Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

After plaintiff's daughter was born with permanent nerve damage in her right shoulder and arm, plaintiff filed suit against the physician who performed the delivery of plaintiff's daughter. The court concluded that the proper standard for review of the district court's order granting the motion in limine is abuse of discretion, not plain error; the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the testimony of plaintiff's experts because the experts' opinions did not fit the specific facts of this case; the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of informed consent where the record did not support the contention that the physician's expert testified the risk factors present in this case required a physician to warn a patient about the possibility of a permanent injury; and the court rejected plaintiff's contention that the district court should have granted her a new trial based on allegedly prejudicial and inflammatory comments made by defense counsel during closing arguments. View "Lawrey v. Kearney Clinic, P.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Thomas Baird appealed on a number of grounds after a jury found in favor of defendants-appellees, Frank R. Owczarek, M.D., Eye Care of Delaware, LLC, and Cataract and Laser Center, LLC. The litigation stemmed from a LASIK procedure plaintiff received, in which he alleged that as a result of the surgery, he developed ectasia, a vision-threatening corneal disease through the medical negligence of the doctor and centers. Upon review of the issues plaintiff raised on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court’s failure to conduct any investigation into alleged egregious juror misconduct (internet research), which violated the Superior Court’s direct instruction to refrain from consulting outside sources of information, constituted reversible error. In addition, the Superior Court’s failure to exclude evidence of informed consent in this medical negligence action also constituted reversible error. Accordingly, the judgments of the Superior Court were reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Baird v. Owczarek, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed wrongful death and lost chance of recovery claims against Defendants-health care providers. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their first case but refiled the same claims in a second case. The trial court dismissed the second case for failure to file health care affidavits as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. 538.225. In their third case, Plaintiffs refiled their petition, along with the required affidavits. The trial court dismissed the third case as barred by the statute of limitations. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment dismissing the second and third cases, holding (1) Plaintiffs failed to preserve their constitutional challenges to section 538.225 and failed to show they had substantially complied with the statute; and (2) the trial court correctly applied the statute of limitations in finding that the claims in the third case were time barred. View "Mayes v. Saint Luke’s Hosp. of Kansas City" on Justia Law

A family-care physician prescribed a powerful medication to treat a patient who suffered from chronic back pain. The patient was known to abuse alcohol and drugs. The complaint alleged that the physician breached the governing duty of care by failing to protect the patient from self-injury. The issue this appeal presented to the Supreme Court centered on the jury’s no-cause verdict and various portions of the trial court's charge on causation. The trial court charged the jury on "preexisting disease or condition" (a "Scafidi" charge). The trial court, however, never identified in its jury charge the preexisting condition or related the facts to the law as required by the Model Jury Charge. Furthermore, this case did not involve the ineluctable progression of a disease on its own. "The ultimate harm caused to the patient was from her own conduct - whether volitional or not - after the physician prescribed the [patch]." For that reason, the court also charged the jury on superseding/intervening causation and avoidable consequences. In a split decision, the Appellate Division overturned the verdict and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in giving the Scafidi charge and failed to articulate for the jury the nature of the preexisting condition or explain the proofs and parties' arguments in relation to the law. The panel majority also determined that the court should not have given a superseding/intervening cause charge because the general charge on foreseeability was sufficient. Additionally, it pointed out that the court had mistakenly included the concept of "but for" causation in a case involving concurrent causes. The Supreme Court agreed with the panel majority that the trial court misapplied the Scafidi charge and that the trial court failed to explain the complex concepts of causation in relation to the proofs and legal theories advanced by the parties. The Court disagreed with the panel majority that the charge on superseding/intervening causation was unnecessary in light of the general charge on foreseeability, and concluded the "but for" causation reference apparently was mistake to which no objection was made by either party. The Court therefore affirmed and modified the Appellate Division's and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Komlodi v. Picciano" on Justia Law

Plaintiff's newborn son died shortly after Plaintiff gave birth. Plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of her son, later brought a medical malpractice action against her obstetrician and nurse midwife and their employer ("Hospital"). Because Hospital was sold to Defendants nine months after the events leading to the present action, Plaintiff also sued Defendants under a theory of successor liability. After reaching a settlement and executing two covenants not to sue, Plaintiff withdrew her claims against Hospital and its employees. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the covenant not to sue Hospital prevented Plaintiff from seeking to recover from Defendants. The Appellate Court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court, holding that Plaintiff’s execution of the covenant not to sue Hospital in perpetuity foreclosed, as a matter of law, her right of action against Hospital and against any subsequent purchaser of Hospital’s assets under the mere continuation theory of successor liability. View "Robbins v. Physicians for Women's Health, LLC" on Justia Law

