Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants alleging claims of medical malpractice and then later filed a claim for elder abuse. At issue is whether the definition of neglect under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, Welf. & Inst. Code, 15600 et seq., applies when a health care provider - delivering care on an outpatient basis - fails to refer an elder patient to a specialist. The court concluded that the Act does not apply unless the defendant health care provider had a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship, involving ongoing responsibility for one or more basic needs, with the elder patient. It is the nature of the elder or dependent adult‘s relationship with the defendant - not the defendant‘s professional standing - that makes the defendant potentially liable for neglect. In this case, because defendants did not have a caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent, the court found that plaintiffs cannot adequately allege neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. Plaintiffs rely solely on defendants‘ allegedly substandard provision of medical treatment, on an outpatient basis, to an elder. But without more, such an allegation does not support the conclusion that neglect occurred under the Elder Abuse Act. View "Winn v. Pioneer Med. Grp." on Justia Law

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Thompson, who suffered from Alzheimer’s disease, resided at CMO’s nursing facility, 2001-2011. Following his death, his estate filed suit, alleging that Thompson’s injuries and death resulted from the abuse and neglect he suffered while a resident at the nursing facility. The complaint also sought damages in connection with systemic problems at the nursing facility concerning staffing, budgeting and allocation of resources, and inappropriate policies and procedures under the West Virginia Nursing Home Act (W.Va. Code 16­ 5C-15) and in violation of the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act (W.Va. Code 46A-6-101 to -110). 4 At trial, the petitioner introduced evidence of falls, subdural hematoma, hip fracture, malnutrition, personal dignity violations, and extreme pain. The state’s highest court granted a new trial on the personal injury claim, but denied on as to the wrongful death claim. The trial court erred by applying the two-year limitations period under theMedical Professional Liability Act in a manner that prevented introduction of pertinent evidence of Thompson’s injuries. View "Williams v. CMO Mgmt., LLC" on Justia Law

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Ho Im Bae died from acute morphine intoxication at Lakeside Adult Family Home. Esther Kim, the personal representative of Bae's estate, brought tort claims against several individuals involved in Bae's care. The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review came from Alpha Nursing & Services Inc. and two of its nurses, who did not provide nursing services to Bae, but who were alleged to have observed signs of abuse and physical assault that should have been reported to the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) and law enforcement. Specifically, the issue was whether the abuse of vulnerable adults act (AVAA) created an implied cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse. The trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that one of the nurses did not have a duty to report and the other nurse fulfilled her reporting duty by contacting DSHS. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue: "[t]he AVAA creates a private cause of action against mandated reporters who fail to report abuse, and genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment." A separate issue was whether the claims against one of the nurses should have been dismissed for insufficient service. The nurse, Christine Thomas, moved to Norway, and plaintiff personally served her there almost a year after filing and amended complaint and properly serving Alpha. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the nurse's motion to dismiss: "Consistent with Norway's ratification of the Hague Convention, however, the plaintiff acted with reasonable diligence in serving Thomas through Norway's designated central authority." View "Kim v. Lakeside Adult Family Home" on Justia Law

