Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Terrance White appealed a superior court's order in his wrongful death action that granted summary judgment to Defendant Fletcher Allen Health Care, Inc. This case arose from the suicide of Plaintiff's fourteen-year-old daughter. Plaintiff sued Defendant, which employed a psychiatrist who was briefly involved with the decedent's case through a telepsychiatry research study. Plaintiff argued that summary judgment was improperly granted on the issue of the duty owed to decedent by the psychiatrist. Ultimately, the trial court found that the psychiatrist's contact with decedent was "so minimal as to not establish a physician-patient relationship," and consequently found that no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. Even assuming that a doctor-patient relationship was established, the court concluded that it was terminated following the video-conference and, thus, any duty was extinguished by termination of the relationship and no duty existed at the time of decedent's death. The court thus granted defendant's summary judgment motion. Plaintiff argued that the court erred in finding that the doctor owed no duty to decedent. They maintained that the doctor had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect decedent from the danger she posed to herself, and that the doctor did not effectively terminate the doctor-patient relationship prior to decedent's death. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiff and thus reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for additional proceedings. View "White v. Harris" on Justia Law

Linda Mohr suffered a trauma-induced stroke and became permanently disabled. She and her husband, Charles, claimed that negligent treatment by her health care providers caused Mrs. Mohr a loss of the chance of a better outcome. In "Herskovits v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound," the Supreme Court recognized the "lost chance doctrine" in a survival action when the plaintiff died following the alleged failure of his doctor to timely diagnose his lung cancer. The Mohr's case "compel[led]" consideration of whether, in the medical malpractice context, there was a cause of action for a lost chance, even when the ultimate result is some serious harm short of death. The Supreme Court held that there was such a cause of action and, accordingly, reversed the order of summary judgment. View "Mohr v. Grantham" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the executor of a decedent's estate, settled medical malpractice claims against several medical care providers for the decedent's wrongful death. Plaintiff then initiated this action against Defendant, the Indiana Patient's Compensation Fund, for damages that exceeded the $250,000 future value of her settlement with the medical providers pursuant to the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. The trial court awarded Plaintiff the full amount. Defendant appealed, challenging the trial court's ruling that damages under the Adult Wrongful Death Statute (AWDS) included expenses of administration, contingent attorney fees, and loss of services. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that such damages may be sought under the AWDS. View "Ind. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Brown" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Penny Cummings filed a medical malpractice action against Defendants, a doctor and a health care facility. The trial court entered judgment for Defendants after a jury found that Defendants were not liable for Plaintiff's injuries. Based on two affidavits submitted by jurors after the trial alleging juror misconduct, Plaintiff filed a motion to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order setting aside the verdict and awarding a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court erred by considering the evidence of alleged juror misconduct in the form of the two affidavits because the affidavits were inadmissible pursuant to N.C. R. Evid. 606(b), which reflects the common law rule that affidavits of jurors are inadmissible for the purposes of impeaching the verdict except as they pertain to extraneous influences that may have affected the jury's decision. View "Cummings v. Ortega" on Justia Law

Following the death of plaintiff's wife, plaintiff amended the complaint for medical malpractice in a pending action against defendants, to include a claim for wrongful death. The wrongful death claim in the amended complaint was subsequently dismissed as time barred pursuant to G.L.c. 260, section 4 (statute of repose), and plaintiff appealed. The court held that a wrongful death claim could be substituted for a personal injury claim only where the trial had not commenced; the original complaint alleging malpractice was filed within the statutes of limitation and repose; and the allegations of liability supporting the personal injury claim were the same as those supporting the wrongful death claim. Accordingly, the court held that the wrongful death claim in this case should not have been dismissed where plaintiff could, after the period of time set forth in the statue of repose had expired, amend a complaint alleging medical malpractice resulting in injury including expected premature death. View "Sisson, Jr., et al. v. Lhowe, et al." on Justia Law

Richard Compere appealed a trial court’s dismissal with prejudice and its imposition of monetary sanctions for his filing a second medical-malpractice action against Dr. Bryan Lantrip and St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital. The Hinds County Circuit Court imposed these sanctions because Compere previously had filed the same action, and it was pending at the time Compere filed his second complaint. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the trial court erred in dismissing the second complaint with prejudice and imposing monetary sanctions. Therefore, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Compere v. St. Dominic Jackson Mem. Hosp." on Justia Law

