Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a trial court's order striking the testimony of plaintiff's rebuttal expert witness, and portions of two of plaintiff's previously disclosed expert witnesses. The underlying case centered on a medical malpractice claim brought by the parents of a minor child against a hospital, its management and the doctor that delivered the child. The minor was allegedly injured at birth after his umbilical cord wrapped around his neck, depriving his brain of oxygen. The parties disputed the cause of the child's injuries: Plaintiffs argued the child was injured by preventable intrapartum events (namely Defendants' alleged negligence); defendants argued the injuries occurred days, or possibly weeks prior to birth. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded plaintiff's expert's rebuttal testimony because her testimony properly refuted a central theory of the defendants' case. The trial court also abused its discretion when it excluded the disclosed experts' testimony because the late disclosure of their testimony did not harm the defendants, as required for sanctions under Rule 37. Accordingly, the Court made the rule absolute and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re Warden v. Exempla" on Justia Law

Welch called 911. A Wishard ambulance arrived. Welch was 34 weeks pregnant. Paramedics ascertained that her water broke and she had a prolapsed umbilical cord. After consulting with her obstetrician’s office, paramedics contacted the Beech Grove emergency room and transported her there. Beech Grove did not have an obstetrics facility. Rather than delivering the baby, the physician sent Welch in the Wishard ambulance to another hospital, where the baby was delivered by Caesarean section. He had suffered hypoxia resulting in severe brain damage. Plaintiffs alleged that Wishard violated the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd. The district court granted defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the situation did not fit the definition of “come to the emergency room:” that an individual in an ambulance owned and operated by the hospital is deemed to have come to the emergency room unless the ambulance is operated under communitywide emergency medical service protocols that direct it to transport the individual to a hospital other than the owner. The Wishard ambulance was operating under EMS protocols when it transported the plaintiffs. Although the definition was adopted after the incident, it was merely a clarification. View "Beller v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty. IN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, individually and as executor of the estate of her husband, appealed the district court's dismissal of her action for wrongful death and loss of consortium under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346. The court concluded that, because adjudication of plaintiff's FTCA claim would not affect the validity of her VA benefits award, the district court did not err in holding that 38 U.S.C. 511 did not preclude the court from making independent findings of fact and conclusions of law in plaintiff's FTCA proceeding. Nor did the district court err in holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact since plaintiff conceded that she would not call any expert witnesses to prove her medical malpractice case, as required by North Carolina law. Accordingly, the court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the Government. View "Butler v. United States" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a pathologist was competent to testify as an expert witness regarding the standard of care in a medical malpractice action asserted against a board-certified general surgeon. Decedent Mildred Anderson sought treatment from surgeon Gary McAfoos, M.D. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Anderson took a turn for the worse and died from sepsis in response to surgery ultimately conducted by Dr. McAfoos and his practice partners. Mrs. Anderson's estate sued, and at trial proferred the testimony of a pathologist, who asserted that Dr. McAfoos and his agents' acts fell below ordinary standards of care by allowing Mrs. Anderson's discharge from the hospital despite certain indicators that she was suffering from a serious infection (that ultimately lead to her death). The doctor objected to Mrs. Anderson's use of the pathologist as an expert, arguing he was incompetent to assess the standard of care on a doctor who sees patients, "[h]e can't possibly second guess care and treatment on a patient when he doesn't see patients." The trial court sustained the objection to the expert's testimony; subsequently the doctor moved for nonsuit which was granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Mrs. Anderson did not properly preserve her claim that the expert's credentials satisfied the requirements of the state competency statute, and accordingly, could not advance her contention that he should have been allowed to render standard-of-care testimony against a board-certified surgeon. View "Anderson v. McAfoos, et al" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a medical malpractice action brought by Appellant Thomas Bruckshaw as Administrator of the Estate of Patricia Bruckshaw (Decedent) and in his own right, against Appellees Frankford Hospital of Philadelphia (Frankford Hospital), Jefferson Health System, Inc., Brian P. Priest, M.D., and Randy Metcalf, M.D. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a court was empowered to remove a principal juror without any reason and without any notice to the parties, and replace her with the last possible alternate, without notice, after all evidence was submitted and the jury had already retired to deliberate. Upon review, the Court concluded that the removal of a juror can only be done by a trial court, on the record, with notice to the parties, for cause. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the trial court committed reversible error for which the aggrieved party was not required to demonstrate prejudice. View "Bruckshaw v. Frankford Hospital" on Justia Law