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The question this case presented for the Oregon Supreme Court's review was whether a statute limiting a state employee’s tort liability violated either the remedy clause of Article I, section 10, of the Oregon Constitution or the jury trial clauses of Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court held that the statute, as applied to the state employee, violated each of those provisions and entered a limited judgment against the employee for the full amount of the jury’s verdict. Plaintiff’s six-month-old son developed a cancerous mass on his liver. Two doctors at Oregon Health & Science University (OHSU) participated in an operation to remove the mass: Dr. Harrison, a specialist in pediatric surgery, and Dr. Durant, a pediatric surgical fellow in training. During the operation, the doctors inadvertently transected blood vessels going to the child’s liver, resulting in the child having to undergo a liver transplant, removal of his spleen, additional surgeries, and lifetime monitoring due to the risks resulting from the doctors’ act. Plaintiff brought this action on her son’s behalf against Harrison, Durant, OHSU, and Pediatric Surgical Associates, P.C. The trial court granted Pediatric Surgical Associates’ motion for summary judgment, and dismissed Durant as a result of an agreement among plaintiff, OHSU, and Harrison. Pursuant to that agreement, Harrison and OHSU admitted liability for the child’s injuries and plaintiff’s case against Harrison and OHSU went to the jury to determine the amount of the child’s damages. The jury found that plaintiff’s son had sustained and will sustain economic damages of $6,071,190.38 and noneconomic damages of $6,000,000. After the jury returned its verdict, OHSU and Harrison filed a motion to reduce the jury’s verdict to $3,000,000 based on the Oregon Tort Claims Act. The trial court granted the motion as to OHSU. The trial court, however, denied the motion as to Harrison. Harrison appealed. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that applying the Tort Claims Act limit to plaintiff’s claim against defendant did not violate the remedy clause in Article I, section 10, nor does giving effect to that limit violate the jury trial clauses in Article I, section 17, or Article VII (Amended), section 3. View "Horton v. OHSU" on Justia Law

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After Defendant performed surgery on Plaintiff’s back, Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging medical negligence and negligent failure to obtain informed consent. Defendant moved for summary judgment, alleging that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim of negligent failure to obtain informed consent because Plaintiff did not have medical expert testimony as to the “materiality” of the risk to support his claim. The circuit court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to both of Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment as to the claim of negligent failure to obtain informed consent, holding (1) the common law materiality factors do not apply to a claim of negligent failure to obtain informed consent, and the circuit court erred in relying upon them instead of on Haw. Rev. Stat. 671-3(b); (2) consequently, Defendant was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law based on lack of expert testimony as to the common law materiality factors; and (3) the circuit court erred in concluding that Defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiff’s claim of negligent failure to obtain informed consent. View "Garcia v. Robinson" on Justia Law

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Appellants Lucia Navo, Serena Navo, and Nicole Navo appealed the dismissal on summary judgment of a case arising out of the death of Ellery Navo during a surgery at Bingham Memorial Hospital (“BMH”). At trial, Appellants argued that BMH was liable both for its own negligence and for the negligent actions of certified nurse anesthetist Ryan Sayre (“Sayre”), an independent contractor who administered anesthesia services at BMH. Appellants supported their claim that BMH itself had been negligent with expert testimony from Dr. Samuel Steinberg. The district court held, inter alia, that: (1) Dr. Steinberg’s testimony was inadmissible because Appellants had failed to provide evidence that he was familiar with the relevant local standard of care; (2) Appellants had failed to provide any evidence that BMH employees had acted negligently; (3) Appellants had failed to plead that Sayre was an agent of BMH under a theory of apparent authority; (4) even if Appellants had properly pleaded a theory of apparent authority, they failed to provide evidence sufficient to create an issue of material fact; and (5) BMH was not entitled to discretionary costs, including attorney fees. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in holding that Appellants were barred from arguing "apparent authority in response the BMH's motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the Court concluded the district court erred in finding no genuine issue of material facts existed as to whether Sayre was BMH's agent under "apparent authority." The Supreme Court vacated the grant of summary judgment and the award of costs and fees and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Navo v. Bingham Memorial Hospital" on Justia Law

