergency room of Highlands Medical Center, and a chest x-ray was ordered as part of his treatment. While in the radiology department, he fell and was injured. Mr. and Mrs. Paradise filed suit alleging negligence and wantonness stemming from Mr. Paradise's injuries. Dr. Ismail was the emergency room physician "in charge and control of [Mr.] Paradise's treatment." The Doctor filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing the claim was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the claim was indeed time-barred as to Dr. Ismail. The Court vacated the trial court's order denying the Doctor's motion and remanded the case for the trial court to enter summary judgment in the Doctor's favor. View "Paradise v. Highlands Medical Ctr." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the applicable standard that courts should use in determining whether a medical expert is qualified to testify as an expert witness in a medical malpractice case. Donna Shipley filed a medical malpractice action against two doctors and a hospital, alleging various claims for medical negligence. The trial court granted the hospital and one doctor summary judgment. After disqualifying Shipley's medical experts, the trial court granted summary judgment to the remaining defendant, Dr. Williams, and dismissed Shipley's case. The court of appeals upheld the trial court's decision to disqualify Shipley's medical experts but reversed the grant of summary judgment on Shipley's negligence claims. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the trial court's judgment disqualifying Shipley's medical experts; (2) reversed the judgment of the court of appeals in part and reinstated summary judgment in Dr. Williams' favor on one of Shipley's negligence claims; and (3) vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment on Shipley's remaining claims. Remanded. View "Shipley v. Williams" on Justia Law

The estate of Charles Harris filed a medical malpractice action against John Lee, M.D. and the Forest Family Practice Clinic. Days before trial, the estate tried to move the circuit court to transfer venue based on Dr. Lee's status in the community and his son's position as the local sheriff. The circuit court denied the estate's motion. In jury selection, the estate exercised only seven of its ten peremptory challenges. Ultimately the empaneled jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Lee and the clinic. On appeal, the estate argued multiple errors at trial pertaining to voir dire and to the court's jury instructions warranted a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court found certain jurors' lack of candor during voir dire, and subsequent disclosures and opinions that surfaced only during jury deliberations constituted misconduct that the trial court should have considered before denying the estate's motion to set aside the verdict. Therefore, the Court reversed the circuit court's denial of the estate's motion to set aside the verdict and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Merchant v. Forest Family Practice Clinic, PA" on Justia Law

Jacob Gordon's mother sued Howard Community Hospital, alleging it committed medical malpractice while caring for her newborn son. In another count of the complaint, the mother sought separate damages for spoliation, alleging that the hospital had lost certain medical records associated with Gordon's care and that this loss made it impossible for Gordon to pursue a medical malpractice claim against one of his doctors, who was also a defendant. The trial court granted the Gordons partial summary judgment with respect to the third-party spoliation claim. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the court of appeals and reversed the grant of partial summary judgment, holding that because the Court had so far declined to recognize a count alleging spoliation as representing a separate cause of action, the hospital was entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Remanded. View "Howard Reg'l Health Sys. v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Appellants Bobbi Young and Linda Carter, next of kin to Clarence Young, appealed an order of the circuit court that granted summary judgment in favor of Respondent Dr. Robert Smith and Baptist Memorial Hospital. On appeal, the Youngs argued that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to grant their "motion to withdraw admissions" filed seven years after the admissions were otherwise "conclusively established." Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the circuit court's ruling was well within its discretion under the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court further affirmed the circuit court's finding that no genuine issue of material fact remained regarding the Youngs' claims against Dr. Smith and the hospital, and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in the Doctor's favor. View "Young v. Smith" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the issue before the Supreme Court pertained to whether Plaintiffs Willie and Beverly Driver were entitled to amend their original notice of intent (NOI) when adding a nonparty defendant to their pending litigation in order that the NOI related back to the original filing for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. Upon review of the NOI at issue and the Court's decision in "Bush v. Shabahang," the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to amend an original NOI to add nonparty defendants so that the amended NOI relates back to the original filing. The Court affirmed the result reached by the Court of Appeals on this issue, and reversed the case in all other aspects. View "Driver v. Naini " on Justia Law

Edris Ligons underwent a colonoscopy. Four days later, she developed vomiting, diarrhea, chills and fever. She was admitted to the emergency room at Defendant Crittenton Hospital. Ms. Ligons refused to be admitted to the hospital. The hospital discharged her after giving her antibiotics, treating her for dehydration and giving her instructions to follow up with her treating physician the next day. Tests and exploratory surgery would reveal that Ms. Ligons suffered from a perforated colon, inflamed pelvic mass and an abscess. She had advanced liver failure brought in part by 30 years of alcoholism. Removal of the colon was impossible due to Ms. Ligons' preexisting conditions. Ms. Ligons never recovered from the surgery and died in early 2002. Plaintiff was the personal representative of Ms. Ligons' estate. He delivered a notice of intent (NOI) to sue to the Hospital and the doctors involved ("Defendants"). Plaintiff delivered a supplemental NOI providing more detail regarding proximate cause. Plaintiff then filed suit accompanied by two affidavits of merit (AOM). Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the NOIs and AOM did not comply with the governing statutes. The trial court denied Defendant's motions, and the Court of Appeals found that the AOMs were insufficient. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the AOMs at issue in this case were filed after both the limitations and saving periods had expired. The Court held in such cases, dismissal with prejudice must follow because "allowing amendment of the deficient AOM would directly conflict with the statutory scheme governing medical malpractice actions, the clear language of the court rules and precedent of this Court." The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals which dismissed Plaintiff's case with prejudice. View "Ligons v. Crittenton Hospital" on Justia Law

After Madeleine Willson died of metastatic breast cancer and acute aspiration pneumonia, Robert Willson filed a complaint against Benefis Hospitals, Peace Hospice, and Dr. T. Brice Addison for medical malpractice. Robert alleged that the administration of medication expedited Madeleine's death and that Madeleine did not give informed consent to administration of the medications. Benefis filed two motions for summary judgment, the first of which argued that Robert had failed to establish causation through qualified expert testimony. Robert filed a motion for summary judgment seeking default judgment as a sanction for Benefis' alleged spoliation of evidence. The district court granted summary judgment on the issue of causation in favor of Benefis and Dr. Addison. The court denied Robert's motion, finding Robert failed to prove spoliation. On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to Benefis and Dr. Addison, and (2) although the district court denied Robert's motion for summary judgment for the wrong reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion where sanctions were not appropriate. View "In re Estate of Willson v. Addison" on Justia Law