Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants, health care practitioners and health care facilities, alleging claims for medical negligence, wrongful death, and statutory abuse and neglect arising from the care of Patient. The district court denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment, and the Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for writ of mandamus, finding that the court abused its discretion in not granting summary judgment in Defendants' favor because the claims failed to comply with the affidavit requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. Plaintiffs subsequently filed a new complaint, reasserting the dismissed medical malpractice claims, but the statute of limitations for Plaintiffs' claims had passed. The district court applied Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.500, Nevada's savings statute, to save the time-barred medical malpractice claims. The Supreme Court subsequently granted Defendants' writ for mandamus relief, holding that section 11.500 does not save medical malpractice claims dismissed for failure to comply with section 41A.071 because these claims are void, and section 11.500 applies only to actions that have been "commenced." View "Wheble v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Patient received medical treatment from Nurse at Medical Clinic. Nurse prescribed Patient at least six medications. With all of these drugs in his system, Patient shot and killed his wife. Patient subsequently pled guilty to aggravated murder. Patient's children (Plaintiffs) filed suit through their conservator against Nurse, her consulting physician, and Medical Clinic (collectively Defendants), alleging negligence in the prescription of the medications that caused Patient's violent outburst and his wife's death. The district court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, concluding that Nurse owed no duty of care to Plaintiffs because no patient-health care provider relationship existed at the time of the underlying events between Plaintiffs and Defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that healthcare providers owe nonpatients a duty to exercise reasonable care in the affirmative act of prescribing medications that pose a risk of injury to third parties. View "Jeffs v. West" on Justia Law

Lisa Mullins, the widow and administrator of the estate of Charles Mullins, filed a complaint against Appellants, a doctor and a medical facility, alleging negligence in the treatment of Charles that resulted in his death. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate. The court of appeals remanded the matter, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on Lisa's alleged contributory negligence and denying Appellants' motion for a new trial. On remand, Lisa filed a complaint in the court of appeals for a writ of prohibition to prevent the judge sitting in the court of common pleas from retrying the issue of the medical negligence of Appellants at a second jury trial. The court of appeals granted the writ to prevent the judge from retrying the negligence issue in the case against Appellants. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and denied the writ, holding that the court erred in determining that a retrial of the negligence claim against Appellants patently and unambiguously violated the court's mandate in the prior appeal. View "State ex rel. Mullins v. Court of Common Pleas (Curran)" on Justia Law

Appellants, Little Rock Healthcare (LRHC), a nursing care facility; Donald Bedell, the sole member of the governing body for LRHC; and Heartland Personnel Leasing, appealed from a judgment in favor of Appellee Brenda Williams, as personal representative of the Estate of Minnie Valentine, who died after being discharged from LRHC. The Supreme Court reversed, dismissing Bedell and remanding for a new trial as to LRHC and Heartland, holding (1) the circuit court erred by denying Bedell's directed-verdict motion and judgment notwithstanding the verdict as Bedell owed no personal duty to Valentine; and (2) the circuit court erred in excluding Valentine's post discharge medical evidence, which error was prejudicial and warranted a new trial. View "Bedell v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the widow of a decedent and the adult children of her marriage with the decedent. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Wrongful Death Statute against University of Maryland Medical Systems Corporation (UMMSC). In their complaint, Plaintiffs did not identify or notify a stepson, Ricky Muti, whom the decedent had adopted during a prior marriage. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims arising from the failure to name Ricky as a "use" plaintiff in violation of Md. R. 15-1001. The court of special appeals held (1) Plaintiffs violated Rule 15-1001, and (2) the circuit court abused its discretion by denying Plaintiffs' leave to amend without first considering whether Ricky would be prejudiced by the denial. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the special court of appeals and remanded with instructions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the circuit court abused its discretion in dismissing Plaintiffs' wrongful death claims as a sanction for the omission, where there was no basis for inferring that Ricky was omitted as a use plaintiff for the purpose of hiding the litigation from home or in the hope that Plaintiffs would increase their recovery. View "Univ. of Md. Med. Sys. Corp. v. Muti" on Justia Law