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This was a medical malpractice case premised in part on the doctrine of informed consent. Appellant Teresa Allen swallowed a small nail. She went to Duncan Regional Hospital's emergency room. Appellee John Harrison, D.O., emergency room physician (Physician), examined Allen. An X-ray confirmed the presence of a foreign body in Allen's stomach, just below the diaphragm. Based on Physician's assessment and clinical judgment, Physician discharged Allen prescribing: (1) "a high-fiber diet to let the nail pass;" (2) return to the hospital if she had any problems; and (3) follow up with her family doctor in three days. A few days later following severe vomiting, Allen went to the emergency room at Southwestern Hospital in Lawton. That same day, the hospital performed emergency surgery to remove the ingested nail from Allen's intestines. At that time, Allen was treated for a perforated and infected bowel. In addition, Allen endured two additional surgeries to treat the complications that arose from the initial surgery. Allen sued Duncan Regional Hospital and Physician for the defendants' alleged medical negligence and failure to obtain Allen's informed consent. Specifically, Allen contended that Physician failed to disclose the potential risk in letting the nail pass through her digestive system as well as the alternatives to his recommended course of treatment. Had Physician effectively discharged his duty to disclose, Allen would have "chosen the option of no treatment or a different course of treatment." The issue presented on certiorari review was whether the doctrine of informed consent required a physician to obtain the patient's consent before implementing a nonsurgical or noninvasive course of treatment. "Inherent in the question presented, is whether a physician-in addition to discussing with the patient treatment alternatives that the physician recommends-should discuss medically reasonable alternatives that the physician does not recommend." After review of the trial court record, the Oklahoma Supreme Court answered both of those questions in the affirmative. View "Allen v. Harrison" on Justia Law

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Joseph Mickels died from an incurable, terminal brain tumor. Mickels’ family (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought a wrongful death action against Defendant, a physician, for negligently failing to diagnose the tumor. Plaintiffs presented evidence that even though Mickels certainly would have died of his brain tumor with or without Defendant’s alleged negligence, he would not have died as early as he did had the brain tumor been properly diagnosed. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Defendant, concluding that Plaintiffs could not establish that Defendant’s negligence caused Mickels’ death so as to be actionable under Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.080.1. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that Plaintiffs cannot sue for wrongful death under section 537.080.1, but the allegations in the petition do state a cause of action for negligence that would have been actionable under Mo. Rev. Stat. 537.020 if brought by Mickels’ personal representative. Remanded. View "Mickels v. Danrad" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, the parents of a newborn baby, alleged that on June 12, 2012, their son died as a result of the medical malpractice of the Hospital defendants and the Baker defendants (Richard Baker, M.D. and Mary Beerworth, M.D.). It was undisputed that this filing was within the period established by the applicable statute of limitations. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the denial of motions to dismiss filed by the Hospital defendants and the Baker defendants. Both sets’ motions were predicated on plaintiffs’ failure to timely serve process. On appeal, the Baker defendants argued that the trial court’s grant of an enlargement of time to serve process expired prior to plaintiffs’ serving of the summons and complaint, while the Hospital defendants contended that although they signed a waiver of service, plaintiffs failed to file that waiver with the court before the expiration of the service period. Both sets of defendants also appealed the trial court’s conclusion that even if plaintiffs’ service was found to be untimely, it retained the authority to retroactively grant a motion for enlargement of time and extend the period for service after the running of the statute of limitations on the basis of excusable neglect. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Clark v. Baker" on Justia Law

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In November 2009, Plaintiff underwent a knee-replacement surgery at Sanford USD Medical Center. The day after the surgery, when he was still hospitalized, Plaintiff fell while walking with assistance from a patient-care technician. After being discharged, Plaintiff underwent inpatient rehabilitation and outpatient physical therapy. In September 2012, Plaintiff sought additional physical therapy for the alleged effects of the injury resulting from his fall. When Sanford declined to pay for additional treatment, Plaintiff commenced this action. Sanford moved for summary judgment, asserting that Plaintiff’s action was time-barred under S.D. Codified Laws 15-2-14.1 as a medical malpractice claim. The circuit court granted the motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he commenced his action within the three-year statute of limitations applicable to general-negligence actions and that the circuit court erred in determining his action was time barred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff’s action against Sanford was one for error or mistake, and therefore, section 15-2-14.1’s two-year period of repose applies; and (2) principles of estoppel and tolling are inapplicable to a period of repose, and the continuous-treatment rule did not toll section 15-2-14.1’s period of repose under the facts of this case. View "Pitt-Hart v. Sanford USD Med. Ctr." on Justia Law