Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Six days after his birth, Plaintiff suffered irreversible brain damage. Through his mother as guardian ad litem, Plaintiff sued his pediatrician and the hospital in which he was born. Before trial, Plaintiff and the pediatrician agreed to settlement of $1 million. At a jury trial, Plaintiff was awarded both economic and noneconomic damages. The jury found the pediatrician was fifty-five percent at fault and the hospital forty percent at fault. The court of appeal reversed the portion of the trial court's judgment awarding Plaintiff economic damages against the hospital after applying the common law "release rule," under which Plaintiff's settlement with the pediatrician also released the nonsettling hospital from liability for Plaintiff's economic damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the common law release rule is no longer to be followed in California; and (2) therefore, the defendant hospital remained jointly and severally liable for Plaintiff's economic damages. View "Leung v. Verdugo Hills Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, an obstetrician and gynecologist, contending that Defendant's failure to advise her that she should have her ovaries removed due to a family history of cancer resulted in her developing ovarian cancer. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court improperly permitted expert testimony and instructed the jury in a manner consistent with a claim of traditional medical negligence and asserting that Plaintiff's complaint necessarily sounded exclusively in informed consent rather than in medical negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court's decisions were proper because Plaintiff's complaint properly alleged medical negligence. View "Downs v. Trias" on Justia Law

Appellants sought a new trial in this medical battery/lack-of-consent case on the ground that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on the technical elements of battery, particularly the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact. They further maintained that the charge was erroneous because it instructed the jury that Appellants-Plaintiffs were required to prove that the surgeon who performed the allegedly unauthorized operation did so with the intent to harm. Viewing the jury charge in its entirety, the Supreme Court concluded that it clearly and accurately set forth the law. Contrary to Appellants' contentions, the jury charge did not require proof that the surgeon performed the operation with the intent to harm. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the order of the Superior Court, which affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment on the verdict in favor of Appellees. View "Cooper v. Lankenau Hospital, et al" on Justia Law

Deborah Watts filed the underlying medical malpractice action alleging that her son was born with disabling brain injuries because Cox Medical Centers and its associated physicians (collectively, Cox) provided negligent health care services. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Watts and awarded $1.45 million in non-economic damages and $3.37 million in future medical damages. The trial court entered a judgment reducing Watts' non-economic damages to $350,000 as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.210. The judgment also established a periodic payment schedule that required immediate payment of half of all net future medical damages with the other half paid in equal annual installments over the next fifty years with an interest rate of 0.26 percent. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgment to the extent it capped non-economic damages pursuant to section 538.210; (2) reversed the judgment to the extent that the trial court entered a periodic payment schedule that did not assure full recovery; and (3) affirmed in all other respects. View "Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs." on Justia Law

In 1998, Barbara Lanier's two-year-old son Darrell Gill Jr. died while being treated at the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMC) for a a rare genetic disorder – Chediak-Higashi Syndrome (CHS). Lanier filed a complaint against UMC alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. In 2008, the case was resolved by bench trial in circuit court with a verdict in favor of Lanier of $250,000. UMC appealed, raising four issues for the Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the trial court erred by denying UMC's motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations; (2) whether the trial court erred by denying UMC's motion for directed verdict; (3) whether the verdict was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred by granting Lanier's motion to conform the pleadings to the evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred by denying UMC's motion for a directed verdict. Because the Court reversed and rendered the case on that issue, the remaining issues were moot. View "University of Mississippi Medical Ctr. v. Lanier" on Justia Law

In this joint and several liability medical malpractice case, Defendant Dr. Martin Tuma sought a reduction of the final judgment rendered against him by the amount of his codefendants' settlement. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the common-law "setoff rule," whereby a jointly and severally liable tortfeasor is entitled to a setoff from any adverse verdict in the amount of the cotortfeasor's settlement, and the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, which limits a medical malpractice plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages. Both the circuit court and Court of Appeals held pursuant to "Markley v Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc." that the common-law setoff rule applied and that the setoff must be applied to the jury's verdict before application of the cap on noneconomic damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that "Markley" was correctly decided and thus held that the Legislature did not abolish the common-law setoff rule in the context of joint and several liability medical malpractice cases. "[The Court affirmed] the Court of Appeals in this regard and further clarif[ed] that where the Legislature has retained principles of joint and several liability, the common-law setoff rule applie[d]. The lower courts' sequencing of the setoff and the noneconomic damages cap, however, result[ed]in an outcome contrary to the Legislature's requirement that medical malpractice plaintiffs 'shall not' recover more noneconomic losses than the amount determined by MCL 600.1483. . . . Because application of the setoff to the jury's verdict can result in a recovery beyond those statutorily mandated damages limitations," the Court held further that a joint tortfeasor's settlement must be set off from the final judgment after application of the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, as well as the collateral source rule. View "Velez v. Tuma" on Justia Law