Barbara Mammarella sued her radiologist, Alan Evantash, M.D., her OB/GYN, Christine Maynard, M.D., and All About Women of Christiana Care, Inc. for medical malpractice. To establish her claim, Mammarella needed to present expert testimony that could support a jury verdict that the alleged negligence, which was a six-month delay in her breast cancer diagnosis, was the proximate cause of her injury, which was an alleged change in treatment that required Mammarella to undergo chemotherapy. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the testimony of Mammarella's sole medical expert on causation could not support a jury verdict because the expert did not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Mammarella's treatment options had changed as a result of the alleged negligence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's grant of judgment as a matter of law in favor of the health care providers. View "Mammarella v. Evantash, M.D., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit, individually and per proxima amici, against numerous defendants, alleging, inter alia, negligence, lack of informed consent, and vicarious liability for injuries sustained by their minor daughter, Yendee, who was born with a genetic blood disorder. Four groups of defendants filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that R.I. Gen. Laws 9-1-14.1(1), an act that tolls the three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice claims when the person claiming injury is a minor, barred Plaintiffs’ claims. The trial justice entered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that all of Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred but that Yendee retained the right to bring suit on her own behalf when she reached the age of majority, and up to three years thereafter. After issuing an order to show cause, the Supreme Court (1) vacated the judgments entered in favor of defendants Corning Incorporated and Quest Diagnostics, LLC because Plaintiffs’ allegations against these defendants were not medical malpractice claims; and (2) directed that Plaintiffs’ appeal, as well as the appeals and cross-appeals of Rhode Island Hospital, Miriam Hospital, Women & Infants Hospital and each hospital’s associated medical professionals, be assigned to the Court’s regular calendar for further briefing and argument. View "Ho-Rath v. R.I. Hosp." on Justia Law

In the late 1990s, people who had taken the prescription diet-drug combination Fen-Phen began suing Wyeth, claiming that the drugs caused valvular heart disease. A 2000 settlement included creation of the Fen-Phen Settlement Trust to compensate class members who had sustained heart damage. Claims required medical evidence. Attorneys who represented certain claimants retained Tai, a board-certified Level 2-qualified cardiologist, to read tests and prepare reports. Tai read 12,000 tests and asserted that he was owed $2 million dollars for his services. Tai later acknowledged that in about 10% of the cases, he dictated reports consistent with the technicians’ reports despite knowing that the measurements were wrong, and that he had his technician and office manager review about 1,000 of the tests because he did not have enough time to do the work. A review of the forms Tai submitted found that, in a substantial number of cases, the measurements were clearly incorrect and were actually inconsistent with a human adult heart. Tai was convicted of mail and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343, was sentenced to 72 months’ imprisonment, and was ordered to pay restitution of $4,579,663 and a fine of $15,000. The Third Circuit rejected arguments that the court erred by implicitly shifting the burden of proof in its “willful blindness” jury instruction and applying upward adjustments under the advisory Sentencing Guidelines for abuse of a position of trust and use of a special skill, but remanded for factual findings concerning whether Tai supervised a criminally culpable subordinate, as required for an aggravated role enhancement. View "United States v. Tai" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Defendant, which provided laser hair removal services, for negligence after she allegedly suffered burns and scarring on her face and neck while receiving laser hair removal treatments. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss because Plaintiff had not served an expert report as required by the Medical Liability Act for health care liability claims. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Plaintiff did not rebut the presumption that her claim for improper laser hair removal was a health care liability claim, and therefore, Plaintiff’s failure to serve an expert report precluded her suit. View "Rio Grande Valley Vein Clinic, P.A. v. Guerrero" on Justia Law

The issue in this mandamus proceeding was whether the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion to change venue. Plaintiffs, a husband and wife, initiated a medical malpractice action against defendants in Multnomah County. Defendants argued that venue was in Clackamas County, because that was where the clinic was located, where the doctor who provided the husband's medical services resided, and where the husband received treatment. Plaintiffs argued that venue is proper in Multnomah County, because defendants solicited patients who lived in that county, referred patients to imaging facilities in that county, used medical education programs in that county, and "identified" the clinic's location in its website as the "Portland area." The trial court denied defendants' motion, explaining that defendants, by soliciting patients in Multnomah County, "purposely availed themselves of the court's jurisdiction" in that county. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court mistakenly conflated personal jurisdiction considerations with the statutory requirements for venue and erred in denying defendants' motion. The Court therefore granted defendants relief and granted the writ. View "Kohring v. Ballard" on Justia Law