On December 12, 2002, Defendant Dr. Steven Wenrich delivered Plaintiff Cynthia Provencio's fourth child via caesarean section. Prior to surgery, Mrs. Provencio consented to Defendant contemporaneously performing a tubal ligation procedure on her sole fallopian tube because she did not wish to have additional children. After completing the surgeries, Defendant sent a portion of what he believed was ligated fallopian tube to a laboratory for analysis. The resulting pathology report revealed that the tissue Defendant had ligated was ligament, not fallopian tube, and Plaintiff still could conceive children. Since the Supreme Court issued "Lovelace Medical Center v. Mendez," (111 N.M. 336 (1991)) more than 20 years ago, the Court has not had an opportunity to clarify whether a doctor who negligently performs a tubal ligation procedure, but who then informs the patient of her continued fertility, may be sued for the future costs of raising a subsequently conceived child to the age of majority. Upon review, the Court held that those particular damages are only available when a doctor has breached a duty to inform. In this case, the Court of Appeals held otherwise, concluding that notice of continued fertility, or lack thereof, was merely a factor for the jury to consider as questions of causation and comparative fault. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and affirmed the district court's dismissal of this action. View "Provencio v. Wenrich" on Justia Law

This was an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a motion to sever and transfer venue. Plaintiffs Hattie Douglas, Kevin Hamlin, and the victim’s five siblings (collectively Plaintiffs) filed a complaint in circuit court against Sunshine Medical Clinic; Dr. Vibha Vig, in her official and personal capacities and Lisa Hoehn, nurse practitioner, in her official and personal capacities (collectively Defendants). The Plaintiffs alleged a medical-negligence and negligent-hiring cause of action against Defendants concerning the treatment and care of their minor son and brother, Kaddarius Douglas (Kaddarius) received before he died. Plaintiffs, in the same complaint, also brought claims against the Mississippi Crime Laboratory; Mississippi State Medical Examiners; Dr. Steven Hayne, in his official and personal capacities; Expertox, Inc.; and MedScreens, Inc. (Wrongful Incarceration Defendants) asserting that their acts and omissions in performing a postmortem examination and toxicological tests on Kaddarius's body, as well as in storing and handling blood and urine samples, caused the wrongful incarceration of Hattie Douglas for the murder of Kaddarius. All Defendants moved to have the trial court sever the claims and to transfer the claims against the Wrongful-Incarceration Defendants and to transfer the claims against the medical-negligence Defendants to another county court. The trial court denied the motion. All Defendants brought an interlocutory appeal to severe the two claims and transfer venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in not severing and transferring the claims to their proper venues. The Court the circuit court's judgment and remanded the case for severance and transfer. View "Miss. Crime Lab. v. Douglas" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, Husband alleged that Defendants, several physicians, a hospital and others, caused his Wife's death by negligently failing to administer an expensive drug to treat her hypertension. Because the drug needed to be administered indefinitely and could cause deadly symptoms if its administration was interrupted, Wife's treating physicians decided not to administer the drug until Wife's insurer approved it or another source of payment could be found. Wife died before either happened. The jury returned a general verdict for Defendant. Husband then filed a motion for a new trial, which the court granted based on its conclusion that Defendants' expert testimony was inconsistent with the standard of care. At issue on appeal was whether under the circumstances of this case, an expert medical witness is permitted to opine that under the customary standard of care, a physician should consider the health risks to a patient who may be unable to pay for continued treatment. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting a new trial, holding that such testimony is admissible and that, as a matter of law, it could not be said that Defendants' decisions in this case violated the standard of care. View "Murray v. UNMC Physicians" on Justia Law

Lita St. John sued Dr. Linda Peterson, alleging medical malpractice in repairing a vesicovaginal fistula. The jury entered a verdict for Peterson. St. John appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of other cases where Peterson failed to repair vesicovaginal fistulas. The Supreme Court held that the trial court misstated and apparently misapplied the balancing test of S.C. R. Evid. 403, which states that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Because it was possible that the exclusion of the evidence in all probability affected the outcome of the jury's verdict and thereby constituted prejudicial error, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded. View "St. John v. Peterson" on Justia Law