This case involved a medical malpractice lawsuit brought by the Wilsons on behalf of their son, Jared. The Wilsons alleged that employees of IHC Hospitals breached their duty of care during Ms. Wilson's labor and delivery of Jared. The Wilsons further claimed that IHC's negligence caused Jared to suffer severe brain damage. The jury found that IHC did not act negligently. The Supreme Court vacated the jury's verdict, holding (1) IHC's trial tactics violated the court's in limine order excluding collateral source evidence at trial, misled the trial court, and substantially prejudiced the jury; (2) the collateral source rule precludes both explicit reference and methodical allusion to collateral source benefits; and (3) because IHC repeatedly disregarded the in limine order and violated the collateral source rule, the case must be remanded. View "Wilson v. IHC Hosps., Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to review a summary judgment ruling dismissing a wrongful death action because it was commenced later than is allowed under Iowa Code 614.1(9), a statute of repose limiting the time allowed for commencing medical negligence cases. Plaintiffs contended their case should not have been dismissed because Defendants fraudulently concealed the fact that a tissue specimen harvested from Plaintiffs' decedent more than six years before the filing of this action was not evaluated by a board-certified pathologist. In the alternative, Plaintiff contended the continuum-of-negligent-treatment doctrine precluded the summary dismissal of this case notwithstanding the statute of repose. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 614.1(9) in this case operated to extinguish the decedent's cause of action even before she and her husband knew it had accrued; and (2) under the the circumstances, the fraudulent-concealment doctrine and the continuum-of-negligent-treatment doctrine did not preserve Plaintiffs' causes of action, and section 614.1(9) denied Plaintiffs a remedy for negligent acts or omissions occurring more than six years prior to the commencement of this action. View "Estate of Anderson v. Iowa Dermatology Clinic, PLC" on Justia Law

This appeal involved the interpretation of a claims-made professional liability insurance policy that Appellant Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., d.b.a. PIC Wisconsin (PIC), issued to nonparty dentist Hamid Ahmadi, D.D.S. The policy covered dental malpractice claims made against Dr. Ahmadi and reported to PIC during the policy period. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that PIC received constructive notice of Respondent Glenn Williams’s malpractice claim against Dr. Ahmadi while the policy was in force and held that this was enough to trigger coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that a "report" of a potential demand for damages to qualify as a "claim" required sufficient specificity to alert the insurer’s claim department to the existence of a potential demand for damages arising out of an identifiable incident, involving an identified or identifiable claimant or claimants, with actual or anticipated injuries. The Court did not find an ambiguity that would permit the PIC policy to have been triggered by the report of a default judgment against the doctor filed in public records. As such, the Court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of PIC. View "Physicians Insurance Co. v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the trial court's dismissal of his medical malpractice action for failing to satisfy the applicable statute of limitations. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Allan Eisemann, M.D., practicing through a medical practice which bore his name, negligently failed to advise Plaintiff or his dentist of the known risks associated with a tooth extraction while Plaintiff was taking intervenous doses of a medication called "Zometa," prescribed for multiple myleoma. Defendant allegedly approved the procedure; Plaintiff's dentist pulled the tooth. Following the procedure, Plaintiff developed osteonecrosis of the jaw. All parties agreed that the statute of limitations period for Plaintiff's malpractice claims would expire October 9, 2009. By a letter dated in September, Plaintiff's counsel proposed to Dr. Eisemann's counsel and other potential defendants a "time out" agreement to toll the statute of limitations for ninety days so that the parties could pursue settlement. Although Dr. Eisemann signed off on the agreement, not all defendants did. As a result of Plaintiff's failure to reach an agreement with all defendants, Plaintiff filed suit on October 7, 2009. Counsel for Dr. Eisemann returned the acceptance of service to Plaintiff's counsel in January, 2010. Plaintiff did not filed the acceptance with the court at that time. The trial court dismissed the case on its own motion on April 15, 2011 based on Plaintiff's failure to prosecute his claim. Three days later, Plaintiff filed the signed acceptances of service. Dr. Eisemann moved to dismiss. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Eisemann defendants are equitably estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Plaintiff could not rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel because his own "omissions or inadvertences" contributed to the problem. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal of his case. View "Beebe v. Eisemann" on Justia Law