When Cody Metheny underwent brain surgery, the physician (Doctor) mistakenly operated on the wrong side of his brain. Fifteen months later, Cody's parents (the Methenys) learned tissue had been removed from the wrong side of Cody's brain. The Methenys filed a direct-action suit, alleging medical negligence on the part of Hospital where Doctor practiced and against Hospital's liability-insurance carrier (Insurer). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Methenys. Insurer appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in (1) failing to instruct the jury in a manner that would allow it to apportion liability among it and certain physicians who were sued in a prior case but ultimately settled; (2) refusing to allow Insurer to present evidence of fault attributable to the settling physicians; and (3) denying Insurer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the evidence supporting Cody's future damages was based on improperly bundled calculations. The Methenys cross-appealed the circuit court's order reducing the jury's verdict from $20 million to $11 million. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal and cross-appeal, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "ProAssurance Indem. Co. v. Metheny" on Justia Law

Plaintiff gave birth to Child at Hospital. Complications arose prior to and after Child's delivery, leading to problems with Child's brain development. Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of Child, later sued the doctor who delivered Child and Hospital. Plaintiff subsequently settled her claims with the doctor. The district court granted summary judgment to Hospital on all of Plaintiff's claims. This appeal arose out of pre-trial rulings made by the district court in Plaintiff's litigation with Hospital. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) extending discovery deadlines; (2) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's agency claims; (3) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's Consumer Protection Act Claim; (4) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's joint venture claim; and (5) granting summary judgment to Hospital on Plaintiff's negligent credentialing claim. View "Brookins v. Mote" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants, a hospital and doctors, alleging negligence. The hospital was owned by the County. The County filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Government Claims Act (Act) because her claim was never presented to or received by a statutorily designated recipient. Plaintiff responded by arguing that she had substantially complied with the Act by delivering a letter of intent to the risk management department of the hospital and that the letter was received by the County risk management department. The trial court granted the County's summary judgment motion, holding that the County made a sufficient showing of noncompliance. The court of appeal reversed, holding (1) a claim may substantially comply with the Act, notwithstanding failure to deliver it to one of the statutorily specified recipients, if it is given to a department whose functions include the management or defense of claims against the defendant entity, and (2) Plaintiff had "substantially complied" with the presentation requirements of the Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of appeals erred by judicially expanding the statutory requirements; and (2) a claim must satisfy the express delivery provisions language of the statute. View "DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

This writ application involved the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A)(2)(c), and whether the running of the statutory ninety (90) day grace period in which prescription is suspended in a medical malpractice case begins when a plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint is dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman, or when plaintiff is notified that his complaint has been dismissed for failure to appoint an attorney chairman. After reviewing the record and the applicable law, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's ruling, finding that the 90 day grace period begins to run from the date of dismissal. Because plaintiff failed to file her petition for damages within this 90 day period, her claim was dismissed. View "Turner v. Willis Knighton Medical Center" on Justia Law

These petitions for certiorari pertained to contribution among joint tort-feasors and arose from a medical malpractice action in which Petitioners, the Spences, alleged wrongful death and survival claims against Petitioner Mercy Medical Center and Respondents, a medical doctor and his practices. The issue of contribution arose because the Spences and Mercy entered into a pre-trial settlement by which the Spences agreed to dismiss their claims against Mercy without exacting an admission of liability. After Mercy was dismissed as a party, the case proceeded to trial against Respondents, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the Spences. Respondents subsequently initiated a separate action against Mercy seeking contribution. The Spences contemporaneously brought suit against Respondents seeking a declaration that Respondents were not entitled to contribution. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the Spences' release extinguished any right Respondents had to seek contribution against Mercy because Respondents did not join Mercy as a third party defendant in the original action after it was dismissed as a party. The Court of Appeals held that Respondents were not prohibited from pursuing contribution from Mercy in a separate action because the release's conditional language did not fully relieve Mercy's contribution liability. View "Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Julian" on Justia Law