The Eighth District Court of Appeals certified a conflict between its decision in this case and a decision of the Tenth District Court of Appeals on the question of whether Ohio Rev. Code 2315.21(B), as amended by S.B. 80, was unconstitutional, in violation of the Ohio Constitution, because it was a procedural law that conflicted with Ohio R. Civ. P. 42(B). Section 2315.21(B) created a substantive right to bifurcation in tort actions when claims for compensatory and punitive damages had been asserted. The state Court of Appeals held that section 2315.21(B) was unconstitutional because it conflicted with Rule 24(B), in violation of the separation of powers required by the state Constitution, by purporting to "legislate a strictly procedural matter already addressed by the Civil Rules." The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 2315.21(B) creates, defines, and regulates a substantive, enforceable right to separate stages of trial relating to the presentation of evidence for compensatory and punitive damages in tort actions and therefore takes precedence over Rule 42(B) and does not violate the Ohio Constitution, as it is a substantive law that prevails over a procedural rule. View "Havel v. Villa St. Joseph" on Justia Law

Appellants, Theresa and Eddie Paulino, filed an action against Appellees, QHG of Springdale and NorthWest Arkansas Hospitals (collectively, NMC), for negligent credentialing and negligent retention after three surgeries left Mrs. Paulino unable to walk. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of NMC, concluding that, inter alia, the Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing, nor did a cause of action for negligent credentialing exist in Arkansas. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that (1) the Medical Malpractice Act did not confer a cause of action for negligent credentialing; (2) there did not exist nor was it necessary to create a tort for negligent credentialing; and (3) because the nurse that monitored the surgeries was the employee of an independent contractor, NMC could not be held liable for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of the nurse. View "Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court's dismissal of his state-law claims against Stryker under Rule 12(b)(6). Plaintiff alleged in his complaint that a hip replacement product manufactured by Stryker malfunctioned and caused him injury. The court affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's strict liability, design defect, negligence, and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA), Tex. Bus. Comm. Code 17.41 et seq., claims to the extent they were premised on a failure to warn or a marketing defect; affirmed as to plaintiff's breach of express warranty claims; and reversed and remanded the following: (1) plaintiff's strict liability and negligence claims, to the extent they were based on manufacturing defects that violated the FDA's Current Good Manufacturing Practices or are inconsistent with Stryker's manufacturing processes or procedures that were approved by the FDA; (2) his claim for breach of an implied warranty to the extent it relied on the failure to comply with the FDA's requirements; and (3) his DTPA claim, to the extent that it relied on a breach of an implied warranty. View "Bass v. Stryker Corp., et al." on Justia Law

In McQuitty I, Dylan McQuitty, by and through his parents, successfully sued Ms. McQuitty's physician and his practice (collectively, Spangler) for having failed to obtain Ms. McQuitty's informed consent to treatment, which resulted in severe injuries to Dylan during his birth. In a series of post-trial motions following McQuitty I, Spangler moved to reduce the verdict in favor of the McQuittys. After the verdict but prior to resolution of the post-trial motions, Dylan died. The circuit court found that Dylan's death did not absolve the portion of the judgment allocated to Dylan's future medical expenses. The Court of Appeals held (1) the trial court properly denied Spangler's motions for post-trial relief; (2) the post-verdict death of Dylan did not absolve Spangler from the finality of the jury's award of future medical expenses; (3) the hospital, for which summary judgment was entered in its favor as to liability and damages during McQuitty I, was not a joint tort-feasor under Maryland's Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, such that its settlement release from the McQuittys did not entitle Spangler to a reduction of the judgment against them; and (4) post-judgment interest on the verdict accrued from the date of the original judgment. View "Spangler v. McQuitty" on Justia Law

Teresa Broussard brought a medical malpractice action against, inter alia, Dr. Stephen Seffense and Dr. Michael Coleman, Jr. after she developed and was treated for a burn following a surgery. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Defendants. Broussard appealed, asserting that the trial court erred in finding that Ark. Code Ann. 16-114-206(a), which requires that proof in medical malpractice cases must be made by expert testimony by medical care providers of the same speciality as the defendant, was constitutional. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the statute violated the separation-of-powers doctrine and the inherent authority of the courts to protect the integrity of proceedings and the rights of litigants. Remanded. View "Broussard v. St. Edward Mercy Health Sys." on Justia Law